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Perils of the Rulemaking Process:
The Development, Application, and
Unconstitutionality
of Rule 804(b)(3)'s Penal Interest Exception
PETER W. TAGUE*.
As the culmination of a decade of rulemaking, in 1975 Congress
enacted the Federal Rules of Evidence, which include in rule
804(b)(3) an exception to the hearsay rule that allows federal courts
to admit statements against penal interest. Having reviewed previ-
ously unpublished memoranda and nonpublic tape recordings of the
deliberations of the Advisory and Standing Committees to the
Judicial Conference and the Special Subcommittee on Reform of
Federal Criminal Laws of the House Judiciary Committee, Professor
Tague explores the development of rule 804(b)(3), one of the more
controversial rules that emerged from that rulemaking process. After
analyzing rule 804(b)(3) and describing under what circumstances a
penal interest statement is admissible, Professor Tague discusses why
the penal interest exception of rule 804(b)(3) is unconstitutional As
a result of his study, Professor Tague concludes that the Supreme
Court should revise the present rulemaking process to ensure that the
process evolves as a professional, dispassionate, and unpoliticized
approach to effectuating needed changes in the law.
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RULE 804(b)(3)
I. INTRODUCTION1
"You must not tell us what the soldier or any other man said, sir," interposed
the judge; "it's not evidence. "2
Charged with murder, a defendant learns that another person, the declar-
ant, confessed to the crime. In this example, 3 one might expect the defendant
to encounter no difficulty in introducing that statement during his trial to
prove his innocence or to rebut the Government's evidence. Various impedi-
ments, however, may prevent the defendant from using the confession.
First, the evidentiary bar to the introduction of hearsay presents an
obstacle.4 If the defendant subpoenas the declarant to testify and the declarant
invokes the privilege against self-incrimination, thereby refusing to admit
either that he committed the crime or that he confessed, the defendant cannot
introduce the declarant's out-of-court statement because he offers it for its
1. The following abbreviated citations have been adopted for use throughout this article:
Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure of the Judicial Conference of the United
States, Preliminary Draft of Proposed Rules of Evidence for the United States District Courts
and Magistrates, 46 F.R.D. 161 (1969) [hereinafter Preliminary Draft].
Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure of the Judicial Conference of the United
States, Revised Draft of Proposed Rules of Evidence for the United States Courts and
Magistrates, 51 F.R.D. 315 (1971) [hereinafter Revised Draft].
Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure of the Judicial Conference of the United
States, Revised Definitive Draft of Proposed Rules of Evidence for the United States Courts and
Magistrates (1971) (unpublished; on file with Judicial Conference of United States) [hereinaf-
ter Revised Definitive Draft].
Supreme Court of the United States, Rules of Evidence for United States Courts and
Magistrates, 56 F.R.D. 183 (1973) [hereinafter Supreme Court Draft].
Two Committees, an Advisory Committee to the Judicial Conference of the United States (the Advisory
Committee) and the Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure of the Judicial Conference of the
United States (the Standing Committee), tape-recorded several of the meetings each held to consider the
various drafts of the Federal Rules of Evidence. The tapes of these meetings, which are presently stored at
the Judicial Conference, have not been catalogued or identified other than by date. Thus, the tape
recordings are identified in this article only by committee and by date. E.g., Advisory Committee Meeting,
Sept. 5, 1971. To preserve the confidentiality of the committee members, only Professor Edward W.
Cleary, the Reporter to the Advisory and Standing Committees, is identified by name in this article. The
editors of the Georgetown Law Journal have relied upon the author for verifying the accuracy of statements
in these tape recordings.
The Subcommittee on the Reform of Criminal Justice of the House Committee on the Judiciary also
tape-recorded the markup sessions in which it reviewed the Supreme Court Draft of the Federal Rules of
Evidence. The author and an editor of the Georgetown Law Journal have listened to a copy of the tape
recordings of these sessions provided by Herbert E. Hoffman, then staff counsel to the Subcommittee.
Throughout this article, the tape recordings are cited by date only. E.g., Markup Session, June 5, 1973.
2. C. DICKENS, PICKWICK PAPERS 530 (Signet ed. 1964).
3. For a discussion of nine more complicated examples, see notes 43-50 infra and accompanying text.
4. For various definitions of hearsay, see MCCORMICK, EVIDENCE § 246, at 584 (2d ed. 1972)
("Hearsay evidence is testimony in court, or written evidence, of a statement made out of court, the
statement being offered as an assertion to show the truth of matters asserted therein, and thus resting for its
value upon the credibility of the out-of-court assertion.") [hereinafter, MCCoRMICK]; 5 WIGMORE,
EVIDENCE § 1362, at 3 (Chadbourn rev. ed. 1974) (hearsay rule rejects "assertions offered testimonially,
which have not been in some way subjected to the test of cross-examination") [hereinafter WIGMORE];
FED. R. EVID. 801(c) (.'Hearsay' is a statement, other than one made by the declarant while testifying at
the trial or hearing, offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted").
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truth. Second, the defendant may not comment to the jury about the
declarant's assertion of the privilege against self-incrimination. 5 As a result,
the defendant probably cannot force the declarant to assert the privilege
before the jury because the jury might draw the forbidden inference of guilt
from the defendant's pregnant questions. 6 Finally, the defendant cannot
require the Government to immunize the declarant.7 Such immunization
would force the declarant to testify about his complicity in the crime, and his
confession.8
Of these three impediments, the most important and most commonly
encountered is the hearsay rule. Before Congress enacted the Federal Rules of
Evidence in 1975 federal courts refused to recognize a hearsay exception for
statements, known as statements against penal interest, that expose the
declarant to prosecution, conviction, or punishment. 9 Rule 804(b)(3), in
which Congress recognized this exception to the hearsay rule, 10 provides:
5. See PROP. FED. R. EVID. 513(a), 56 F.R.D. 260 (1973) (no inference may be drawn from assertion of
privilege).
6. In fact, counsel may not ethically "call a witness who[m] [he] knows will claim a valid privilege not
to testify for the purpose of impressing upon the jury the fact of the claim of privilege." ABA, STANDARDS
FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE Standard 5.7(c), at 3.84 (2d ed. 1980) (prosecutor); id. Standard 7.6(c), at 4.90
(defense counsel).
7. United States v. Trejo-Zambrano, 582 F.2d 460, 464 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1005 (1978).
But see Virgin Islands v. Smith, 615 F.2d 964, 966-68 (3d Cir. 1980) (court should grant use immunity if
Government's refusal to confer immunity intended to distort investigatory process); State v. Broady, 41
Ohio App. 2d 17, 22-23, 321 N.E.2d 890, 895-96 (1974) (under state law, prosecutor's duty to seek justice
requires Government to grant use immunity).
8. See 18 U.S.C. § 6002 (1976) (authorizing federal courts, agencies of United States, or Congress to
compel testimony pursuant to grant of use immunity).
9. See note 26 infra (citing examples of federal and state cases rejecting hearsay); 11 MOORE'S
FEDERAL PRACTICE 804.06(3)[2], at VIII-280 & n.9 (2d ed. 1976) (same) [hereinafter MooRE].
10. To follow the various changes made in rule 804(b)(3), an outline of the steps in passage of the
Federal Rules of Evidence may prove helpful. The Advisory Committee submitted the Preliminary Draft to
the Standing Committee on March 31, 1969. Preliminary Draft, supra note 1, at 161. Following a period for
comment by the bench and the bar, the Advisory Committee submitted the Revised Draft to the Standing
Committee, which made it public on March 15, 1971. Revised Draft, supra note 1, at 315. The Standing
Committee submitted the Revised Definitive Draft to the Supreme Court on October 29, 1971 but did not
publish it in a reporter system. Revised Definitive Draft, supra note 1. The Court returned the Revised
Definitive Draft on or about January 6, 1972. After further review, the Standing Committee resubmitted
that draft on March 22, 1972. Although the Supreme Court promulgated the Supreme Court Draft on
November 20, 1972, Supreme Court Draft, supra note 1, at 183, it did not transmit that draft to Congress
until February 5, 1973. 409 U.S. 1132 (1973). The rules were to take effect on July 1, 1973. Id. The Special
Subcommittee on Reform of Federal Criminal Laws of the House Committee on the Judiciary (the House
Subcommittee) conducted hearings on the Supreme Court Draft between February 7 and March 15, 1973.
The House Subcommittee announced initial changes to the Supreme Court Draft on June 28, 1973.
SUBCOMM. ON CRIMINAL JUSTICE OF THE HOUSE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 93D CONG., 1ST SESS.,
REPORT ON H.R. 5463 (Comm. Print 1973) [hereinafter JUNE 28, 1973 PRINT], reprinted in HOUSE
COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, RULES OF EVIDENCE: SUPPLEMENT TO HEARINGS BEFORE THE SUBCOMM.
ON CRIMINAL JUSTICE OF THE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, 93D CONG.,
1ST SES. 145 (Comm. Print 1973) [hereinafter SUPPLEMENT TO SUBCOMMITTEE HEARINGS]. Following a
public comment period, the House Subcommittee reworked its June 28, 1973 print and published a second
print on October 10, 1973. SUPPLEMENT TO SUBCOMMITTEE HEARINGS supra, at 357 [hereinafter
OCTOBER 10, 1973 PRINT]. The House Committee on the Judiciary approved the Subcommittee's work,
with minor changes not relevant for our purposes, on November 15, 1973. HOUSE COMM. ON THE
JUDICIARY, REPORT ON THE FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE, H.R. REP. No. 650, 93d Cong., Ist Sess.
(1973), reprinted in [1974] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 7075 [hereinafter HOUSE JUDICIARY REPORT],
RULE 804(b)(3)
A statement which was at the time of its making so far contrary to
the declarant's pecuniary or proprietary interest, or so far tended to
subject him to civil or criminal liability, or to render invalid a claim
by him against another, that a reasonable man in his position
would not have made the statement unless he believed it to be true.
A statement tending to expose the declarant to criminal liability
and offered to exculpate the accused is not admissible unless
corroborating circumstances clearly indicate the trustworthiness of
the statement.'1
Rule 804(b)(3), however, does not solve the defendant's admissibility
problem. The rule bristles with interpretative questions. For example, the
tests of "so far tended" in the first sentence and of "exculpate" and "clearly
indicate" in the second sentence are terms of art not used elsewhere in the
Federal Rules of Evidence. Unfortunately, not much published legislative
history explains what the rule means.12 Furthermore, the published material
is both inconclusive and inconsistent.1 3 As a result, one federal court has
complained about the dearth of "clues" about the rule's meaning.' 4 Because,
in the absence of a clear legislative directive, no federal common law provides
interpretative guidelines, federal decisions are both tentative and conflicting.
As a primary goal, this article will explain under what circumstances a
penal interest statement is admissible under rule 804(b)(3) and then will
evaluate the constitutionality of the rule. As an ancillary goal, the article will
illustrate one problem With the Supreme Court's rulemaking process: Al-
though the Judicial Conference, through its Advisory and Standing Commit-
tees, drafted the Federal Rules of Evidence that the Supreme Court promul-
gated, it published only the version of the rule and its accompanying
The House adopted the Rules on February 6, 1974. 120 CONG. REc. 570 (1974). The Senate Committee on
the Judiciary conducted hearings on June 4 and 5, 1974, and approved its version on October 11, 1974.
SENATE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY REPORT ON THE FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE, S. REP. No. 1277,
93d Cong., 2d Sess. (1974), reprinted in [1974] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NENi's 7051 [hereinafter SENATE
JUDICIARY REPORT]. The Senate adopted the Senate Committee's- draft on November 22, 1974. 120 CONG.
REc. 1917 (1974). The conference committee considered both versions of the rules. CONFERENCE REPORT
No. 1597, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. (1974), reprinted in [1974] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 7098 [hereinafter
SENATE JUDICIARY REPORT]. The House adopted the conference version on December 18, 1974, 120
CONG. REC. 12,260 (1974), as did the Senate on December 16, 1974. 120 CONG. REC. 21,645 (1974). The
Federal Rules of Evidence became effective on July 1, 1975. Federal Rules of Evidence, 28 U.S.C. rules
101-1103 (1976).
11. FED. R. EVID. 804(b)(3).
12. In this article, the term "legislative history" refers to the prelegislative work of the Advisory and
Standing Committees as well as to the legislative work of the House of Representatives and the Senate.
13. Lowery v. Maryland, 401 F. Supp. 604, 607 (D. Md. 1975), affd without opinion, 532 F.2d 750 (4th
Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 919 (1977). The district court lamented the absence of explanation of
what constitutes corroborating circumstances. Id.
14. Id. Federal courts have compounded this problem by failing to consider state court decisions
interpreting the penal interest exception. Moreover, courts of appeals may use the "clearly erroneous"
standard in judging the correctness of a trial court's decision to exclude a defense-offered third party
statement under rule 804(b)(3). See United States v. Metz, 608 F.2d 147, 157 (5th Cir. 1979) (clearly
erroneous standard), cert. denied, 101 S. Ct. 80 (1980); cf. United States v. Alvarez, 584 F.2d 694, 701 (5th
Cir. 1978) (absent trial court's findings of corroboration, appellate court not bound by clearly erroneous
standard and may examine record for corroboration). The judicial imagination is then freed to find some
justification for the exclusion. See United States v. Bagley, 537 F.2d 162, 166-67 (5th Cir. 1976) (under
clearly erroneous standard, if trial court fails to make express findings, appellate court must determine
whether any reasonable view of evidence supports ruling), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1075 (1977).
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explanatory Note in the Preliminary, Revised, and Supreme Court Drafts.15
These goals require a lengthy discussion of the legislative history of the rule.
Access to a trove of previously unpublished memoranda and nonpublic tape
recordings of the work of the Judicial Conference and the House Subcommit-
tee on Criminal Justice makes this discussion possible. 16 Based on these
materials, this article will examine the development and the application of
rule 804(b)(3).
15. As is true with all of the rules of evidence, the Judicial Conference did not publish the alternatives
that it considered, the reasons why it rejected those alternatives, the unresolved questions about the
adopted version, or any comments by the public about the several versions of the penal interest exception.
No witness who testified during the congressional hearings regarding the work of the Advisory and
Standing Committees had access to the Advisory Committee's internal papers. See Hearings before the
Special Subcomm. on Reform of Federal Criminal Laws of the House Comm. on the Judiciary on Proposed
Rules of Evidence, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 181 (1973) (statement of Charles R. Halpern & George T.
Frampton) ("The Advisory Committee kept no notes or minutes or even a summary of its deliberations,
that are open to the public") [hereinafter House Subcommittee Hearings]. In preparing their presentation to
the House Subcommittee, Halpern and Frampton enjoyed the "unique opportunity" to review the public's
comments about the work of the Advisory and Standing Committees. Id. at 159. Although Halpern and
Frampton suggested that Congress investigate the role played by the Department of Justice and Senator
McClellan in influencing the Advisory and Standing Committees, id. at 181, Congress apparently never
made such an investigation.
16. Arguably, because the Federal Rules of Evidence were legislatively enacted, the work of Congress
alone is relevant. Four reasons, however, justify considering the previously unpublished material. First,
only the Standing and Advisory Committees considered certain interpretive questions pertaining to rule
804(b)(3). Because the House Subcommittee, for example, erroneously assumed that the Supreme Court
Draft of the rule restated the common law approach except for that draft's treatment of the corroboration
requirement in the second sentence, it only discussed this alteration. Markup Session, June 5, 1973. Thus,
we must review the Advisory and Standing Committees' interpretation of the penal interest test of the
rule's first sentence. Second, although Congress changed the corroboration requirement as proposed, a
review of the purpose of the proposal will help in assessing the constitutionality of the rule as enacted. Cf.
Frankfurter, Some Reflections on the Reading of Statutes, 47 COLUM. L. REV. 526, 544 (1947) (courts may
use external aids to interpret statutes). Third, the unpublished material may help to resolve the differences
between the principal commentators' interpretations of rule 804(b)(3). Compare 11 MOORE, supra note 9, 1
804.06(3)[2], at VIII-282-83 (suggesting corroboration requirement may not be so high as to violate due
process) with J. WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER, 4 WEINSTEIN'S EVIDENCE: COMMENTARY ON RULES OF
EVIDENCE FOR THE UNITED STATES COURTS AND MAGISTRATES 804(b)(3)[03], at 804-103-09 (1979)
(corroborating evidence must allow reasonable person to conclude statement true) [hereinafter WEIN-
STEIN]. Finally, the unpublished material highlights the need for changing the current rulemaking process.
See notes 843-46 infra and accompanying text (discussing suggested revisions in the rulemaking process).
The material includes internal memoranda of the Advisory and Standing Committees, tape recordings
of the discussion by those Committees about rule 804(b)(3), and tape recordings of the markup sessions of
the Special Subcommittee on Reform of Federal Criminal Laws. Although the markup sessions were
public, apparently no commentator on rule 804(b)(3) has previously had access to the tape recordings of
those sessions. Unfortunately, certain legislative sources were unavailable. For example, the House
Subcommittee's October 2, 1973 review of the public's comments concerning the Subcommittee's June 28,
1973 version of the penal interest exception is not included in the tape recording of that session. Of the
members of the Subcommittee whom I contacted, none could recreate the missing discussion. Also, neither
the Senate Judiciary Committee nor the conference committee tape-recorded the discussions each held in
considering the rules.
Like other commentators, I share the concern about using unpublished papers and discussions.
Disclosure may impede candid discussion by a committee of the Judicial Conference in the future. On
balance, however, I think that discussing this unpublished information is justified because it will assist
courts in interpreting the penal interest exception and Congress in considering whether to alter the
Supreme Court's rulemaking procedures. Cf W. MURPHY, ELEMENTS OF JUDICIAL STRATEGY viii (1964)
(use of private papers of Supreme Court justices justified despite possibility of negative publicity and
impeding future discussion).
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First, the article discusses the common law treatment of defense-offered
penal interest statements. This section presents hypothetical situations in
which a declarant makes a statement that is arguably against his penal
interest, and then the section examines the questions raised by application of
the exception.
Second, the article reviews the legislative treatment of penal interest
statements offered by the defense and by the Government. The exception
underwent significant change during this process. At each step the drafters
ratcheted higher the burden that the defendant must meet to introduce a
statement against penal interest. This section suggests that the rule is the
product of unwise policy choices made through a questionable process. 17
Commentators criticized not only the development of the Supreme Court
Draft,18 but also the substance of many of the rules. That criticism in part
prompted Congress, for the first time in the history of the Rules Enabling
Act, 19 to conduct hearings on procedural rules promulgated by the Supreme
Court.20 Justifiably concerned about the way that the Supreme Court Draft
was developed, Congress enacted legislation stripping part of the Court's
autonomy in drafting the rules of evidence. 21
17. The process of enacting the penal interest exception suggests that any state legislature considering
whether to enact a code of evidence should not adopt rule 804(b)(3) without close inspection of that rule's
tests. A close inspection also is warranted because the Constitution may require some form of penal interest
hearsay exception. In two decisions, Green v. Georgia, 442 U.S. 95 (1979) (per curiam), and Chambers v.
Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284 (1973), in which neither state recognized the exception, 442 U.S. at 96 n.1; 410
U.S. at 299, the Supreme Court decided that the due process clause required admitting the declarant's
statement. 442 U.S. at 97; 410 U.S. at 302. Although Chambers did not hold that some form of exception is
constitutionally required, the Court suggested in dictum that it might so hold in the future. 410 U.S. at 300
("[W]e need not decide in this case whether, under other circumstances, [having no such exception] might
serve some valid state purpose by excluding untrustworthy testimony."). Nonetheless, Mississippi
continues to reject the exception. See Lee v. State, 338 So. 2d 399, 402 (Miss. 1976) ("Chambers does not
seek to impose a general rule on the States that all declarations against penal interest which tend to
exonerate a defendant must be admitted").
18. One group critical of the drafting process of the Federal Rules of Evidence noted that
significant changes were made in the proposed Federal Rules of Evidence from the time when
the last previously published draft appeared for comments by the Bench and Bar and the date
of the approval by the Supreme Court of a final and different draft of the proposed Rules. In
most instances, the Advisory Committee did not see fit to explain the rationale for these
changes, nor, indeed, did the Committee make even passing reference to the fact that the
changes had been made. Such a breakdown in communications between the Advisory
Committee which drafted the Rules on the one hand and the judges and lawyers who must
practice under the rules on the other hand is regrettable.
House Subcommittee Hearings, supra note 15, at 129 (statement of the Committee on Federal Courts of the
Association of the Bar of the City of New York). Although this comment applied to all of the rules, it
appropriately followed a discussion of rule 804(b)(3) because the struggle to enact that rule perhaps has
remained the most hidden from public view.
19. 28 U.S.C. §§ 2071-2076 (1976).
20. Friedenthal, The Rulemaking Power of the Supreme Court: A Contemporary Crisis, 27 STAN. L.
REV. 673, 675 n.18 (1975). The Advisory and Standing Committees' desire to avoid congressional review
of the rules of evidence and to preclude increased congressional oversight of the Supreme Court's
rulemaking authority significantly shaped the Committees' version of the penal interest exception. See
notes 85-102 infra and accompanying text (describing Committees' political decisions in responding to
Senator McClellan's challenge).
21. See 28 U.S.C. § 2076 (1976) (changing Rules Enabling Act so that Supreme Court rule effective,
absent congressional action by either branch, 180 days after Court's transmission of rule).
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Third, the article examines the various versions of rule 804(b)(3) in light of
the legislative history. During the development of the rule, the Advisory and
Standing Committees raised the defendant's burden in an attempt to placate
Senator McClellan, a critic the Committees accurately perceived as a
formidable opponent of their work in general and of their version of the penal
interest exception in particular. That appeasement, never publicly disclosed,22
led the House Subcommittee to misinterpret the Advisory and Standing
Committees' version of the penal interest exception and to increase the
defendant's admissibility burden further. In light of this process, the article
suggests how courts should interpret rule 804(b)(3).
Fourth, the article discusses the constitutionality of the enacted version of
the rule. The defendant bears a higher burden than the Government when
seeking to use the exception to introduce a declarant's statement simultane-
ously implicating himself and the defendant. This burden may infringe upon
the defendant's compulsory process right to introduce evidence under the
sixth amendment. Furthermore, when contrasted with the Government's
lower admissibility burden, the defendant's burden may be unconstitutional
under the equal protection clause.
Finally, the article comments on the rulemaking process and suggests
possible improvements. The Supreme Court, for example, should publish or
at least make available to the public the background memoranda prepared by
the reporter, the alternative proposals that the Advisory and Standing
Committees considered, the rationale for any proposals they rejected, and
whatever public comments that would assist courts and scholars in under-
standing how the Court intends that lower courts should interpret the
proposed rule.23 Through these steps, the Supreme Court could enhance the
credibility of the rulemaking process.24
II. THE COMMON LAW AND SELECTED EXAMPLES
Two introductory inquiries will assist in the analysis of the legislative
history of the rule 804(b)(3). The first inquiry, a brief review of the common
law courts' skeptical treatment of the penal interest exception, explains
congressional opposition to the changes proposed by the Advisory and
Standing committees. The second inquiry, a discussion of statements that
either the defendant or the Government may introduce under the penal
interest exception, highlights the issues courts must resolve in order to admit
statements under this exception.
22. Two insightful critics, however, suspected the influence of Senator McClellan's intervention on the
Advisory and Standing Committees. See House Subcommittee Hearings, supra note 15, at 180-81
(statement of Charles R. Halpern & George T. Frampton) (noting Senator McClellan's activities).
23. This proposal is not as multi-faceted as the criticism of one commentator who objected that the
Supreme Court's development of the Federal Rules of Evidence simultaneously involved inadequate
participation by many interested groups and too much participation by the Department of Justice. Letter
from Charles R. Halpern to William L. Hungate (July 31, 1973), reprinted in SUPPLEMENT TO
SUBCOMMrrrEE HEARINGS, supra note 10, at 281.
24. See generally Friedenthal, supra note 20, at 677 (noting "current distrust of the Supreme Court's
rulemaking authority" and encouraging Court to increase its supervision over work done by Judicial
Conference's committees).
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A. THE COMMON LAW APPROACH
The common law courts were skeptical of the penal interest exception,
using it to admit hearsay in only a few, dramatic instances. This skepticism
originated in the Sussex Peerage,25 an influential nineteenth-century English
case whose dictum has overshadowed its stated rationale for excluding the
particular penal interest statement offered. Without analyzing whether the
exception should be recognized generally or whether the statement should be
admitted in a particular case, American courts heedlessly have followed the
dictum in the Sussex Peerage.26
The case arose in 1843 following the death of the Duke of Sussex. Augustus
Frederick D'Este, the Duke's son, claimed his father's "honours, dignities,
and privileges." 27 D'Este asserted that Mr. Gunn, a minister of the Church of
England, married D'Este's father and mother in Rome, even though the Duke
had not received the King's permission as required by the Royal Marriage
Act.28 To prove that his father married in Rome, D'Este offered the undated
statement by Mr. Gunn to his son that he married the Duke and his wife in
Rome. 29 Because it was a crime to marry a person who had not complied with
the Royal Marriage Act, D'Este argued that Gunn's statement was against his
penal interest and thus was trustworthy. 30 Disagreeing with D'Este, the
Committee for Privileges of the House of Lords refused to consider Gunn's
statement for two reasons.
25. 8 Eng. Rep. 1034 (1844).
26. See Donnelly v. United States, 228 U.S. 243, 272-77 (1913) (since Sussex Peerage, near unanimity in
state courts against admitting evidence of confessions of third parties made out of court and tending to
exonerate accused). Although federal courts followed Donnelly, several questioned the decision, acknowl-
edging that trial courts should admit penal interest statements in certain circumstances. See, e.g., Scolari v.
United States, 406 F.2d 563, 563-64 (9th Cir.) (following Donnelly but questioning whether federal courts
bound by Supreme Court decision interpreting rule of evidence), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 981 (1969); Jones v.
United States, 400 F.2d 134, 136 (9th Cir. 1968) (following Donnelly but noting criticism of rule); United
States v. Dovico, 380 F.2d 325, 327 & n.2 (2d Cir.) (same), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 944 (1967). State courts
generally have followed the blanket exclusion of penal interest statements on the authority of the Sussex
Peerage and Donnelly. See State v. English, 201 N.C. 295, 300, 159 S.E. 318, 320 (1931) (noting injustice of
excluding hearsay, court nonetheless held that "if proffered testimony is technically and legalistically
hearsay, then this technical interpretation must prevail."). See generally 5 WIGMORE, supra note 4, § 1476
at 352-57 n.9 (listing state cases in which penal interest statements excluded). In some state decisions,
however, the courts admitted the hearsay statement when a third party admitted guilt and the defendant
faced execution. See, eg., Weber v. Chicago, R.I. & P. R.R., 175 Iowa 358, 393-94, 151 N.W.2d 852, 864
(1915) (Sussex Peerage circumvented by finding statement against proprietary, rather than penal, interest
and thus admissible); Blocker v. State, 55 Tex. Crim. 30, 31, 114 S.W. 814, 815 (1908) (reversing conviction
when evidence against defendant circumstantial and declarant admitted committing murder); Hines v.
Commonwealth, 136 Va. 728, 735, 117 S.E 843, 850 (1923) (declarant's statement admitted because
corroborated by circumstantial evidence).
27. 8 Eng. Rep. 1034, 1035 (1844).
28. Id. at 1037. The Committee for Privileges of the House of Lords, the body deciding the case,
concluded that D'Este was not entitled to the "honours, dignities, and privileges" of his father because the
Royal Marriage Act applied to the Duke, a descendant of King George II. Id. Even though the Act was
applicable regardless of where the marriage occurred, the Committee discussed the penal interest exception
to hearsay in terms of whether the marriage actually took place in Rome. Id.
29. Id. at 1042. Gunn had been called as a witness to testify about the Duke's marriage as part of an
unrelated action in chancery involving an undisclosed controversy. Id. He refused to answer on the ground
that any answer might incriminate him. That refusal, D'Este argued, justified the conclusion that Gunn
had no reason to misrepresent the marriage when Gunn spoke to his son. Id.
30. Id.
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First, the Committee expressed concern that D'Este's argument, if fully
expanded, would permit the prosecution to introduce a deceased's penal
interest statement to implicate the defendant.3' This concern obviously was
irrelevant because D'Este offered the statement only to support his claim.
Second, the Committee indicated that Gunn never was "liable to prosecu-
tion."32 Although this concern is relevant in assessing the trustworthiness of
Gunn's statement, we cannot judge its force because the decision fails to
disclose fully the circumstances in which Gunn made the statement. 33 Lord
Brougham rejected D'Este's offer of Gunn's statement in far broader
language than the two reasons would justify: "The rule, as understood now, is
that the only declarations of deceased persons receivable in evidence, are
those made against the proprietary or pecuniary interests of the party making
them, when the subject-matter of such declarations is within the peculiar
knowledge of the party so making them. '34
Wigmore and other American commentators railed at the barbarity of the
"rule" of the Sussex Peerage.35 Nonetheless, the United States Supreme Court
casually accepted the rule without scrutiny in Donnelly v. United States, 36 a
31. Lord Brougham announced:
To say, if a man should confess a felony for which he would be liable to prosecution, that
therefore, the instant the grave closes over him, all that was said by him is to be taken as
evidence in every action and prosecution against another person, is one of the most monstrous
and untenable propositions that can be advanced.
Id. at 1045. The Lord Chancellor argued that Gunn's statement should not be admitted on behalf of D'Este
because Gunn's statement could not be admitted against the Duke of Sussex, were he on trial. Id. at 1044.
English reaction to the conviction of Sir Walter Raleigh may have influenced these statements. See Trial of
Sir Walter Raleigh, 2 State Trials (1603) (Raleigh's conviction based upon statements attributed to Raleigh
by individual not called at trial). Today, the Committee's concern is embodied in the Sixth Amendment's
confrontation clause.
32. 8 Eng. Rep. at 1044. The Lord Chancellor believed that Gunn did not fear prosecution because
Gunn made the statements to his son. Id.
33. The difficulty in determining the trustworthiness of a statement suggests a different reason why
common law courts might have distinguished between statements against proprietary or pecuniary interest
and those against penal interest. Because most statements against proprietary or pecuniary interest were
written in books of account or diaries found among the papers of the declarant, they presented less chance
of fabrication by the witness who would testify about them. See 5 WIGMORE, supra note 4, § 1477, at 358
(possibility of fabrication only logical rationale for excluding oral penal interest statements); cf 1 S.
GREENLEAF, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF EVIDENCE § 150, at 234 (16th ed. 1899) (noting common law
courts' more frequent admission of documentary evidence).
34. 8 Eng. Rep. at 1045. Without explanation, Lord Campbell spoke in even broader terms of the
importance of rejecting any penal interest statement: "I think it would lead to most inconvenient
consequences, both to individuals and to the public, if we were to say that the apprehension of a criminal
prosecution was an interest which ought to let in such declarations [against penal interest] in evidence." Id.
35. In Wigmore's view, the Sussex Peerage, which had "not [been] strongly argued and not considered
by the judges in the light of the precedents," represented "a backward step.., and an arbitrary limit...
upon the rule [establishing an exception for statements against interest]." 5 WIGMORE, supra note 4, §
1476, at 351. Wigmore thought the practical consequence of the Sussex Peerage was "shocking to the sense
of justice," id. § 1477, at 359, permitting the conviction of an innocent defendant who had the means to
prove that another person was guilty. He therefore urged "discard[ing] this barbarous doctrine." Id. §
1477, at 360. For a discussion by other commentators protesting the refusal to include penal interest
statements in the against-interest exception, see MCCORMICK, supra note 4, § 278, at 674-75; Jefferson,
Declarations Against Interest: An Exception to the Hearsay Rule, 58 HARV. L. REV. 1, 39-43 (1944).
36. 228 U.S. 243, 272-77 (1913). For an extensive discussion of Donnelly, see notes 549-67 infra and
accompanying text.
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case that would play an important, if uncertain, role in congressional
evaluation of rule 804(b)(3). Donnelly, charged with murdering an Indian
named Chickasaw in the Klamath Indian reservation at the turn of this
century, sought to introduce the statement of Joe Dick, who had died before
the trial, that he killed Chickasaw.37 In affirming the trial court's exclusion of
Dick's purported statement, the Supreme Court relied upon the Sussex
Peerage and the "great and practically unanimous weight of authority in the
state courts against admitting evidence of confessions of third parties made
out of court and tending to exonerate the accused."' 38 In the Court's view, it
was "[un]necessary to review the authorities, for we deem it settled by
repeated decisions of this court, commencing at an early period, that
declarations of this character are to be excluded as hearsay. ' 39 Without
examining the reasons for excluding such statements or the unfairness of
excluding Dick's statement in Donnelly, the Court established a rule for
federal courts that would last almost until enactment of rule 804(b)(3).
Despite the almost unanimous judicial refusal to admit defense-offered
penal interest statements,40 when the Advisory Committee published its
Preliminary Draft of the Federal Rules of Evidence in 1969 a trend had
emerged toward recognizing the penal interest exception. For example, two
model codes of evidence included penal interest statements as a general
hearsay exception for statements against interest.41 After the Judicial Con-
37. 228 U.S. at 252-53.
38. Id. at 273-74. Many of the state court decisions the Supreme Court cited, id. at 274 n.1, are in part
understandable in terms of the exception itself because the declarant was near death when he exonerated
the defendant. Id. at 274-76. Thus, the declarants arguably had no reasonable fear that the statement would
emperil them. Those statements do not qualify as "dying declarations" under rule 804(b)(2) of the Federal
Rules of Evidence because they did not "concern... the cause or circumstances of what [the declarant]
believed to be his impending death." FED. R. EVID. 804(b)(2).
39. 228 U.S. at 276.
40. See note 26 supra (discussing judicial exclusion of penal interest statements). The chilling result of
excluding the statement did not persuade many courts to relax the hearsay bar. In State v. English, 201
N.C. 295, 159 S.E. 318 (1931), for example, the defendant, convicted of murdering his wife, failed in his
attempt to introduce the detailed statement of another, given to three police officers after the murder, that
he and not the defendant had committed the crime. Id. at 296, 159 S.E. at 318. Although the judge who
authored the English opinion agreed with Justice Holmes, who in dissent in Donnelly had argued that penal
interest statements should be admitted at times, 228 U.S. at 277, that judge nonetheless followed state
precedent in excluding the statement. 201 N.C. at 299-300, 159 S.E. at 320. As "explanation," the judge
quoted from an earlier decision which also had refused to admit a penal interest statement: "The great
jurist who wrote the May case [the decision followed in English], confesses that the holding might seem
absurd to a layman, 'but the law must proceed in general principles,' and hence if proffered testimony is
technically and legalistically hearsay, then this technical interpretation must prevail." Id. at 300, 159 S.E.
at 320. See also Note, Declarations Against Penal Interest: What Must be Corroborated Under the Newly
Enacted Federal Rules of Evidence, Rule 804(b)(3), 9 VAL. L. REv. 421 (1975) [hereinafter Note, What
Must be Corroborated].
41. Rule 509(1) of the Model Code of Evidence provides:
A declaration is against the interest ofa declarant [and therefore admissible] if the judge finds
that the fact asserted in the declaration.., so far subjected [the declarant at the time of the
statement] to... criminal liability... that a reasonable man in his position would not have
made the declaration unless he believed it to be true.
MODEL CODE OF EVIDENCE rule 509(1) (1942). No state has adopted this code.
Rule 63(10) of the Uniform Rules of Evidence provided: "[A declaration is against the interest of a
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ference published the Preliminary Draft but before Congress enacted theRules, the Supreme Court loosened the stricture of Donnelly by admitting
penal interest statements in four cases. In all but one of these cases the
Government, rather than the defendant, benefited from the use of the
statement.4 2
B. THE ISSUES PRESENTED BY THE PENAL INTEREST EXCEPTION
The penal interest exception rests on the assumption that no one wouldknowingly implicate himself falsely in criminal conduct. Testing the validity
of that assumption in a particular case involves at least six evidentiary
questions. This section identifies these questions and presents nine examples
of a declarant's statement that a defendant or the Government might attempt
to offer at trial.
First, is a statement against a declarant's penal interest because of the
"plain" meaning of the words spoken, the litigation effect of the statement, or
the declarant's motivation to tell the truth?43 If a court concentrates on the
words spoken, it probably will limit admissibility to confessions ("I am guilty
of murdering Smith") or to explicit factual assertions ("I shot Smith"). If,however, the court analyzes the litigation effect of the statement, it mightpermit the introduction of opinions ("The defendant is not guilty"), state-
ments whose relevance depends upon an inference ("I was present whenSmith was shot"), or comments about the defendant's complicity related to
the statement ("X and I, but not the defendant, committed the crime").
declarant if] the judge fnds... [it]... so far subjected him to... criminal liability [at the time of the
assertion] ... that a reasonable man in his position would not have made the statement unless he believed it
to be true .. " UNIFORM RULE OF EVIDENCE 63(10) (superseded 1975). Kansas and New Jersey
essentially adopted Uniform Rule 63(10). Cf. KAN. CIV. PRO. CODE ANN. § 60-4600) (Vernon 1965); N.J.
REV. STAT. § 2A:84A Rule 63(10) (1967). California also has enacted a penal interest exception, but it
differs from Uniform Rule 63(10). Cf. CAL. EVID. CODE § 1230 (West 1980).
42. See United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164,'176-77 (1974) (authority to consent to warrantless
search inferable from penal interest statement); Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 302 (1973) (due
process violated when trial court excluded confession offered by defendant); United States v. Harris, 403U.S. 573, 583-84 (1971) (reliability of informant inferable from penal interest statement); Dutton v. Evans,
400 U.S. 74, 83, 87-89 (1970) (no violation of confrontation clause to admit coconspirator's hearsay penal
interest statement implicating defendant).
43. Commentators have bitterly divided in addressing this threshold issue. One has dismissed it as aprofitless philosophical inquiry. Letter from Kenneth W. Graham, Jr., to Committee on Rules of Practice
and Procedure (July 28, 1971), reprinted in House Subcommittee Hearings, supra note 15, at 197. ProfessorMorgan believed that common law courts largely ignored the declarant's motivation. Morgan, Declarations
Against Interest, 5 VAND. L. REV. 451, 454 (1952). Morgan argued that the focus should be on the facts
stated and not on whether the statement creates a liability. Id. For him, the possibility that the statement
might lead to the declarant's prosecution or that it might be damaging if introduced at the declarant's trial
was irrelevant. Morgan's view appears consistent with that of Wigmore. Yet as Morgan points out, Id.,Wigmore's position was ambiguous because Wigmore also believed that when "the fact is against interest..
. the open and deliberate mention of it is likely to be true." 5 WIGMORE, supra note 4, § 1462, at 337. Not
surprisingly, since Morgan was the reporter of the Model Rules, Rule 509(1) adopts his approach. The
confusion over this question is illustrated by Jefferson's belief that rule 509(1) adopted the litigation effect
of a statement as controlling. Jefferson, supra note 35, at 10. Jefferson also believed, without substantiation,
that common law courts had adopted this position. Id. Congress did not consider this question in its review
of rule 804(b)(3). Because the Advisory Committee implicitly adopted a very relaxed interpretation of
"against interest," the Committee's oversight was of considerable importance. See notes 248-58 infra and
accompanying text (discussing Advisory and Standing Committees' failure to discuss historic definitional
controversy over when statement against interest).
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Second, must the statement have been "against interest" at the time the
declarant made it?44 If a court admits only statements that are confessional in
nature, it would focus on when the declarant made the statement. If, however,
the court analyzes the litigation effect of the statement, its inquiry could
encompass a greater time period.
Third, must the declarant have understood that his statement was "against
interest"? Courts usually use a "reasonable man" inquiry because they
condition admission on the declarant's unavailability to testify.45 If, however,
at the moment he spoke or at some later point the declarant says that he
understood the "against interest" nature of his statement, should a court
reject the "reasonable man" test and focus instead on the declarant's apparent
subjective understanding?
Fourth, must the statement substitute the declarant for the defendant as
the culprit?4 6 If so, a court should exclude the statement if it is relevant only
to the defendant's degree of culpability, not his innocence. A statement that
exonerated the defendant of complicity in a crime committed by more than
one person is similarly inadmissible because this kind of statement provides
the Government with a reason to charge the declarant as well as the
defendant.
Fifth, may the Government use the exception to introduce a statement that
implicates both the declarant and the defendant?47 A Government-offered
statement presents the same "collateral statement" problem as does the
defense-offered statement in the fourth issue.
Sixth, must the proponent introduce other evidence to support the
truthfulness of either the witness' report of the statement or the statement
itself? Demanding corroborating evidence of either sort suggests uncertainty
about the declarant's motivation or his sincerity.
Several of these issues are illustrated in the following examples of hearsay
statements purportedly against penal interest.48 In the first seven examples,
44. Statements that were not against the declarant's penal interest might become against his interest at a
later point, for example, if the Government or the defendant discovers other inculpatory information. This
position would tend to equate the penal interest exception with the party admission rule. See notes 254-57
infra and accompanying text (comparing penal interest exception with party admission rule). Similarly, a
statement might trigger the penal interest exception if a declarant invoked the fifth amendment after
recognizing the disserving effect of his statement. See notes 469-72 infra and accompanying text (arguing
that declarant's invocation of fifth amendment might justify admitting statement).
45. See FED. R. EVID. 804(a).
46. Common law courts admitted defense-offered penal interest statements only in this factual setting.
See note 26 supra (discussing common law application of penal interest exception).
47. A party's attempt to introduce a declarant's statement poses a constitutional as well as an
evidentiary issue. This article, however, does not focus on the constitutionality of admitting such a
statement over a defendant's confrontation clause objection. For a discussion of the differences between the
defendant's ability to exclude such a statement and his right to introduce a third-party statement, see notes
708-59 infra and accompanying text.
48. The defendant (D) need not always rely on the penal interest exception to introduce the statement
of a declarant (T). For example, charged with rape, D claims that T committed the crime. Soon after the
crime was committed, T registered under a false name at a hotel located near the crime scene. D wants to
introduce that false registration-a crime-because T looks like D, T was detained by the police for
investigation following the rape, and T tentatively was identified by the victim as her assailant before D
positively was identified by her. Here, D need not resort to the penal interest exception because he is not
offering the statement for the truth of what T asserted-that he was somebody else. Because the statement
is not hearsay, its admissibility depends upon its relevancy.
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assume the defendant (D), charged with murdering Smith at the intersection
of Turk and Taylor streets in San Francisco's Tenderloin district, offers the
statement of an unavailable declarant (T). In the eighth and ninth examples,
assume the defendant is charged with possession of marijuana found in his
automobile; in the eighth, the defendant offers the statement of T, apassenger, about who put the marijuana in the automobile; in the ninth, the
Government offers T's statement against the defendant.
First, D offers T's statement, "I killed Smith," or "I committed the murder
with which D is charged," and the Government's evidence indicates that only
one person committed the crime. In making these factual assertions, T
confesses to the crime. He appears to have personal knowledge of the crime,his personal involvement, and the charge against D. By offering T's state-
ment, D substitutes T for himself as the culprit.
Second, D offers T's statement, "I was present when Smith was mur-dered." This second example also involves a factual assertion. The relevance
of T's statement, however, depends upon an inference: T not only was present
at the scene of the crime, but also is culpable. Although more evidence is
needed to substitute T for the defendant as the culprit, T's statement may
assist D in shifting responsibility to T.
Third, D offers T's statement, made several weeks after the crime, "I
murdered a guy in the Tenderloin district several weeks ago." T has admittedfacts constituting a crime. The problem is one of relevance, but in a differentform from the problem in the second example. Has T admitted committing
the crime with which D is charged? Without more information, the relevance
of the statement to the charge against D remains unclear. Nonetheless, D
might argue that T's admission, at least when coupled with other evidence,49
suggests that T, not D, is guilty.
Fourth, D offers T's statement, "I murdered Smith by myself," and D, afriend of T's, is identified as being at the intersection when the crime was
committed. The confession is an indirect comment on D's lack of participa-
tion. By confessing, T indicates that he personally knows the facts; as a result,he also may know whether D participated in the crime. Because T is a friend
of D, however, T may be claiming sole responsibility to shield D.
A separate problem arises because rule 801(a) indicates that conduct is not hearsay as long as the actor
did not intend to assert a belief by acting. See FED. R. EVID. 801(a) (nonverbal conduct not statement
unless intended as assertion). If the Government charged a migrant worker with murder, for example, he
might seek to introduce the departure of other migrant workers immediately after the murder as evidence
of "flight" and thus of their "admission" of guilt. If the departing workers were held not to have asserted
their involvement in the crime, the defendant could circumvent the hearsay bar (and thus the admissibility
problems of rule 804(b)(3)). In contrast, if they intended to assert their involvement by their action thedefendant would be required to satisfy either the tests of rule 804(b)(3) or those of another hearsay
exception. See State v. Piernot, 167 Iowa 353, 359, 149 N.W. 446, 448 (1914) ("flight" is hearsay because it
constitutes that person's "confession," and third-party's confession is inadmissible hearsay). Remarkably,
because of the high admissibility burden imposed by rule 804(b)(3), the defendant might be in a betterposition if he contends that the migrant workers asserted nothing by their departure. The problem, of
course, is whether their departure is relevant if it is neither circumstantial evidence of state of mind nor anindirect assertion of complicity. Cf. People v. Mendez, 193 Cal. 39, 52-53, 223 P. 65, 70-71 (1924)(departure of other workers excluded as irrelevant because no other evidence connected them to crime).
49. The defendant, for example, might introduce evidence to show either that T had a motive or thatSmith was murdered in the same unusual way as T killed another person. See FED. R. EVID. 404(b)(evidence of other crimes admissible for indications of motive, plan, or knowledge).
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Fifth, D offers T's statement, "D is not guilty of murdering Smith." This
example also presents an opinion by T about D's complicity. This statement,
however, differs from T's opinion in the fourth example because it is less clear
that T implicated himself in exonerating D: T might know that D is not guilty
because T is guilty or T might simply know of information that led him to
opine about D's innocence without thereby implying that he himself is guilty.
It is also less clear when T obtained the information upon which he bases his
opinion. Did T only learn of information after the crime had been committed?
Moreover, is T saying that D was not involved or that D has a legal excuse or
defense for a killing that D committed?
Sixth, D offers T's statement, "X and I killed Smith; D did not partici-
pate." In this example, T has exonerated D of complicity. T's admission of
personal guilt is obviously against his self-interest. But is his exoneration of D,
a statement related to his personal admission, similarly against his penal
interest?
Seventh, D admits that he hit Smith in the stomach. D offers T's statement,
"I hit Smith in the head with a baseball bat," when a blow to the head caused
Smith's death. Or, D admits stabbing Smith and offers T's statement, "I gave
the knife to D while he fought Smith," when D claims self-defense,
provocation, or no premeditation. The first statement, "I hit Smith in the
head with a baseball bat," is a factual admission to the crime. The second
statement, "I gave the knife to D," may or may not be an admission to a
crime, depending upon whether either possession of the knife was illegal or
transferring the knife made T an accessory. Both statements, however, are
relevant to D's conduct, to his state of mind, and thus to his culpability,
punishment, and perhaps defense.
Eighth, D offers T's statement, "I put the marijuana in the spare tire." This
example involves a stronger case for the prosecution than does the analogous
fourth example. D might be prosecuted based on his ownership of and
presence in the car. T, whose factual assertion is self-incriminating, has not
commented explicitly about D's participation in the crime of possessing
marijuana. D might have participated even if he had not put the marijuana in
the spare tire. Nonetheless, D might use T's statement to support his claim
that he knew nothing of the crime. The Government also might use that
statement to charge T with possession.
Ninth, the Government offers T's statement, "D and I put the marijuana in
the spare tire." This final example, like the sixth, involves a related statement.
Here, however, the Government offers T's statement against D. Is T's
accusation of another person against T's penal interest? If T's self-accusation
is reliable, should a court conclude that he spoke the truth in condemning D?
Or, is T damning D in hope of immunity or a favorable plea bargain?
Of these nine examples, all but the seventh are relevant to the defendant's
guilt; the seventh is relevant to either the defendant's degree of guilt or his
punishment. Were the declarant on trial, a court would admit his statement in
every example. 50 Were the defendant on trial prior to enactment of rule
804(b)(3), however, federal courts would have invoked Donnelly to exclude
each statement without analyzing its penal-interest effect. All but the
statement in the first example still might be inadmissible for the defendant
50. Each would be admissible as a party's admission under the common law or as nonhearsay under
rule 801(d)(2)(A) of the Federal Rules of Evidence. The sole exception might be the fifth example.
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under rule 804(b)(3). A review of the legislative history of rule 804(b)(3) will
suggest why the federal law of evidence with respect to a defendant's offer of apenal interest statement has not progressed significantly since Donnelly.
III. THE LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF RULE 804(b)(3)
A. THE DEFENDANT OFFERS A DECLARANT'S STATEMENT
As first proposed by the Advisory Committee in the Preliminary Draft, rule
804(b)(3)51 provided:
STATEMENT AGAINST INTEREST. A statement which was at the
time of its making so far contrary to the declarant's pecuniary or
proprietary interest, or so far tended to subject him to civil or
criminal liability or to render invalid a claim by him against
another or to make him an object of hatred, ridicule, or social
disapproval, that a reasonable man in his position would not have
made the statement unless he believed it to be true. This example
does not include a statement or confession offered against the
accused in a criminal case, made by a codefendant or other person
implicating both himself and the accused.52
51. In the Preliminary Draft, the Advisory Committee numbered the rule as 8-04(b)(4). In the Revised
Draft and the Revised Definitive Draft, the Committee changed the rule number to 804(b)(4). The House
Subcommittee renumbered the rule as 804(b)(3), the identification of the rule as enacted. Throughout this
article, I identify the rule as 804(b)(3), unless one of the prior numbers is more appropriate.
52. Preliminary Draft, supra note 1, at 378. When first discussed by the Advisory Committee during its
March 7-9, 1968 meeting, the rule did not contain the last sentence. As then drafted, the Committee
adopted the rule by a 12-2 vote. Unfortunately, the Committee recorded neither its discussion nor the
reasons for the two negative votes. The Committee also rejected, by a 7-5 vote without recorded
explanation, a motion to transfer the rule from the illustrations of rule 8-04 to those of rule 8-03. That
transfer would have eliminated the declarant's unavailability as a condition of admissibility. At least one
member thought that statements against interest "offer the strongest guarantee of trustworthiness to be had
.. " Minutes of Advisory Committee Meeting 15, 16 (March 7-9, 1968) (on file at Judicial Conference).
During its meetings on May 23-25, 1968, the Committee unanimously voted to adopt the rule as quoted in
the text, but without the last sentence. Minutes of Advisory Committee Meeting 83 (May 23-25, 1968) (on
file at Judicial Conference). Later that year the Supreme Court decided Bruton v. United States. 391 U.S.
123 (1968). This led Professor Cleary, the Reporter to the Advisory and Standing Committees, to add the
final sentence (the "Bruton sentence") that appeared in the Preliminary Draft to comport with his reading
of Bruton and Douglas v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 415 (1965). See Letter from Edward W. Cleary to Members of
The Advisory Committee on Rules of Evidence 3 (Nov. 12, 1968) (on file at Judicial Conference). He
apparently first believed that the addition was constitutionally required by Douglas and Bruton but
probably not compelled by the logic of the penal-interest exception. He noted that although Douglas did
"not preclude admitting a third-party confession against an accused when offered as such and nothing
more .... [t]he weight to be given [such a statement] is another matter." Memorandum No. 19, article
VIII, part 5, at 292-93 (Feb. 21, 1968) (on file at Judicial Conference) (background memorandum prepared
by Professor Cleary for Advisory Committee to explain hearsay rule) [hereinafter Memorandum No. 19].
That comment is ambiguous. He would later change his mind twice, next arguing that a statement
implicating the accused was not against the declarant's penal interest, see note 191 infra, but then
concluding that it might be. See text at note 199 infra.
The Committee conditioned the admissibility of a statement against interest upon the unavailability of
the declarant. Preliminary Draft, supra note 1, at 377-78. Congress retained that prerequisite in the enacted
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This version favored the criminal defendant in two significant ways. The final
sentence, the so-called "Bruton sentence," precluded the Government from
using the penal-interest exception to admit a declarant's statement simultane-
ously implicating the declarant and the defendant. 53 Furthermore, this
version of the penal interest exception marked a radical break from Donnelly
v. United States.54 In its Note explaining the rule, the Advisory Committee
sided with Justice Holmes who, dissenting in Donnelly, argued that distin-
guishing between statements against either pecuniary or proprietary interests
and those against penal interests-admitting the former but excluding the
latter-was logically indefensible. 55 In siding with Justice Holmes, however,
rule. FED. R. EVID. 804(a). Unavailability, a condition required by the common law, was not required by
either rule 63(10) of the Uniform Rules of Evidence or rule 509(1) of the Model Code of Evidence. Only the
Advisory Committee considered whether the condition was justified. Professor Cleary thought that
"unavailability add[ed] nothing to the trustworthiness of the hearsay statement." Memorandum No. 19,
supra, at 293. Nonetheless, he included the requirement because the exception would otherwise have had to
be transferred to the illustrations of rule 8-03. In his opinion, the exception did not belong in the rule 8-03
illustrations because against-interest statements were "concededly inferior evidence" and the rule 8-03
illustrations, in contrast, "embraced ... evidence as good as if given by declarant on the stand." Id.
Although Professor Cleary thought that certain against-interest statements were as trustworthy as the rule
8-03 illustrations, he also thought that many were not as reliable. Id. He provided no examples, however, to
illustrate his observation. Interestingly, the Advisory and Standing Committees later would claim that "[a]
good case can be made for eliminating the unavailability requirement entirely for declarations against
interest cases." Letter from Roszel C. Thomsen to Senator James Eastland, reprinted in Proposed
Amendments to the Federal Rules of Evidence: Hearings on H.R. 5463 Before the Senate Committee on the
Judiciary, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 69 (1974) (sending Comments of the Judicial Conference on H.R. 5463)
[hereinafter Senate Judiciary Hearings]. Those Committees, however, did not push their point. Apparently,
neither the Senate Judiciary Committee nor the conference committee considered it. In light of Chambers
v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284 (1973), in which the Supreme Court held that a defendant had a constitutional
right to introduce hearsay admissions and confessions by a testifying declarant, id. at 302, the
unavailability requirement may be unconstitutional in certain cases, if not on its face. For a discussion of
the constitutional implications of Chambers, see notes 789-814 infra and accompanying text.
53. Although the Advisory Committee's rationale for including this sentence is unclear, the Committee
did not intend to bar the Government from introducing such a statement through some other hearsay rule,
such as rule 801(d)(2)(E), the coconspirator rule. See notes 206-07 infra and accompanying text
(Committee hoped to retain coconspirator doctrine as means for Government to introduce third-party
statements implicating defendant).
54. 228 U.S. 243 (1913). Rule 8-04(b)(4) also broke new ground, at least in the federal courts, by
permitting a party to introduce statements that "so far tended.., to make [the declarant] an object of
hatred, ridicule, or social disapproval ... " Preliminary Draft, supra note 1, at 378. Although California
had a similar provision, CAL. EVID. CODE § 1230 (West Supp. 1980), and Professor McCormick supported
the idea, see MCCORMICK, supra note 4, § 278, at 674-75, Congress deleted this extension of the against-
interest exception because it thought that such statements usually were not against interest. HousE
JUDICIARY REPORT, supra note 10, at 16, [1974] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws at 7089. Congress may
have objected because it was concerned that what one person would consider as social disapproval another
person would view as praise. Because Professor Cleary agreed that the word "social" was vague, he deleted
it and substituted "disgrace" in the Revised Draft. Revised Draft of Proposed Federal Rules of Evidence,
(Public's) Suggestions with Reporter's Comments, at 114d (undated) (prepared by Professor Cleary for
Advisory Committee's Sept. 3-5, 1971 meeting) (on file at Judicial Conference) [hereinafter Reporter's
Comments to Revised Draft]. Professor Cleary thought that the phrase "hatred, ridicule, or disgrace" was
sufficiently clear that declarants and courts would understand it. Id. Thus, the Advisory Committee
expansively viewed statements against interest offered by a criminal defendant or a civil litigant,
"expand[ing] to the full logical limit" the scope of the exception. Advisory Committee Note to Preliminary
Draft, supra note 1, at 385.
55. Advisory Committee Note to Preliminary Draft, supra note 1, at 385. Although Justice Holmes did
not condemn the distinction so explicitly, he cited Dean Wigmore, Donnelly v. United States, 228 U.S. 243,
278 (1913) (Holmes, J., with Lurton & Hughes, JJ., dissenting), who forcefully had condemned the
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the Advisory Committee appeared to omit the limitations on admissibilityimplicit in his dissent.56 Justice Holmes appeared to demand some "circum-
stances pointing to [the statement's] truth," 57 but he did not specify in his
short, two-page dissent what test he would apply.58 By its public silence on theissue of corroboration, the Advisory Committee ostensibly rejected condition-
ing admissibility on the existence or introduction of other evidence supporting
the trustworthiness of the statement. Furthermore, the Advisory Committee
noted that "one senses in the decisions [denying admission] a distrust of
evidence of confessions by third persons arising from suspicions of fabrication
either of the fact of the making of the confession or in its contents." 59 This
statement implicitly rejected those fears as unfounded or as outweighed by theimportance of the statement to the defendant and to the factfinder. 60
Moreover, the Advisory Committee thought that those fears were impossible
distinction. See 5 WIGMORE, supra note 4, § 1477, at 358-62. In addition to Justice Holmes, commentators
also have criticized the distinction between economic and penal interest statements. See MCCORMICK,
supra note 4, § 278, at 674 (acknowledgement of facts rendering declarant criminally liable as trustworthy
as acknowledgement of debt); Jefferson, supra note 35, at 39 ("Penal interest is certainly as important to a
person as pecuniary or proprietary interest ").
56. Professor Morgan, who urged recognition of the penal interest exception, also suggested adding afoundation requirement that "there be some other evidence tending to show the declarant's guilt." Morgan,
supra note 43, at 475. Morgan may have suggested that test principally to silence the objections of those
commentators who opposed admitting penal interest statements under any circumstances. By its comment
that rule 8-04(b)(4) "expands [the against-interest exception] to the full logical limit," Advisory Committee
Note to Preliminary Draft, supra note 1, at 385, and by its reference to other evidentiary codifications thatdid not condition admission on the declarant's unavailability, id. at 387, the Advisory Committee
demonstrated its eagerness to admit penal interest statements.
57. Donnelly v. United States, 228 U.S. 243, 277 (1913) (Holmes, J., with Lurton & Hughes, JJ.,
dissenting).
58. Although Justice Holmes would have demanded proof that "the confession really was made, and
that there was no ground for connecting [the defendant with the declarant]," id., he did not explain either
what evidence he thought relevant to these questions or the amount of evidence that he would have
required. Nonetheless, neither Justice Holmes nor Professor Morgan used the word "corroboration" to
describe what each would have demanded. Unfortunately, the Advisory Committee added this confusing
term in the Revised Definitive Draft and the House Subcommittee later embraced it. For a discussion of thelegislative history of the corroboration requirement of rule 804(b)(3), see note 474-543 infra and
accompanying text.
59. Advisory Committee Note to Preliminary Draft, supra note 1, at 385. Professor Cleary recognized
that this fear was "enhanced ... by the requirement that [the] declarant be unavailable," Memorandum
No. 19, supra note 52, at 290, but nonetheless rejected this fear as a ground to exclude penal interest
statements from the illustration.
60. Professor Cleary thought that conditioning admissibility on the unavailability of the declarant was abetter way of protecting against admitting untrustworthy statements than was interpreting "againstinterest" restrictively. See note 310 infra and accompanying text. When the Advisory Committee later
added a corroboration requirement to the rule, it did so to mollify critics of the rule, not to reject Professor
Cleary's view. See notes 96-109 infra and accompanying text (describing Committee's reaction to Senator
McClellan's demand for corroboration requirement).
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to eliminate with a rule61 and that juries were capable of assessing the
possibility of fabrication.62
The Department of Justice swiftly attacked proposed rule 8-04(b)(4). In the
first of three letters objecting to the Committee's work, the Department
"strongly urge[d]" deletion of the penal interest exception, 63 not because it
clung mulishly to the position of the Donnelly majority, but because it
doubted the trustworthiness of the reporting witness and of the declarant. In
its view, "[e]xperience shows that most instances of evidence of statements
against penal interests proffered by an accused in a criminal case involve
statements allegedly made to the accused or by one prison inmate to
another-situations fraught with the possibility of contrivance or of un-
founded braggadocio." 64 However, because the Department begrudgingly
admitted that certain sorts of penal interest statements might be admitted,
65
61. Professor Cleary wrote: "The Maryland court has been especially sensitive to the difference between
crackpot and fabricated third-party confessions and those bearing substantial earmarks of genuineness, but
the distinction seems to be an impossible one to incorporate in a rule." Memorandum No. 19, supra note
52, at 291. The Maryland decisions referred to by Professor Cleary are discssed in Brady v. State, 226 Md.
422, 427-28, 174 A.2d 167, 170 (1961). Letter from Edward W. Cleary to Peter W. Tague (May 17, 1979)
(on file with author) [hereinafter Cleary Letter]. The Maryland courts have suggested admitting a
declarant's written confession when the declarant admits to having committed the crime charged against
the defendant and when the defendant confesses to the same crime. Brady v. State, 226 Md. 422, 428, 174
A.2d 167, 170 (1961) (citing Thomas v. State, 186 Md. 446, 452, 47 A.2d 43, 46 (1946)). Both Brady and
Thomas conditioned admissibility on the absence of collusion between the declarant and the defendant.
Brady v. State, 226 Md. 422, 429, 174 A.2d 167, 171 (1961); Thomas v. State, 186 Md. 446, 452, 47 A.2d
43, 46 (1946). The Brady court thought that the judge should decide the collusion issue. 226 Md. at 429,
174 A.2d at 171.
62. See Advisory Committee Note to Preliminary Draft, supra note 1, at 386 ("Questions of possible
fabrication are better trusted to the competence of juries than made the attempted subject of treatment by
rule"). The Advisory and Standing Committees, which initially thought that the jury should assess the
trustworthiness of the declarant's statement, eventually reversed positions on this issue, delegating that
task to the judge. See notes 625-28 infra and accompanying text (describing change between Preliminary
and Revised Drafts and Supreme Court Draft).
63. Letter from Sol Lindenbaum, Executive Assistant to Attorney General, to Judge Albert B. Maris at
34 (Jan. 12, 1970) (sending Department's Report to the Attorney General Concerning Proposed Federal
Rules of Evidence of the United States District Courts and Magistrates) (on file at Judicial Conference)
[hereinafter Justice's First Letter]. Before writing this report, the Department of Justice had asked the
United States Attorneys to comment on the Preliminary Draft. Because those comments are no longer on
file at the Department of Justice, we cannot determine what, if anything, the United States Attorneys said
about the penal interest exception. As far as I can determine from a review of the public comments received
by the Advisory Committee, only the Department of Justice objected to rule 8-04(b)(4) of the Preliminary
Draft.
64. Justice's First Letter, supra note 63, at 33 (footnote omitted). To support its position, the
Department ofJ.ustice ited Scolari v. United States, 406 F.2d 563 (9th Cir.) (per curiam), cert. denied, 395
U.S. 981 (1969). In Scolari the lower court convicted the defendant for smuggling narcotics from Mexico
into the United States in a spare tire. Id. The court of appeals excluded Scolari's testimony that a passenger
in his automobile admitted to him that she had hidden the narcotics in the tire without his knowledge. Id.
at 564. Because the court affirmed on the authority of Donnelly v. United States, 228 U.S. 243 (1913), its
decision lacks all of the information necessary to evaluate the Department of Justice's concern over the
trustworthiness of a third-party's statement reported by the defendant: the passenger's identity, her
whereabouts at the time of the trial, and the content and context of her declaration. I have been unable to
contact the attorneys to obtain this information.
The Department of Justice sought the opinions of the United States Attorneys about the problems
presented by the Preliminary Draft for prosecution of criminal cases. See note 63 supra. Thus, it is
remarkable that the Department of Justice could marshal only Scolari as an example of the danger of the
penal interest exception.
65. Because rule 8-04(b)(5) was simply "illustrative" of one type of hearsay that might be admitted, the
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its reasons for demanding deletion of the penal interest language remain
unclear.66 If the Advisory Committee retained the penal interest language, the
Department of Justice urged it to condition admissibility on a defense offer of
"other substantial evidence which tends to show clearly that the declarant,
and not the defendant, is in fact the person guilty of the crime for which the
defendant is on trial. ' 67
In his unpublished rejection of the Department of Justice's objections,
Professor Cleary addressed all but the Department's concern over the
defendant as a reporting witness. He wrote:
Department of Justice argued that "the deletion of express reference would not mean that all [penal
interest] statements would have to be excluded." Justice's First Letter, supra note 63, at 34. To demonstrate
the sorts of against-interest statements that it thought should be admissible, the Department of Justice cited
two inconsistent cases, State v. Larsen, 91 Idaho 42, 415 P.2d 685 (1966), and State v. Sejuelas, 94 N.J.
Super. 576, 229 A.2d 659 (Super. Ct. App. Div. 1967).
In Larsen, Butler, initially suspected by the police as the murderer, explained to three disinterested
people soon after the crime how he had killed and buried the victim. 91 Idaho at 47, 415 P.2d at 690. At
trial Larsen made an offer of proof that Butler's car was observed near the victim's grave, that grass and
brush like that at the gravesite had been found on Butler's car, and that human blood had been found inside
Butler's car. Id. Having excluded this evidence, the trial court convicted Larsen for murder. Id. at 47-48,
415 P.2d at 690-9 1. Because Larsen failed to offer any supporting evidence to substantiate his offer of proof
at trial, the Idaho Supreme Court affirmed his conviction. Id. at 49, 415 P.2d at 692. The court held that
"third-party confessions, made out of court, are admissible only when there is other substantial evidence
which tends to show clearly that the declarant is in fact the person guilty of the crime in question." Id. This
holding was arguably unfair because the trial court had prevented the defendant from introducing any
supporting evidence, unless his offer of proof was inadequate for failing to identify the manner of proof.
In Sejuelas, a police officer testified that he saw the defendant drop some packets containing heroin. 94
N.J. Super at 578-79, 229 A.2d at 660. The trial court excluded the testimony of an eyewitness, Maldonado,
that Camacho had said before the incident that Camacho intended to frame the defendant. Id. at 579-80,
229 A.2d at 661. The trial court, however, allowed Maldonado to testify that she saw Camacho drop the
packets. Id. The New Jersey Superior Court reversed the defendant's conviction, stating that "[t]he totality
of the evidence, if believed, directly substantiates the conversation which Mrs. Maldonado allegedly
overheard." Id. at 582, 229 A.2d at 662. In the court's view, a statement against penal interest is admissible
if direct evidence tends to substantiate it. Id. at 581, 229 A.2d at 662.
Sejuelas cannot be harmonized with Larsen. See Note, What Must be Corroborated, supra note 40, at
483 (criticizing Larsen as conditioning admissibility on "compelling evidence of declarant's guilt").
Incredibly, the Sejuelas court cited Larsen as support. State v. Sejuelas, 94 N.J. Super. 576, 581, 229 A.2d
659, 662 (Super. Ct. App. Div. 1967). The only difference between the cases is that an eyewitness observed
the declarant's conduct in Sejuelas. That difference should be relevant only to the weight of the penal
interest statement, not to its admissibility. Nonetheless, both cases support the Department of Justice's
claim that a court should admit only against-interest statements that substitute the declarant for the
defendant as the culprit.
The Department of Justice also suggested that a third-party confession made to a police officer before
the defendant's arrest might be admissible. Justice's First Letter, supra note 63, at 34.
66. The Department of Justice apparently was worried that an explicit recognition of the penal interest
exception might tempt defendants to fabricate third-party statements. In its view, "It]he deletion of the
reference to statements against penal and social interests simply serves to discourage attempts to introduce
testimony concerning an absent third party's alleged statement exonerating a defendant." Justice's First
Letter, supra note 63, at 34. The Department of Justice marshaled only Scolari as a case in which the
defendant was the reporting witness. It cited no cases in which the declarant was a prison inmate. The
Government always can cross-examine a testifying defendant about the statement and his relationship to
the declarant. In attempting to block cross-examination with respect to his guilt, a defendant might testify
only about the statement, without asserting his own innocence. The jury, however, undoubtedly would
distrust such restricted testimony and would question the defendant's innocence. The Department of
Justice also failed to discuss the more difficult aspect of Scolari: Should a court admit a statement in the
form of an opinion about the defendant's involvement in a crime?
67. Justice's First Letter, supra note 63, at 34. The Department of Justice also objected to the "Bruton
sentence" because it thought that the sentence was more restrictive than Bruton required. Id. at 34-35.
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[The problems of contrived or boastful statements are] aspects
[that] were carefully considered by the Advisory Committee,
particularly against the background of the Maryland decisions ....
and the decision was reached that they were problems of weight
and not appropriate grounds for exclusion. Similar considerations
call for rejection of the Department's proposal that corroboration
be required as a condition to admissibility.68
What had been implicit in the Advisory Committee's Note to the Preliminary
Draft of rule 8-04(b)(4) was now explicit: A court should not condition the
admission of a defense-offered statement on separate proof that the declarant
had spoken and had spoken truthfully. The Advisory Committee had adopted
a low threshold test to admit defense-offered statements against penal interest.
Nonetheless, the Advisory Committee left two critical issues unresolved.
First, should a court admit a statement only if the statement constituted a
direct confession ("I did it") or a direct factual assertion ("I shot the victim"),
or also if the declarant's guilt was inferable from the statement ("I was
present when the victim was shot")? Second, should a court, as the
Department of Justice urged, admit the statement only if the statement
substituted the declarant for the defendant as the culprit? On the other hand,
should the court admit the statement if it might affect the defendant's degree
of culpability without exonerating him,69 or if it permitted the defendant to
argue either that the Government failed to satisfy its burden of proof70 or that
he had not participated with the declarant in a crime committed by more than
one person?
Following a public comment period, the Advisory Committee published a
Revised Draft on March 15, 1971.71 In this draft the Advisory Committee
changed the framework of rule 8-04(a) by deleting as the admissibility test
whether "strong assurances of accuracy" 72 exist whenever the declarant is
unavailable.73 The Committee also converted the rule 8-04(b) illustrations
68. Preliminary Draft of Proposed Federal Rules of Evidence, (Public's) Suggestions with Reporter's
Comments, at 191 (on file at Judicial Conference) [hereinafter Reporter's Comments to Preliminary Draft].
69. The Advisory Committee never clearly answered this question. On the one hand, it noted that
"[o]rdinarily the third-party confession is thought of in terms of exculpating the accused ...." Advisory
Committee Note to Preliminary Draft, supra note 1, at 386. The Committee, however, did not define the
word "exculpate" and it offered that comment as part of a separate attempt to explain the rationale for the
"Bruton sentence." Id. On the other hand, Professor Cleary's reference to the "Maryland experience"
suggests that a statement relevant to the degree of culpability might be admissible. In Brady v. State, for
example, the declarant's statement was relevant only to the defendant's punishment, not to his guilt. See
226 Md. 422, 430, 174 A.2d 167, 171 (1961) ("Appellant's sole claim of prejudice goes to punishment
imposed"). Also, because Professor Cleary opposed a restrictive interpretation of "against interest" as long
as admissibility was conditioned upon the declarant's unavailability, see note 60 supra, he probably thought
that statements whose relevance depends on an inference should be admissible.
70. Although a defendant ordinarily would argue that a declarant's statement demonstrated that the
declarant, not the defendant, committed the crime, the defendant might refuse to accuse the declarant
specifically if, for example, he was a relative or a close friend. Cf. Maness v. Wainwright, 512 F.2d 88, 89
(5th Cir. 1975) (defendant unsuccessfully sought to introduce wife's implicitly disserving statements
without specifically arguing that she committed crime charged against him), cert. dismissed as im-
providently granted, 430 U.S. 550 (1977).
71. Revised Draft, supra note 1, at 315.
72. Preliminary Draft, supra note 1, at 377.
73. See Revised Draft, supra note 1, at 438 (listing circumstances under which declarant considered
unavailable).
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into the examples of the types of hearsay admissible under the rule.74 It did
not change the language of the against-interest exception, but it did renumber
the rule as rule 804(b)(4).
On August 9, 1971, the Department of Justice renewed its attack on the
penal interest exception, objecting, without explanation, that the "standard is
so vague as to be unworkable. 75 The Department continued to concede that a
court need not exclude all penal interest statements, but it deleted the
examples, mentioned in its first letter, of statements a court might admit.76
Justice again objected to the Advisory Committee's standard that statements
qualifying for the penal interest exception be so far against the declarant's
interest that "a reasonable man in his position would not have made the
statement unless it were true." 77 The Department believed that a court should
resort to the "reasonable man" standard only after the court's inquiry into the
particular declarant's understanding of his hearsay statement had proven
fruitless. 78 Thus, the Department of Justice adhered to its argument that the
Committee should delete the penal interest exception.79
In his comments to the Advisory' Committee, Professor Cleary again
dismissed the Department of Justice's concerns. Although he gave no
examples to illustrate his observation, Professor Cleary thought that a
declarant was more likely to recognize the disserving effect of a statement
against penal interest than that of a statement against civil interest. 80 He also
thought that the "reasonable man" test was necessary because the declarant
by defimition was unavailable to explain his understanding of his statement.81
74. Id.
75. Letter from Deputy Attorney General Richard G. Kleindienst to Judge Albert B. Mars, Chairman,
Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure (Aug. 9, 1971), reprinted in 117 CONG. REc. 33,657, 92d
Cong., 1st Sess. (Sept. 28, 1971) [hereinafter Justice's Second Letter]. According to Professor Cleary, this
letter was "more temperate... and better done than the original one... [with the Department of Justice]
chang[ing] [its] position on a number of things rather significantly ... ." Advisory Committee Meeting,
Sept. 5, 1971. Although the Department of Justice's letter was more temperate, its objection to the penal
interest exception was more extreme.
76. Justice's Second Letter, supra note 75, at 33,657. For examples of the sorts of statements that the
Department of Justice suggested in its first letter might be admissible, see note 65 supra.
77. Justice's Second Letter, supra note 75, at 33,657 (quoting Revised Draft, supra note 1, at 438).
78. Justice's Second Letter, supra note 75, at 33,657. The Department of Justice explained this point
more fully in its first letter, stating that the "reasonable man" standard "raises difficult questions as to
whether the determination should be made on an objective or subjective basis.... [Tihe question should be
left to the discretion of the court in the particular case and.., the rule should not impose upon the court
the 'reasonable man' test." Justice's First Letter, supra note 63, at 35.
79. The Department of Justice urged that rule 804(b)(4) should simply read: "A statement [is not
excluded by the hearsay rule] which was at the time of its making contrary to the declarant's pecuniary or
proprietary interest." Justice's Second Letter, supra note 75, at 33,657.
80. Professor Cleary wrote:
[The Department of Justice's] argument fails to convince [me] with respect to penal interest as
it seems almost beyond dispute that awareness of the possible damaging impact of a statement
is greater in the case of penal than pecuniary interest. . . . It seems evident that less
sophistication is demanded of the declarant in appraising his own utterance in the light of
possible adverse effects in [the area of penal interest] than is the case with pecuniary interests.
Correspondingly, the judge is certainly confronted with no greater problem in deciding.
Reporter's Comments to Revised Draft, supra note 53, at 114d.
81. Professor Cleary wrote:
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At the same time that the Department of Justice was protesting, Senator
John L. McClellan, Chairman of the Senate Subcommittee on Criminal Laws
and Procedure of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, was criticizing
certain proposed rules. On August 12, 1971, Senator McClellan wrote to
Judge Albert B. Maris, the Chairman of the Standing Committee, objecting
that the rules in the Revised Draft "would seriously impair the administration
of justice in the United States .... *82 He further noted that he would
"deprecate any effort which would ... radically alter present law and further
debilitate an already weak Federal system of criminal justice. ' 83 His general
objection to the Revised Draft seemed to focus directly on the penal interest
exception. To emphasize this general concern, Senator McClellan had
cosponsored a bill, introduced one week earlier on August 5, 1971, that would
have modified Congress' delegation of rulemaking power to the Supreme
Court, enabling Congress to participate more actively in the formulation of
the Federal Rules of Evidence.84
The Advisory and Standing Committees feared that Senator McClellan's
intervention might jeopardize congressional enactment of whatever code of
evidence they proposed. 85 To forestall the Senator's bill, individual members
were willing to compromise.86 Speaking to the Advisory Committee on
The Department would simply sweep under the rug the question whether an objective or
subjective standard should be applied to the declarant's mental attitude toward the statement.
Since he is required to be unavailable, his own testimony on the subject cannot be had, and it
is unlikely that he would have made a declaration on the subject. Consequently, the only
standard available in actuality is the objective one, which the rule adopts.
Id. Professor Cleary's choice of an objective standard is understandable. The defendant ordinarily will face
an insurmountable barrier in proving what the declarant actually thought the effect of his statement would
be. Many statements by declarants are terse and unelaborated. Although a reporting witness might
describe the declarant's physical condition, he rarely would know why the declarant made the statement.
Professor Cleary's observation does not preclude the defendant from introducing evidence of what the
declarant thought. His failure to publish his comment, however, has led at least one court to misinterpret
the relevance of a declarant's comments about the effect of his allegedly against-interest statement. See
United States v. Satterfield, 572 F.2d 687, 691 (9th Cir.) (because of inevitable uncertainty about success of
appeal, no reasonable declarant would expect that exonerating codefendant would jeopardize declarant's
appeal), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 840 (1978). For a further discussion of Satterfield, see notes 403-09 infra and
accompanying text.
82. Letter from Senator John L. McClellan to Judge Albert B. Mars, Committee on Rules of Practice
and Procedure (Aug. 12, 1971), reprinted in 117 CONG. REc. 33,642 (1971) [hereinafter McClellan Letter].
83. Id.
84. S. 2432, 92d Cong., 1st Sess., 117 CONG REC. 29,893 (1971). Under Senator McClellan's bill, no rule
of evidence would take effect until the end of the session in which it was reported (in contrast to the then-
applicable law that a federal rule of evidence automatically was enacted 90 days after being transmitted by
the Supreme Court to the Congress); no rule would become effective if either the Senate or the House of
Representatives objected; and either body could object to a rule. 117 CONG. REc. 29,894 (1971) (remarks
of Sen. McClellan when introducing S. 2432). In placing his letter to Judge Maris in the Congressional
Record and in urging the Senate Judiciary Committee to hold hearings both on his bill and on the Revised
Draft, Senator McClellan reiterated his concern that "[w]e cannot afford to weaken the administration of
criminal justice [by enacting the rules as proposed in the Revised Draft]." 117 CONG. REc. 33,642 (1971)
(remarks of Sen. McClellan).
85. Because the Advisory Committee had been working on the rules since 1965, Congress' refusal to
enact the rules would have been a significant blow to the Committee.
86. On August 25, 1971, Judge Maris, for example, wrote to Professor Charles A. Wright, a member of
the Standing Committee, that "it may well be that we will have to make major concessions in the evidence
draft." Letter from Judge Albert B. Maris to Professor Charles A. Wright (Aug. 25, 1971). Judge Maris
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September 3, 1971, as it met to consider the objections of Senator McClellan
and of the Department of Justice as expressed in its second letter, Chief
Justice Burger emphasized the desirability of a compromise. Enlarging upon
the damage the Senator's bill might work, the Chief Justice worried that the
bill threatened the Supreme Court's historic rulemaking independence.8 7 He
thought, however, that the Committees might placate Senator McClellan and
the cosponsors of his bill by changing some of the proposed rules in the
Revised Draft.8 8 After the Chief Justice left the meeting, one member
reiterated this conciliatory tone: "We ought to accept the suggestions that
they make, even to the point that we withdraw from some of the positions we
take, even advanced positions .... This is a practical situation." 89
On September 5, the Advisory Committee reviewed Senator McClellan's
objections to rule 804(b)(4). Although he acknowledged that federal law
should be changed to admit certain sorts of statements against penal
interest,90 Senator McClellan thought that the proposed rule was too generous
to defendants. Among his objections, first he argued that a court should only
admit a statement that was "directly and immediately" against interest, not
explained:
S. 2432 is unquestionably a storm signal which we must take account of and meet. I am quite
certain that it originates with and is inspired by Robert Blakey, the general counsel of Senator
McClellan's Subcommittee on Criminal Law. Mr. Blakey's views are quite conservative and
prosecution oriented, if one might so describe them, and I think that Senator McClellan will
follow them.
Under date of August 12th the Senator sent me a 26 page letter of comments upon and
criticism of individual evidence proposals, undoubtedly prepared by and representing the
thinking of Mr. Blakey ... Both the Advisory Committee and our [Standing Committee]
must certainly give close attention to this letter.
Id. To Senator McClellan, Judge Maris wrote: "Our committees have never heretofore proposed, and do
not now intend to propose in the uniform rules of evidence any provisions to which the Congress or its
Judiciary Committees may have serious objection." Letter from Judge Albert B. Mars to Senator John L.
McClellan (Aug. 25, 1971) (on file at Judicial Conference). That six of the seven members of the Senate
Judiciary committee cosponsored Senator McClellan's bill surely prompted Judge Maris to adopt a
conciliatory attitude. Letter from Professor Charles A. Wright to Judge Albert B. Mars (Aug. 13, 1971).
87. Advisory Committee Meeting, Sept. 3, 1971 (statement of Chief Justice Burger).
88. Chief Justice Burger cited Revised Draft rule 609, which involved the use of criminal convictions to
impeach a witness, as an example of a rule that if revised might satisfy those Senators who were concerned.
Id. Senator McClellan, for example, was especially upset about rule 609 because it limited this form of
impeachment more than had a 1970 congressional statute governing that subject in the District of
Columbia. Chief Justice Burger did not mention rule 804(b)(3).
89. Advisory Committee Meeting, Sept. 3, 1971. (The quote may not be exact because the tape
recording is somewhat unclear.) Another member thought the Committee should develop a lobbying
strategy to ensure that both the Supreme Court and the Congress would approve the Revised Draft. Id.
90. Senator McClellan wrote that "[i]n the main, I support the introduction into Federal law of the
concept of declarations against not only material, but also penal interests," McClellan Letter, supra note
82, at 33,647, and cited Donnelly v. United States as a case whose result ought to be changed. Id. at 33,648,
Nonetheless, Senator McClellan urged the Committee, first, to delete the "Bruton sentence"; second, to
require jury instructions that any penal interest statement by a jailed declarant should be "received and
credited only with the utmost care because of the special danger of perjury and the virtually universal
experience of the untrustworthiness of such declarations"; and third, to add a requirement that the
declarant must have had personal knowledge about the subject matter of the declaration. Id. Although
some members of the Advisory Committee disagreed that personal knowledge should be a requirement, the
Standing Committee eventually made it a requirement for all hearsay. See note 119 infra (Committee
added personal knowledge requirement to rule 803 Note to cover all hearsay).
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"merely indirectly or only remotely" against interest.91 Thus, he apparently
rejected admission of statements in the form of opinions and of statements
from which an inference of guilt could be drawn. Professor Cleary dismissed
this objection as "pretty nebulous"; 92 the Committee discussed it no further.
Second, because Senator McClellan was worried about a court admitting
statements against penal interest at "face value," he demanded that courts
admit only those statements that "would qualify to convict the declarant
himself. ' 93 Professor Cleary thought that the Senator wanted a court to
exclude any statement that would not substitute the declarant for the
defendant in a one-person crime.94 Unfortunately, the Committee did not
discuss this crucial interpretative limitation on the rule; no member, however,
suggested changing the language of the rule or its Note to embrace the
Senator's point.95 Finally, Senator McClellan wanted the admissibility of
defense-offered statements conditioned on "a rule of corroboration .. as
strong as the rule we now apply to confessions where introduced [by the
Government] for the purpose of convicti[ng]" the defendant. 96 Several
Committee members agreed that a corroboration requirement might have the
advantage of excluding statements as "phony as a $3 bill."' 97 Yet the members
disagreed over the likelihood that a court would admit untrustworthy
statements without such a requirement. One member argued that rule
804(b)(4) should not mention penal interest statements because courts Would
admit too many "$3 bill stories" otherwise and because the Committee could
not draft language to exclude untrustworthy statements.98 Thus, he argued for
a case-by-case determination of admissibility. 99 Other members criticized his
suggested change as a "horse-and-buggy" approach; they intended to mod-
91. McClellan Letter, supra note 82, at 33,647-48.
92. Advisory Committee Meeting, Sept. 5, 1971.
93. McClellan Letter, supra note 82, at 33,648.
94. Advisory Committee Meeting, Sept. 5, 1971.
95. Senator McClellan's demand would have made inadmissible both statements exonerating the
defendant in a two-culprit crime and statements exonerating the defendant by inference.
96. McClellan Letter, supra note 82, at 33,648. Senator McClellan based this demand on his belief that
Justice Holmes, in his Donnelly dissent, similarly conditioned the admission of the declarant's statement.
Id. The Senator's explanation of what he meant by corroborating a defendant's confession is confusing. In
citing to Smith v. United States, 348 U.S. 147 (1954), he actually gave the citation for Opper v. United
States, 348 U.S. 84 (1954). Both cases discuss the corroboration necessary to convict a defendant based in
part on his admission or confession. See Smith v. United States, 348 U.S. 147, 156 (1954) (Government
must establish all elements of crime by independent evidence or corroborated admissions; admission may
be corroborated if independent evidence "bolsters" it); Opper v. United States, 348 U.S. 84, 93 (1954)
(corroboration sufficient if it supports essential facts "sufficiently to justify a jury inference of the truth").
Smith and Opper, however, dealt with the quite different issue of the amount and sort of evidence, apart
from the defendant's statement, necessary to sustain a conviction. Neither case dealt with whether the
defendant's statement was admissible. For a discussion of the problem of using this analogy to explain the
corroboration requirement of rule 804(b)(3), see notes 486-538 infra and accompanying text.
97. Advisory Committee Meeting, Sept. 5, 1971. One member said that defendants offered phony
statements in several recent cases, but he did not identify them. Id.
98. Id. Professor Cleary initially agreed that drafting language to prevent the introduction of
untrustworthy statements was impossible. Because he thought that the restrictions the Maryland courts
placed upon admissibility were not persuasive, see note 61 supra, he thought that the choice was between
either excluding or admitting all statements that appeared to be against penal interest, whether or not the
evidence supported the truth of the statement. Advisory Committee Meeting, Sept. 5, 1971. Nonetheless,
later in the meeting he suggested a corroboration test. See text accompanying note 105 infra (Professor
Cleary's proposed versions of corroboration test).
99. Advisory Committee Meeting, Sept. 5, 1971.
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ernize the federal law of evidence to include a penal interest exception even if
the federal courts and most states had not recognized the exception.
Moreover, another member thought that the Committee did not have to add a
corroboration requirement because corroborating evidence would exist in
almost every case.100 A third member, who questioned the empirical validity
of the second member's assumption, feared that a corroboration requirement
effectively would bar introduction of every defense-offered penal interest
statement.101
Although the Committee eventually acceded to Senator McClellan, the
members were not convinced by the Senator's claim that a corroboration
requirement was necessary to prevent the introduction of fabricated state-
ments. Instead, as one member put it, "[flrom a practical standpoint, we
could give on [the corroboration requirement] without hurt[ing] the rule
much." 102 The Committee apparently viewed the corroboration requirement
as a bargaining chip that lacked substantive merit. Unfortunately, the
Committee never resolved how the defendant could satisfy the corroboration
requirement. One member expected that the defendant's testimony that he
was innocent would satisfy the requirement.1 03 Other members thought the
defendant would have to explain how he had learned of the declarant's
statement, thereby exposing the relationship between the declarant and
defendant to cross-examination. 04
100. Id.
101. Id. Although he did not explain his comment, this third member probably believed that
corroborating evidence would not exist when the defense offered a penal interest statement.
102. Id. Although this member did not explain how a corroboration test would change the application
of the penal interest exception, other suggestions were aired during the Committee's meeting. One member
suggested excluding all statements made in contemplation of pending or anticipated litigation. Id. This
suggestion, which was never made in the form of a motion to amend the rule, was not discussed further. If
adopted, this first suggestion would have excluded any statement made after the defendant was suspected
or charged. This would have unfairly excluded any statement by a trustworthy declarant impelled to speak
to protect an innocent defendant. The second suggestion was to make admissible any statement made after
the defendant had been convicted. Id. This suggestion would have eliminated the Department of Justice's
fear that a prison inmate would "confess" to provide his fellow inmate with a basis to bring a post-
conviction attack on his fellow inmate's conviction. The Committee also did not discuss the merits of this
suggestion. Such a restriction probably was unnecessary. On the one hand, such a statement might not be
against penal interest if the declarant did not fear further prosecution. On the other hand, were such a
statement admissible, the Government would have scant difficulty in countering its force through a skillful
summation on retrial. Moreover, because of the defendant's high burden on postconviction attack, any
statement other than a confession in a one-person crime would probably not justify reversal.
103. Advisory Committee Meeting, Sept. 5, 1971. The member interpreted the corroboration
requirement in this way because he doubted that evidence supporting either the truth of the declarant's
statement or his culpability would ever exist.
The Committee did not discuss the constitutional implications of requiring the defendant to testify.
Imposing the burden of production on the defendant with respect to an affirmative defense might not
infringe upon his fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination. Cf. Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S,
197, 205 (1977) (New York statute burdening defendant with proving affirmative defense of extreme
emotional disturbance not violative of due process). Nonetheless, requiring the defendant to testify as a
condition of admitting the declarant's statement might be unconstitutional. See Brooks v. Tennessee, 406
U.S. 605, 609, 612 (1972) (Tennessee statute requiring defendant to testify first or not at all violative of
defendant's right against self-incrimination and right to counsel). Requiring the defendant to testify might
be constitutional, however, if he could testify at a rule 104(a) hearing out of the presence of the jury and if
the Government could not use his testimony except perhaps as impeachment when he testified during the
trial. For a discussion of this issue, see notes 653-58 infra and accompanying text.
104. Advisory Committee Meeting, Sept. 5, 1971.
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During the Committee's discussion, Professor Cleary drafted proposed
language. He suggested these versions: "Statements tending to expose the
declarant to criminal liability must, in addition, be corroborated in order to be
admissible" and "Statements tending to expose the declarant to criminal
liability and offered to exculpate the accused must, in addition, be cor-
roborated in order to be admissible."105 One member feared that trial judges
would wrongly interpret either suggestion as requiring the defendant to prove
that the declarant made the statement. 106 The other members agreed that the
corroboration test should not require the defendant to prove either that the
declarant made the statement or that the statement was true.10 7 Instead, they
intended that the defendant could corroborate the statement by his own
testimonial denial of guilt.108 With that understanding, the Committee voted
unanimously to add Professor Cleary's second version as long as he explained
the Committee's intent in the Note to the rule. 109
105. Id. He also suggested the language "tending to exculpate the accused." Id. Professor Cleary did
not explain what he meant by "exculpate" and no other member discussed the meaning of that word. As
ultimately approved by the Advisory Committee, the addition read: "A statement tending to expose the
declarant to criminal liability and offered to exculpate the accused is not admissible unless corroborated."
Supreme Court Draft, supra note 1, at 321.
The adopted language, together with Professor Cleary's second version, included a hidden problem. It
made sense for the Advisory Committee to refer to the defendant because at the time of this discussion, the
Committee did not intend to permit the Government to introduce against the defendant a statement that
simultaneously implicated the declarant and the defendant. When the Standing Committee later agreed
with Senator McClellan that a declarant's accusation of the accused might be against the declarant's penal
interest, see notes 188-200 infra and accompanying text, both Professor Cleary's second version and the
sentence as adopted distinguished between the defendant's and the Government's burden: Unlike the
Government, the defendant was required to corroborate the declarant's statement. Like Professor Cleary's
first version, other members' suggestions---"This exception will not apply in criminal cases unless the
statement is corroborated" or "Statements contrary to penal interest are not admissible in criminal cases
unless corroborated"-would have avoided this troubling distinction. Although the Advisory Committee
probably did not intend to create this distinction, it never explained its position.
106. In his view, "a cursory reading of the rule with [Professor Cleary's suggested language] ...might
lead at least one-half of the trial judges to believe that corroborating evidence would have to be of a nature
that the declarant in fact made the statement." Advisory Committee Meeting, Sept. 5, 1971.
107. Id. Without explanation, the Committee rejected the suggestion that the requirement be phrased
"unless the facts stated [by the declarant] are corroborated" as demanding too much from the defendant.
Id.
108. Id.
109. Id. To implement the Committee's directive, Professor Cleary added these sentences to the second
paragraph of the Note to the Revised Draft:
The requirement of corroboration is included as a safeguard against fabrication. Since the
statement will be offered by an accused, the situation is not adapted to control by rulings in
terms of the weight of the evidence. Cf. Rule 406(a). Also, it should be noted that
corroboration may consist of testimony of innocence by the accused, thus presenting a
situation quite different from the requirement that testimony of an accomplice or a confession
be corroborated.
Advisory Committee Amendments to Revised Draft, Sept. 3-5, 1971, at 130 (presented to Standing
Committee at its meeting of Sept. 30-Oct. 1, 1971) (unpublished) [hereinafter Advisory Committee
Minutes]. Several issues were raised by Professor Cleary's change. First, because Professor Cleary
apparently drafted the language after the meeting had adjourned, the Advisory Committee might not have
specifically approved the change to the Note. Second, neither the Advisory Committee nor Professor
Cleary discussed how the defendant would corroborate the declarant's statement if the defendant did not
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On September 22, 1971, Senator McClellan met with representatives of theAdvisory and Standing Committees to discuss his objections in light of the
amendments adopted by the Advisory Committee at its September 3-5
meetings.'10 Senator McClellan continued to oppose rule 804(b)(4) as amend-
ed. He objected both to the addition to the Note permitting the defendant to
corroborate through his own testimony and to the way that the Committee
had changed the "Bruton sentence.""1 If the Committee would redraft the
Note to emphasize that the corroboration requirement was designed to
eliminate fabricated third-party statements and would delete the "Bruton
sentence," he was prepared to drop his other demands for changes to the
rule.112 Senator McClellan indicated, however, that he would continue to
oppose the entire rule if the Committee refused to make those changes.113
In an attempt to meet the Senator's objections, Professor Cleary deleted
from both the rule and the Note most of the changes that the Advisory
Committee had approved on September 5, 1971.114 He dropped the "Bruton
testify. Finally, the second sentence of the revised Note portentiously implied that corroboration should be
a condition precedent to admission, an approach later adopted by the Standing Committee. Because the
Advisory Committee did not discuss this change during its meeting of September 3-5, 1971, Professor
Cleary must have added it on his own. By permitting the defendant to testify during a rule 104(a) hearing
out of the presence of the jury, this change probably would have eliminated the fifth amendment problem
inherent in requiring the defendant to testify to corroborate the declarant's statement.
110. Letter from Senator John L. McClellan to Representative William L. Hungate (Feb. 16, 1973),
reprinted in House Subcommittee Hearings, supra note 15, at 313. Senator McClellan and Professor Blakey
met with Judge Maris, Professor Cleary, and Albert Jenner. Id.
111. In response to Senator McClellan's letter, the Advisory Committee reconstructed the "Bruton
sentence" during its September 5 meeting. To comply with the Senator's interpretation of Nelson v. O'Neil,
402 U.S. 622, 627 (1971) (no confrontation clause violation when declarant available at trial for "full and
effective' cross-examination), the Committee amended the Note to permit the Government to introduce a
declarant's statement implicating the defendant as long as the declarant testified at the defendant's trial.
The Senator misinterpreted Nelson, however, because the Government did not introduce the codefendant's
statement against the defendant. Nelson, like Bruton, involved the question whether the jury could follow
an instruction ordering it not to consider the codefendant's statement against the defendant. Based on
Senator McClellan's misinterpretation, the House Subcommittee later misinterpreted the purpose of the
"Bruton sentence." See notes 201-10 infra and accompanying text (discussing Subcommittee's considera-
tion of "Bruton sentence").
The Advisory Committee amended the rule to read: "A statement or confession offered against the
accused in a criminal case, made by a codefendant or other person implicating both himself and the
accused, is not a statement against interest within this paragraph." Advisory Committee Amendments,
supra note 109, at 125.
112. Standing Committee Meeting, Sept. 30, 1971. In Professor Cleary's report to the Standing
Committee about the meeting, he noted that "what constitutes corroboration is left open." Id. Senator
McClellan, in objecting to the Advisory Committee's change to the "Bruton sentence," argued without
explanation that the declarant, in implicating the defendant, would sometimes speak against his own penal
interest. Professor Cleary agreed. Thus, he decided to delete the "Bruton sentence," leaving the Note to
cover the matter. Cleary Memorandum to File Concerning Conference between Judge Maris and Messrs.
Blakey, Cihlar, Jenner, and Cleary (Sept. 22, 1971) Concerning Objections to Evidence Rules in Senator
McClellan's Letter of Aug. 12, 1971, at 7-8 (prepared Sept. 23, 1971) (on file at Judicial Conference)
[hereinafter Cleary Memorandum].
113. Standing Committee Meeting, Sept. 30, 1971 (comment by Professor Cleary). The members of the
Advisory Committee might not have been notified of the Senator's continuing objections to the rule as
amended by that Committee on September 5, 1971.
114. I have been unable to determine how the representatives from the Advisory and Standing
Committees who met with Senator McClellan decided to respond to his objections. They apparently
instructed Professor Cleary to redraft the rule and its Note to reflect the Senator's objections. That the
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sentence" from the rule and the explanation in the Note that the defendant
could satisfy the corroboration requirement by testifying that he was not
guilty.115 He also rewrote the third paragragh of the Note to explain the
announced purpose of the corroboration requirement. Under this version of
the rule, satisfaction of the corroboration requirement was a condition of
admissibility for the court to decide.
116
The Standing Committee met on September 30, and October 1, 1971, to
discuss the Revised Draft. 1 7 Mirroring the Advisory Committee's discussion
during its September 3 meeting, the Standing Committee's discussion focused
in part on the potential effect of Senator McClellan's proposed legislation. 18
Advisory and Standing Committees acceded to 26 of his 36 objections to the Revised Draft illustrates
Senator McClellan's overall "persuasiveness." Memorandum from G. Robert Blaldey to Senator John L.
McClellan (Feb. 5, 1973), reprinted in House Subcommittee Hearings, supra note 15, at 317.
115. One cannot ascertain whether the representatives, by deleting this explanation of the corrobora-
tion test, either agreed with Senator McClellan that the defendant's testimony of his own innocence could
not corroborate the declarant's statement or simply chose to withdraw any explanation of how a court
should interpret the test. The second interpretation is probably correct because the representatives
apparently did not review the results of the conference with the other members of the Advisory Committee
and did not discuss this question with the Standing Committee during its October 1 meeting.
116. Professor Cleary added the following:
The requirement of corroboration is included in the rule in order to effect an accommodation
between these competing considerations [of the fear of fabrication and of the movement in the
law to adopt a penal interest exception]. When the statement is offered by the accused by way
of exculpation, the resulting situation is not adapted to control by rulings as to the weight of
the evidence, and hence the provision is cast in terms of a requirement preliminary to
admissibility. Cf. Rule 406(a). The requirement of corroboration should be construed in such
a manner as to effectuate its purpose of circumventing fabrication.
Advisory Committee Note to Supreme Court Draft, supra note 1, at 327.
117. Although it met to discuss all of the Advisory Committee's changes to the rules in light of the
public's comments, the Standing Committee focused first on those "crucial" rules to which Senator
McClellan had objected. Standing Committee Meeting, Sept. 30, 1971.
118. One member remarked that
[it would be] unfortunate for this sort of legislation to be enacted. [It would be a] major
setback to the rulemaking process.... Of course, [we have] never before engaged in any quite
as controversial a project as this project.... All things considered, our major consideration
should be to avoid any such legislation. If necessary, [we should] sacrifice a little bit of what
may be from our standpoint perfectly appropriate steps forward in the field of evidence for the
time being.
Standing Committee Meeting, Sept. 30, 1971. Because Congress never before had held hearings on any rule
amendment approved by the Supreme Court, another member hoped that compromising with Senator
McClellan would forestall any congressional committee from holding hearings on the proposed rules of
evidence. Id. Two other members hoped that a compromise that did not sacrifice principle would avoid a
"collision course with influential Senators." Id. By compromising, another member expected that Senator
McClellan's proposed legislation would die in committee. Id. Although that bill died in the Senate, it was
resurrected in a slightly different form by the House Subcommittee. Congress eventually added a section to
the Rules Decision Act that, inter alia, extended the time for congressional review of evidentiary
amendments promulgated by the Supreme Court from 90 to 180 days and empowered either house of
Congress unilaterally to disapprove of a particular Supreme Court amendment to the Federal Rules of
Evidence. See 28 U.S.C. § 2076 (1976) (amendments to Federal Rules of Evidence not to take effect until
180 days after reported to Congress; within that period, either house may disapprove of any rule by
resolution).
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The Standing Committee's heightened concern undoubtedly contributed to itsdecision to approve unanimously the amendments that Professor Cleary
made to rule 804(b)(4) after the September 22 meeting with Senator
McClellan. 1 9
The Standing Committee did not identify publicly either the effect ofSenator McClellan's intervention or the source of the corroboration require-
ment of rule 804(b)(4).120 Only a cryptic addition to the Note explained the
change: "[T]he requirement of corroboration is included in the rule in order
to effect an accomodation between [the] competing considerations [of the fear
of fabrication and of an increasing judicial willingness to adopt a penalinterest exception]." 121 Also, the Committees, like Senator McClellan, failed
to mention a single instance of prevarication by the declarant or of perjury by
the reporting witness.122 Furthermore, the Committees, in the redrafted Note,
did not explain what facts had to be corroborated or by what standard of
proof. Those omissions appear to have been deliberate. 123 By redrafting the
Ironically, the Advisory and Standing Committees' concessions to Senator McClellan, at least with
respect to the penal interest exception, failed to deter Congress from enacting the rulemaking changes the
Committees sought to deter. Moreover, the Committees' hoped-for compromise failed to forestall hearings
on rule 804(b)(3) and the other proposed Federal Rules of Evidence. Both houses of Congress held
extensive hearings on the Supreme Court Draft. The House Subcommittee, for example, received testimony
from about 50 witnesses, developed a 600-page record, and conducted 17 markup sessions. Senate Judiciary
Hearings, supra note 52, at 21 (statement of Rep. William L. Hungate).
119. Minutes of the September 30-October 1, 1971 Meeting of the Standing Committee on Rules of
Practice and Procedure, at 10 (undated) (on file at Judicial Conference) [hereinafter Minutes of September
30-October 1, 1971 Meeting]. Like Senator McClellan, one member wondered whether the rule should be
further amended to condition admissiblity on proof that the declarant had personal knowledge. Standing
Committee Meeting, Sept. 30, 1971. Although Senator McClellan apparently had not pressed this point at
the September 22, 1971 meeting with members of the Committees, the Standing Committee added a
personal knowledge requirement to all hearsay in the Note to rule 803: "In a hearsay situation, thedeclarant is, of course, a witness, and neither this rule nor Rule 804 dispenses with the requirement of
firsthand knowledge. [Firsthand knowledge] may appear from his statement or be inferable from
circumstances. See Rule 602." Advisory Committee Note to Supreme Court Draft, supra note 1, at 303.
120. Professor Cleary later conceded that "[c]onsiderable impetus for the corroboration requirement came
from Senator McClellan's letter of August 12, 1971." Cleary Letter, supra note 61.
121. Advisory Committee Note to Supreme Court Draft, supra note 1, at 327. During the House
Subcommittee's hearings, however, Professor Cleary indicated that the Advisory and Standing Committees
added the corroboration requirement "of third party confessions as a safeguard against fabrication." House
Subcommittee Hearings, supra note 15, at 98 (statement ofEdward W. Cleary). Although his comment was
literally true, he did not explain that Senator McClellan, not the Committees, was concerned about
fabricated statements. He also did not indicate that the Committees added the "simple corroboration"
requirement to placate Senator McClellan. Professor Cleary's explanation greatly influenced the House
Subcommittee, which erroneously assumed that the Advisory and Standing Committees were worried
about the easy introduction of fabricated defense-offered statements. Markup Session, June 5, 1973.
122. In its earlier response to the Department of Justice's objections to the Preliminary Draft, the Advisory
Committee had debunked perjury by the reporting witness as a possible source of fabrication.
123. In discussing the corroboration requirement and the September 22, 1971 meeting between members
of the Advisory and Standing Committees, Senator McClellan, and Professor Blakey, Professor Cleary
noted that "what constitutes corroboration is left open." Standing Committee Meeting, Sept. 30, 1971.
Thus, the Standing Committee never discussed the suggestions made by members of the Advisory
Committee on how the defendant might corroborate the statement. That failure would embroil the federal
courts in the problem of interpreting the corroboration tests of the Supreme Court Draft and of the rule as
enacted. See notes 473-624 infra and accompanying text (discussing development and various interpreta-
tions of corroboration requirement). Professor Cleary accurately forecast the confusion that would result
from adding a corroboration requirement to the rule. Because he found the ground rules established by the
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Note, the Committees clearly intended that admissibility was conditioned
upon satisfaction of the revised rule's tests, however they were to be defined.
As the Standing Committee wrote, "[w]hen the statement is offered by the
accused by way of exculpation, the resulting situation is not adapted to
control by rulings as to the weight of the evidence, and hence the provision is
cast in terms of a requirement preliminary to admissiblity. Cf. Rule
406(a)."' 124 The Committees' decision marked a momentous change from the
earlier versions of the rule. Under this redrafted version, the judge would
decide not only whether the statement was against penal interest but also
whether the defendant had sufficiently corroborated the statement. 125 By
conditioning admissibility upon satisfaction of both tests under the third draft
of the rule, the Revised Definitive Draft, the Committees withdrew the role of
assessing the credibility and weight of the statement they had given to the jury
in the two earlier drafts. 126 Neither Committee widely publicized either the
addition of the so-called "simple corroboration" requirement or the change in
the roles of the judge and the jury.127
Maryland courts unpersuasive, he argued that purported penal interest statements should always be either
excluded or admitted. The jury then could puzzle over the weight and the credit of any statement the court
admitted. Advisory Comittee Meeting, Sept. 5, 1971.
124. Advisory Committee Note to Supreme Court Draft, supra note 1, at 327. The Committee did not
explain its reference to rule 406(a). Rule 406(a) provided:
Evidence of the habit of a person or of the routine practice of an organization, whether
corroborated or not and regardless of the presence of eyewitnesses, is relevant to prove that
the conduct of the person or organization on a particular occasion was in conformity with the
habit or routine practice.
Supreme Court Draft, supra note 1, rule 406(a). The Committee apparently intended to contrast the
absence of a corroboration requirement when evidence of habit or routine practice was offered with the
higher test that the revised penal interest exception would require. Standing Committee Meeting, Sept. 30,
1971 (comments by Professor Cleary). As enacted by Congress, rule 406(a) was renumbered as rule 406.
125. Thus, rule 104(a) would govern admissibility. That rule provides, in part, that "[p]reliminary
questions concerning ... the admissiblity of evidence shall be determined by the court .... FED. R. EVID.
104(a).
126. Thus, the Committees reversed the Advisory Committee's earlier decision that "[questions of
possible fabrication are better trusted to the competence of juries than made the subject of attempted
treatment by rule." Advisory Committee Note to Preliminary Draft, supra note 1, at 386; Advisory
Committee Note to Revised Draft, supra note 1, at 444. The Advisory Committee deleted this sentence
from the Note in both the Revised Definitive and the Supreme Court Drafts.
127. The Revised Definitive Draft, submitted by the Standing Committee to the Supreme Court on
October 29, 1971, was distributed to law professors and those individuals who had commented on the
Preliminary or Revised Drafts. No reporter system published the Revised Definitive Draft. Professor Cleary
estimated that about 600 photocopies were distributed on request. House Subcommittee Hearings, supra
note 15, at 28 (testimony of Edward W. Cleary). In contrast, approximately 50,000 copies of the
Preliminary Draft and 40,000 copies of the Revised Draft had been made available to the public. Senate
Judiciary Hearings, supra note 118, at 205 (testimony of Albert E. Jenner, Jr.). Members of the Advisory
Committee, however, discussed changes in the Revised Definitive Draft "at the judicial conferences and
seminars before law school groups and ... special committees of the American Bar Association." House
Subcommittee Hearings, supra note 15, at 27 (testimony of Albert E. Jenner, Jr.). The Committees' failure
to publicize widely the changes sparked a bitter attack during the House Subcommittee's hearings. See,
e.g., id. at 114-15 (testimony of Alvin K. Hellerstein) (significant changes made after Revised Draft should
have been submitted to bar for comment); id. at 129 (statement of The Committee on Federal Courts, The
Association of the Bar of the City of New York) (breakdown in communications between Advisory
Committee and lawyers and judges regrettable); id. at 170 (statment of Charles R. Halpern & George T.
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Senator McClellan appeared satisfied with rule 804(b)(4) as amended in the
Revised Definitive Draft. 128 The Department of Justice, however, remaineddissatisfied. In an act termed "unprecedented,"129 the Department of Justice
renewed its attack on certain rules in a then-unpublished letter to Chief
Justice Burger.130 The Department attacked rule 804(b)(4) as a rule that
would "raise significant practical problems in the fair and orderly presenta-
tion of evidence" and would "require the consideration [by the factfinder] of
evidence which has little or no probative value."' 3' The Department con-
tinued to worry that it was "virtually impossible to determine whether anindividual who makes a statement knows at the time of the declaration thatthe statement would subject him to... criminal liability."132 The Department
also repeated its objection that the "abstract logic" of enacting a penal interesthearsay exception was "lost in the reality of the situation in which such
statements most frequently occur. Unfounded boasting by inmates as tohaving committed successful or infamous crimes is an everyday facet ofprison life."133 As in its two earlier letters to the Standing Committee, theDepartment again provided no examples to illustrate its belief that inmates
were the principal source of penal interest statements and that they either lied
or failed to recognize the penal interest effect of their statements.
The Department of Justice also expressed dissatisfaction with the "simple
corroboration" requirement added to the Revised Definitive Draft. 134 Because
the Standing Committee had not explained what that requirement meant, theDepartment feared that a statement might be corroborated by the declarant's
repetition of it or by the defendant's testimonial denial of guilt.135 The
Department begrudgingly acknowledged without explanation, however, that
Frampton) (many of most critical sections never circulated and not available even to legal profession until
Rules promulgated by Court). As a result, Representative Elizabeth Holtzman, a member of the
Subcommittee, was prompted to worry about the process of rulemaking by the Committees. House
Subcommittee Hearings, supra note 15, at 26-27 (remarks of Rep. Elizabeth Holtzman).
128. See Letter of Senator John L. McClellan to Representative William L. Hungate, reprinted in House
Subcommittee Hearings, supra note 15, at 313. Senator McClellan wrote:
Although each of my suggestions [to the Standing Committee] was not accepted in precisely
the language I might have desired, or perhaps in some cases, at all, I am inclined, as of now, to
say the Rules should be permitted to go into effect. I intend, however, to continue to study
them and nothing that I say here is intended to pre-judge the merits of any individual
proposal to change the result of any individual Rule.
Id.
129. House Subcommittee Hearings, supra note 15, at 180 (statement of Charles R. Halpern & George
T. Frampton).
130. Letter from Deputy Attorney General Richard G. Kleindienst to Chief Justice Warren E. Burger(Dec. 22, 1971), reprinted in House Subcommittee Hearings, supra note 15, at 42 (on file at Judicial
Conference) [hereinafter Justice's Third Letter].
131. Id.
132. Id. at 48.
133. Id. In contrast to its two earlier letters, the Department of Justice objected to the introduction of
any defense-offered penal interest statement, arguing that "experience showed that such statements could
not be determined to be trustworthy." Id.
134. Id.
135. Id. The Advisory Committee had explained that the defendant could satisfy the "simple
corroboration" requirement by testifying that he was not guilty, see note 109 supra, but Professor Cleary
then deleted that explanation when Senator McClellan objected. See note 115 supra and accompanying text(describing reaction to Senator McClellan's objection).
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trustworthiness might be established if the "corroboration [requirement was]
interpreted to require a showing at least as strong as the showing which is
now required as a prerequisite to the admission of a confession when
introduced for the purpose of conviction."' 136 Nonetheless, the Department
urged the Supreme Court to delete the penal interest exception.
137
Chief Justice Burger considered the Department of Justice's objections to
the Revised Definitive Draft so significant that he returned it on January 6,
1972 to the Standing Committee for reconsideration. 138 The Standing Com-
mittee reviewed these objections on March 17-18, 1972.139 As it had before,
the Standing Committee rejected the objection that a judge could not
determine whether the declarant thought his statement was against his penal
interest. In the Committee's view, a judge could determine the against-interest
effect of a penal interest statement as easily, or at least with no more
difficulty, as he could ascertain the against-interest effect of a pecuniary- or a
proprietary-interest statement. 14 The Standing Committee also rejected as
too broad the Department of Justice's second objection that such statements
are usually made by prison inmates. The Committee thought that the judge
136. Justice's Third Letter, supra note 130, at 48. Although the Department of Justice reluctantly
agreed with Senator McClellan, who had offered this analogy, see note 96 supra and accompanying text,
the Department doubted that the analogous burden was sufficient to ensure trustworthiness. The
Department of Justice stated:
The inherent danger of fabricated testimony coming before the trier of fact under the
provisions of subsection (b)(4), is especially acute in those instances where statements against
penal interest of an unavailable declarant are offered to exculpate the defendant. That such
statements be corroborated is an insufficient guarantee of trustworthiness. It is uncertain
what would be sufficient corroboration of such a statement.
Justice's Third Letter, supra note 130, at 48.
137. Justice's Third Letter, supra note 130, at 47.
138. Letter from Honorable Albert B. Mars, Chairman of the Standing Committee, to Honorable
Warren E. Burger (Mar. 22, 1972) (acknowledging receipt of Chief Justice Burger's recommittal of Revised
Definitive Draft and including Standing Committee's comments about Department of Justice's objections)
(on file at Judicial Conference) [hereinafter Maris Letter]. I could not determine whether Chief Justice
Burger explained to the Standing Committee why he was returning the draft or what changes (if any) he
thought appropriate in light of the Department of Justice's objections. The Chief Justice did not publicize
his decision to recommit and apparently did not suggest that the Standing Committee either publicize the
Department of Justice's objections or solicit comments by others interested in the important changes made
in the Revised Definitive Draft. As far as I have been able to determine, of those who had received a copy of
the Revised Definitive Draft, only the Department of Justice commented on the addition of the "simple
corroboration" requirement to rule 804(b)(4).
139. Id. The Advisory Committee apparently did not review the Department of Justice's objections.
Although agreeing to minor changes proposed by the Department of Justice to other rules, the Standing
Committee concluded that "we do not think that the suggestions made [by the Department of Justice
concerning the penal interest exception] considered from all angles, merit making any changes in the draft
rules now before the Court." Id. Professor Cleary discussed the Department of Justice's objections point by
point in a memorandum prepared for the Standing Committee. See Comments of Committee on Rules of
Practice and Procedure on Letter of Deputy Attorney General Kleindienst to the Chief Justice (Dec. 22,
1971) [hereinafter Committee Response], reprinted in House Subcommittee Hearings, supra note 15, at 51.
One cannot ascertain whether Professor Cleary's memorandum reflects either his personal views or the
Standing Committee's reaction to Justice's objections because no record of the Standing Committee's
March 17-18, 1972 meeting exists.
140. The Standing Committee indicated that "[p]enal interest seems, however, to raise less of a problem
than cases of pecuniary or proprietary interests, since ordinarily the matter proceeds on a less sophisticated
level." Committee Response, supra note 139, at 59.
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could consider the declarant's position and could easily assess whether the
statement was disserving or self-serving. 141 With respect to Justice's third
objection about the meaning of corroboration, the Committee thought that
neither the repetition of the statement by the declarant nor the defendant's
own testimony would normally suffice "unless under most unusual circum-
stances the court could say that the purpose of preventing fabrication was
effectuated."1 42 Although it did not explain this vague comment, the Commit-
tee for the first time suggested "precedents" that might provide meaning for
the "simple corroboration" test: the corroboration necessary to convict a
defendant based in part on his own confession or to introduce an accomplice's
.testimony.143 The Committee thereby reversed its earlier rejection of the
confession analogy.144
The Standing Committee returned rule 804(b)(4) to the Supreme Court
without changing the language of the rule in the Revised Definitive Draft. On
November 20, 1972, the Supreme Court promulgated the Supreme Court
Draft, with rule 804(b)(4) unchanged from the Revised Definitive Draft, and
transmitted that draft to Congress on February 5, 1973. The SpecialSubcommittee on Reform of Federal Criminal Laws (later renamed the
Subcommittee on Criminal Justice) of the House Committee on the Judiciary
first reviewed the Supreme Court Draft.
During hearings before that Subcommittee, the Department of Justice
finally gave up its attack on rule 804(b)(4).145 However, another important
141. Id. Two cases illustrate how easily a court can assess whether a statement that at least implicated
rather than exculpated the defendant was against the declarant's penal interest. See United States v.
Mackin, 561 F.2d 958, 962 (D.C. Cir.) (key Government witness' partial recantation of testimony not
against interest because perhaps intended to "impress" her probation officer and because she was
effectively immune from prosecution for perjury), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 959 (1977); United States v.
Gonzalez, 559 F.2d 1271, 1273 (5th Cir. 1977) (alleged coconspirator's grand jury testimony offered by
Government at trial against defendant not against penal interest because declarant granted immunity and
exposure to criminal prosecution arose only if declarant failed to testify before grand jury).
142. Committee Response, supra note 139, at 59. Thus, the Standing Committee virtually rejected the
Advisory Committee's initial position on this point. See text accompanying note 108 supra (Advisory
Committee indicating defendant could corroborate statement by denying guilt). The Standing Committee's
retort was unnecessarily broad. The Department of Justice had worried that the defendant's denial of guilt
might suffice to provide corroboration. The Committee, however, implicitly rejected as corroboration the
defendant's testimony about facts that would link the declarant to the crime or that would support an
inference that the declarant was trustworthy.
143. To explain the confession analogy the Committee cited Opper v. United States, 348 U.S. 84, 92-94(1954) (as had Senator McClellan, see note 96 supra) and 7 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2071. Committee
Response, supra note 139, at 59. To explain the accomplice analogy, which it was the first to suggest, the
Committee cited 7 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2059. Committee Response, supra note 139, at 59. One senses
that the Committee was purposefully vague in failing to explain the meaning of the corroboration test more
fully because it added that requirement to placate Senator McClellan and not because it believed that such
a requirement was necessary to justify admission. For a further discussion of these two analogies, see notes
486-538 infra and accompanying text.
144. See text accompanying notes 93-106 supra. The Standing Committee may have been politically
astute in suggesting the confession analogy, hoping that it might thereby placate Senator McClellan and the
Department of Justice, both of whom also had suggested the same way of interpreting the "simple
corroboration" test. If the Committee had hoped to forestall further objection by the Senator and the
Department to the penal interest exception, it succeeded. See text accompanying note 145 infra
(Department of Justice finally dropped its opposition to rule 804(b)(4)).
145. House Subcommittee Hearings, supra note 15, at 290 (statement of Donald Santarelli). Although
still concerned about the Standing Committee's failure to make all of the changes urged by the Department
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voice, Judge Henry J. Friendly, repeated Justice's concerns. Conceding that
admitting penal interest statements was "one of those things that has looked
good to many people in theory .... "146 Judge Friendly nonetheless urged
leaving "the law as it is"147 because admitting such statements "appears quite
differently when seen in the context of experience." 148 With alarm, Judge
Friendly argued that the version of the rule in the Preliminary and Revised
Drafts would have permitted a court to admit a statement by a prison inmate
serving a long sentence that he, not the accused, committed the crime.
149
Obviously unaware of Senator McClellan's influence, Judge Friendly ap-
parently believed that the Standing Committee added the "simple corrobora-
of Justice in its letter to Chief Justice Burger, the "Department determined . . . [after reviewing the
Supreme Court Draft] that further efforts to seek modification of the Rules would not be productive." Id.
Despite Justice's public disclaimer, the Department's initial position still was "represented" throughout the
Subcommittee's discussions of rule 804(b)(3). The Subcommittee's chief counsel had once worked for the
Department of Justice and its associate counsel worked for the Department both before and after his
service with the Subcommittee. Associate counsel even appeared as a witness on behalf of the Department
of Justice during the Senate Judiciary Committee's hearings. See Senate Judiciary Hearings, supra note 118,
at 105. Indeed, Chairman Hungate candidly admitted:
There were occasions when it seemed that the Justice Department knew immediately when
the subcommittee had adopted a provision that was not in line with Justice Department
policy. Needless to say, the defense counsel of America were not so represented in the mark
ups, and while the views of Justice are certainly to be welcomed, this occasionally, in my
opinion made for a one sided debate.
Letter from Representative William L. Hungate to Professor Peter W. Tague (June 18, 1980) (on file with
author).
146. House Subcommittee Hearings, supra note 15, at 264 (testimony of Judge Henry J. Friendly).
147. Id. at 265. Although Judge Friendly did not explain what he thought the "law" was, one can
assume that he intended to refer to Donnelly and thus to the nonadmissibility of defense-offered penal
interest statements. Because he thought that the rules of evidence should not be codified, perhaps he
thought the law should develop on a case-by-case basis.
148. Id.
149. Id. During the Subcommittee's hearings, Judge Friendly explained the context in which he
thought defense-offered statements usually arose: "[S]omeone who has been convicted of a crime gets
another fellow who is serving a long prison sentence before he dies ... to say that he rather than the
accused was the one who did it." Id. at 252-53. Judge Friendly's failure to illustrate his observation with
specific cases was unfortunate because in an earlier decision he had thought that the federal courts should
recognize a penal interest exception. See United States v. Annunziato, 293 F.2d 373, 378 (2d Cir. 1961)
(dictum) (characterizing exclusion of penal interest statements as a "rather indefensible limitation"). Judge
Friendly conceded that he had once thought that the exception should be recognized. House Subcommittee
Hearings, supra note 15, at 253 (testimony of Judge Henry J. Friendly).
Judge Friendly, like the Department of Justice, see text accompanying note 64 supra, worried that a
false confession by a fellow inmate would free a convicted and jailed defendant. Nonetheless, Judge
Friendly, Senator McClellan, the Department of Justice, and the House Subcommittee's associate counsel
never substantiated the basis for this fear. Furthermore, no one explained how the defendant would
accomplish this scheme. Perhaps he could advance the declarant's confession as "newly discovered
evidence" in a motion for a new trial or as support for a writ of coram nobis. (A petition for habeas corpus
probably would not succeed unless the Government suspected the declarant's complicity before the
defendant was convicted.) Because the defendant's burden of proof in a postconviction attack is so high,
however, his likelihood of success is minimal. Moreover, Judge Friendly's concern underestimates a trial
judge's power to exclude such a statement as not against the penal interest of the declarant. See United
States v. Satterfield, 572 F.2d 687, 690 (9th Cir.) (while two jailed defendants waited decision on each
other's appeal, first defendant announced that second defendant was not first defendant's actual
accomplice; statement held not to have been against interest because first defendant should have recognized
unlikelihood of success on appeal and statement would not have jeopardized appeal), cert. denied, 439 U.S.
840 (1978).
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tion" test to the Revised Definitive and Supreme Court Drafts to defuse his
own fear of the fraudulent prisoner confession. 150 He objected to the "simple
corroboration" requirement, indicating that he had "no idea what [it]
means."1 51
The House Subcommittee changed the "simple corroboration" test signifi-
cantly, rewriting it to read: "A statement tending to expose the declarant to
criminal liability and offered to exculpate the accused is not admissible unless
corroborating circumstances clearly indicate the trustworthiness of the
statement."1 52 The Subcommittee's explanation for its revision 53 masked the
disturbing process that led to this drafting change. 154
150. Judge Friendly testified that "[ait the last moment the committee apparently became aware that..
• [the defense offer of a prisoner's confession] was the common situation and [it] stuck in a provision so that
such a declaration 'is not admissible unless corroborated."' House Subcommittee Hearings, supra note 15,
at 253.
151. Id. at 265. Judge Friendly further testified: "I should suppose that any evidence of the defendant's
innocence or verification of any significant aspect of the exculpatory statement would constitute
'corroboration' in the ordinary sense of that word." Id. Judge Friendly, however, did not explain why
either form of evidence would not suffice to corroborate the statement.
Several commentators objected to the "simple corroboration" requirement during the House Subcom-
mittee's review of the Supreme Court Draft. John J. Cleary, Executive Director of Federal Defenders of San
Diego, Inc., for example, objected that the "simple corroboration" test "will effectively preclude the use of
this new exception in a criminal case by the defense. The possibility of fabrication, as suggested in the
Revised Draft, should go to the weight rather than the admissibility of such statements introduced to
exculpate the accused." Id. at 237 (statement of John J. Cleary). Similarly, Stuart H. Johnson, who worried
that the corroboration requirement might require the defendant to testify, id. at 493 (testimony of Stuart H.
Johnson, Jr.), correctly interpreted what the Advisory Committee had originally intended. Johnson's fear
was the reverse of that of Judge Friendly and the Department of Justice, both of whom worried that the
defendant could corroborate by testifying. See also Supplement to Subcommittee Hearings, supra note 10, at
129 (statement of Committee on Federal Courts, Association of the Bar of the City of New York) (no
explanation for "unwarranted" addition of "simple corroboration" requirement in Advisory Committee's
opinion offered in Note accompanying Supreme Court Draft).
152. HOUSE JUDICIARY REPORT, supra note 10, at 16, [1974] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws at 7089.
153. The House Judiciary Committee published this explanation for the Subcommittee's revision of the
"simple corroboration" test:
As for statements against penal interest, the Committee shared the view of the Court that
some such statements do possess adequate assurances of reliability and should be admissible.
It believed, however, as did the Court, that statements of this type tending to exculpate the
accused are more suspect [than statements against pecuniary or proprietary interest] and so
should have their admissibility conditioned upon some further provision insuring trustworthi-
ness. The proposal in the Court Rule to add a requirement of simple corroboration was,
however, deemed ineffective to accomplish this purpose since the accused's own testimony
might suffice while not necessarily increasing the reliability of the hearsay statement. The
Committee settled upon the language "unless corroborating circumstances clearly indicate
the trustworthiness of the statement" as affording a proper standard and degree of discretion.
It was contemplated that the result in such cases as Donnelly v. United States, 228 U.S. 243(1912) [sic] where the circumstances plainly indicated reliability, would be changed.
HousE JUDICIARY REPORT, supra note 10, at 16, [1974] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws at 7089-90.
154. A separate problem from those discussed in the text concerns the way that the Subcommittee
considered the information provided during its hearings. Its staff apparently did not summarize all of the
testimony and written submissions of the witnesses and commentators concerning rule 804(b)(3). Instead,
associate counsel focused on the opposition of Judge Friendly and the Department of Justice to the version
of the penal interest exception in the Supreme Court Draft. This is perhaps understandable because of his
relationship with the Department of Justice. See note 145 supra (associate counsel worked for Department
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The penal interest exception sparked extensive debate during four markup
sessions held on June 5, 12, and 18, 1973, and October 2, 1973.155 During the
first markup session, the rule "produced extensive discussions" but "no
unanimity."' 156 Other than Representative Elizabeth Holtzman, 157 however,
the members agreed that the rules should include a hearsay exception for
penal interest statements, thereby implicitly suggesting that a court should
admit a statement similar to the one allegedly made by the declarant in
Donnelly v. United States.58
For several reasons, the Subcommittee believed that some form of cor-
roboration requirement was necessary to enable the judge to exclude a
defense-offered statement that appeared on its face to be disserving. First,
echoing the assertions of Senator McClellan, the Department of Justice, and
Judge Friendly, associate counsel claimed that in "many, many instances" the
declarant had been a friend, a relative, or a fellow prison inmate who had lied
in claiming responsibility for a crime actually committed by the defendant. 159
Second, the Subcommittee misinterpreted the purpose of the penal interest
test set forth in the rule's first sentence. 160 Finally, the Subcommittee
erroneously assumed that the Standing Committee both shared the Subcom-
mittee's concern over fabricated statements 161 and added the "simple cor-
roboration" test in a genuine attempt to solve the problem of collusive
statements. 162
of Justice both prior to and after working for Subcommittee). As a result, the Subcommittee was not
informed of those admittedly few comments critical of either the Standing Committee's addition of the
"simple corroboration" test or its deletion of the "Bruton sentence" from the Supreme Court Draft.
155. As one member remarked after staff counsel reviewed the Subcommittee's treatment of the penal
interest exception during the two prior markup sessions, "[b]oy, we worked this one over." Markup
Session, Oct. 2, 1973.
156. Unsigned, Undated Paper Attached to Staff Counsel Herbert E. Hoffman's Handwritten Notes
Concerning June 5, 1973 Markup Session (on file at National Archives) [hereinafter Staff Counsel's Notes].
157. Representative Holtzman, who thought that a court should admit statements against pecuniary
and proprietary interests, did not explain her objection to statements against civil and penal interests.
Markup Session, June 5, 1973; Markup Session June 12, 1973. The other members, staff counsel wrote,
were "of the opinion that statements against penal interests have sufficient guarantee of trustworthiness to
be admissible but that the problem was to define the situations where such trustworthiness existed." Staff
Counsel's Notes, supra note 156. Of these members, one indicated that he shared Representative
Holtzman's concern about admitting statements against civil interest. Markup Session, June 12, 1973.
158. Markup Session, June 5, 1973. For an extensive discussion of Donnelly v. United States, 228 U.S.
243 (1913), see notes 549-67 and accompanying text.
159. Markup Session, June 5, 1973; Markup Session, June 12, 1973. The Subcommittee agreed with
associate counsel that "the Judge should have discretion to exclude, for example, a statement exculpating
the accused by a person connected with him by family or friendship ties or serving time in jail, with motive
to fabricate and take the blame." Staff Counsel's Notes, supra note 156.
160. Representative Holtzman questioned the need for a corroboration requirement if a judge could
closely examine whether the statement was in fact against the declarant's penal interest. Markup Session,
June 5, 1973. The Advisory Committee refused to add a corroboration requirement to the Preliminary and
Revised Drafts of the rule for the very reason raised by Representative Holtzman. Associate counsel
illogically answered that the declarant might act reasonably in falsely confessing to help the defendant.
Markup Session, June 5, 1973. Although a declarant's decision to confess might be reasonable, his
statement nonetheless might not be against his penal interest.
161. Associate counsel believed that the Standing Committee added the corroboration requirement so
that a court could exclude a collusive statement by a prison inmate. Markup Session, June 5, 1973. He may
have based his belief on Professor Cleary's misleading statement submitted to the Subcommittee on
February 7, 1973. See note 121 supra (corroboration requirement added "as a safeguard against
fabrication").
162. The Subcommittee obviously was unaware of Senator McClellan's role in pressuring the Advisory
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Without explanation the Subcommittee rejected the "simple corrobora-
tion" test as too vague (thereby agreeing with Judge Friendly) and asinadequate to provide the needed protection.163 The Subcommittee failed to
ask the Standing Committee to explain why it added the test or how it
intended that a court should interpret the test.164 Moreover, the Subcommit-
tee failed to apply either corroboration test to fact situations drawn from caselaw or posed as hypotheticals, failed to explore how a court should interpret
the two "precedents" offered by the Standing Committee to explain the
"simple corroboration" test, and failed to discuss whether either "precedent"
would provide adequate protection against the introduction of fabricated
statements. Instead, during the June 5, 1973 markup session, the members
toyed with different language in an attempt to draft a corroboration
requirement that would capture their heightened concern. 165 Unable to
agree, 166 the Subcommittee directed staff counsel to draft appropriate lan-
guage. 167
and Standing Committees to include the "simple corroboration" requirement. Although the Senator sent
to the Subcommittee a copy of his letter to Judge Marns, see Supplement to Subcommittee Hearings, supra
note 10, at 46-47, the Subcommittee may not even have known that the Senator objected to the version of
the penal interest exception in the Revised Draft because the letter never discussed the Senator's objections.
Further confirmation that the Subcommittee did not comprehend the Senator's influence on the Advisory
and Standing Committees is found in the argument of Representative Hogan, a member of the
Subcommittee. Representative Hogan argued that Congress should adopt the version of rule 609 in the
Supreme Court Draft, which would have permitted greater use of prior convictions to impeach than did the
Subcommittee's version of that rule, because the Standing Committee apparently believed that a broad
impeachment rule was wise. Senate Judiciary Hearings, supra note 118, at 17 (testimony of Rep. Lawrence
J. Hogan). In fact, the Advisory and Standing Committees changed the Revised Draft to broaden the use of
prior convictions solely as part of its pacification of Senator McClellan.
163. Markup Session, June 5, 1973; see Staff Counsel's Notes, supra note 156 ("There was dissatisfac-
tion with the final phrase in the [Supreme Court Draft's] Rule requiring corroboration as not appropriate to
accomplish the purpose of assuring trustworthiness").
164. The Subcommittee's failure to question the Standing Committee on these issues was surprising
because the Subcommittee had not been reluctant on prior occasions to ask the Advisory and Standing
Committees to explain particular rules in the Supreme Court Draft or to negotiate with them to find
language that satisfied both the Committees and the Subcommittee. See Supplement to Subcommittee
Hearings, supra note 10, at (V) (table of contents) (listing letters between Professor Cleary and
Subcommittee). In fact, immediately before discussing the penal interest exception at its June 12, 1973
markup session, the Subcommittee reviewed a lengthy negotiation with the Advisory and Standing
Committees over the language of rule 801(d)(1). Markup Session, June 12, 1973.
165. The Subcommittee's skepticism over the effectiveness of the "simple corroboration" test is
consistent with its general distrust of hearsay. Illustrative of its conservative approach, the Subcommittee
deleted three hearsay exceptions from the Supreme Court Draft (rules 804(b)(2) (statement of recent
perception) and 803(24) and 804(b)(6) (the "catch-all" exceptions)); limited the admissibility of so-called
"dying declarations" in criminal cases to homicides (rule 804(b)(2) (as enacted)); and added requirements
to the business records exception (rule 803(b)) and to the prior inconsistent statement doctrine (rule
801(d)(1)). Interestingly, except for its revision of the penal interest exception, the Subcommittee's
treatment of hearsay favored the criminal defendant.
166. The Subcommittee considered and rejected at least four versions of a corroboration requirement.
First, a statement "is not admissible unless corroborated, and the circumstances are such as to lead the trial
court to believe that a sufficient guarantee of trustworthiness exists." Second, paraphrasing rule 804(b)(6)
of the Supreme Court Draft, a statement is "not admissible unless having circumstantial guarantees of
trustworthiness." Third, paraphrasing rules 803(6)-(8) of the Supreme Court Draft, a statement is
inadmissible "unless the sources of information or other circumstances indicate... trustworthiness." This
proposal deleted the words "lack of" as they appear in rules 803(6)-(8). Finally, a statement should be
excluded unless it was made "under circumstances guaranteeing or tending to guarantee trustworthiness."
Markup Session, June 5, 1973.
167. Id.
1981] RULE 804(b)(3)
At the next markup session, June 12, 1973, staff counsel proposed the
language that the Congress eventually enacted. 168 During this session,
associate counsel noted that, although the Supreme Court in Chambers v.
Mississippi 169 held that the failure to admit a penal interest statement was a
constitutional violation,1 70 he did not believe Chambers mandated the admis-
sion of every penal interest statement. 171 Neither he nor the Subcommittee,
however, discussed whether the proposed corroboration requirement was
constitutional in light of Chambers, which the Court decided after trans-
mitting the Supreme Court Draft to Congress. At the next markup session,
June 18, 1973, the Subcommittee unanimously approved its version of the
rule, renumbered as rule 804(b)(3), which included its redrafted version of the
corroboration requirement and the "Bruton sentence."
172
On June 28, 1973, the House Subcommittee completed its revision of the
Supreme Court Draft and invited comments by the public about its work.173
Several commentators expressed concern about the Subcommittee's changes
to the penal interest exception.174 The Advisory and Standing Committees
acquiesced in "the rephrasing in general of the corroboration
requirement . . . " but urged that the word "clearly" be deleted. 175 That
word, they thought, would impose "a burden beyond those ordinarily
168. Letter from Herbert E. Hoffman to Members of the Special Subcommittee on Reform of Federal
Criminal Laws (June 14, 1973) (on file at National Archives). The language recommended by the staff
included the "Bruton sentence." The Subcommittee's records at the National Archives include nothing
that explains the choice of language. Furthermore, no participant I spoke with was able to offer an
explanation. Neither the language the Congress adopted nor the alternatives the Subcommittee rejected
focuses on the Subcommittee's true concern of excluding collusive statements by prison inmates or friends
and relatives of the defendant; instead, the language applies to every defense-offered statement regardless of
source or content.
169. 410 U.S. 284 (1973).
170. Id. at 298.
171. Markup Session, June 12, 1973.
172. Markup Session, June 18, 1973.
173. The Subcommittee's print was published in the Congressional Record and by several publishers
and was sent to state bar associations and to every organization or person who submitted material or
testified. Memorandum of Staff of Senator Roman L. Hruska, Re: H.R. 5463, An Act to Establish the
Federal Rules of Evidence, and for Other Purposes, at 2 (sent with letter from Senator Hruska to Senator
James 0. Eastland (Feb. 28, 1974)) (on file at National Archives) [hereinafter H.R. 5463 Agenda].
174. One commentator correctly thought the corroboration requirement presented a "methodological
problem" because a hearsay exception was created only when that type of hearsay was assumed to be
trustworthy enough to excuse live testimony. A corroboration requirement was inconsistent with that
assumption and would therefore interfere with the factfinder's usual assessment of weight. Letter from
Alvin K. Hellerstein to William L. Hungate (Aug. 2, 1973) (sending comments of the Committee on
Federal Courts, the Association of the Bar of the City of New York), reprinted in Supplement to
Subcommittee Hearings, supra note 10, at 309. Another commentator thought that the Subcommittee's
corroboration requirement was unclear. See Letter from Representative William S. Cohen to Representa-
tive William L. Hungate (July 31, 1973), reprinted in Supplement to Subcommittee Hearings, supra note 10,
at 273 (no reason for change because no practical difference from rule in Supreme Court Draft). In contrast,
Judge Friendly was "gratified" by the Subcommittee's changes to the penal interest exception. See Letter
from Judge Henry J. Friendly to Representative William L. Hungate (July 12, 1973), reprinted in
Supplement to Subcommittee Hearings, supra note 10, at 199 (expressing approval of new material in rule
804(b)(3)).
175. Letter from Judge Albert B. Maris to Representative William L. Hungate (July 31, 1973) (sending
the Advisory and Standing Committee's Comments on the Subcommittee's June 28, 1973 Print), reprinted
in Supplement to Subcommittee Hearings, supra note 10, at 298 [hereinafter Committee's Comments to
Subcommittee Print]. It is not clear whether either the Advisory Committee or the Standing Committee
met formally to consider the changes proposed by the House Subcommittee.
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attending the admissibility of evidence, particularly statements offered by
defendants in criminal cases, and [would become a] prolific source of disputes
and appeals."' 176 The Department of Justice cautioned that the Subcommit-
tee's test was unclear 77 and might pose a constitutional problem when read
against Chambers.178 Thus, the Department of Justice recommended adding
"a note to indicate that the subsection [on penal interest statements] is to be
applied in conformity with the Chambers decision."1 79
On October 2, 1973, the House Subcommittee reconsidered the rule in light
of public comments.180 Neither the Subcommittee at that meeting nor the
176. Id. The Committees did not explain to the House Subcommittee how the penal interest exception
as reworded by the Subcommittee differed from other evidentiary rules either in general or as applied to the
offer of evidence by criminal defendants. The Committees' public objection to the Subcommittee's
corroboration test unfortunately downplayed the full force of Professor Cleary's criticism of the
Subcommittee's change. In an internal memorandum prepared for the Advisory and Standing Committees,
Professor Cleary wrote:
The [Subcommittee's] amendment [to the penal interest exception] also purports to strength-
en the corroboration requirement with respect to third party confessions. A principal declared
purpose is to preclude resort to the accused's own testimony for corroboration. This result
may be too sweeping: while one would certainly entertain grave doubts whether mere denials
of guilt by the accused would satisfy a corroboration requirement, a contrary view would
seem appropriate when his testimony recounted events independently supporting the truth of
the confession. Of course, the likelihood of his being able to perform the latter feat without
establishing some measure of complicity on his own part is slight. The amendment seems to
inject the judge unduly into the area reserved to juries. The same may be said with respect to
establishing the standard of proof as "clearly," a burden beyond that ordinarily attending the
admissibility of evidence by any party and particularly going beyond burdens that have been
thought properly to be imposed upon defendants in criminal cases.
Reporter's Comments on Amendments to Proposed Rules of Evidence Drafted by House Subcommittee on
Criminal Justice, at 38 (July, 1973) (on file at Judicial Conference) [hereinafter Reporter's Comments to
Subcommittee Print]. Implicit in Professor Cleary's comment was his belief that the judge, in deciding
under rule 104(a) whether the defendant had established his burden, would require proof beyond the
preponderance of evidence test normally applicable. Because Professor Cleary's comment was not
published, the House Subcommittee may not have recognized the effect of its change in the corroboration
requirement. Also, neither Professor Cleary nor the Advisory and Standing Committees noted the possible
constitutional problem in increasing the corroboration requirement as the House Subcommittee had done.
177. Letter from William D. Ruckelshaus, Acting Deputy Attorney General, to Representative
William L. Hungate (Sept. 13, 1973) (sending Department of Justice Analysis and Recommendations
Regarding Draft of Proposed Rules of Evidence of the Subcommittee on Criminal Justice, House
Committee on the Judiciary) reprinted in Supplement to Subcommittee Hearings, supra note 10, at 352 ("It
is not clear exactly what corroborating circumstances are required under this provision") [hereinafter
Ruckleshaus Letter].
178. Id. As the House Subcommittee began its discussion of the penal interest exception on June 5,
1973, one member remarked that he had received "notice of a constitutional problem" presented by
Chambers. Markup Session, June 5, 1973. Nonetheless, the Subcommittee failed to consider the effect of
Chambers on its version of the rule during the June 5, 12, and 18 markup sessions and apparently during its
October 2, 1973 session.
179. Ruckleshaus Letter, supra note 177, at 352. To define the corroboration test, the Department of
Justice suggested that the Subcommittee refer to the language in Chambers. Id. In Chambers the Supreme
Court indicated that due process requires the admission of a penal interest statement if "considerable
assurance of [its] reliability [exists]." 410 U.S. 284, 302 (1973). The Department of Justice's suggestion is
ironic: Although it opposed the Subcommittee's reinsertion of the "Bruton sentence" because it feared that
such an addition would codify the constitutional principle of Bruton, the Department understandably
feared that the Subcommittee's corroboration requirement might be unconstitutional unless courts read it
to impose a test no higher than that of Chambers.
180. Regrettably, the tape recording of that meeting does not include the Subcommittee's discussion of
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House Judiciary Committee changed the rule or included anything in their
respective reports either to reflect the criticism of the Advisory and Standing
Committees or to incorporate the concern of the Department of Justice. As a
result, we do not know whether the Subcommittee and the Judiciary
Committee disagreed with those comments or instead believed that the
federal courts would interpret the rule as the Department of Justice had
urged.
The rule as proposed by the Subcommittee passed the House without
discussion on the floor. 181 During two days of hearings before the Senate
Committee on the Judiciary, the penal interest exception received little
attention. 182 After considering the prepared comments submitted by the
Standing Committee, 183 the Senate Judiciary Committee accepted the House
language with respect to the accused, but deleted the "Bruton sentence." The
Senate passed this version of the rule without amendment. 184 Because the
those public comments that concerned a defense-offered penal interest statement. The tape recording,
however, contains the discussion of statements against proprietary, pecuniary, and social interest, omits the
discussion of the corroboration requirement, and includes the discussion of the "Bruton sentence." No
participant to whom I spoke remembers the discussion of the corroboration test.
181. H.R. 5463, 93d Cong., 2d Sess., 120 CONG. REC. 2393 (1974).
182. One substantive comment about the penal interest exception appeared in an article hidden in the
Senate Judiciary Committee's record. See Rothstein, The Proposed Amendments to the Federal Rules of
Evidence, 62 GEo. L.J. 125, 152-55 (1973), reprinted in Senate Judiciary Hearings, supra note 118, at 232-
34 (urging deletion of corroboration requirement). The sparse record of the Senate Judiciary Committee's
work includes the record of its public hearings, the report that accompanied the Committee's print, and a
few scattered documents kept by the National Archives. The Senate Judiciary Committee decided to focus
only on those few proposals of the House that were of especial concern to the Senators. See Letter from
Senator Quenton N. Burdick to Senator James 0. Eastland, Chairman of the Senate Committee on the
Judiciary (Feb. 20, 1974) (on file at National Archives). Senator Burdick stated:
Although each of us may have our own views as to how we would write a particular rule ....
I believe the hearings in the Senate should not involve a general review of the proposed rules,
but should be limited to only the specific matters that are of concern .... [Tihe rules should
receive expeditious consideration by the Committee and I believe this might be facilitated by
having the staff members of the various interested Senators .... compile a list of those rules
which would appear to warrant further review.
Id. (emphasis in original).
The only part of the penal interest exception that apparently drew the Committee's attention was the
"Bruton sentence." See note 215 infra (setting forth unpublished agenda of Senate Judiciary Committee's
September 18, 1974 meeting). Because no record of the executive sessions of the Senate Judiciary
Committee exists and because none of the correspondence addressed to the Committee on file with the
National Archives discussed the penal interest exception, we can assume that the Committee did not
discuss any part of the rule other than the "Bruton sentence."
183. See Letter from Judge Roszel C. Thomsen, Chairman, Judicial Conference of the United States,
Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure, to Senator James 0. Eastland (May 22, 1974) (sending
[Comments on] Federal Rules of Evidence), reprinted in Senate Judiciary Hearings, supra note 118, at 70
[hereinafter Comments on Federal Rules of Evidence]. The Standing Committee's comments on rule
804(b)(3) were the same as those it submitted to the House Subcommittee, see notes 175-76 supra and
accompanying text, with the remarkable additional suggestion that the rule might be moved from the rule
804 exceptions to the rule 803 exceptions (in which the declarant's unavailability was not a requirement)
because against-interest statements were more reliable than the other forms of hearsay covered by the rule
804 exceptions. See Comments on Federal Rules of Evidence, supra, at 69. The members of the Standing
Committee who testified before the Senate Judiciary Committee did not comment on the rule. See Senate
Judiciary Hearings, supra note 118, at 27-53 (testimony of Judge Roszel C. Thomsen, Judge Albert B.
Mars, Judge Charles W. Joiner, Professor James W. Moore, and Professor Edward W. Cleary).
184. H.R. 5463, 93rd Cong., 2d Sess., 120 CONG. REc. 37,084 (1974).
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Senate's position on Bruton prevailed in conference, 185 Congress enacted the
rule without the "Bruton sentence." 18 6
B. THE GOVERNMENT OFFERS A DECLARANT'S STATEMENT
Determining whether the Government may use the penal interest exception
to introduce a declarant's statement in which he implicates both himself and
the defendant is an important inquiry. Significantly, that determination alsohelps answer two questions about a defense use of the exception. In a one- or a
multi-person crime, may the defendant introduce that part of the declarant's
statement that directly or inferentially exonerates the defendant? Is the
corroboration requirement imposed on the defendant constitutional? Unfor-
tunately, we cannot answer either question with certainty because Congress
confused the relationship between the evidentiary and the constitutional
doctrines 187 and misunderstood the Advisory and Standing Committees'
position with respect to the Government's use of the exception.
In the Preliminary Draft version of rule 804(b)(3), the Advisory Committee
wrote: "[The penal interest] example does not include a statement or
confession offered against the accused in a criminal case, made by a
codefendant or other person implicating both himself and the accused."188
The Advisory Committee's publicized explanation of this "Bruton sentence"
in its Note to the rule is somewhat ambiguous. On the one hand, the Advisory
Committee suggested that the declarant's implication of the accused could be
admissible as a collateral statement,18 9 apparently on the assumption that if
the declarant truthfully implicated himself, he also truthfully implicated the
accused. On the other hand, after citing Justice White's dissent in Bruton in
which he argued that the declarant would advance, rather than jeopardize, his
interests by serving up others as possible defendants, 19 0 the Advisory Commit-
tee concluded that such a statement would never be against the declarant's
penal interest.191 Thus, the Advisory Committee did not include the "Bruton
185. I could find no record of the conference meeting apart from the Conference Report and comments
by Representatives on the House floor, none of which addressed the penal interest exception. See 120
CONG. REC. 40,890-96 (1974).
186. H.R. 5463, 93rd Cong., 2d Sess., 120 CONG. REc. 40,070 (1974) (Senate); id. at 40,896 (House of
Representatives).
187. No evidence indicates that anyone discussed the relationship between the penal interest exception
and the treatment of a coconspirator's statements under rule 801(d)(2)(E). For example, the statement to a
police officer, "The defendant and I killed the victim yesterday," probably would be inadmissable under
rule 801(d)(2)(E) as not "in furtherance of the conspiracy." FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(2)(E). Nonetheless, that
sort of statement might be admissible against the defendant because both parts 'arguably are against the
declarant's penal interest.
188. Preliminary Draft, supra note 1, at 378. Professor Cleary added this "Bruton sentence," see note 52
supra, after the Supreme Court decided Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123 (1968).
189. See Preliminary Draft, supra note 1, at 386 ("Ordinarily the third-party confession is thought of in
terms of exculpating the accused, but... it may include statements implicating him, and under the general
theory of declarations against interest they would be admissible as related statements").
190. Dissenting in Bruton, Justice White argued that "[d]ue to his strong motivation to implicate the
defendant and to exonerate himself, a codefendant's statements about what the defendant said or did areless credible than ordinary hearsay evidence." Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123, 141 (1968) (White, J.,
dissenting).
191. Advisory Committee Note to Preliminary Draft, supra note 1, at 386. In the Advisory Committee's
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sentence" on the supposition that Bruton constitutionally mandated exclu-
sion. Nonetheless, the citation to Bruton in the Committee's Note led to
misinterpretations that it never publicly corrected. 192
The Committee changed neither the rule nor the Note until the Revised
Definitive and Supreme Court Drafts. Senator McClellan objected to the
"Bruton sentence" because he misinterpreted the Note to the Preliminary
Draft. He argued that the sentence misstated constitutional doctrine in light
of Nelson v. O'Nel,193 a case decided by the Supreme Court after publication
of the Preliminary and the Revised Drafts.194 In Nelson the Court held that the
Government did not violate the confrontation clause by introducing against
only the codefendant his oral admission implicating both himself and the
defendant.195 Citing Nelson, Senator McClellan argued that the "Bruton
sentence" should be deleted because the Advisory Committee had eschewed
"writ[ing] the Rules in terms of their constitutional implications." 196
During its September 5, 1971 meeting, the Advisory Committee rejected
Senator McClellan's broad attack on the "Bruton sentence." As Professor
Cleary correctly noted, the "Bruton sentence" does not exclude a statement
when, as in Nelson, the declarant testifies because he is not then unavailable as
required by rule 8-04(a). To clarify its position, the Advisory Committee
directed Professor Cleary to accommodate Senator McClellan's concerns by
explaining in the Note to the rule that the "Bruton sentence" does not apply
to the Nelson facts.197
view,
[t]he unacceptability of a confession of this kind as a declaration against interest is
emphasized in the dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice White: statements of codefendants have
traditionally been regarded with suspicion because of the readily supposed advantages of
implicating another. This view is reflected in the concluding sentence of the example.
Id.
After the Department of Justice argued in its first letter that the "Bruton sentence" did not reflect
constitutional doctrine, see Justice's First Letter, supra note 63, at 34-35, Professor Cleary responded that
the Department of Justice's objection assumed
that the sentence attempts to codify the confrontation phrase of Bruton, when in fact Bruton is
relied upon only to repel any supposition that a statement of this kind is truly against interest.
In other words, the sentence does not say that a Bruton confession violates the right of
confrontation; it does say that a Bruton confession is not against interest.
Reporter's Comments to Preliminary Draft, supra note 68, at 191. The Advisory Committee adopted the
same position during its September 5, 1971 meeting. Advisory Committee Meeting, Sept. 5, 1971.
192. Commentators, as well as Senator McClellan and the House Subcommittee, erroneously thought
that the Preliminary and Revised Drafts included the "Bruton sentence" to codify the constitutional
principle of Bruton. The Committee on Federal Courts of the New York City Bar Association, for example,
noted that although the Revised Draft "attempted to accommodate the rationale of Bruton v. United
States . . . .the [Supreme Court Draft] of the Rule does not purport to deal with the Bruton question."
House Subcommittee Hearings, supra note 15, at 129 (statement of the Committee on Federal Courts, the
Association of the Bar of the City of New York).
193. 402 U.S. 622 (1971).
194. McClellan Letter, supra note 82, at 33,648.
195. 402 U.S. at 626. The codefendant testified that he had not made the statement and that its contents
were false. Id. at 624. Both defendants testified to the same defense. Because O'Neil had the opportunity to
cross-examine the declarant-codefendant and because the jury had been instructed not to consider the
statement against O'Neil, the Supreme Court found no confrontation clause violation. Id. at 626.
196. McClellan Letter, supra note 82, at 33,648.
197. Professor Cleary added this sentence to the Note: "This situation [when the declarant is
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Senator McClellan shifted his objection to the "Bruton sentence" during
his meeting with representatives of the Advisory and Standing Committees on
September 22, 1971. The Senator argued that the "Bruton sentence" was
overbroad because not every statement made by a declarant implicating the
accused is an attempt "to curry favor with the authorities ... ,"198 Agreeing
with Senator McClellan, Professor Cleary and the representatives of the
Committees decided to delete the "Bruton sentence" from the rule and to
change the Note to state that a court should determine the penal interest
effect of such a statement in each case.199 Interestingly, the Standing
Committee did not detect the disparity it created by imposing the "simple
corroboration" requirement on the defendant but not on the Government. 200
The House Subcommittee decided to reinsert the "Bruton sentence" in a
slightly reworded form: "A statement or confession offered against the
accused in a criminal case, made by a codefendant or other person implicating
both himself and the accused, is not admissible." 201 The reason for the
Subcommittee's reinsertion of the "Bruton sentence" is not altogether clear.
During the June 12, 1973 markup session, one representative expressed the
Advisory Committee's once-held concern that the declarant would not speak
unavailable] is not to be confused with those where the confessing defendant is present and testifies at the
trial." Advisory Committee Amendments, supra note 109, at 130. However, this addition did not respond
to the Senator's broader objection to the "Bruton sentence," namely whether its purpose was to codify
Bruton or to hold, on evidentiary grounds, that such a statement was not against penal interest.
198. Cleary Memorandum, supra note 112, at 7.
199. Although the Committees capitulated to Senator McClellan by adding the "simple corroboration"
requirement, they did not delete the "Bruton sentence" for the same reason, as they have been accused of
having done. See generally Comment, Federal Rule of Evidence 804(b)(3) and Inculpatory Statements
Against Penal Interest, 66 CALIF. L. REv. 1189, 1193-94 (1978) [hereinafter Comment, Inculpatory
Statements].
During its September 30, 1971 meeting, the Standing Committee agreed with Professor Cleary's
suggested change to the Note. In the Revised Definitive and Supreme Court Drafts, the Note reads:
These decisions [Bruton and Douglas v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 415 (1965) (reversal on
constitutional ground when trial court admitted codefendant's confession implicating ac-
cused)] ... by no means require that all statements implicating another person be excluded
from the category of declarations against interest. Whether a statement is in fact against
interest must be determined from the circumstances of each case. Thus a statement admitting
guilt and implicating another person, made while in custody, may well be motivated by a
desire to curry favor with the authorities and hence fail to qualify as against interest .... On
the other hand, the same words spoken under different circumstances, eg., to an acquaint-
ance, would have no difficulty in qualifying. The rule does not purport to deal with questions
of the right of confrontation.
Advisory Committee Note to Supreme Court Draft, supra note 1, at 328.
200. Several of the alternative ways of phrasing the "simple corroboration" requirement would not
have created this difference. See note 105 supra and accompanying text (setting forth different versions of
corroboration requirement). During the June 12, 1973 markup session, Representative Holtzman asked
why the Government had not been burdened with the corroboration requirement. Markup Session, June
12, 1973. See also Letter from Melvin B. Lewis to William L. Hungate (July 18, 1973), reprinted In
Supplement to Subcommittee Hearings, supra note 10, at 210 (noting disparity). Associate counsel
responded that he saw no need to impose such a burden because Bruton constitutionally prevented the
Government from introducing a nontestifying declarant's statement implicating the defendant. Markup
Session, June 5, 1973. Although he misinterpreted Bruton's reach, see note 204 infra, his answer satisfied
the Subcommittee, which did not discuss the imbalance further. For a discussion of the constitutionality of
imposing the corroboration burden on the defendant but not on the Government, see notes 708-59 infra.
201. JUNE 28, 1973 PRINT, supra note 10, at 175.
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against his penal interest by implicating the defendant. In arguing that the
declarant, for example, might "clear up twenty burglaries" in hope of either a
favorable plea bargain or incarceration in a federal prison,20 2 this represehta-
tive implicitly assumed that the declarant in each instance would damn the
defendant to help himself. This evidentiary concern, however, did not
motivate the Subcommittee to reinsert the "Bruton sentence." Rather,
associate counsel, who argued that Bruton constitutionally excluded any
statement by a nontestifying declarant, 2 3 thought that the rule should include
a "Bruton sentence" to codify his understanding of that decision. Although he
misinterpreted Bruton,204 associate counsel persuaded the Subcommittee to
adopt his position.205
In an intriguing response, the Advisory and Standing Committees in-
dicated that they would "express no disagreement with the proposed final
sentence to be added to [the rule]. The wording may, however, invite
confusion, and it is suggested that 'not admissible' be replaced by 'not within
this exception.' The result is consistent with the Subcommittee Note. '206 By
suggesting this change in language, the Committees apparently hoped to
salvage the coconspirator doctrine and other hearsay exceptions as possible
avenues for the Government to introduce third-party statements implicating
the defendant. However, their failure to oppose the Subcommittee's decision
to remove the availability of the penal interest exception conflicted both with
Professor Cleary's evaluation of the reinserted "Bruton sentence" 20 7 and with
the Standing Committee's earlier decision that a declarant's implication of the
defendant might be against the declarant's penal interest. Is it possible that
202. Markup Session, June 12, 1973.
203. Id.
204. Associate counsel erroneously assumed that Bruton held that the confrontation clause barred the
introduction of any hearsay statement against the defendant when the declarant did not testify. Because the
trial court did not admit the codefendant's statement against the defendant, the Supreme Court left
unresolved the constitutionality of introducing a nontestifying declarant's statement through a hearsay
exception that justified its substantive use against the defendant. Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123, 128
n.3 (1968).
Associate counsel's misinterpretation, however, explains why the Subcommittee wrote that a declarant's
implication of the defendant "is not admissible." The Subcommittee assumed that neither rule 804(b)(3)
nor any other hearsay exception provided a way of surmounting Brutoin's constitutional bar.
205. In its report, the Subcommittee explained that it "also determined to add to the Rule the final
sentence from the 1971 draft, designed to codify the doctrine of Bruton v. United States." JUNE 28, 1973
PRINT, supra note 10, at 176.
206. Committees' Comments to Subcommittee Print, supra note 175, at 298.
207. In an unpublished comment, Professor Cleary wrote:
With regard to the final sentence of the amendment, which is taken from the Revised Draft of
1971, the Advisory Committee, after inserting it, concluded that its principle, extracted from
Bruton, could not safely be put in the form of a rule, but that room should be left for an ad hoc
determination in each case whether an implicating confession by a codefendant was against
his interest. True, a generalization may safely be made that such confessions by a person in
custody are tainted by self-interest, but the same broad conclusion cannot be reached
concerning statements made under other circumstances. Moreover, the formulation seemed
to invite confusion with respect to confessions by a codefendant who is prepared to testify,
even though strictly speaking he is not unavailable and his statement therefore not literally
within the scope of the provision. The Reporter believes that the Advisory Committee's
decision to omit the sentence was a wise one.
Reporter's Comments to House Subcommittee Print, supra note 176, at 38-39.
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Senator McClellan's argument that such a statement could be against penal
interest no longer persuaded the Committees? Or, did they not object because
they were secretly pleased by the indirect slap that the Subcommittee had
administered to Senator McClellan, whose pressure they could not withstand?
Unfortunately, neither question is answerable because neither Committee
recorded its discussion of the House Subcommittee's "Bruton sentence."
The Subcommittee discussed the public's comments to its "Bruton sen-
tence" on October 2, 1973. The Subcommittee discussed and quickly
dismissed the Department of Justice's objection that the Subcommittee's
"Bruton sentence" did not express constitutional doctrine.208 Nonetheless, the
Advisory and Standing Committees' response engendered much discussion
and confusion. Since both Committees had proposed similar language in the
Revised Draft, several Subcommittee members did not understand why the
Committees suggested changing the language of the reinserted "Bruton
sentence. '209 Although the Subcommittee ultimately decided to retain the
"Bruton sentence," it also decided both to change the last clause to conform
with the Advisory and Standing Committees' recommendation and to point
out the policy issue for the House Judiciary Committee to consider.210
The House Judiciary Committee retained the amended sentence. Because
the Committee did not record its discussions, we cannot determine whether it
was motivated by constitutional or evidentiary considerations.211 By
republishing the Subcommittee's explanation of the "Bruton sentence," the
full Committee apparently agreed that Bruton mandated that courts exclude
Government-offered penal interest statements. 212 Thus, both the Subcommit-
tee and the full Committee misunderstood why the Advisory and Standing
Committees included the "Bruton sentence" in the Revised Draft but then
deleted it from the Supreme Court Draft. The House Committees also
apparently never addressed the threshold evidentiary question whether a
declarant's implication of the defendant could be against his penal interest. As
a result, the Committees did not make the policy decision to exclude such a
statement whether or not it was against interest.
The Senate Judiciary Committee voted to delete the "Bruton sentence"
because it thought the "[c]odification of a constitutional principle is unneces-
sary and, where the principle is under development, often unwise. ' 213
Moreover, the Committee thought that the House's version excluded certain
208. Markup Session, Oct. 2, 1973. The Department of Justice had argued that the "Bruton sentence"
should not be included because the Bruton issue was "complicated and marked by nuance." Ruckelshaus
Letter, supra note 177, at 352.
209. Markup Session, Oct. 2, 1973. Staff counsel, after reviewing the competing considerations
underlying the Subcommittee's earlier decision to include the sentence, suggested that constitutional
doctrine probably did not require that the rule forbid the introduction of every third party statement
implicating the accused. Nonetheless, he argued that Congress could decide as a matter of policy to provide
more protection for the defendant than the Constitution required. Id. Staff counsel, however, did not
identify what policy considerations might justify greater protection for the defendant. He also mistakenly
thought that the Standing Committee deleted the "Bruton sentence" from the Supreme Court Draft
because it decided not to codify Bruton. Id.
210. OCTOBER 10, 1973 PRINT, supra note 10, at 388.
211. Also, neither the Subcommittee's Note to its October 10, 1973 Print nor the tape recording of the
Subcommittee's October 2, 1973 discussion provide an explanation for this change.
212. HOUSE JUDICIARY REPORT, supra note 10, at 16-17, [1974] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS at
7090.
213. SENATE JUDICIARY REPORT, supra note 10, at 22, [1974] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws at 7068.
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types of statements that were constitutionally admissible.214 Because the
Senate Judiciary Committee kept no record of its discussion, we cannot
determine if it considered the evidentiary question whether the declarant's
implication of the defendant could ever be against his penal interest. Since
Senator McClellan was chairman of the Subcommittee on Criminal Laws and
Procedures, however, we reasonably can assume that he convinced the
Committee that a declarant's implication of the defendant might be against
the declarant's penal interest.215 The Senate Committee's position prevailed at
the conference. Therefore, rule 804(b)(3) as enacted does not include the
"Bruton sentence" and does not specifically mention whether a court may
admit statements implicating the accused as against the declarant~s penal
interest.
C. REVIEW
Before turning to specific questions concerning the interpretation and the
application of rule 804(b)(3), we should review the path of the rule from its
proposal by the Advisory Committee to its enactment by Congress. First, the
discussion at each stage proceeded in a factual vacuum, with no review of the
case law to determine either the typical relationship between the declarant
and the defendant or the type of statement that parties typically offered and
courts usually admitted.216 This failure led the House Subcommittee to
suggest that the statement in Donnelly was representative of most admissible
declarations, a remarkable suggestion given the facts of that case.
217
214. The Senate Report cited two cases, United States v. Zelker, 452 F.2d 1009 (2d Cir. 1971), and
United States v. Mancusi, 404 F.2d 296 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 942 (1970), in which no
confrontation clause violation occurred. SENATE JUDICIARY REPORT, supra note 10, [1974] U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS at 7068. The Senate Committee cited Zelker to establish that the confrontation clause
is not violated when other evidence places the defendant at the scene of the crime. Id. Although such
evidence was offered in Zelker, the court based its decision on the "interlocking confession" doctrine. See
United States v. Zelker, 452 F.2d 1009, 1010 (2d Cir. 1971) (when defendant's confession interlocks with
and supports confession of codefendant, no violation of Bruton rule). Zelker and Mancusi presaged the
Supreme Court's decision in Parker v. Randolph, 442 U.S. 62 (1979) (plurality opinion), in which a
plurality reached the same result. See id. at 72 (joint trial admission of defendant's interlocking confessions
did not infringe either defendant's confrontation right).
215. The only evidence that the Senate Judiciary Committee discussed this evidentiary issue conflicts
with this assumption. In a background memorandum, apparently intended to guide the Committee's
discussion, a staff member on the Committee wrote:
Background [to rule 804(b)(3)]: As passed by the House, the last sentence of this section
precludes the use of a statement of a person implicating the defendant, whether the declarant
is a codefendant in the trial or merely a witness. It goes beyond the rule in Bruton which
precludes the use of such a statement on sixth amendment grounds when the declarant is a
codefendant. Issue: Whether the rule should go beyond the Bruton principle.
H.R. 5463 Agenda, supra note 173.
216. During the Senate Judiciary Committee's hearings, the Senators and staff aides, in off-the-record
discussions, feared that defense counsel would search death row for a condemned prisoner who, in
exchange for a promise to care for his family, would "confess" to the crime charged against the defendant.
Conversation with Professor Paul Rothstein (May 7, 1979). Distrust of defense-offered statements had
reached a new high.
217. See notes 549-67 infra and accompanying text (discussing Donnelly and Subcommittee's view of
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Second, the House Subcommittee misunderstood the Advisory and Stand-ing Committees' purpose in adding the corroboration requirement. Because
the House Subcommittee refused to follow the advice that it review only the
rules on privileges in the Supreme Court Draft218 and instead chose to examine
that draft rule by rule, the Subcommittee should have determined why theAdvisory and Standing Committees added the "simple corroboration" test.Such an inquiry would have revealed that the Subcommittee misconceived the
Advisory and Standing Committees' purpose in adding that requirement.
Those Committees had not added the requirement, as the Subcommittee
assumed, because they believed the version of the rule in the Preliminary and
Revised Drafts would have required admitting a dying prisoner's fabricated
confession. Instead, the Committees surrendered to Senator McClellan'sdemand that the rule contain a corroboration requirement to prevent theintroduction of fabricated statements. Those Committees, perhaps un-
derstandably,219 did not publicize the source of their "simple corroboration"
test, a failure that led to misinterpretation by the House Subcommittee and
others as to their purpose in adding that requirement.220 Also, the Subcom-
mittee's announced reason for strengthening the corroboration requirement-
to prevent the defendant from satisfying the Supreme Court Draft's "simple
corroboration" test through his own testimony-was unwarranted. TheStanding Committee had rejected this interpretation of the test after Senator
McClellan objected to it. The Subcommittee thus overdrafted the corrobora-
tion requirement to remove a problem that the Standing Committee already
had eliminated. If the defendant had other evidence implicating the declarant,
he would not have to testify and consequently there was no need for the
Subcommittee to increase the corroboration hurdle.
Third, the Subcommittee made no attempt to explain how courts should
interpret its corroboration requirement. It also overdrafted the corroboration
requirement; it could have allayed its concern that untrustworthy statements
by friends, relatives, or prison inmates would prompt juries to acquit guiltydefendants in various other ways. The Subcommittee, for example, could have
instructed courts to evaluate closely the penal interest effect of statements by
those sorts of declarants.221
218. See House Subcommittee Hearings, supra note 15, at 427 (testimony of Alan B. Morrison) ("I do
not believe that either this committee... or the Congress as a whole should become so enmeshed in the
rules of evidence, with the exception of the article on privileges, to take the time to try to draft the rules").219. The Committees probably decided not to publicize the influence of Senator McClellan to forestallhim from objecting to the Supreme Court Draft. They also may have feared that other members of
Congress might have urged striking the "simple corroboration" test if its addition were perceived as an
unprincipled compromise. Had other members of Congress objected to the compromise, the Committees
might reasonably have feared that Senator McClellan would then press for his proposed amendment to the
rulemaking process.
220. Two commentators told the House Subcommittee that pressure from Senator McClellan and theDepartment of Justice apparently caused the Advisory and Standing Committees to change the Revised
Draft. See House Subcommittee Hearings, supra note 10, at 180 (statement of Charles R. Halpern & George
T. Frampton) (McClellan and Department of Justice responsible for "puzzling shifts" in Revised Draft).Halpern snd Frampton, however, did not have access to the internal documents of the Advisory andStanding Committees to identify precisely their reaction to the pressure exerted by the Senator and theDepartment of Justice. The Subcommittee did not respond to Halpern and Frampton's call for aninvestigation. See id. ("We do not know at this point what transpired, but this is something this
Subcommittee certainly has an obligation to find out").
221. For other alternatives, see notes 702-07 infra and accompanying text.
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Fourth, except for the Department of Justice, which belatedly expressed
concern about the effect of Chambers v. Mississippi, 222 each group that
considered the rule either was unaware of or blithely ignored the constitu-
tional implications of the various versions. This failure is surprising223 because
statements against penal interest are vitally important to the defense.
Furthermore, in Chambers and Washington v. Texas, 224 a case decided before
publication of the Preliminary Draft, the Supreme Court announced constitu-
tional doctrine of obvious relevance to the rule.
Finally, another constitutional problem crept into the rule when Congress,
by imposing a corroboration requirement only on the defendant, created a
difference between the Government's ability and the defendant's right to
introduce a penal interest statement. As enacted, the rule also may create a
constitutional problem if it allows the Government to introduce a related
statement against the defendant but allows the defendant to introduce only a
third-party statement that substitutes the declarant for the defendant in a one-
person crime.
IV. ANALYSIS OF RULE 804(b)(3)
A. WHEN IS A STATEMENT AGAINST INTEREST?
1. Did the declarant make the "statement"?
225
Before a court determines whether a declarant's statement is against his
penal interest, the court must be satisfied that the declarant made the
statement attributed to him.226 Alternatively, the court must trust that the
222. 410 U.S. 284 (1973).
223. In a letter to Chief Justice Burger in defense of the Preliminary Draft, the Advisory Committee
wrote:
[We may appreciate the fact that despite the efforts of the Committee to forestall them,
constitutional issues may lurk in the Proposed Rules, but... this is no less so than as may be
true of the other federal rules .... The Advisory Committee, greatly assisted by the scholars,
has sought diligently to expose and to frustrate those possibilities. It is of the unanimous
opinion that its proposals have constitutional integrity.
Letter from Albert E. Jenner, Jr., Chairman, Advisory Committee, to Chief Justice Burger, at 16 (Jan. 11,
1971) (on file at Judicial Conference). At the time Jenner wrote, the version of the penal interest exception
in the Preliminary Draft was constitutional. The constitutional integrity of the rule became suspect only
later, with the addition of a corroboration burden. Surprisingly, the Advisory and Standing Committees
did not consider the constitutionality of adding the "simple corroboration" test and did not urge Congress
to consider the constitutionality of the Subcommittee's higher corroboration requirement.
224. 388 U.S. 14 (1967). In Washington the Supreme Court held that a defendant was denied his due
process and sixth amendment compulsory process rights when he was prevented from calling an
accomplice to testify as a witness. Id. at 19.
225. A related problem is whether a third party made a "statement" in evidentiary terms so that his
conduct or oral statement is hearsay within rule 801(a). See note 48 supra (discussing People v. Mendez,
193 Cal. 39, 223 P.2d 65 (1924)).
226. One aspect of this problem concerns the proponent's burden of proof. See notes 632-38 infra and
accompanying text. A second aspect concerns whether a third party's failure to respond to an accusation
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witness who testified about the statement truthfully reported both the
existence of the declarant and the substance of his statement.227 This problem
of proof is not serious if defense counsel either spoke to the declarant orparticipated in obtaining his statement.228 The relationship between the
constitutes a declaration. The defendant, for example, confronts the third party and says, "You did it, not
me," and the third party does not respond. The legislative discussion of rule 804(b)(3) does not indicate
whether the third party's silence constitutes an implied statement that he agrees with the defendant's
comment. In considering the related problem of a party's failure to respond to such a comment, the
Advisory Committee noted that inferring an admission from a failure to deny is "fairly weak" and raises
"troublesome" questions. See Advisory Committee Note to Supreme Court Draft, supra note I, at 279-98(Note to rule 801(d)(2)(B); discussing admission by adoption or acquiesence in statement by another). TheAdvisory Committee concluded, however, that recent Supreme Court decisions relating to custodial
interrogation and the right to counsel justified admitting into evidence in a criminal prosecution a party's
failure to respond to an accusation when one would have expected him to respond. Id. at 298.
This question has a constitutional dimension when a suspect who has received a Miranda warning fails
to answer a police officer's accusation. Cf Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610, 619-20 (1976) (Government may
not use defendant's silence at time of arrest to impeach subsequent exculpatory explanations). The
constitutional problem, however, does not exist when the defendant offers the third party's silence. The
third party is not on trial and the person speaking to the third party will rarely give him a Miranda
warning. To introduce the third party's silence, then, the defendant must show that the accusation was
made in the third party's presence, the third party heard and understood the accusation, the third party
was physically and psychologically able to respond, and the accusation and surrounding circumstances
naturally called for a reply. See Note, Tacit Criminal Admissions, 112 U. PA. L. REV. 210, 213-14 (1963)(listing conditions courts impose when defendant attempts to introduce evidence that admission occurred),
227. The Advisory Committee did not examine the separate problem that arises either when a witness(X) claims the declarant never made the statement that X is reported to have said the declarant made or
when X invokes the privilege against self-incrimination and refuses to testify about the declarant's alleged
statement. In each example, a second witness (Y) must then testify about what X purportedly said to Y.This situation involves double hearsay because it involves the truth of what the declarant allegedly told X
and the truth of what X allegedly told Y. It is unlikely that X's alleged statement would be against his penal
interest unless his statement included a damaging personal admission or it implied that X was a
coconspirator or an accessory after the fact. Impeaching X's denial through Y's statement would not justify
admitting X's statement for substantive purposes. Thus, a court would exclude it and the declarant's
statement as well on evidentiary grounds. Cf. In re Weber, 11 Cal. 3d 703, 721-22, 523 P.2d 229, 240-42,
114 Cal. Rptr. 429, 441-42 (1974) (in bank) (witness' report of declarant's statement against penal interest
even though against witness' social interest to report it because the witness would be "snitch"). But cf.
People v. Marcus, 36 Cal. App. 3d 676,679, 111 Cal. Rptr. 772, 774 (Ct. App. 1974) (police officer
permitted to repeat statement by two witnesses that defendant confessed to them even though both denied
having made statement). In contrast, if the declarant testifies that he did not speak as the witness reported,
a court would allow the defendant to use the declarant's out-of-court statement to impeach the declarant,
thereby bypassing the penal interest exception. Because the defendant carries no burden to disprove hisguilt, he is less concerned than the Government with admitting the declarant's statement for substantive
purposes. He simply wants the jury to learn of the declarant's statement. Nonetheless, the force of the
exculpatory statement may be reduced if the declarant called by the Government denies making the
statement or denies its truth and the defendant then impeaches him. Cf. United States v. Thomas, 571 F.2d
285, 288-90 (5th Cir. 1978) (defendant permitted to introduce declarant's statement exculpating defendant
if the declarant, called by the Government as a witness, denied making the statement).
228. Defense counsel should record the declarant's statement whenever possible. Recording the
statement eliminates questions about the accuracy of the witness' repetition and increases the likelihood
that the declarant understands the significance of his statement. This strategy, however, might backfire if
counsel becomes a witness to material evidence as a result of participating in obtaining the deelarant's
statement. See People v. Smith, 13 Cal. App. 3d 897, 905-08, 91 Cal. Rptr. 786, 791-94 (Ct. App. 1970)(proper to preclude defense counsel from testifying about declarant's statements when court told defendant
before trial that counsel could not both testify and represent defendant); ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL
RESPONSIBILIrry DR 5-102 (mandating withdrawal as counsel when lawyer becomes witness with respect
to substantive and contested matters). Because of this problem, counsel might ask his client to obtain the
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witness and the defendant, however, sometimes gives the witness an incentive
to misconstrue, overstate, or even fabricate the declarant's statement. Addi-
tionally, the declarant's statement may be made under unusual circum-
stances, 229 may be terse, or may be reported by an inattentive witness. In these
circumstances the Government may have difficulty using cross-examination
to determine what the declarant intended by his statement or what he
understood to be the effect of his statement.
Although the Department of Justice apparently was concerned with this
problem, the Advisory Committee was not.230 The Committee thought that
witness reliability problems are no more troublesome with penal interest
statements than with other forms of hearsay. Because the witness is available
for cross-examination, the Government may test his veracity, his relationship
to the defendant, and his accuracy in reporting the statement. 231
The Advisory Committee's position did not satisfy all members of the
House Subcommittee, several of whom worried that a witness who is a friend
or a relative of the defendant might lie.232 The defendant, his friends, or his
relatives clearly are not disinterested parties. Nonetheless, the self-interest of
these sorts of witnesses should be obvious to the jury and subject to
exploitation by the Government on cross-examination, particularly when the
defendant, as a witness, limits his testimony to reporting the declarant's
statement without denying his own culpability. 233 By so restricting his
statement. In United States v. Oropeza, 564 F.2d 316 (9th Cir. 1977), for example, counsel suggested that
his client attempt to obtain a statement from the declarant. Conversation with counsel (May 8, 1979). If the
defendant then must testify about the statement, however, counsel has eliminated the option of keeping the
defendant off the stand. Counsel might attempt to block the Government's cross-examination of the
defendant by limiting direct examination to the substance of the declarant's statement. See FED. R. EVID.
611 (cross-examination restricted to scope of direct examination). The jury, however, might wonder why
the defendant failed to testify about his involvement. Additionally, the defendant might not know the
proper questions to ask the declarant unless the defendant understands the intricacies of rule 804(b)(3).
229. See United States v. Guillette, 547 F.2d 743, 754-55 (2d Cir. 1976) (declarant made inculpatory
statement while drinking with informant, whom he had just met, four months after crime; statement
excluded because unreliable under circumstances), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 839 (1977).
230. See Reporter's Comments to Revised Draft, supra note 54, at 114a, 114c (Department of Justice
objecting both to vagueness of penal interest exception and to objective test for determining whether
declarant understood effect of statement). Professor Cleary believed that the Department of Justice's "real
objection" to the penal exception was "directed to the quality of the witnesses who would testify to the
making of such statements .... Id. at 114d. Professor Cleary dismissed the Department of Justice's
concern as "scarcely an acceptable ground" for deleting the penal interest exception. Id. The Department
of Justice apparently feared that witnesses would fabricate statements, not that they would honestly err in
reporting them. See id. at 1 14a (Department of Justice citing lack of safeguards for ensuring veracity of
hearsay statements). The Department of Justice should have been more concerned about witnesses making
honest errors in reporting statements. See J. MARSHALL, LAW AND PSYCHIATRY IN CONFLICT 8-40 (1966)
(discussing problems of witness perception, recall, and articulation). This concern, however, does not
warrant excluding the statement.
231. But cf. United States v. Hughes, 529 F.2d 838, 840-41 (5th Cir. 1976) (when defendant's brother
offered as witness to declarant's statement, testimony excluded because of sibling relationship and because
defendant did not establish circumstances in which declarant supposedly made statement to brother).
232. Markup Session, June 12, 1973. In the Subcommittee's view, this problem justified imposing a
corroboration requirement on the defendant. Id.
233. Several members of the Advisory Committee expected that the defendant would need to testify
about his noninvolvement to satisfy the "simple corroboration" test. See notes 103-09 supra and
accompanying text (Advisory Committee concluded defendant's testimony with respect to innocence
sufficient to corroborate declarant's statement). The Committee did not discuss whether the defendant
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testimony, the defendant might preclude the Government from cross-
examining him about his culpability. 234 The jury should recognize that
omission and react suspiciously despite the Government's inability to com-
ment about the defendant's failure to announce his innocence.
A different problem arises if the witness is unable to describe or to identify
a declarant whom he had never seen before and has not seen since the
statement was made.235 Here, the defendant's problem in convincing a
skeptical jury that the witness truthfully and accurately reported the existence
of and statement by the declarant is as great as the Government's problem in
cross-examining the witness.236 As long as defense counsel establishes the
unavailability of the declarant through unsuccessful efforts to locate him, the
court should not exclude the statement. Thus, both the existence of the
declarant and the substance of his alleged statement should be issues of weight
for the jury to assess rather than issues of admissibility for the court to decide.
By failing to change the rule to require proof of the credibility of the witness
as a condition of admissibility, Congress implicitly acquiesced in this
conclusion.
Although Congress apparently rejected the requirement that a defendant
establish the credibility of a witness who reports having heard a declarant
make a statement against penal interest, at least one court of appeals has
affirmed a trial court that excluded such a statement out of fear that the
reporting witness had fabricated it. In United States v. Bagley237 the United
States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held that in determining the
trustworthiness of a statement against penal interest a trial court may
consider evidence that indicates the declarant did not make the statement. 238
could corroborate the declarant's statement through testimony other than a denial of personal guilt. Also,
the Committee did not determine how the defendant could corroborate the statement without testifying. In
Professor Cleary's view, to require the defendant to testify would be dangerous because many defendants
thereby would reveal their own complicity. Advisory Committee Meeting, Sept. 5, 1971. Thus, a defendant
might have to choose between the evidentiary value of the statement and his right not to testify. Cf. United
States v. Dovico, 261 F. Supp. 862 (S.D.N.Y. 1966) (defendant chose not to testify).
234. See FED. R. EvID. 611(b) (court should limit cross-examination to matters testified to in direct
examination). The defendant's credibility as a witness always is open to exploration on cross-examination,
id., and thus the court might stretch this issue to include the defendant's involvement in the crime,
235. In Steadman v. United States, 358 A.2d 329 (D.C. 1976), for example, three witnesses heard a
person admit to a shooting minutes after it occurred. Id. at 331. Although none of them had seen the
declarant before or knew who he was, all three gave a similar description of him. Id. The defense was
unable to locate the declarant. Defense counsel thought the witnesses were truthful because, although two
were friends of the defendant, the one who was not a friend of the defendant did not know the other two.
Conversation with counsel (May 7, 1979). The District of Columbia Court of Appeals affirmed the trial
court's exclusion of the statements. 358 A.2d at 332.
236. The defendant's problem is exacerbated when the declarant becomes "unavailable" by invoking
the fifth amendment. See United States v. Thomas, 571 F.2d 285, 288 (5th Cir. 1978) (construing
unavailability requirement of rule 804(a)(1) to include assertion of fifth amendment privilege). The
defendant may be unable to convince the jury that the declarant exists unless the defendant forces the
declarant to invoke the fifth amendment before the jury, the court advises the jury that the declarant in fact
exists but is unable to testify, or the defendant's corroborating information is admissible.
237. 537 F.2d 162 (5th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1075 (1977).
238. Id. at 167-68. The defendant, Bagley, had been convicted of intent to distribute heroin to a fellow
inmate. He claimed, however, that at the time he was delivering the heroin he thought he was delivering
valium. Schropshire, the inmate responsible for giving Bagley the heroin, allegedly stated to Duke, his
cellmate, that he mistakenly had given Bagley the heroin, not valium, to deliver to a fellow prisoner.
Schropshire allegedly also had spoken to other inmates about delivering a package of valium for him. Id. at
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The court ruled that such evidence may include the character of the witness to
the alleged statement,239 the relationship between the witness and the parties
involved,240 and the witness' demeanor while testifying.241 In reaching this
conclusion, however, the court rendered a questionable interpretation of the
legislative history of rule 804(b)(3).242 Moreover, the court ignored the
constitutional problem implicated when a trial court passes on the credibility
of a witness, -an issue normally resolved by the jury.243
164-65. Because Schropshire died prior to trial, Bagley sought to introduce the statements Schropshire
made to Duke and the other inmates. Id. The trial court excluded the statement made to Duke and the
statements made to the inmates about delivering valium because in the court's view circumstances did not
clearly reveal the trustworthiness of the statements. Id. at 165. The court of appeals decided that implicit in
the trial court's ruling was the finding that the inmates fabricated the statements allegedly made by
Schropshire. Id. at 167. Under its reading of the legislative history of rule 804(b)(3) the court of appeals
concluded that a court may pass on the credibility of a witness to a statement against penal interest and
may exclude the statement when it believes the witness is lying about the statement ever having been made.
Id. at 167-68. But see United States v. Atkins, 558 F.2d 133, 135-36 (3d Cir. 1977) (credibility of witness to
statement against penal interest irrelevant), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1071 (1978).
239. The court noted, for example, that "each of the critical defense witnesses was a prison inmate who
had been convicted of a crime." 537 F.2d at 167.
240. The court indicated that although Duke, one of the witnesses, was a friend of the declarant's, he
waited until after the declarant's death to report the incriminating statement. In the court's view, this delay
detracted from the trustworthiness of the statement because Duke could testify without any danger of
implicating his deceased celimate, the declarant. Id. at 167.
241. Id. at 167-68. Thus, the court ruled that witness credibility is an important factor in determining
whether the proffered statement is trustworthy. Id.
242. Although the court relied upon language in the Senate Report to the effect that statements tending
to exculpate a defendant should have their admissibility conditioned upon further provisions ensuring
trustworthiness, id. at 167, it ignored the conclusion of the House Committee Report that the rule should
result in the admission of statements like the one that was excluded in Donnelly v. United States. HousE
JUDICIARY REPORT, supra note 10, at 16, [1974] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS at 7089-90. As will be
demonstrated below, see notes 549-67 infra, one cannot make much of the Subcommittee's rationale for
indicating that the trial court should have admitted the statement in Donnelly. The only substantive
support the Bagley court could muster was a comment by the Advisory Committee saying that the
corroboration requirement of rule 804(b)(3) should be construed so as to achieve the purpose of
circumventing fabrication. 537 F.2d at 167 (citing Advisory Committee Note to Supreme Court Draft,
supra note 1, at 327). In a preceding discussion, however, the Advisory Committee noted that "an
increasing amount of decisional law recognizes exposure to punishment for crime as a sufficient stake" to
counterbalance suspicions of fabrication. Advisory Committee Note to Supreme Court Draft, supra note 1,
at 327.
243. At least one other court has indicated that without a strong mandate from Congress a court may
not pass on the credibility of a witness to a penal interest statement. See United States v. Satterfield, 572
F.2d 687, 691-92 (9th Cir.) (by passing judgement on credibility of witness, trial court may usurp
traditional role of jury), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 840 (1978). In Satterfield at least two inmates were prepared
to testify that during the course of an argument in prison another inmate, Merriweather, made statements
exonerating his codefendant, Satterfield. Id. at 690. Because Merriweather refused to testify at Satterfield's
retrial, Satterfield sought to introduce the statements made to the two other inmates. In opposing the
introduction of the testimony by these two witnesses, the Government introduced prison records indicating
that the alleged argument never occurred and that the two witnesses had been segregated from
Merriweather and Satterfield at the time of the alleged argument. Id. The trial court excluded the
testimony by the witnesses. Id.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit clearly was troubled with allowing the trial
court to pass on the credibility of the witnesses and thus to usurp the power of the jury. Id. at 691-92.
Additionally, the court noted that Washington v. Texas, 338 U.S. 14, 22-23 (1967), forbids a trial court
from excluding the testimony of an accomplice on the ground that he may be likely to perjure himself. 572
F.2d at 692. The court concluded that the same may be true when the defendant seeks to introduce an out
of court statement made by an accomplice who is unavailable at trial. Id. The court, however, did not
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2. Was the statement "against penal interest"?
The Department of Justice vigorously objected that the penal interest
"standard is so vague as to be unworkable" 244 and claimed that it is "virtually
impossible to determine whether an individual who makes a statement knows
at the time of the declaration that the statement would subject him to ...
criminal liability." 245 The Advisory Committee dismissed Justice's objection,
saying "[iut seems evident that less sophistication is demanded of the
declarant in appraising his own utterance in the light of possible adverse
[penal interest] effects . . . than is the case with pecuniary interests." 246
Although the Department of Justice's fears were exaggerated, the Advisory
Committee did not anticipate the problems involved in determining when a
statement is against penal interest. Part of the difficulty arises from the
Advisory and Standing Committees' failure to explain the exception's relation
to other legal doctrines, such as the "party admission rule" or the Govern-
ment's constitutional obligation to disclose evidence. 247
recognize that by admitting the testimony it could satisfy constitutional requirements and ensure the
Government an opportunity to test the credibility of the witness to the declaration. Cf. Dutton v. Evans,
400 U.S. 74, 87-89 (1970) (confrontation clause not violated when admission of witness to coconspirator's
statement inculpating defendant conditioned on ability of defendant to cross-examine witness).
The Satterfield court noted that Bagley provides some support for allowing a court to assess the
credibility of witnesses, and then stated rule 804(b)(3) might be read to "put the trustworthiness of the
witness as well as the declarant in issue." 572 F.2d at 692. The court also found support in the Advisory
Committee's comment that "'one senses in the decisions a distrust of evidence of confessions by third
persons .... arising from suspicions of fabrication either of the fact of the making of the confession or in its
contents...."' 572 F.2d at 692 (citing Advisory Committee Note to Supreme Court Draft, supra note 1, at
327) (emphasis in opinion). The court, however, misread the intent of the Committee, which offered the
argument in order to reject it. See note 230 supra (discussing Committee's rejection of this concern).
Ultimately deciding that it did not have to resolve the constitutional issue, the Satterfield court ruled
that even if Merriweather had made the statement, circumstances did not "clearly" corroborate the truth
of the statement. 572 F.2d at 692. Thus, the court held that excluding the statement was not an abuse of the
trial court's discretion. The effect of the court's ruling, however, is to allow the trial court to exclude
testimony on the basis of possible fabrication, as long as the court is careful to cloak its objection in the
language of rule 804(b)(3).
The House Subcommittee's change to rule 801(d)(1)(A) provides the slimmest circumstantial support
for the court of appeals' belief in Satterfield that Congress was concerned with whether the declarant had
spoken as reported. Rule 801(d)(1)(A) involves the substantive admissibility of a witness' out of court
statements that are inconsistent with his testimony. The Supreme Court Draft provided that a witness'
prior statement that was inconsistent with his trial testimony was admisssible as substantive evidence
rather than only as impeachment. Supreme Court Draft, supra note 1, at 293. The House Subcommittee
changed the rule to admit as substantive evidence only those prior inconsistent statements that were made
"under oath subject to the penalty of perjury at a trial or hearing or in a deposition or before a grand jury."
JUNE 28, 1973 PRINT, supra note 10, at 170. In its explanatory report, the Subcommittee explained:
[U]nlike in other situations, there can be no dispute as to whether the prior statement was made [in the
enumerated situations]." Id. at 171. During the Senate Judiciary Committee's hearings, the Advisory and
Standing Committees objected that the House Subcommittee's explanation "appears to be based on the
underlying assumption that in the case of prior inconsistent statements some factor is present that requires
an extraordinary degree of assurance that the statement was in fact made." Senate Judiciary Hearings,
supra note 52, at 66. If that "underlying assumption" did prompt the House Subcommittee to change rule
801(d)(1)(A), it may also have underlain the Subcommittee's decision to increase the corroboration
requirement of the penal interest exception.
244. Justice's Second Letter, supra note 75, at 33,657.
245. Justice's Third Letter, supra note 130, at 48. The only example the Department of Justice cited was
"unfounded boasting by [prison] inmates as to having committed successful or infamous crimes." Id.
246. Reporter's Comments to Revised Draft, supra note 54, at 114d.
247. See notes 373, 383 & 399 infra (discussing exception's relation to other legal doctrines).
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More importantly, however, the Committees did not discuss the historic
definitional controversy over when a statement is reliable enough to warrant
its admission. In the absence of empirical information explaining why a
declarant would damn himself, the common law commentators disagreed
over whether a court should examine either the facts allegedly stated by the
declarant or the statement itself and the context in which it was made.248 The
first approach, supported by Dean Wigmore and Professor Morgan, would
limit admissibility to statements whose facts are so compellingly against
interest that no one would have uttered them unless they were true. This
conclusion assumes that the declarant would neither deny that he had spoken
nor dispute the accuracy of his statement. Thus, the evidentiary significance
of the statement plays no part in analyzing its admissibility because the
declarant would not demand a trial to determine his guilt.249 The second
approach, supported by Professor Jefferson, focuses on the declarant's
understanding of the litigation significance of the statement: the probability
that the statement would be disclosed; the likelihood of a resulting arrest and
criminal prosecution; the number of criminal charges that would result from
disclosure; and the certainty of conviction and severity of punishment were
the declarant prosecuted. Implicit in this second approach is a greater
willingness to admit a statement that the factfinder needs to reach an accurate
248. Compare 5 WIGMORE, supra note 4, § 1462, at 337 (question whether statement of fact against
interest beside mark; fact stated must be against interest) and Morgan, supra note 43, at 476 (common sense
dictates that declarant's knowledge that fact stated against interest controlling rather than knowledge that
statement may be used as evidence against declarant) with Jefferson, supra note 35, at 8-17 (statement of
fact must be against interest). In other words, the commentators disagreed over whether the court should
focus solely on what the declarant said or whether it also should consider the circumstances surrounding
the making of the statement.
Both tests are premised on the unverified psychological and empirical assumptions that a guilty person
usually will remain silent to protect himself, even if his silence results in damage to an innocent person, and
that if the declarant speaks, he must be speaking the truth. As one commentator has recognized, "it is easy
to feel, to intuit with strange certainty, that most people ordinarily would not speak against themselves if
the truth were favorable." Jaffee, The Constitution and Proof by Dead or Unconfrontable Declarants, 33
ARK. L. REV. 227, 362 (1979) (concluding that admission of penal interest statements may be less
problematic than admission of dying declarations or certain other forms of hearsay). It is not clear,
however, why Wigmore and Morgan limited admissibility to obviously self-damning accusations. Perhaps
they thought that limiting the exception was a politically expedient way of driving an opening wedge into
the common law courts' uniform refusal to admit any type of penal interest statement. A declarant's
unequivocal confession of guilt represents the strongest example of the unfairness of excluding all penal
interest statements. But instead, perhaps they distrusted the accuracy of the assumption underlying the
argument in favor of recognizing a penal interest exception. The trustworthiness of even a clear self-
condemnation occasionally is open to doubt. The declarant, for example, might be motivated to lie to
protect another person or he might erroneously admit guilt for an unconscious reason. Cf. Hutchins and
Slesinger, Some Observations on the Law of Evidence-Consciousness of Guilt, 77 U. PA. L. Rlv. 725, 736-
40 (1929) (discussing difficulties with inferring consciousness of guilt from conduct). See generally J.
MARSHALL, supra note 230, at 38. In the absence of psychological data explaining the motivation behind a
statement against penal interest, courts generally should view an act of self-condemnation as sufficiently
trustworthy to warrant its admission. Of course, this conclusion does not settle the dispute between
Wigmore and Morgan on the one hand and Jefferson on the other because a declarant might lie or
misperceive his own complicity either in writing a confession in his diary or by creating evidence that could
be used against him.
249. See Morgan, supra note 43, at 457 (concluding declarant probably would not make statement with
intent to deny it later). Morgan's analysis led him to conclude that "[the disserving quality of the fact must
be so apparent and important that a reasonable man in the position of the declarant would not have made
the declaration unless he believed it to be true." Id. at 476.
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and fair result even if the statement is not as trustworthy as the first approach
would require. 250
The two approaches clearly would lead to different results in certain cases.
Assume, for example, that a declarant writes in his diary that he killed the
victim with whose murder the defendant is charged. Although secreted in a
locked chest, the diary is discovered inadvertantly by a thief. Under the more
objective first approach, the statement would be against the declarant's penal
interest because a court could infer that no one would write such a comment
unless he believed it to be true. An examination of the declarant's state of
mind would focus solely on his statement.251 That the declarant had no
expectation that his diary would be discovered and that he might be
prosecuted for having penned the note is irrelevant. 252 Under the more
subjective second approach, however, the statement might not be against the
declarant's interest because the declarant had no reasonable expectation that
someone would discover his diary. He did not intend to communicate his guilt
to another person and in fact tried to prevent discovery. Because he had no
reason to fear that his statement would expose him to arrest, prosecution, and
conviction, a court would not consider his statement to be against his penal
interest.253
250. This second approach reflects an important shift away from the common law tradition of zealously
guarding against the admission of hearsay and toward a balancing of need against trustworthiness.
Compare State v. English, 201 N.C. 295, 299-300, 159 S.E. 318, 319-20 (1931) (need for law to proceed on
general principles justifies apparent absurdity of excluding statement against penal interest) with
Weinstein, Probative Force of Hearsay, 46 IowA L. REV. 331, 338 (1961) (recommending rejection of class
exceptions to hearsay rule and adoption of test that weighs probative force against possibility of prejudice).
A problem with this second approach is the judicial willingness to be inventive. Jefferson warns that by
"devising ingenious theories of interest, courts have admitted statements which the declarants could not
conceivably have believed against their interests." Jefferson, supra note 35, at 18. Jefferson's concern may
hold true in civil litigation; in criminal cases, in contrast, courts consistently have excluded a defense-
offered statement, concluding that it is not against penal interest ipse dixit.
251. See Commonwealth v. Colon, 461 Pa. 577, 585, 337 A.2d 554, 558 (1975). In Colon the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court ruled that the declarant's confession that he alone killed the victim was a
statement against penal interest. Id. The court affirmed the trial court's exclusion of the statement,
however, because the fact stated-the defendant was not an accomplice-was not against the declarant's
interest. Id.
252. The source of this example is rule 509 of the Model Code of Evidence:
The theory is that a declarant would not concede even to himself the existence of a matter
contrary to his interest unless he believed it to be true. Hence, such a statement, found in a
secret diary which the writer believed would never be seen by another, is quite as admissible in
evidence as one made to a multitude.
MODEL CODE OF EVIDENCE, rule 509, Comment c at 258.
253. For a second example of how these approaches would lead to different results, consider a declarant
sending a signed confession of murder to the police immediately before he commits suicide. If the court
focuses on the facts stated in the note, the court would admit the statement. If the court, however, focuses
on the litigation significance of the statement, it would not admit the statement because the declarant did
not expect that it would be used against him. Compare State v. Gold, 27 CRiM. L. Rv'R. 2261, 2262
(Conn., May 15, 1980) (admitting confession of declarant who subsequently committed suicide) and
Brennan v. State, 151 Md. 265, 270-73, 134 A. 148, 150-51 (1926) (same) with Jefferson, supra note 35, at
41-42 (criticizing Brennan result because declarant intending suicide would not expect statement to lead to
prosecution, conviction, and sentence). Moreover, the result under the second approach would not differ if
the declarant survived his suicide attempt.
As a third example, consider the effect of a defendant attempting to introduce a privileged
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A comparison of the admissibility of a party admission with the admissibil-
ity of a nonparty statement against penal interest makes the difference
between the two approaches clearer. As Wigmore recognized, 254 the two
hearsay exceptions are different. A party's statement can qualify as an
admission even if not disserving when made. In fact, the party may have
intended or expected that his statement would be self-serving, or he may
recognize the disserving effect of the statement only later upon learning of
other information. The trustworthiness of a statement against interest,
however, is premised upon the declarant's recognizing the disserving nature
of his statement at the time he made it. Moreover, a hearsay statement is
inadmissible primarily because no opportunity existed to cross-examine the
declarant at the time he made the statement. The party declarant can explain
his out-of-court statement by testifying.255 In contrast, the declarant of a penal
interest statement must be unavailable to testify at trial as a condition of the
exception; no opportunity therefore exists to cross-examine him.
Despite the differences between the party admission doctrine and the penal
interest exception, the two exceptions are not mutually exclusive. Indeed, the
second approach assumes that they overlap. By evaluating whether a
statement might result in arrest, prosecution, and conviction, the second
approach equates the two doctrines as long as the penal interest statement
constituted an admission at the time the declarant spoke. This equation might
prove enormously valuable to the defendant, who then could introduce either
a statement in the form of an opinion whose disserving effect became clear to
others only later or a seemingly neutral statement whose disserving effect
became clear when understood in context. Both statements can qualify as
party admissions.
In one sense, the distinction between these two approaches to "against
interest" may be more apparent than real. Did the advocates of the second
communication between the declarant and his attorney. Under the first approach, a confession would
qualify as a statement against penal interest even if the declarant did not anticipate that his attorney would
report his confession. Under the second approach, however, the statement would not be against interest as
long as the declarant reasonably believed either that the lawyer would not report the statement or that the
declarant could block its use against him if it were reported. See generally Bloom, The Law Office Search:
An Emerging Problem and Some Suggested Solutions, 69 GEo. L.J. 1, 20-24 (1980). This result is
questionable, however, if the particular privilege involved is not one that the declarant generally would
recognize.
As a fourth example, assume a declarant said, "I had a .38 calibre revolver." A court might admit the
statement under the second, but not the first, approach. If the declarant knew that the police found a .38
calibre revolver at the scene of the murder, he might reasonably fear that they would dust the revolver in
hope of discovering his fingerprints. The police would not otherwise make a fingerprint comparison in the
absence of information linking the declarant to the crime. On the other hand, the fact contained in the
statement standing alone is not so clearly against the declarant's penal interest that a court would admit it
under the first approach.
254. 5 WIGMORE, supra note 4, § 1475, at 348-49. Wigmore distinguished the two doctrines, possibly
out of a fear that equating the two would lead to a further restriction of the admissibility of party
admissions by adding the penal interest exception's requirement that the declarant be unavailable. See id. at
348 (statement by party opponent not deemed trustworthy for same reason as fact against interest;
otherwise, party opponent would have to be unavailable before statement could be admitted).
255. This distinction explains why the Federal Rules of Evidence treat party admissions as nonhearsay
rather than as an exception to the hearsay rule. See FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(2)(A) (admission by party
opponent not hearsay). It also explains why a statement is admissible even if the party spoke without
firsthand knowledge, normally a requirement for a hearsay exception to apply. See Advisory Committee
Note to Supreme Court Draft, supra note 1, at 303 (stating that first-hand knowledge required when
declarant testifies).
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approach, for example, intend to reject the first approach or did they intend to
supplement the first approach with the second approach instead?256 If they
intended that the second approach should supplement the first approach, a
court should admit a statement when the facts stated are confessional or,
when taken in context, the statement's effect would imperil the declarant. 25 7
The Advisory and Standing Committees did not discuss the merits of either
of the two historic approaches to analyzing statements against interest.258 This
failure would not be regrettable had either Committee analyzed the admissi-
bility of the sorts of statements that a defendant might offer. Unfortunately,
neither the Committees nor the other major participants in the formulation of
rule 804(b)(3) discussed the admissibility of such statements, whether in the
form of an opinion ("The defendant is not guilty"), a related or collateral
statement (such as the second clause in "I did it; the defendant did not"), or
admissions whose relevance depends upon an inference ("I owned a .38
calibre revolver at the time the victim was murdered").
The penal interest test also is difficult to interpret because the Advisory
and Standing Committees failed to define certain words in the rule that are
256. Jefferson criticizes the introduction of a confession by a dying declarant on the ground that the
declarant would not anticipate that the statement could be used against him. Jefferson, supra note 35, at 56.
Thus, Jefferson may not have intended that the second approach supplement the first approach. Under
Wigmore's analysis, however, such a statement probably would be admissible. In a related context,
Professor McCormick simply concludes that a statement is admissible if it "state[s] facts which are against
the pecuniary or proprietary interest of the declarant, or [if its] making... create[s] evidence which would
endanger his pocketbook if the statement were not true." MCCORMICK, supra note 4, § 276, at 670
(footnote omitted). His explanation overlooks the historical disagreement between Wigmore and Morgan
on the one hand and Jefferson on the other.
On occasion, courts apparently have required that the statement satisfy both approaches-that the
statement both consist of "facts" and that it have evidentiary significance. See Demeter v. The Queen, 75
D.L.R.3d 251, 255-56 (Can. 1977) (ruling that fact stated must be against interest and declarant must
apprehend vulnerability to penal consequences as result); cf. In re Weber, 11 Cal. 3d 703, 720-22, 523 P.2d
229, 240-42, 114 Cal. Rptr. 429, 440-42 (1974) (in bank) (ruling that for statement to be against declarant's
social interest both content of statement and fact statement made must be against interest). See generally
Ziff, Statements Against Penal Interest: A New Exception to the Hearsay Rule in Canada, 11 OTrAWA L.
REV. 163 (1979) (discussing Demeter and subsequent cases).
257. One commentator described those state cases in which a penal interest statement was admitted as
lying along a continuum between the demand for special circumstances establishing the trustworthiness of
the statement, on the one hand, and the demand for special circumstances justifying the importance of
admitting the statement on the other. Note, What Must Be Corroborated, supra note 40, at 429. In terms of
the Federal Rules of Evidence, these two considerations would equate the penal interest exception test with
the test for admission of hearsay statements under the "catch-all" provisions of rules 803(24) and
804(b)(5). See FED. R. EviD. 803(24) (allowing for introduction of hearsay having circumstantial
guarantees of trustworthiness equivalent to listed class exceptions upon, inter alia, showing of inability to
procure equally probative evidence through reasonable efforts); FED. R. EVID. 804(b)(5) (same). Under
rule 804(b)(3), however, the defendant is not required to establish his need to introduce the statement, even
though in every case he could argue convincingly that the statement was important to his defense, his
degree of culpability, or his sanction. See United States v. Thomas, 571 F.2d 285, 289-90 (5th Cir. 1978)
(admitting statement that if true would exonerate defendant). See also notes 8 15-18 infra and accompany-
ing text.
258. The Advisory Committee's occasional citation to Dean Wigmore's treatise should not be viewed as
an indication of agreement with the objective approach that Wigmore advanced. A comment by Professor
Cleary in a memorandum to the Advisory Committee may be the only point when the Committee discussed
this question. Professor Cleary wrote: "Another manifestation of breaking away from the narrowness of
the common law rule is the recognition that exposure to criminal liability is sufficiently against interest to
satisfy the requirements of the exception." Memorandum No. 19, supra note 52, at 290. The word
"exposure" suggests that Cleary advocated the second approach.
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susceptible to different or mutually inconsistent interpretations. For example,
does the word "subject" in the rule's first sentence mean something different
from the word "expose" in the rule's second sentence? What, for that matter,
does "tended to" mean in the rule's first sentence? Also, does the word
"exculpate" in the rule's second sentence restrict the "so far tended to
subject" language of the first sentence or does it simply indicate that the
corroboration requirement applies only when the criminal defendant offers
the statement?
The Advisory and Standing Committees' failure to provide interpretive
guidelines underscores one commentator's conclusion that any analysis of a
penal interest statement is "difficult and subtle at best. '259 The legislative
history of the rule provides no explanation of when a statement is against
penal interest. The House Subcommittee (and, presumably, the Congress)
seems to have assumed that the first sentence of the rule tracked the common
law treatment of penal interest statements and that the sentence posed no
questions for the Subcommittee to consider. Had the Subcommittee perceived
that the first sentence apparently defines penal interest more generously to the
defendant than any common law court probably had done, it would have
recognized the fallacy of its assumption. Although the internal memoranda
and discussions of the Advisory and Standing Committees provide clues for
interpreting rule 804(b)(3), no clear answer emerges from that evidence. As a
result, the federal courts of appeals have split over the proper analysis of penal
interest.
The Judicial Divergence. United States v. Oropeza26° and United States
v. Barrett261 represent different approaches to the admissibility of a statement
that exonerates the accused without explicitly implicating the declarant. In
Oropeza, the Government charged Oropeza, Minton, and Heinze with
conspiring to distribute heroin, and Minton with possession of a firearm.
262
While in jail, defendant Heinze wrote a statement exonerating Minton of both
participating in the drug sale and possessing the gun.2 63 The United States
259. J. SCHMERTZ, FEDERAL EVIDENCE NEWS 79-84 (1979). In commenting about the common law
treatment of declarations against interest, Morgan stated the point more bluntly:
[R]arely in the application of a rule of law can be found such a conglomeration of
inconsistencies, such flat contradictions in the facts of the very basis of the rule declared to be
applied. It is utterly useless to attempt to harmonize the decisions or even to understand the
intellectual processes of the writers of many of the opinions.
Morgan, supra note 43, at 476.
260. 564 F.2d 316 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1080 (1977).
261. 539 F.2d 244 (1st Cir. 1976).
262. 564 F.2d at 320. Defendants Minton and Heinze were in Heinze's van when the police arrested
both of them. The police found the gun under a blanket near the spot where Minton was lying at the time of
the arrest. Id.
263. Id. at 325. Heinze wrote in part:
I wish to make it clear that [Minton] had no idea of the transaction that took place .... I wish
to make it clear that the gun was owned by me, George Heinze. It was never in Mr. Minton's
possession .... Also like to make it clear the charge of conspiracy Mr. Minton again is
innocent [sic].
Id. at 325 n.9. Minton's defense attorney believes that he gave the defendant the stationery on which
Heinze wrote the statement. Conversation with counsel (May 22, 1979).
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Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the trial court's refusal to
allow Minton to introduce the statement, holding that "Heinze's statement
was merely a general assertion of Minton's innocence rather than an assertion
of his own culpability. There was nothing in the statement that would
necessarily subject Heinze to criminal liability." 2 " The court of appeals did
not grapple with the meaning of the "tended to subject ... tending to expose"
language in the rule, but rather adopted Senator McClellan's position that a
statement is admissible under rule 804(b)(3) only when it substitutes thedeclarant for the defendant. The court also did not discuss whether the
evidentiary consequences of Heinze's statement were significant in analyzing
rule 804(b)(3).265 Furthermore, in deciding whether the statement appeared
trustworthy, the court did not consider that Heinze wrote the statement in thepresence of four people, 266 pleaded guilty to thirteen criminal counts after
writing the statement but before Minton had been tried, did not appeal his
conviction, and never contested the truthfulness of the statement. 267
In contrast to the Ninth Circuit in Oropeza, the United States Court ofAppeals for the First Circuit rendered a generous interpretation of the penalinterest test in United States v. Barrett.26s Of eight defendants charged with
conspiracy and the transportation and disposal of stolen postage stamps,Barrett alone went to trial.269 In defense, Barrett sought to introduce the
testimony of a witness to a conversation with Ben Tilley, an allegedparticipant in the crime who had died by the date of Barrett's trial.270 Tilley
reportedly stated to the witness that he was having trouble with the "stamp
theft or matter" and that Barrett was not involved.27' The court of appealsdisagreed with the district court's belief that an exculpatory statement is
admissible only when the defendant's innocence is "prejudicial" to thedeclarant.272 In the court of appeals' view, Tilley's statement about the stamp
264. 564 F.2d at 325. With respect to the gun charge, the court of appeals explained that Heinze
admitted ownership but not possession of the gun and that nothing in the record indicated that ownership
of the gun was a crime. Id. at 325 n.10. Even if valid, this distinction assumes a sophistication most
criminals lack. In addition to ruling against Minton on the ground that Heinze's statement was not againsthis penal interest, the court also stated that corroborating circumstances did not exist and that Heinze's
"unavailability was questionable." Id. at 325.
265. If the court of appeals had used the second approach for determining when a statement is against
interest, it would have discussed whether the statement would have been admissible against Heinze. If the
statement had evidentiary value, the court should have admitted the statement.
266. Conversation with counsel (May 22, 1979).
267. 564 F.2d at 319. The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit similarly adhered to a
strict interpretation of "against interest" in United States v. Hoyos, 573 F.2d 1111 (9th Cir. 1978). InHoyos the police charged the appellant and Castro with selling narcotics. Id. at 1113. Before pleadingguilty, Castro told his wife that Hoyos had nothing to do with the crime. Id. Hoyos sought to introduce the
testimony of Castro's wife. Id. The court of appeals upheld the trial court's exclusion of the wife's
testimony in part because Castro's statement consisted "largely of matter that is exculpatory of Hoyos but
not significantly inculpatory of the defendant Castro." Id. at 1115. Hoyos also failed in attempting tointroduce the wife's testimony under the residual hearsay exception of rule 804(b)(5). Id. at 1115-16.
268. 539 F.2d 244 (1st Cir. 1976).
269. Id. at 245. Two of Barrett's codefendants pleaded guilty and testified against him. The prosecutor
dropped charges against the other five defendants. Id. at 245 n.2.
270. Id. at 246, 249.
271. Id. at 249. Tilley allegedly said that he and "Buzzy" were going to have trouble because of the
"stamp theft or matter." The witness, Melvin, inquired whether Tilley meant Bucky Barrett or Buzzy
Adams, to which Tilley replied, "No, Bucky [Barrett] wasn't involved. It was Buzzy." Id. (brackets in
original).
272. Id. at 250. The district court excluded the testimony because it was not offered to "prove anything
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theft was against his penal interest because it suggested that he had
participated in the crime.273 Moreover, the against-interest nature of the
statement about the theft gave sufficient credence to the collateral statement
exonerating Barrett that it constituted an integral part of the entire statement
and satisfied the penal interest requirement of rule 804(b)(3). 274
In United States v. Pena275 and United States v. Toney276 two courts of
appeals split over the correct approach for determining the admissibility of a
statement whose relevance depends upon an inference. In Pena the United
States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court's
exclusion of an informant's statement that, under one plausible interpretation,
was against his penal interest.277 Convicted of arranging a drug sale to a
Government agent, Pena admitted that he had received money from the agent
and had given it to Rubio, an informant. 278 Pena, however, claimed that at
that time he did not know he was participating in a drug sale. Rather, he
thought that he was merely passing on reward money from the agent to
Rubio.279 Pena argued that Rubio had framed him.280 To support his
somewhat strained theory, Pena called a witness to testify that Rubio
admitted receiving the money from Pena.281 Pena claimed the admission was
against Rubio's penal interest because it suggested that Rubio had embezzled
the money from the Government.282 Although troubled by Pena's argument,
the court of appeals concluded that other equally plausible explanations of
Rubio's action indicated that Rubio's statement was not against penal
prejudicial to the alleged maker of the statement but to prove that [Buzzy] rather than [Bucky] did it." Id.
Under the district court's approach a court may admit a statement only if it substitutes the declarant for
the defendant. Id. at 252. The court of appeals, however, did not "understand the hearsay exception [for
penal interest statements] to be limited to direct confessions." Id. at 251.
273. Id. The court felt that Tilley's statement about having trouble with the "stamp theft or matter"
would have been "important evidence against Tilley were he himself on trial for the stamp crimes." Id.
Moreover, Tilley's having made the statement to acquaintances during a card game did not justify inferring
that he did not recognize the disserving effect of his statement. Id. at 251-52.
274. Id. at 252-53. Although Tilley's exoneration of Barrett was not by itself against Tilley's interest,
the court of appeals thought the collateral statement was admissible because it "fortiftied] the [against-
interest] statement's disserving aspects" and strengthened the impression that Tilley had an insider's
knowledge of the crime. Id. at 252. Nonetheless, the court did not conclude that Tilley's statement was
admissible. The district court had not determined whether the corroboration requirement of rule 804(b)(3)
had been satisfied because of its ruling on the against interest test. The court of appeals reversed on a
separate ground and instructed the district court to consider the corroboration issue on retrial. Id. at 253.
275. 527 F.2d 1356 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 949 (1976).
276. 599 F.2d 787 (6th Cir. 1979).
277. 527 F.2d at 1361-62. The court of appeals indicated that other possible interpretations of the
declarant's statement were inconsistent with the declarant's culpability. Id. at 1361.
278. Id. at 1359-60.
279. Id. at 1359. The Government agent testified that in exchange for the money Pena tendered two
packages containing heroin. Pena testified that he merely received money from the agent. Id.
280. Id. Pena claimed that Rubio was motivated by the mistaken belief that Pena had killed Rubio's
brother. Id.
281. Id. at 1360. The witness testified that Rubio admitted both setting Pena up for revenge and
receiving the money from Pena. Id.
282. Id. at 1361.
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interest.2 83 In the court of appeals' view, Rubio's statement was "neither a
confession nor a clear inculpatory remark." 284
In United States v. Toney285 the United States Court of Appeals for theSixth Circuit reversed a conviction because the trial court excluded a
statement that inferentially exonerated the defendant.286 At Toney's trial forbank robbery, the prosecutor established that Toney possessed seventy dollars
of "bait money. ' 287 Toney admitted to the police that he planned the robberybut claimed that he withdrew from the crime and that King took his place.288Toney claimed he obtained the bait money during the course of a dice game in
which King participated. In an out of court statement, King confirmed thathe gambled with Toney, that both had large sums of money at stake, and thatboth won substantial amounts. 289 At Toney's trial the court excluded King'shearsay statement.290 The Sixth Circuit reversed Toney's conviction, finding
that King's statement was against his penal interest because he admitted bothparticipating in an illegal dice game and possessing a large sum of money
immediately after the robbery. 291
The Oropeza and Barrett courts divided over the issue whether a declar-
ant's statement exonerating the defendant in a multi-person crime is against
the declarant's penal interest. Oropeza seems to require that the statement
substitute the declarant for the defendant before a court may admit the
statement. Barrett, on the other hand, indicates that a statement thatindirectly implicates the declarant while exonerating the defendant satisfies
the penal interest test. In both Pena and Toney the declarant did not explicitly
exonerate the defendant, but instead provided support for the defense.Although the effect of the declarant's statement was sufficient for the Toney
283. The court of appeals suggested that "to complete his job as informant-participant Rubio may
have delivered the payment to the ultimate supplier of the heroin or he may have returned it to [theGovernment agent]." Id. at 1361-62. The court also thought that Rubio's admitting to a desire to set Pena
up was not against Rubio's penal interest as long as he was discharging his proper role as informant. Id. at
1361.
284. Id. at 1362. The defense did not develop an adequate record of either Rubio's statement or its penal
interest effect. See id. at 1361 (Pena's interpretation of Rubio's statement not justified by "scanty tender
shown by the record"). Pena stands as a lesson to defense counsel to make the most complete offer of proof
possible.
285. 599 F.2d 787 (6th Cir. 1979).
286. Id. at 790.
287. Id. at 788. None of the eyewitnesses to the robbery could identify the three robbers allegedlyinvolved, but the witnesses agreed that Toney matched the physical build of one of the robbers. Id.288. Id. King, arrested several days after Toney, also matched the description of one of the robbers. Id.
at 788-89.
289. Id. at 789.
290. Id. Exercising his fifth amendment privilege, King refused to testify at Toney's trial. Id.
291. Id. at 790. Although King's participation in the dice game by itself did not link King to the
robbery, his possession of a large sum of money suggested that King's initial stake in the dice game came
out of the stolen money. King's gambling admission, however, added weight to Toney's claim that King
committed the crime. Similarly, in People v. Brown, 26 N.Y.2d 88, 257 N.E.2d 16, 308 N.Y.S.2d 825(1970), the defendant claimed that he shot the victim in self-defense because the victim had a gun. Id. at 90,257 N.E.2d at 1, 308 N.Y.S.2d at 826. The Government's evidence, however, indicated the victim was
unarmed. A declarant later confessed that he picked up the victim's gun immediately after the defendant
shot the victim. Id. at 9Q, 257 N.E.2d at 17, 308 N.Y.S.2d at 826. Apparently, the declarant later used thisgun to commit an unrelated robbery. Id. at 93, 257 N.E.2d at 18, 308 N.Y.S.2d at 828. The New York
Court of Appeals thought the declarant's statement was against his penal interest and that the trial court
should have admitted it because it supported the defendant's case. Id. at 94, 257 N.E.2d at 19, 308
N.Y.S.2d at 829.
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court, it did not satisfy the Pena court. Thus, the approach of the courts of
appeals in Oropeza and Pena is much more restrictive than that of the courts
of appeals in Barrett and Toney.
292
The Advisory and Standing Committees' Position. Under rule 804 of the
Preliminary Draft, a court would admit the hearsay statement of an unavaila-
ble declarant as long as the "nature and the special circumstances under
which it was made offer strong assurances of accuracy ... -"293 That version
of the rule simply focused on the reliability of the statement without directing
the court to analyze reliability in any particular way. However, when the
illustrations to rule 804 became the exceptions to that rule in the Revised
Draft, the precise language of rule 804(b)(3) became important.
Several clues suggest the Advisory Committee intended a court to admit a
statement if the declarant's words clearly were disserving or if the statement
might jeopardize the declarant, thereby adopting both historical approaches
for defining "against interest." These clues involve differences between the
language of rule 804(b)(3) and that of rule 509(1) of the Model Code of
Evidence 294 and rule 63(10) of the Uniform Rules of Evidence. 295
The first clue is the use of the word "statement" in the first sentence of rule
804(b)(3). Rule 509(1) of the Model Code permits the introduction of a
"declaration" if the "fact asserted in the declaration" is against the declar-
ant's penal interest.296 The phrase "fact asserted" is a short-hand way of
expressing the first approach to analyzing penal interest statements. Professor
Morgan, the reporter for the Model Code of Evidence, argued for the first
approach and undoubtedly chose the phrase "fact asserted" so that courts
would focus on the words spoken by the declarant rather than on the
litigation effect of the statement.297 In contrast, the word "statement"
indicates courts should focus on the litigation effect of the declarant's
statement. 298 Professor Cleary must have been aware of the historical debate
between Morgan and Wigmore on the one hand and Jefferson on the other.
Moreover, Professor Cleary stated that Uniform Rule 63(10),299 which also
uses the word "statement" rather than the phrase "fact asserted," was the
model for rule 804(b)(3). 300 The Advisory Committee's adoption of the word
292. The Supreme Court's use of the penal interest exception also contrasts sharply with that of
Oropeza and Pena. See notes 418-41 infra and accompanying text (discussing the Supreme Court's
decisions in Matlock, Harris, and Dutton).
293. Advisory Committee Note to Preliminary Draft, supra note 1, at 377.
294. MODEL CODE OF EVIDENCE rule 509 (1) (1942).
295. UNIFORM RULE OF EVIDENCE 63(10) (superseded 1975), and MODEL CODE OF EVIDENCE rule
509(1) (1942) were earlier codifications of the penal interest exception to hearsay.
296. MODEL CODE OF EVIDENCE rule 509(1) (1942).
297. The comment to rule 509 makes this point clear: "The theory of the Rule ... is not that the
declarant is making evidence against himself.... [I]t is the matter declared which must have [an against-
interest] quality." Id. rule 509, Comment c. See also Morgan, supra note 43, at 476 (exception rests on
theory that person will not concede existence of fact that will cause him substantial harm unless he believes
fact exists). Wigmore similarly argued that a court should focus on the fact stated, not the statement. 5
WIGMORE, supra note 4, § 1462, at 337.
298. See Jefferson, supra note 35, at 13 ("statement" focuses on litigation effect of declarations against
interest).
299. UNIFORM RULE OF EVIDENCE 63(10) (superseded 1975).
300. Memorandum No. 19, supra note 52, at 289.
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"statement" rather than the phrase "fact asserted" by itself does not justifythe conclusion that rule 804(b)(3) is more liberal than rule 509(1).301A second clue more clearly distinguishes rule 804(b)(3) from rules 509(1)
and 63(10). Rule 804(b)(3) provides that a "statement" is admissible if it "sofar tended to subject the declarant to civil or criminal liability . . . that a
reasonable man in his position would not have made the statement unless hebelieved it to be true." 302 Rule 509(1), however, substitutes the phrase "so far
subjected" for the "tended to subject" language of rule 804(b)(3).303 Thus, rule804(b)(3) creates a lesser burden for the defendant to overcome than does rule509(1).304
The Advisory Committee was willing to lower the against interest standardbecause the Committee addressed the fundamental question of declarant
availability differently than had the drafters of rules 509(1) and 63(10).Neither of those rules conditioned the admissibility of the declarant's
statement on his inability to testify. 305 Apparently, the drafters of rule 509(1)
301. The reason is the use of the word "statement" in rule 63(10), a word that is unfortunately not
explained in the comment to that rule. See UNIFORM RULE OF EVIDENCE 63(10), Comment (superseded1975). The comment, which is singularly unhelpful in resolving any of the difficult interpretive issues
concerning the penal interest exception, indicates that the drafters made "[n]o attempt ... to lay down aguide, as does the Model Code, for the determination of what portions of a statement containing
declarations against interest, are admissible." Id. Nonetheless, one commentator has argued that thedrafters intended "statement" to express the same focus as did the phrase "fact asserted" in rule 509(l). SeeHetland, Admissions in the Uniform Rules: Are They Necessary? 46 IowA L. REv. 307, 322 (1961). Hetland
contends that Model Rule 63(10)
adopts the test ... that the facts of the statement be against interest, rather than that the
making of the statement be against interest. This means that the declarant need not have a
conscious understanding that he is creating adverse evidence by making the statementbecause of the likelihood that a third person will see or overhear the declaration. Instead,
veracity is guaranteed by the fact that a declarant would not admit the existence of such factprivately unless it were true.
Id. (footnote omitted). If Hetland is correct, the Advisory Committee's adoption of the language used in
rule 63(10) is not significant.
302. FED. R. EVID. 804(b)(3) (emphasis added).
303. MODEL CODE OF EVIDENCE rule 509(1) (1942) (emphasis added).304. Both Rule 401 and the Judicial Conference's general approach to hearsay provide further supportfor the conclusion that the Advisory Committee set a lower "penal interest" test than had the Model Code
and the Uniform Rules of Evidence. Rule 401 defines relevant evidence as that evidence "having anytendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action moreprobable or less probable than it would be without the evidence." FED. R. EVID. 401. Thus, evidence is
relevant if its introduction changes in any way the probabilities of the fact to be proven. The "so far tendedto" language of rule 804(b)(3) demands an unspecified but greater shift in the probability that thedefendant is or is not guilty. Although the language of rule 804(b)(3) is vague, the use of the word "tend" inboth rule 804(b)(3) and rule 401 suggests the Advisory Committee would allow a lesser showing of againstpenal interest than would the drafters of the Model Code and the Uniform Rules.Moreover, the Advisory and Standing Committees were less worried about the introduction of hearsaythan was the House Subcommittee. See Senate Judiciary Hearings, supra note 118, at 212 (testimony ofAlbert E. Jenner, Jr., Chairman of the Advisory Committee) (arguing that although juries probably unableto determine when statement is hearsay, juries can adequately evaluate credit and weight of hearsay
evidence).
305. See MODEL CODE OF EVIDENCE rule 509, Comment c (1942) (unavailability of declarant not
required); UNIFORM RULE OF EVIDENCE 63(10), Comment (superseded 1975) (statement admissible eventhough declarant available as witness). But cf. State v. Sease, 138 N.J. Super. 80, 83, 350 A.2d 262, 264(Super. Ct. App. Div. 1975) (per curiam) (affirming exclusion of statement under rule 63(10) and statingdefendant could have called declarant to stand).
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thought the requirement that the statement consist of expressly disserving
facts, 306 as well as the application of an objective test,30 7 ensured that a
statement would possess "as much trustworthiness as one made by the
declarant on the witness stand .... ,,308 In the view of these drafters, this
conclusion obviated the need for an unavailability requirement.
30 9
The Advisory Committee relaxed the penal interest test because rule
804(b)(3) conditioned admissibility on the declarant's unavailability. Profes-
sor Cleary explained: "The Reporter is of the view that a greater amount of
needed evidence would be admitted by a combination of unavailability plus
relaxation of against-interest concepts than by no unavailability requirement
but a strict approach to what is against interest. ' 310 This explanation appears
paradoxical: If against-interest statements are not as trustworthy as the other
sorts of hearsay admissible under rule 803's exceptions, the declarant's
unavailability to testify might exacerbate the problem of reliability. If, on the
other hand, against-interest statements are important to both the proponent
and the factfinder, Professor Cleary's explanation is defensible. By requiring
the proponent to call the declarant as a witness whenever possible,
31
' the
Advisory Committee chose a different way of restricting admissibility than
had the drafters of rules 509(1) and 63(10).
306. See MODEL CODE OF EVIDENCE rule 509(1) (1942) (fact asserted in statement must subject
declarant to criminal liability).
307. Id. rule 509, Comment c (rule requires test of belief of reasonable man in position of declarant).
308. Id. Thus, the statement would have to be as trustworthy as the declarant's testimony would be if
elicited by direct examination and subjected to cross-examination. This explains why rule 509(1) demanded
the statement consist of express disserving facts.
309. The comment to rule 63(10) does not indicate why the drafters decided to eliminate the
unavailability requirement. Moreover, rule 63(10), unlike rule 509(1), does not require that a statement
have "testimonial qualifications." Hetland, supra note 301, at 321. The term "testimonial qualifications"
refers to the Model Code's distinction between a hearsay statement and a hearsay declaration. The Code
defines a hearsay declaration as a "hearsay statement which would be admissible were the declarant present
and making it as a part of his testimony and which does not involve other hearsay .... MODEL CODE OF
EVIDENCE rule 501, Comment a (1942) (emphasis added). By categorizing against-interest statements as
"declarations against interest," MODEL CODE OF EVIDENCE rule 509(1) (1942), the drafters apparently
intended that courts should strictly scrutinize such statements to ensure they possess testimonial
qualifications and that they should exclude a purported penal interest expression in the form of an opinion
or whose disserving nature turned on an inference. This strict approach explains why rule 509(1) focuses on
the "facts asserted" by the declarant rather than on the litigation effect of his statement.
310. Memorandum No. 19, supra note 52, at 293. Professor Cleary further explained:
It is true that unavailability adds nothing to the trustworthiness of the hearsay statement.
Nevertheless, if unavailability is not continued as a requirement, declarations against interest
would have to be moved out of the category of the present rule, i.e., concededly inferior
evidence admitted in preference to no evidence, and transposed into the category embraced in
proposed Rule [803], i.e. evidence as good as if given by [the] declarant on the stand. This
might be completely justifiable in some situations, but in many the against-interest motivation
would seem scarcely to be that compelling.
Id.
311. Professor Cleary's analysis is similar to Justice Harlan's original explanation of the protection the
confrontation clause affords a defendant. That clause, Justice Harlan explained, is "confined to an
availability rule, one that requires production of a witness when he is available to testify." California v.
Green, 399 U.S. 149, 182 (1969) (Harlan, J., concurring). Although Justice Harlan repudiated that
explanation in Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74, 94-95, 96-97 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring), at least one
commentator has advanced his earlier position as the proper approach. See Westen, The Future of
Confrontation, 77 MICH. L. REV. 1185, 1187 (1979) (future of confrontation analysis lies in direction of
Harlan's Green concurrence) [hereinafter Westen, Future of Confrontation].
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Although the Advisory Committee adopted a more liberal interpretation of
against penal interest," 312 it failed to explain this interpretation publicly.Moreover, the Committee did not publicize its rebuff of Senator McClellan,
the only critic of the rule who apparently sensed the implication of the "so fartended to subject" language. Senator McClellan urged that the Committee
redraft the rule to provide "some requirement of directness and immediate-
ness. . . [The rule's] rationale is supportable to the degree that [the]
statement is directly and immediately against interest, and conversely,
unsupportable to the degree that the statement is merely indirectly or only
remotely against a declarant's interest." 313 Although Senator McClellan
neither explained his objections nor illustrated them with examples, he
undoubtedly wanted admissibility limited to "explicit and unequivocal con-fessions. '314 During the Advisory Committee's meeting on September 5, 1971,however, Professor Cleary dismissed the Senator's request as "pretty nebu-lous." 315
Apparently, only Senator McClellan noticed the important change hiddenin the Advisory Committee's choice of language. Although critical of the rule,the Department of Justice overlooked the phrase "tended to subject." TheHouse Subcommittee assumed that the first sentence of the rule simply
restated the common law316 and that the "simple corroboration" test in the
second sentence of the Supreme Court Draft was the only controversial aspect
of the proposed penal interest exception. As a result, the Subcommittee all butignored the first sentence during its markup sessions on the rule.317To conclude that the Advisory and Standing Committees intended a liberalinterpretation of penal interest 318 does not explain how they intended a court
312. This approach, which is certainly more liberal than that adopted by the drafters of rules 509(1) and63(10), is probably more liberal than any twentieth-century judicial decision. Professor Cleary nonetheless
believed that the against-interest barrier to admissibility historically had not been a difficult burden to
overcome and that the proposed rule marked a return to the position set forth in older English cases.Memorandum No. 19, supra note 52, at 288. In his view, "[t]he exception as developed by common lawdecisions limited admissibility to situations in which the declaration was against a pecuniary or proprietaryinterest, but within these limits the judges displayed an ingenuity little less than astounding in discovering
an against-interest aspect." Id. Professor Cleary apparently intended that courts interpret the "againstinterest" test of the proposed rule in light of that generous English approach. See id. at 289 (proposal
removes common law limits with respect to penal interest statements and expands exception to full logical
limits).
313. McClellan Letter, supra note 82, at 33,647-48.
314. See id. at 33,648 (suggesting courts admit only admissions that qualify to convict declarant),
315. Advisory Committee Meeting, Sept. 5, 1971.
316. Markup Session, June 5, 1973.
317. One Subcommittee member mentioned the ease with which the prosecutor might obtain an
admission of sexual contact that would support a statutory rape charge, an admission that the declarant
might not recognize would satisfy the jurisdictional elements of that crime. Id. Aside from that comment,
however, the Subcommittee never discussed the meaning of the first sentence of the rule.318. A possible third clue to the Advisory Committee's position is the shift in language from "so far
tended to subject" in the rule's first sentence to "tending to expose" in the second sentence. FED. R. EVID.804(b)(3). In two ways "tending to expose" implies a lesser likelihood that the declarant will be arrested,prosecuted, or convicted based upon his statement than does "so far tended to subject." "Expose" is
defined as "to bring to light" or "to lay open to view." WEBSTER'S NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 404(1977) (senses 2, 3a). "Subject" is defined as "to make liable" or "to make accountable." Id. at 1159(homograph 3, senses 2a, b). Theoretically, any statement might "expose" the declarant to prosecution, but
not every statement would "subject" him to prosecution. The declarant, for example, might be beyond a
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to apply the test in a particular case. Unfortunately, neither the Committees'
internal memoranda nor the discussion of the rule at the meetings of
September 5 and September 30, 1971, provide a definite answer. In its Note to
the Supreme Court Draft, the Standing Committee added this sentence:
"Whether a statement is in fact against interest must be determined from the
circumstances of each case. '319 Although contextually this sentence applies to
the Government's offer of a declarant's statement simultaneously implicating
the declarant and the defendant, 320 it also represents the Committee's
approach to all against-interest statements. Under this approach, courts
should not determine trustworthiness solely by analyzing the words spoken
by the declarant. Rather, the court should assess each statement according to
the context in which the declarant made it. This ad hoc approach requires a
court to consider what the declarant knew of the incident in question, why the
declarant spoke, and what degree of criminal liability the declarant reasona-
bly expected to result from his statement.321 Additionally, this approach
court's jurisdiction, he might already be in jail, or he might be a trusted informant who the prosecutor
never intended to prosecute. This subtle distinction, however, probably is insignificant. Professor Cleary
chose the word "expose" while searching for language to placate Senator McClellan. See notes 96-105
supra and accompanying text (indicating language selected to meet McClellan's request for corroborative
requirement). During the discussion of the "simple corroboration" test on September 5, 1971, no member
of the Advisory Committee inquired about the change in wording and no one suggested that the word
"expose" modified the word "subject." Thus, the Committee probably used the two words synonymously.
Second, "tending to expose" is not modified by the "so far" language in the first sentence. Did the Advisory
Committee implicitly equate the penal interest test with the relevancy test of rule 401, thereby reducing the
defendant's penal interest burden? The Advisory Committee's discussion on September 5, 1971 also does
not support this interpretation.
319. Advisory Committee Note to Supreme Court Draft, supra note 1, at 328.
320. See id. (referring to statements admitting guilt and implicating another person). The Standing
Committee added the sentence as an implicit explanation of its reversal in position in response to Senator
McClellan's objections. See notes 194-200 supra and accompanying text (discussing Committee's reaction
to McClellan's criticism of "Bruton sentence").
321. In examining the declarant's reasonable expectation of prosecution, conviction, and punishment,
the courts could refer to the analogous situation in which a witness invokes the privilege against self-
incrimination. In People v. Traylor, 23 Cal. App. 3d 323, 100 Cal. Rptr. 116 (Ct. App. 1972), for example,
a declarant refused to answer questions in court relating to statements he allegedly made exonerating the
defendant. Id. at 328-29, 100 Cal. Rptr. at 119. After the trial court upheld the declarant's assertion of the
fifth amendment, defense counsel argued that the declarant's refusal to testify on the grounds that he would
incriminate himselfproved the against-interest nature of the out of court statement. Id. at 329-30, 100 Cal.
Rptr. at 121. Nonetheless, the trial court excluded the statement. Id. at 331, 100 Cal. Rptr. at 121. In
affirming the trial court, the California Court of Appeals reasoned that although the privileged testimony
might have provided a "link in the chain of evidence leading to the declarant's criminal liability" this link
did not prove that the declarant realized "the statement he made.., was 'distinctly' against his own penal
interest." Id. The California penal interest exception, however, uses the phrase "so far subjected" in
speaking of the degree of criminal liability to which the statement exposes the declarant. CAL. EVIDENCE
CODE § 1230 (West 1966). As indicated earlier, the "tended to subject" language of rule 804(b)(3) imposes
a lesser burden on the defendant. See notes 302-10 supra and accompanying text (distinguishing phrase
"tended to subject" from "so far subjected" language of rule 509(1) of Model Code of Evidence). To the
degree that the declarant's refusal to testify in Traylor indicated his out of court statement shifted the
responsibility for the crime from the defendant to the declarant and a third person, it "tended to subject"
the declarant to criminal liability. See also United States v. Benveniste, 564 F.2d 335, 341 (9th Cir. 1977)
(declarant's assertion of fifth amendment at trial lends strong support to conclusion that out of court
statement against-declarants-penal interest). Thus, federal courts might use the fifth amendment's "link in
the chain" doctrine to determine whether the declarant's statement tended to subject the declarant to
criminal liability within the meaning of rule 804(b)(3).
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requires the courts to err on the side of admitting rather than excluding such
statements.322 The precise words spoken, of course, remain important. When
a statement constitutes an opinion of guilt ("I am guilty of the crime charged
against the defendant") or an express factual concession ("I shot the victim"),
the statement clearly is against interest. Courts can assume that a declarant
would not make such a statement unless it were true, regardless of his
expectation that it would not be discovered or would not result in his
prosecution.
Courts should go further than just examining the words spoken. TheStanding Committee's focus on the circumstances of each case allows the
courts to admit statements other than confessions. A declarant reasonably
might believe that the statement, "I had the gun," is just as damaging as an
explicit confession of murdering the victim, even when that statement onlyinferentially exonerates the defendant.323 Similarly, when a declarant's state-
ment exonerates the accused ("The defendant is not guilty"; "I did it, thedefendant did not"; "The defendant did not participate"), the declarant'sknowledge of the defendant's innocence either explicitly or implicitly in-dicates that the declarant participated in the crime. The Government clearly
could introduce such a statement against the declarant were he on trial.Viewed in context, then, an admission, a related statement, or an opinion
might seem trustworthy. Certain language in the Note to the Supreme Court
Draft, however, indicates the Advisory and Standing Committees may haveintended otherwise. Consequently, we must probe more deeply into the intent
of the Advisory and Standing Committees.
In discussing the trustworthiness of admissions, the Advisory and Standing
Committees considered the relationship between the penal interest exception
and the party admission doctrine. Equating the two as they apply to criminal
defendants has superficial appeal.324 This equation, once almost unanimously
Additionally, the courts might analyze the degree of liability to which a statement might subject the
declarant by determining whether the statement provides the basis for a finding of probable cause to arrest
the declarant. See Ryan v. State, 95 Wis. 2d 83, 97, 289 N.W.2d 349, 355 (Ct. App. 1980) (statement did
not tend to subject declarant to criminal liability because declarant's statement would not withstand
probable cause test for charging declarant with crime).
322. See text accompanying note 310 supra (Professor Cleary stating approach of rule 804(b)(3) should
result in admission of greater amount of necessary evidence).
323. The declarant might want to help the defendant without eliminating all hope of either pleabargaining or defending himself successfully in the event he was prosecuted. For example, a defendant
might say, "Sure, I had something to do with Smith's murder," when the evidence indicates that only one
person killed Smith. On at least one occasion, the Supreme Court has upheld a trial court's admission of a
more ambiguous statement than this one. In Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74, (1970), the Court ruled that the
statement, "If it hadn't been for [the defendant] we wouldn't be in this now," was against the declarant's
penal interest and thus was admissible under Georgia's coconspirator exception to the hearsay rule. Id. at89-90. But cf. United States v. Pena, 527 F.2d 1356, 1361-62 (5th Cir.) (excluding statement which was
against interest under only one of several plausible interpretations), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 949 (1976).
324. The disserving effect of a party admission is, after all, the source of trustworthiness that justifies
the doctrine's status as a hearsay exception. Moreover, if a statement would defeat a defendant party's alibi,
that statement also should "tend ... to subject ... or to expose" the declarant to criminal liability in the
language of rule 804(b)(3).
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rejected,3 25 has resurfaced to a limited degree in several recent decisions.326
Although the Advisory and Standing Committees did not take the radical
step of equating the doctrines, 327 they probably did not intend that an
admission could never qualify as a statement against interest. They signaled
the overlap between the doctrines by noting the differences: To be admissible,
a statement against interest, unlike an admission, must satisfy the lay opinion
and personal knowledge requirements of rules 701 and 602.328 With respect to
firsthand knowledge, for example, the Advisory Committee, by cross-
referencing in the Note to rule 804 to its Note to rule 803,329 conditioned
admissibility of statements against interest upon proof of the declarant's
personal knowledge, established by the statement itself or inferable from its
context.330 Similarly, in its Note to rule 803 the Advisory Committee
implicitly conditioned admissibility under the same exception on satisfaction
325. See, e.g., Home Ins. Co. v. Allied Tel. Co., 246 Ark. 1095, 1100-01,442 S.W.2d 211, 214-15 (1969)
(admission by out of court nonparty declarant admissible as statement against interest, but not as party
admission because declarant lacked authority to make statement); MCCORMICK, supra note 4, § 276, at 671
(rejecting equation because party admission doctrine, unlike statement against interest exception, requires
neither that declarant be unavailable nor that admission actually be against interest when made); 5
WIGMORE, supra note 4, § 1475, at 348-49 (same).
326. See, e.g., United States v. Garris, 616 F.2d 626, 630 (2d Cir. 1980) (statement by out of court
declarant implicating brother in bank robbery satisfied rule 804(b)(3)'s requirement that it "tended" to
subject declarant to criminal liability because it would be probative in trial against declarant as accessory);
United States v. Thomas, 571 F.2d 285, 288-89 (5th Cir. 1978) (rule 804(b)(3) not limited to direct
confessions of guilt; rule encompasses disserving statement by declarant "[t]hey ought to let [defendant] go,
he didn't have anything to do with it" because statement would have probative value in trial against
declarant); United States v. Barrett, 539 F.2d 244, 251 (1st Cir. 1976) (declarant's statement that exposed
his inside knowledge about stamp theft and its participants satisfies penal interest exception because it
would be important evidence against delcarant were he on trial). In two other recent decisions, courts
admitted out of court statements that constituted admissions as statements against penal interest. In
neither case, however, did the court discuss the relationship between the party admission doctrine and the
statement against interest exception. See United States v. Toney, 599 F.2d 787, 789-90 (6th Cir. 1979)
(statement constituting admission admissible under penal interest exception because it revealed declarant's
involvement in illicit gambling and because it disclosed that declarant gambled with large sum of money
shortly after bank robbery for which he had been arrested); People v. Brown, 26 N.Y.2d 88, 90, 257 N.E.2d
16, 17, 308 N.Y.S.2d 825, 826 (1970) (statement constituting admission admissible under penal interest
exception because declarant indicted for robbery admitted picking up gun near scene of crime).
327. Standing Committee Meeting, Sept. 30, 1971 (comment by Professor Cleary distinguishing
doctrines).
328. See FED. R. EVID. 701 (lay opinion admissible only if rationally based upon witness' perception
and helpful to clear understanding of statement or determination of disputed fact); FED. R. EVID. 602
(personal knowledge admissible only if witness introduces sufficient evidence to establish his knowledge
about matter). The Advisory Committee did not mention a third evidentiary hurdle, one that would
require proof of the declarant's competency. See Note, Declarations Against Penal Interest: Standards of
Admissibility Under an Emerging Majority Rule, 56 B.U. L. REV. 148, 171-72 (1975) (arguing that court
should exclude statement of, inter alia, mentally deficient or obviously drunken declarant) [hereinafter
Note, Declarations Against Penal Interest]. Because rule 601 eliminates most common law witness
competency requirements, I would not erect this hurdle, anticipating that the prosecutor could successfully
establish the declarant's condition by examining the witness who reported the statement.
329. Advisory Committee Note to Supreme Court Draft, supra note 1, at 322 ("As to firsthand
knowledge on the part of hearsay declarants, see the introductory portion of the Advisory Committee's
Note to Rule 803."). Although Professor Cleary thought firsthand knowledge was implicitly required by
rule 804(b)(3), see Memorandum No. 19, supra note 52, at 294, he decided to state the obvious because
Senator McClellan had thought the Revised Draft had implicitly eliminated the requirement. See
McClellan Letter, supra note 82, at 33,648 (criticizing Revised Draft for lack of personal knowledge
requirement).
330. Advisory Committee Note to Supreme Court Draft, supra note 1, at 303.
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of the lay opinion rule. In the committee's view, "[t]he exceptions are phrasedin terms of nonapplication of the hearsay rule, rather than in positive terms of
admissibility, in order to repel an implication that other possible grounds for
exclusion are eliminated from consideration." 331
The Committee's position on the application of the lay opinion andfirsthand knowledge rules to the penal interest exception was more clearly
stated in an internal memorandum prepared by Professor Cleary. In this
memorandum he cross-referenced the treatment of opinions and firsthand
knowledge under rule 804(b)(3) to "dying declarations" under rule804(b)(2).332 The Note to rule 804(b)(2) states: "Any problem as to declara-
tions phrased in terms of opinion is laid at rest by Rule 701, and continuation
of a requirement of firsthand knowledge is assured by Rule 602."333 Because
rule 701 does not bar lay testimony in the form of an opinion if it is "rationallybased on the perception of the witness and . . . [is] helpful to a clear
understanding of his testimony or determination of the fact in issue," 334 theAdvisory Committee apparently intended that a statement whose disserving
effect required an inference could qualify as a statement against interest aslong as the declarant spoke with firsthand knowledge. Consequently, a court
might admit the statement, "The defendant is not guilty," as the sort of lay
opinion that might assist the factfinder under rule 701, subject to proof that
the declarant thereby implicated himself.3 35
This analysis, however, presents a problem. The Advisory Committee in itsNote twice used the word "confession" in discussing the penal interest
exception. 336 Professor Cleary also used that word in his criticism of theHouse Subcommittee's revision of the "simple corroboration" test.337 Did theAdvisory Committee thereby intend to limit admissibility to statements that
constitute a full "confession"? 338 Or, did it instead use that term as a
331. Id.
332. Memorandum No. 19, supra note 52, at 294.
333. Advisory Committee Note to Supreme Court Draft, supra note 1, at 326.
334. FED. R. EVID. 701.
335. One might have reservations about this analysis because the example involves an opinion about the
ultimate legal issue in the litigation. Although rule 704 does not bar opinions on the ultimate factual issue,it probably does exclude an opinion that simply instructs the jury how to decide the case. See AdvisoryNote to Supreme Court Draft, supra note 1, at 285 (provisions of rules 701, 702, and 403 "afford ample
assurances against the admission of opinions which would merely tell the jury what result to reach"). To
avoid rule 704's exclusionary bar, however, we could restate the textual example in more precise terms: "I
committed the crime; the defendant did not" or "I committed the crime with X and Y but not with thedefendant." As restated, the example would not present a rule 704 problem. Before a court would admit
such a statement, the defendant would have to establish the declarant's involvement and would have to
negate the implication that the declarant had simply opined about the defendant's guilt based on
information that did not implicate himself.
336. See Advisory Committee Note to Supreme Court Draft, supra note I, at 327 ("one senses in thedecisions a distrust of evidence of confessions by third persons offered to exculpate the accused"); id. at 328("whether the confession [in Douglas v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 415 (1965)] might have been admissible as a
declaration against penal interest was not considered or discussed.").
337. Reporter's Comments to Subcommittee Print, supra note 176, at 38-39. Professor Cleary also
repeatedly used the word "confession" when discussing the penal interest exception in an internal AdvisoryCommittee memorandum. Memorandum No. 19, supra note 52, at 291, 292, 293.338. The Supreme Court's decision in Chambers v. Mississippi may add to the confusion because theCourt continually referred to the declarant's statements as "confessions" during its discussion of the penalinterest exception. 410 U.S. 284, 297, 299, 301 (1972). Limiting admissibility to "confessions" is consistent
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shorthand description for all types of penal interest statements, including one
whose disserving character requires an inference, because most would consist
of confessions? The second interpretation probably is correct because, in the
context of the Note to rule 804(b)(3), the word "confession" refers to third-
party statements offered by the Government against the defendants in Bruton
v. United States339 and Douglas v. Alabama.34° In those cases the Government
offered a statement in which the declarant simultaneously admitted his own
guilt and accused the defendant of complicity.341 The declarant's implication
of the defendant is not itself a "confession," even if it is part of his own
confession. Thus, the Committee must have meant the word "confession" to
describe all statements against penal interest, not just those amounting to full
confessions. 342
In addition to analyzing the admissibility of admissions, the Advisory
Committee considered the admissibility of statements related to or collateral
to an explicitly disserving statement.3 43 Examples include the second clause in
the statements, "I did it, the defendant did not" or "I did it; X and Y but not
the defendant helped me." Common law courts usually excluded both
examples because, as is apparent from the Sussex Peerage,344 they worried that
the second clause was self-serving.345 In fact, neither example presents this
with the position that the statement must substitute the declarant for the defendant in a one-person crime.
Another reason for limiting admissibility to confessions is that any reasonable person easily understands
that a confession can gravely imperil his interests. Thus, we could postulate that few declarants would
confess to a crime that they did not commit. This postulate ameliorates three hearsay fears by assuring that
the declarant is not lying, mistaken, or joking. Furthermore, limiting admissibility to "confessions" is not
inconsistent with the "so far tended to subject" language of the first sentence of rule (804)(b)(3): Not even a
confession would subject the declarant to criminal sanctions if the Government had no interest in
prosecuting him or if he either was near death or beyond the jurisdiction of the authorities. Nonetheless, we
should not make too much of the Court's discussion in Chambers because the declarant's statements were
confessions.
339. 391 U.S. 123 (1968).
340. 380 U.S. 415 (1965).
341. In Bruton the Government offered against the declarant in a joint trial for armed postal robbery
his statement that he and the defendant committed the robbery. Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123, 124
(1968). The trial court instructed the jury not to consider the declarant's statement in determining his
codefendant's culpability because the statement was inadmissible hearsay for this purpose. Id. The
Supreme Court held that the trial court's admission of the statement violated the defendant's right to cross-
examination secured by the confrontation clause of the sixth amendment because of the substantial risk
that the jury ignored the instructions and considered the statement in finding the defendant guilty.
In Douglas the Government offered against the defendant a statement by the declarant, his accomplice,
describing in detail the involvement of both in the crime. Douglas v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 415, 416 (1965).
The trial court admitted the declarant's statement. Id. The Supreme Court held that the trial court's
admission of the statement violated the defendant's right to cross-examination because, although the
declarant was present at the defendant's trial, the declarant exercised his fifth amendment right to remain
silent. Id. at 420.
342. The Advisory Committee's rejection of Senator McClellan's demand that admissibility be limited
to statements that were confessions reinforces the correctness of the second interpretation.
343. Rule 804(b)(3) takes no explicit position on the admissibility of these sorts of statements.
344. See notes 26-34 supra and accompanying text (discussing Sussex Peerage).
345. At least one common law court, however, admitted the second clause of a related statement over
the Government's argument that the statement was untrustworthy. In People v. Gulett, 245 Cal. App. 2d
685, 54 Cal. Rptr. 308 (Cal. App. 1966), the defendant and the declarant were convicted of second degree
robbery. Id. at 686, 54 Cal. Rptr. at 309. At trial the defendant sought to introduce a note he found in his
automobile, the alleged escape vehicle, that said: "Frank, I took your car. I didn't think it would get you
into trouble, but I pulled that job with Jim. Sorry, Rick." Id. at 687, 54 Cal. Rptr. at 310. The trial court
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concern. The second clause can only help the declarant if we infer that his
relationship with the defendant offers him something to gain by speaking(helping a friend escape the declarant's plight) or something to lose by not
speaking (retaliation if he refuses to exonerate the defendant). 346 Common law
courts also refused to admit either example because the second clause was not
thought to be against the declarant's interest 347 and the first clause was
considered irrelevant to the defendant's guilt.348
The Advisory Committee apparently rejected the niggardly approach of
the common law. This rejection is implicit in the Committee's agreeing with
rule 509(1) of the Model Code,349 which states that "such additional parts [of
a purported statement against penal interest should be admitted] as the judgefinds to be so closely connected... as to be equally trustworthy." 350 ProfessorCleary, however, refused to announce this rejection publicly. 35I He thought
excluded the note because it was hearsay evidence, refusing to admit it under the penal interest exception.Id. at 688, 54 Cal. Rptr. at 310. In that court's view, the note was not against the declarant's penal interestbecause at the time the note was offered at trial the declarant already had been indicted and thus the notedid not subject him to further criminal liability. Id. The California Court of Appeals reversed, ruling thatthe statement was reliable under the penal interest exception. Id. In the court's view, the statement was
against the declarant's interest at the time he made it because the declarant had not yet been indicted for
the crime. Id.
346. See United States v. Miller, 277 F. Supp. 200, 209-10 (D. Conn. 1967) (declarant repudiated
allegedly coerced confession exculpating defendant of narcotics conviction).347. Common law courts believed that the assurance of trustworthiness was absent in the second clausebecause the declarant neither admits having committed additional crimes nor subjects himself to other
charges or to more severe punishment.
348. See, e.g., United States v. Marquez, 462 F.2d 893, 895 (2d Cir. 1972) (codefendant's statement,
"Cocaine mine. Other guys had nothing to do with it," inadmissible under penal interest exception;
untrustworthy because it did not subject him to more severe penalty; first clause separately inadmissiblebecause irrelevant to defendant's culpability); United States v. Seyfried, 435 F.2d 696, 697-98 (7th Cir.1970) (convicted bank robber's statement at end of full confession, "No other person had knowledge of orparticipated with me," untrustworthy because it did not subject him to more severe penalty; first part of
confession separately inadmissible because irrelevant to defendant's culpability), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 912(1971); Commonwealth v. Colon, 461 Pa. 577, 585, 337 A.2d 554, 558 (1975) (convicted murderer's
statement at end of full confession, "I acted alone," untrustworthy because it did not subject him to more
severe penalty; first part of confession separately inadmissible because irrelevant to defendant's culpabili-
ty), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1056 (1976); cf. State v. Allen, 139 N.J. Super. 285, 287-88, 353 A.2d 546, 548(Super. Ct. App. Div. 1976) (per curiam) (interpreting New Jersey evidence rule 63(10); finding statement
inadmissible under common law approach).
The common law approach resulted in at least one unsupportable judicial decision. In Baker v. State,336 So. 2d 364 (Fla. 1976), after the Government convicted Baker and another person for robbery, thedeclarant's wife reported that the declarant had told her Baker was innocent. Id. at 366. At the same time,
the declarant's mother-in-law reported that he had told her he was guilty, but Baker was innocent. Id. In
affirming the grant of a motion for a new trial, the Florida Supreme Court distinguished these statements.First, the court held that the statement to the wife was inadmissible because it was not against thedeclarant's penal interest. Id. at 367. Unfortunately, in determining the declarant's intent the court did not
analyze the context in which the declarant spoke but rather limited its analysis solely to the words of his
statement. Second, the court found that because the statement to the mother-in-law was against thedeclarant's penal interest, it was admissible. Id. at 370. Simply noting that the authorities were divided onthe admissibility of such a statement, the court failed to explain why the statement was against thedeclarant's penal interest. The court also failed to explain whether the declarant's statement to his mother-in-law served to substitute him for Baker in the multi-person crime or whether it was possible that he
committed the crime with Baker.
349. See Reporter's Comments to Preliminary Draft, supra note 68, at 192 (stating that Preliminary
Draft rule and Model Code rule have same effect regarding related statements).
350. MODEL CODE OF EVIDENCE rule 509(2) (1942).
351. During the public comment period after publication of the Preliminary Draft, the Chicago Bar
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that rule 804(b)(3), "by simply remaining silent," would reach the same
result.352 In addition to thinking that adding specific language to the rule to
cover the problem of related statements would be unnecessary, Professor
Cleary thought doing so would be unwise. "If one goes beyond [the language
of the Preliminary Draft] in blanketing in [sic] ... related statements," he
wrote, "the rationale [of the rule] is probably stretched beyond a breaking
point. 3 53 One could read this ambiguous comment as meaning that Professor
Cleary thought a court should not admit related statements. Judging from the
context of the statement, he probably thought the problem of drafting helpful
language outweighed the ambiguity created by the failure to draft such
language. Accordingly, by concluding later in the paragraph that it was better
"to leave the matter for construction in the individual situation, ' 354 he
probably meant to indicate that a court should test the admissibility of
collateral parts of statements against penal interests by their trustworthiness.
Three reasons support the conclusion that Professor Cleary probably
intended the second interpretation. First, this interpretation is consistent with
his focus on whether the declarant spoke with firsthand knowledge and
whether the opinion would help the factfinder as required by rules 602 and
701.355 Second, rule 509(1) of the Model Code focused on the trustworthiness
of the related statement in context rather than on whether the related
statement, standing alone, was against penal interest.356 Finally, having been
Committee asked why neither the rule nor its Note discussed the admissibility of related statements. Letter
from Kenneth Hanson, on behalf of Chicago Bar Association Federal Civil Procedure Committee, to
William Foley at 80 (Jan. 23, 1970) (on file with Judicial Conference). Professor Cleary's refusal to
publicize the Advisory Committee's position has resulted in confusion. See 11 MOORE, supra note 9, %
804.06(3)[3], at VIII-286 (law on admissibility of related statements unsettled in federal courts; rule
804(b)(3) gives no guidance). Compare United States v. Barrett, 539 F.2d 244, 252 (1st Cir. 1976)
(interpreting rule 804(b)(3) as restricting admissible collateral statements to those "actually tending to
fortify statements' disserving aspects" or "integral to the entire statement") with United States v. Goodlow,
500 F.2d 954, 956-57 (6th Cir. 1974) (dictum) (interpreting forthcoming rule 804(b)(3); treating compound
statement with disserving and collateral parts as one for purposes of "overall exclusion or admission").
352. Reporter's Comments to Preliminary Draft, supra note 68, at 192. Professor Cleary thought both
rule 509(1) of the Model Code and rule 63(10) of the Uniform Rules authorized the introduction of related
statements. Id. At least one court has disagreed with this interpretation. See State v. Allen, 139 N.J. Super.
285, 288, 353 A.2d 546, 548 (Super. Ct. App. Div. 1975) (by implication) (excluding declarant's
identification of three other persons, none of whom was defendant, as coparticipants in crime; state penal
interest exception modeled after 63(10) of Uniform Rules).
Professor Cleary's interpretation suffers from another problem. Under rule 509 of the Model Code the
single illustration of a penal interest statement suggests that the only sort of related statement a court may
admit is one confirming the declarant's guilt of the crime charged against the defendant. See MODEL CODE
OF EVIDENCE rule 509, Illustration 4 (1942) ("At a trial of D for the murder of X, W offers to testify for D
that M confessed that he, M, alone did the killing without the knowledge or assistance of any other person.
Admissible.").
353. Reporter's Comments to Preliminary Draft, supra note 68, at 192.
354. Id. Additionally, judging from the historical context in which Professor Cleary indicated that
going beyond the language of the Preliminary Draft would stretch the rule "beyond a breaking point," he
probably preferred this second interpretation. Advisory Committee Note to Preliminary Draft, supra note
1, at 385. The Preliminary Draft treated the penal interest exception as an "illustration" of one sort of
admissible hearsay rather than as an "exception" to the hearsay rule. Professor Cleary's failure to discuss
the problem of admissibility of related statements became a problem when the "illustrations" became the
"exceptions" in the Revised Draft.
355. For a discussion of the lay opinion and the personal knowledge requirements, see notes 328-35
supra and accompanying text.
356. See text accompanying note 350 supra (quoting rule 509(1) of Model Code).
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persuaded by Senator McClellan, Professor Cleary and the representatives of
the Advisory and Standing Committees reversed their earlier position that a
statement implicating the defendant could never be against the declarant's
penal interest.357 Although no one on either Committee explained why adeclarant's implication of the defendant might be against the declarant's
interest, two explanations are possible. If the statement exonerating the
defendant is part of a confession, the declarant's trustworthy frame of mind,
inferable from his self-condemnation, might be assumed to continue when hedamns the defendant. 358 Alternatively, we might assume that the declarant
would recognize that by implicating the defendant he would implicitlyimplicate himself.359 By parallel reasoning, both explanations support the
conclusion that a court should admit the declarant's exoneration of the
defendant whenever it is linked with a self-implicating statement. 36 0
This third explanation is not inconsistent with the Standing Committee's
enigmatic cite, in its Note to rule 804(b)(3), to Professor McCormick's
discussion of collateral statements.361 In discussing the common law treat-
ment of statements that contain disserving and self-serving parts, Professor
McCormick preferred the approach that admitted the disserving part but
excluded the self-serving part.362 Although the Standing Committee did not
expressly accept Professor McCormick's choice,363 it probably meant to agree
357. For a discussion of the Committees' change of heart, see notes 198-99 supra and accompanying
text.
358. 5 WIGMORE, supra note 4, § 1465, at 339.
359. Were he on trial, the declarant would have made a statement that was admissible against him.
Implicating the defendant also might be against the declarant's interest in the following manner: By
naming X and Y as coparticipants, for example, the declarant might speed his own conviction because X or
Y eventually might testify against him or because the police might uncover evidence against him in a search
directed against X or Y. Furthermore, the jury might convict the declarant when presented with only scant
evidence against him because strong evidence existed against X or Y. Similarly, the declarant's exoneration
of the defendant might be against his self-interest. For example, naming X and Y but exonerating the
defendant might be against the declarant's social interest. As a "snitch," the declarant would expose
himself to retribution either from X or Y or from others who disapprove of informants. Cf. State v.
Sanders, 27 Utah 2d 350, 359, 496 P.2d 270, 273 (1972) (being informer sufficiently socially disgraceful to
satisfy against-interest requirement of statements against-interest exception; declarant's naming copartici.
pants and excluding defendant nevertheless excluded because exception should be "applied with caution"
and because court should defer to trial court's possible suspicion of untrustworthiness). Arguably, because
Congress refused to enact the against-social-interest exception in rule 804(b)(3), resort to this argument is
barred.
360. See United States v. Goodlow, 500 F.2d 954, 956-57 (8th Cir. 1974) (declarant said he was "good
for crime" and defendant not "good for it"; latter statement not against penal interest, but admissible
because coupled with former statement).
361. See Advisory Committee Note to Supreme Court Draft, supra note 1, at 328 (citing MCCORMICK,
supra note 4, § 279(d), at 677). Although the Advisory Committee is designated as the author of the Note,
the Standing Committee added this reference to Professor McCormick.
362. MCCORMICK, supra note 4, § 279(d), at 675. Professor McCormick suggested two other
approaches. A court either could admit the entire statement or it could either admit or exclude the entire
statement depending on whether the disserving or self-serving part predominated. Id. When severance is
impossible, Professor McCormick does not indicate which option he prefers. Id. He does argue, however,
that when a single statement has both disserving and self-serving aspects, a court should balance the
disserving and collateral parts to decide whether the declarant was more likely to have lied to help himself.
Id.
363. The Committee simply cited Professor McCormick without indicating whether it agreed with his
choice or with either of the other approaches. Advisory Committee Note to Supreme Court Draft, supra
note 1, at 328.
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that the self-serving part should be redacted whether the statement was
offered by the defendant or by the Government.364 Presumably, the Commit-
tee would not have made the effort to exclude the self-serving part if it did not
also intend that a court should admit the collateral, non-self-serving part.
365
It follows from the preceding discussion that the admissibility of related
statements under rule 804(b)(3) initially should involve the fact question of
whether the declarant's implication or exoneration of the defendant is self-
serving.366 That inquiry will force a court to examine the motivation of the
declarant in the context in which he made the statement. Thus, if a related
statement is not self-serving and is linked to a disserving statement, a court
should admit it as long as it meets the other requirements of rule 804(b)(3).
In discussing rule 804(b)(3), neither Committee addressed the admissibility
of opinions. If they are "helpful to the factfmder" under rule 701, opinions
might be admissible under the penal interest exception of rule 804(b)(3). A
court might admit the declarant's compound statement, "I am guilty, the
defendant is innocent," by attributing to the second clause the trustworthiness
of the first, disserving clause. Defendants, however, may have a more difficult
time convincing a court to admit naked opinions such as, "The defendant did
not commit the crime," "The defendant is innocent," or "The defendant did
not participate in the crime." First, because a declarant's inferential statement
364. The Standing Committee discussed Professor McCormick's position while discussing the admissi-
bility of third-party statements offered by the Government. Standing Committee Meeting, Sept. 30, 1971.
Nonetheless, the Standing Committee probably intended that the reference also should apply to statements
offered by the defendant because its citation to Professor McCormick appears in a separate paragraph of
the Note to rule 804. Advisory Committee Note to Supreme Court Draft, supra note I, at 328.
365. A fourth rationale constituting a more extreme position on this question would admit a related
statement if the part in which the defendant is especially interested in "tend[s] to explain the declaration
against interest or pertain[s] to the same subject." B. JEFFERSON, CALIFORNIA EVIDENCE BENCHBOOK, §
6.2, at 107 (1972). This rationale is patterned after the California Evidence Code, id., § 21.2, at 200, which
permits a party to introduce other relevant portions of a statement of which the opponent has introduced
only part when a court needs these other sections to understand the introduced evidence in its proper
context. CAL. EVID. CODE. § 356 (West 1966); accord, FED. R. EvID. 106 (permitting adverse party to
"introduce any other part or any other writing or recorded statement which ought in fairness to be
considered contempdraneously with it"). See also FED. R. EVID. 611(a)(1) (requiring court to exercise
reasonable control over interrogation of witnesses and presention of evidence to promote ascertainment of
truth). This theory assumes that if the declarant speaks the truth in implicating himself, he also speaks the
truth in exculpating the declarant. Wigmore accepts this position, writing:
Since the principle is that the statement is made under circumstances fairly indicating the
declarant's sincerity and accuracy... ,it is obvious that the situation indicates the correctness
of whatever he may say while under that influence. In other words, the statement may be
accepted, not merely as to the specific fact against interest, but also as to every fact contained
in the same statement.
5 WIGMORE, supra note 4, § 1465, at 339 (footnote omitted) (emphasis in original); accord, United States v.
Barrett, 539 F.2d 244,252 (lst Cir. 1976) (after citing Wigmore, admitting declarant's collateral statement
because simultaneous with disserving part). Wigmore might even more liberally admit collateral
statements because his comment suggests that he would admit collateral statements spoken simultaneously
with, but not pertaining to, the disserving statement. This fourth rationale extends rule 106, however,
because that rule permits the opponent to introduce other parts of the statement; the defendant, not the
Government, would seek to introduce the exonerating words related to the declarant's self-condemnation.
366. See 5 WIGMORE, supra note 4, § 1465, at 341 (if statement against interest, "any reference to
collateral records which amounts to a repetition or an incorporation of them would make them a part of
the admissible statement").
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indicating his guilt is less certainly against his interest than is a direct
admission, a court may not be able to conclude as easily or as safely that the
declarant was in a trustworthy state of mind when he spoke. Indeed, the only
way a naked exculpatory opinion can be disserving to the declarant is if a
court assumes that the reason for the declarant's knowledge of the defendant's
innocence is the declarant's own complicity in the crime. 367 Second, if the
declarant states a naked opinion, a court will have more difficulty inferring
that the declarant spoke with firsthand knowledge, as required by rule 602.368
Nonetheless, if the defendant links the declarant to the crime369 and establish-
es that he spoke with personal knowledge, rule 804(b)(3) probably does not
exclude these sorts of statements.
Since the Advisory and Standing Committees failed to discuss these
problems, the House Subcommittee, which may have thought these sorts of
statements should be admissible, was the sole commentator on these issues.
With respect to a statement offered by the Government in which the declarant
implicated the defendant, the Subcommittee apparently believed the declarant
must have simultaneously and expressly implicated himself before a court
should admit such a statement.370 In its view, the opinion statement, "The
defendant is guilty," as well as all similar statements would be inadmissible
when offered by the Government because the statement only implicitly
367. See State v. Gaines, 147 N.J. Super 84, 97 370 A.2d 856, 863-64 (Super. Ct. App. Div. 1975)
(declarant's statement that defendant knew nothing about guns implied under circumstances that
declarant had such knowledge), affd sub nom. State v. Powers, 72 N.J. 346, 370 A.2d 854 (1977) (per
curiam).
368. See Advisory Committee Note to Supreme Court Draft, supra note 1, at 303 ("In a hearsay
situation, the declarant is, of course, a witness, and neither this rule nor Rule 804 dispenses with the
requirement of firsthand knowledge ").
369. Requiring defendants who seek to introduce exculpatory naked opinions to link the declarant to
the crime is necessary to bar the introduction of a statement by a declarant who simply opined about the
defendant's guilt based on information he had learned of personally but independent of his own complicity.
In State v. Gaines, 147 N.J. Super. 84, 370 A.2d 856 (Super. Ct. App. Div. 1975), affd sub nom. State v.
Powers, 72 N.J. 346, 370 A.2d 854 (1977) (per curiam), three defendants were charged with possession of
guns found in a car, but the third defendant's case was severed. Id. at 87, 370 A.2d at 858. The trial court
excluded the third defendant's statement that the second defendant knew nothing about the guns because
the statement did not inculpate the declarant. Id. at 90, 370 A.2d at 860. The New Jersey Court of Appeals
reversed, ruling that the declarant's "initial statement, that [the second defendant] knew nothing about the
guns, implied, in the circumstances, that he himself knew something about the guns, of their origin or their
existence, which tends toward proving the charge of possession against him." Id. at 97, 370 A.2d at 863-64.
Noting that the guns were hidden under a towel on the floor behind the front seat and that the second
defendant was lying on the rear seat, the court found that the declarant's statement that the second
defendant knew nothing about the guns confirmed the declarant's complicity in the crime. Id. at 97-98, 370
A.2d at 863-64; cf. State v. Davis, 50 N.J. 16, 28-29, 231 A.2d 793, 799 (1967) (defendant, convicted of
murder, who stated that driver of automobile in which police arrested him had nothing to do with murder,
inferentially indicated defendant's own involvement; linkage of defendant to crime not based on
circumstances but solely on inference from statement). The Gaines analysis might become important in
jurisdictions that have adopted a presumption of possession rule that is based upon the defendant's
proximity to an item that is illegal to possess. See County Court v. Allen, 442 U.S. 140, 167 (1979) (holding
constitutional New York statute permitting presumption that occupants of vehicle illegally possess
firearms found within vehicle). This presumption will make it easier for a party seeking admission of an
opinion statement to link the declarant/defendant to the crime.
370. Associate counsel said that a statement implicating both the declarant and the defendant was not
against the declarant's penal interest in so far as it implicated the defendant. Markup Session, June 5, 1973.
The Subcommittee members agreed that the declarant had to implicate himself for his statement to be
against his penal interest. Id.
RULE 804(b)(3)
implicated the declarant. By parallel reasoning, this position suggests that the
Subcommittee also would not permit the introduction of a naked opinion
offered by the defendant. 371
Before concluding that the Advisory and Standing Committees believed
admissions, related statements, and perhaps naked opinions might qualify as
statements against penal interest, we must examine the meaning of the word
"exculpate" in "offered to exculpate the accused," which the Advisory
Committee included in the rule's second sentence. With this word, did the
Advisory Committee intend to apply the "simple corroboration" test only
when the c-iminal defendant, in contrast to the Government in a criminal
case or any party in a civil proceeding, offers a penal interest statement? Or,
did the committee intend to restrict the sorts of statements that the defendant
may introduce? 37 2 With respect to the latter possibility, if the Committee
371. The Subcommittee, however, never discussed this possibility. Even though the House Judiciary
Committee cited Gichner v. Antonio Troiano Tile and Marble Co., 410 F.2d 238 (D.C. Cir. 1969), in its
report, HOUSE JUDICIARY REPORT, supra note 10, at 16, [1974] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS at 7089, a
court should not conclude that the Committee intended to preclude the introduction of naked opinions. In
Gichner the plaintiff sued the lessee of his warehouse for fire damage allegedly caused by the negligent
cigarette smoking of the lessee's employees. 410 F.2d at 240. The plaintiff sought to introduce two
statements by one of the lessee's employees, the first an admission that he had been smoking and the second
that he had been negligent. Conversation with appellee's counsel (May 25, 1979). The trial court excluded
the statements. 410 F.2d at 240. The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit
remanded for a determination whether the employee was unavailable; if he was, the court ordered reversal
on the ground that the trial court should have admitted the first statement as a statement against pecuniary
interest. Id. at 243. The court of appeals thought the second statement was inadmissible, however, because
it was simply an opinion about negligence. Id. at 243 n.5; accord, Carpenter v. Davis, 435 S.W.2d 382, 384-
85 (Mo. 1968) (en banc) (statement by plaintiff's deceased wife to defendant's employee truck driver after
accident, "Yes, I know, its not your fault," inadmissible because opinion about fault in negligence case).
Although Gichner stands for the proposition that a naked opinion cannot be admitted under rule 804
(b)(3), the House Judiciary Committee did not cite the case for that proposition. Instead, the Committee
cited Gichner to support its decision not to include a "civil interest" exception to the rule because it thought
pecuniary and proprietary interests were sufficiently broad to include statements against civil interest.
HOUSE JUDICIARY REPORT, supra note 10, at 16, [1974] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS at 7089.
One might contest the House Subcommittee's arguable denial of admissibility of opinions under the
penal interest exception by drawing a distinction between opinions about civil liability and criminal guilt. A
declarant might be unaware of the legal defenses commonly available in civil litigation, such as
contributory negligence or last clear chance. In contrast, a declarant's statement about his or the
defendant's criminal guilt does not require the same sophistication. See Reporter's Comments to
Preliminary Draft, supra note 68, at 114(d) (declarant should more easily recognize that statement against
penal interest than that another statement against either pecuniary or proprietary interest). Thus, opinions
about criminal guilt are less likely to be mistaken than are opinions about civil liability, supporting the
conclusion that if civil liability statements are admissible so should be penal interest statements a fortiori.
372. Judge Weinstein interprets the purpose of the last sentence of rule 804(b)(3), and thus the word
"exculpate," quite differently. He argues that Congress intended to restrict the admissibility of all penal
interest statements in criminal suits to those offered by defendants. 4 WEINSTEIN, supra note 16,
804(b)(3)[03], at 804-110. He argues that the House Subcommittee deleted the "Bruton sentence" from
the rule on the ground that the rule achieved that limitation without the sentence. See id. ("in context, this
means that the Rule should be interpreted to include [the 'Bruton sentence']" because this interpretation
"would have been the result obtained under the present rule"). The last sentence of the enacted rule also
implies this limitation because it speaks only about the defendant. See FED. R. EVID. 804(b)(3) (statement
tending to expose declarant to criminal liability and offered to exculpate "accused" admissible only if
corroborating circumstances clearly indicate trustworthiness of statement). Judge Weinstein's interpreta-
tion of "exculpate" is wrong. Senator McClellan convinced the Standing Committee that a statement
implicating the defendant could be against the declarant's penal interest. See notes 198-99 supra and
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intended "exculpate" to limit admissibility to statements that by themselves
exonerate the defendant by eliminating his complicity, that word would
exclude statements relevant to the defendant's degree of guilt or to his
punishment and statements offered to support a defense argument that theGovernment failed to meet its burden of proof.373 In other words, the rule
would admit only those statements that establish the defendant's factual
innocence. 374 Considerable evidence suggests that those parties who discussed
accompanying text (Professor Cleary redrafted rule and Note to meet Senator McClellan's objection). The
House Subcommittee reinserted the "Bruton sentence" because it sought to codify Bruton, not because it
disagreed with either Senator McClellan or the Standing Committee with respect to the evidentiary
question. See notes 201-05 supra and accompanying text (associate counsel convinced Subcommittee that
"Bruton sentence" necessary to codify Bruton decision). Neither the Senate nor the conferees disagreed
with either Senator McClellan or the Standing Committee. Instead, the Senate and the conferees deleted
the "Bruton sentence" to avoid codifying constitutional doctrine. See"SENATE JUDICIARY REPORT, supra
note 10, at 20-21, [1974] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS at 7068 ("Bruton sentence" deleted because
codification of constitutional principle unnecessary and often unwise).
373. Two recent Supreme Court decisions suggest that the constitutional dimension of a restrictive
interpretation of "exculpate" is uncertain. In Green v. Georgia, 442 U.S. 95 (1979) (per curiam), the Court
reversed for resentencing because the trial court during the sentencing phase excluded a coparticipant's
statement that he, not the defendant, killed the victim. Id. at 96, 97. In reversing, the Court grounded its
decision upon a due process analysis rather than upon an interpretation of "exculpate." Nevertheless,
Green suggests that interpreting "exculpate" to exclude statements relevant only to punishment or degree
of guilt arguably is unconstitutional.
In United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97 (1976), a Brady-type case, the defense did not request and the
prosecution did not disclose the murder victim's criminal record for assault. Id. at 101. This record would
have supported the defendant's claim that the victim was the aggressor. Id. at 100. The Court repeatedly
used the word "exculpatory" in describing the sort of evidence to which the Brady doctrine applies. Id. at
105, 106, 107, 111, 112 n.20. The Court defined "exculpatory" by stating that "if the omitted evidence
creates a reasonable doubt that did not otherwise exist, constitutional error has been committed." Id. at
112. Although this holding does not indicate whether "exculpate" has an exclusionary nature, language in
two immediately following sentences including "reasonable doubt about guilt" and "if the verdict is of
questionable validity," id., respectively, suggests that the Court defines "exculpate" broadly to include any
guilt-related statements. As a result, the declarant's equivocal statement, "I was present at the murder
scene," when analyzed with other evidence, might suggest reasonable doubt and thus a court should admit
it. On the other hand, the examples cited by the Court suggest that it viewed Brady as applicable only to
nondisclosed evidence supporting the defendant's factual innocence rather than as applicable to evidence
challenging the Government's proof. See id. at 110 n. 18 (fingerprint evidence indicating defendant did not
shoot victim); id. at 112 n.21 (one of two eyewitnesses says defendant not culprit). Thus, the Court's
discussion of "exculpate" is unclear over whether the Brady doctrine renders unconstitutional a narrow
interpretation of "exculpate."
374. Accord, State v. Smith, 415 A.2d 553, 560-61 (Me. 1980) (codefendant's exculpation of defendant
not sufficiently corroborated because her self-implication not "inherently inconsistent with accused's
guilt"; defendant could have planned or participated in murder); Thompson v. State, 480 S.W.2d 624, 628.
29 (Tex. Crim. App. 1972) (penal interest statement exonerating defendant of robbery admissible only
when defendant's guilt inconsistent with declarant's guilt); KAN. CIV. PRO. CODE ANN. § 60-460(j),
Author's Comments (Vernon 1965) ("[A] statement against declarant's interest should be admissible if it
exculpates a defendant on trial and for the same policy reason which prevents it from being used against
him, namely, to protect an innocent person.") If the Advisory Committee intended to limit admissibility to
statements establishing the defendant's innocence, it probably would have tracked the Supreme Court's
frequent restriction of habeas corpus relief to constitutional violations that prevent the defendant from
establishing his innocence. See generally Seidman, Factual Guilt and the Burger Court: An Examination of
Continuity and Change in Criminal Procedure, 80 COLUM. L. REV. 436, 437 (1980) (noting that Burger
Court has focused attention of criminal courts narrowly on questions of guilt or innocence); Tague, Federal
Habeas Corpus and Ineffective Representation of Counsel: The Supreme Court Has Work to Do, 31 STAN. L.
REV. 1, 5, 6, 29 (1978) (criticizing Supreme Court's "actual prejudice" requirement for unnecessarily
restricting federal habeas review of constitutional claims of state defendants forfeited in state courts due to
state procedural rules).
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the penal interest exception expected that the defendant could use the rule to
admit only a statement whose effect would substitute the declarant for the
defendant in a one-person crime. In its first criticism of the rule, for example,
the Department of Justice argued that the penal interest exception, if adopted,
should be limited to statements that substitute the declarant for the defendant
as the single culprit. 375 Also, rule 509(1) of the Model Code of Evidence,
which permits the introduction of a "related statement," appears to define a
related statement as one that confirms the substitution of the declarant for the
defendant. 376 Furthermore, Professor Cleary, in his initial memorandum to
the Advisory Committee explaining the rule, expressly approved of the
Maryland decisions that admitted written confessions substituting the declar-
ant for the defendant as well as contradictory confessions by the declarant
and defendant when each claimed sole responsibility for the crime.
377
Although the Advisory and Standing Committees did not specifically
discuss the meaning of "exculpate," they probably did not intend to limit
admissibility to statements that substitute the declarant for the defendant.
During its September 5, 1971 meeting, the Advisory Committee added the
word "exculpate" to the rule by including it in the sentence proposing the
"simple corroboration" requirement. 378 By including "exculpate" in this
sentence, the Committee intended only to appease Senator McClellan, not to
adopt the Senator's interpretation of the sorts of statements admissible under
the rule. In the clearest public demand that only confessions substituting the
declarant for the defendant should "exculpate" the defendant, Senator
McClellan wrote: "An accused seeks, in effect, to convict [the declarant] by
such a confession in order that [the defendant] may go free. ' 379 During that
meeting, however, the Advisory Committee did not discuss Senator McClel-
lan's intended limitation on the meaning of exculpation.380 Indeed, after the
September 22, 1971 meeting with Senator McClellan, Professor Cleary
indicated that he added the language, "offered to exculpate the accused," to
the Note to identify the sorts of cases in which the commentators and the
common law courts feared fabrication.381 Thus, the Advisory and Standing
375. Justice's First Letter, supra note 63, at 34.
376. See note 352 supra (quoting only penal interest illustration accompanying rule 509, which involved
statement exonerating defendant of guilt).
377. Memorandum No. 19, supra note 52, at 291. For a discussion of the Maryland decisions, see note
61 supra.
378. The word "exculpate" first appeared in the Committee's explanation of the Bruton problem. See
Advisory Committee Note to Preliminary Draft, supra note 1, at 386 ("Ordinarily, the third-party
confession is thought of in terms of exculpating the accused, but this is by no means always or necessarily
the case: it may include statements implicating him .... .
379. McClellan Letter, supra note 82, at 33,648.
380. The Advisory Committee adopted "offered to exculpate" rather than Senator McClellan's
language. See Supreme Court Draft, supra note 1, 321 ("A statement tending to expose the declarant to
criminal liability and offered to exculpate the accused is not admissible unless corroborated."). In response
to Senator McClellan's objection to the rule changes made by the Advisory Committee on September 5,
1971, the Standing Committee inserted the clause, "offered to exculpate the accused," in the Note to the
Supreme Court Draft. Advisory Committee Note to Supreme Court Draft, supra note 1, at 327. In doing so,
however, the Committee did not agree by implication with the Senator's narrow reading of the rule. A
careful review of the Advisory Committee's September 5, 1971 discussion of alternative ways of expressing
the "simple corroboration" requirement suggests, for example, that no member was trying to limit the
admissibility of particular types of statements against penal interest. See note 105 supra and accompanying
text (setting forth Professor Cleary's suggested formulations for "simple corroboration" requirement).
381. Standing Committee Meeting, Sept. 30, 1971.
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Committees probably only inserted that clause to identify the circumstance in
which the "simple corroboration" requirement applies: when the defendant
offers the statement.
The Standing Committee's use of the accomplice analogy to explain the
"simple corroboration" requirement it added to the Supreme Court Draft
further supports this conclusion. Because an admission and a confession by a
coparticipant are equally admissible under the accomplice doctrine, a declar-
ant's admission that implicates himself and eliminates the defendant as a
participant in a multiparticipant crime should be equally admissible. Also,
Professor Cleary approved of Brady v. State,382 one of the Maryland state
court decisions admitting a declarant's statement that did not absolve him of
guilt in a multiperson crime.38 3 Professor Cleary's reference to Brady suggests
that the Advisory Committee did not intend that "exculpate" should exclude
from the penal interest exception statements relevant only to certain issues,
including the Government's burden of proof, the defendant's degree of guilt,
and his punishment, or statements that do not substitute the declarant for the
defendant.
The House Subcommittee's discussion about the meaning of "exculpate"
only adds to the confusion. During the markup sessions, various Subcommit-
tee members used the word "exculpate" without explaining what they
understood it to mean. Nonetheless, the Subcommittee's desire to change the
result in a case like Donnelly, which was the only case and the only factual
setting discussed during the markup sessions, suggests that the Subcommittee
expected the statement to replace the declarant for the defendant as the sole
culprit in a single-person crime. Whether the Subcommittee intended that
only statements offered for that purpose would be admissible, however, isproblematic because of its discussion of the "Bruton sentence." Unlike the
Advisory Committee, which in the Preliminary and Revised Drafts chose to
exclude purported penal interest statements offered by the Government
382. Memorandum No. 19, supra note 52, at 291.
383. Brady v. State, 1-74 A.2d 167, 172 (Md. 1961), affd sub nora. Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83(1963). In Brady the defendant, charged with a murder committed in the course of a robbery, admitted at
trial that he participated in the robbery, but claimed that his companion, Boblit, actually killed the victim.
Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 84 (1963). Before trial, Brady moved to discover any statement made by
Boblit. Id. Despite Brady's request, the prosecution did not disclose a statement in which Boblit admitted
having killed the victim. Id. The Maryland Court of Appeals held that the prosecution's failure to disclose
the statement violated due process, and remanded for reconsideration of Brady's punishment, but not his
guilt. Id. at 85. In affirming, the United States Supreme Court ruled that the prosecutor's suppression of
evidence requested by the defendant violated due process on the issue of punishment because prosecutors
must disclose all evidence that "tend[s] to exculpate [the defendant] or reduce the penalty." Id. at 87, 88.
On the issue of guilt, the Court rejected Brady's request for a new trial. Agreeing with the Maryland court,
the Supreme Court indicated that Boblit's statement would have been inadmissible on the issue of guilt at
Brady's trial because "nothing in it could have reduced the appellant Brady's offense below murder in the
first degree." Id. at 88. In dictum, however, the Court indicated that if the requested evidence had been
"favorable" to the defense on the issue of guilt, the prosecutor's failure to disclose it would have violated
due process. Id. at 87. The Court did not explain how Boblit's statement might have been "favorable" to
Brady. Nonetheless, by using this term as shorthand for the language "nothing in it could have reduced the
appellant Brady's offense below murder in the first degree," the Court may have indicated that it wanted
prosecutors to disclose evidence relevant to lesser guilt-related issues such as burden of proof, guilt of lesser
included offenses, or degree of guilt. Thus because it also equated the disclosure test of "tends to exculpate
the defendant" with the test "favorable on the issue of guilt," the Court may have implied that "exculpate"
should include lesser guilt-related issues. But qf. note 373 supra (discussing United States v. Agurs, 427
U.S. 97 (1976)).
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against the accused because they were not against interest, the Subcommittee
decided to exclude such statements because it felt Bruton constitutionally
mandated this result. In Bruton a coparticipant's statement implicated the
defendant in a crime. 384 Such a statement could not have been a confession
that substituted the declarant for the defendant because it merely added a
second culprit to the crime. Thus, if the Subcommittee truly had intended to
limit admissibility of defense-offered statements to those that substitute the
declarant for the defendant in a one-person crime, it would have had no
reason to include the "Bruton sentence" in the rule because Bruton-type
statements already would have been excludable under a narrow interpretation
of "exculpate." No explicit evidence, however, supports the inference that the
Subcommittee did not intend such a narrow interpretation of "exculpate."
B. THE "REASONABLE MAN" TEST
Rule 804(b)(3) provides that a statement is against interest if "a reasonable
man in [the declarant's] position would not have made the statement unless he
believed it to be true. ' 385 The "reasonable man" test was adopted only after a
spirited exchange between the Department of Justice and the Advisory
Committee. In its first letter to the Advisory Committee, the Department of
Justice argued that a court should be free to evaluate the understanding of
either the specific declarant or the "reasonable man" with respect to a
statement's disserving possibilities.386 It repeated this argument in its objec-
tions to the Revised Draft.38 7 The Advisory Committee rejected the Depart-
ment of Justice's objection, defending the "reasonable man" approach as
being the only viable test courts could employ.38  The Advisory Committee's
position prevailed when the Department did not press its objection during the
congressional hearings and when neither the House of Representatives nor
the Senate discussed the propriety of the "reasonable man" approach.
The Department of Justice never explained why it thought the subjective
analysis of the declarant's understanding would lead to a different result than
an objective inquiry. More importantly, the Advisory Committee did not
explain either whether a court could consider the declarant's subjective
understanding of the penal interest significance of his statement or how courts
should interpret the Committee's ambiguous order to determine the under-
standing of a "reasonable man in [the declarant's] position. 38
9
Courts might interpret the "reasonable man" test in three ways. First, a
court might ignore the declarant's subjective understanding and ask only
384. Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123, 124 (1968).
385. FED. R. EVID. 804(b)(3).
386. Justice's First Letter, supra note 63, at 35.
387. Justice's Second Letter, supra note 75, at 33,657. The Department of Justice shifted its attack in
commenting on the Revised Definitive Draft, arguing that penal interest statements should be deleted from
the rule because "[iut is virtually impossible to determine whether an individual who makes a statement
knows at the time of the declaration that the statement would subject him to ... criminal liability."
Justice's Third Letter, supra note 130, at 48.
388. Professor Cleary wrote: "Since [the declarant] is required to be unavailable, his own testimony on
the subject cannot be had, and it is unlikely that he would have made a declaration on the subject.
Consequently, the only standard in actuality is the objective one, which the rule adopts." Reporter's
Comments Concerning Revised Draft, supra note 54, at 114d.
389. FED. R. EVID. 804(b)(3).
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whether an ordinary person would recognize the disserving effect of his
statement.390 Second, the court might explore what the declarant actually
thought, but ignore his understanding if it is unreasonable. 391 Finally, the
court may admit the statement if the declarant thought the statement was
against his interest, regardless of whether either the statement was in fact
disserving or a normal person would have so thought.392 Under the third
390. Professor Morgan adopts this approach. As evidence of this approach, Morgan even would
exclude a statement the declarant thought was disserving when it was in fact self-serving. Morgan, supra
note 43, at 477. Although he acknowledged that such a statement theoretically should be admissible, he
thought that Model Code rule 509 would exclude it. He accepted the rule only because "practical
considerations seem to furnish a sufficient justification for this result." Id.
Courts that admit only statements unquestionably or distinctly against interest implicitly have chosen
the first interpretation of the "reasonable man" test. In United States v. Brandenfels, 522 F.2d 1259 (9th
Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1033 (1975), for example, the declarant moved to Brazil to evade arrest for
embezzlement. Id. at 1262. While there, he exonerated the defendant of complicity in the crime. The
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that the declarant's statement was inadmissible
because it was insufficiently against the declarant's penal interest in that the statement only inferentially
inculpated the declarant. Id. at 1263. The court also held that the statement was inadmissible under the
against-pecuniary interest exception because it was only the "natural accompaniment" of a criminal act.
Id. In People v. Chapman, 50 Cal. App. 3d 872, 123 Cal. Rptr. 862 (Ct. App. 1975), the defendant, charged
with murder, sought to introduce the declarant's admission that he had shot someone and that the
defendant had tried to break up the fight between the declarant and the victim. Id. at 877, 123 Cal. Rptr. at
865. The court of appeals affirmed the exclusion of this exculpatory statement, inter alia, because it was
not "distinctly" against the declarant's penal interest. Id. at 880, 123 Cal. Rptr. at 867. A "reasonable
man" would not have thought it against penal interest. Id. at 878, 123 Cal. Rptr. at 866. Not surprisingly,
under the first interpretation of the "reasonable man" test as adopted by these courts, a court probably
would exclude any statement other than a confession.
391. This approach parallels the two-step analysis of whether the fourth amendment protects an
individual in a particular situation. To determine whether the fourth amendment provides protection to the
individual, the Supreme Court asks whether the party who moves to suppress evidence had a subjective
expectation of privacy in the area searched and whether that expectation is objectively justifiable. See
United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745, 751-52 (1971) (Government's introduction against defendant of his
implicating statement made to government informant who had concealed transmitter not violative of
fourth amendment; defendant had subjective expectation of privacy, but expectation unreasonable because
"one contemplating illegal activities must realize and risk that companions may be reporting to police");
Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring) (Government's introduction
against defendant of his statement implicating him in illegal transmission of wagering information by
phone violates fourth amendment; defendant had subjective expectation of privacy, which Government
unreasonably intruded upon by attaching electronic recording and listening device to telephone booth).
Assuming that the first step is satisfied, the second step gives a court considerable discretion to grant or to
deny fourth amendment protection. This discretion to ignore the defendant's subjective expectation is
perhaps justifiable under the fourth amendment because the rationale for the exclusionary rule, police
deterrence, is a consideration independent of an individual's subjective expectation. Similarly, the second
interpretation of the "reasonable man" test would authorize ajudge to exercise broad discretion under rule
804(b)(3), but for the different rationale of avoiding the introduction of ostensibly unreliable evidence.
Courts should reject the second interpretation of the "reasonable man" test and its broad grant of
discretion. As long as the Government has an adequate opportunity to demonstrate a statement's
unreliability to the jury, the court should admit the statement. Thus, in United States v. Satterfield, 572
F.2d 687 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 840 (1978), the trial court should have admitted the declarant's
statement because the Government might have convinced the jury that either the declarant never spoke or
he fabricated the statement's details. Id. at 693. For a discussion of Satterfield, see notes 403-09 infra and
accompanying text.
392. One might analogize this interpretation to the method by which several courts have decided
whether to invoke the rule excluding statements made during plea negotiations under former rule 410 of
the Federal Rules of Evidence or rule 1 l(e)(6) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. These courts
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approach, a court would exclude the statement if the declarant had not
actually recognized its disserving effect, even if a normal person would have
recognized it. Under this approach, the court would ask what the normal
person would have thought only if it could not determine the declarant's
actual understanding.393
Choosing among these three approaches is complicated by other considera-
tions. First, a necessary interplay exists between the definition of "against
interest" and the meaning of the "reasonable man" test. If courts define
"against interest" strictly, as do Wigmore, Morgan, and rule 509(1) of the
Model Code, the "reasonable man" test would be of little concern because a
declarant's statement would have to be so clearly against interest that no
person could overlook its disserving quality.394 If, however, in defining
"against interest," courts follow Jefferson and consider the litigation signifi-
cance of the statement, a question of fact arises. These courts then must
ascertain how a "reasonable man" would assess the likelihood that witnesses
would report his statement and that he then would be prosecuted, convicted,
and punished.395 In answering this question, a court also must decide whether
have held that the only relevant issue in this area is not a Government official's actual authority, but the
defendant's perception of the Government official's authority to bargain. See United States v. Herman, 544
F.2d 791, 799 (5th Cir. 1977) (defendant, charged with robbery of post office and murder of post-office
employee, made incriminating statements in connection with attempt to plea bargain with postal
inspectors; statements inadmissible under rule I l(e)(6) because defendant incorrectly assumed inspectors
had authority to plea bargain); cf. United States v. Stirling, 571 F.2d 708, 731 (2d Cir. 1978) (by
implication) (defendant, charged with securities and mail fraud, accepted plea bargain with prosecutor and
made incriminating remarks before grand jury on following day; statements admissible because defendant
conceded he was not engaged in "discussion" to persuade prosecution not to indict; had intent existed,
statement might be inadmisible under Herman), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 824 (1980); United States v. Brooks,
536 F.2d 1137, 1139 (6th Cir. 1976) (defendant, charged with theft and possession of check from mails,
called postal inspector and offered to plead guilty if given maximum of two-year sentence; without
addressing apparent authority issue, court held statement inadmissible because attempts to open plea-
bargaining fall within exclusionary rule for plea-bargain connected statements).
Under both amended rule 410 of the Federal Rules of Evidence and amended rule 11(e)(6) of the
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, a court should admit only those plea-bargain statements made
during discussions with a government attorney. FED. R. EVID 410; FED. R CRIM. P. I l(e)(6). Thus, these
rules now implicitly reject the view that the defendant's perception of a government official's authority to
bargain is the only significant issue raised in these types of cases.
393. Jefferson thought "[s]trict logic" required the third approach. Jefferson, supra note 35, at 22. Like
Professor Cleary, however, he doubted that evidence of what the declarant had thought would exist very
often. Id. Thus, he accepted the objective reasonable man approach for practical reasons, subject perhaps to
proof by the opponent that the declarant in fact had not thought his statement disserving. Id. at 23.
Professor Moore agrees "to the extent that there is evidence to indicate the subjective state of the
declarant's mind, that evidence should be given great weight." 11 MOORE, supra note 9, 804.06(3)[3], at
VIII-284. Professor Moore's examples, however, concerned instances in which the declarant did not
believe his statement was disserving rather than when he did think so. Id.
394. Indeed, Wigmore never mentioned the "reasonable man" issue in discussing the penal interest
exception.
395. When coupled with a subjective interpretation of the "reasonable man" test, the view of "against
interest" that admits statements if they have litigation significance may exclude more statements than
would the other, usually more restrictive interpretation of against interest. Professor Morgan apparently
rejected this approach, implicitly fearful that courts might exclude even the most frank confessions because
many declarants probably are insufficiently sophisticated to understand the litigation significance of their
allegedly disserving statements. Morgan, supra note 43, at 456. Morgan thought a subjective view of the
"reasonable man" test was more compatible with a strict "against interest" interpretation. In his view, even
though a declarant might not recognize the evidentiary significance of his statement, he surely would
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it should examine the sophistication of the declarant. A police officer, an
attorney, or even an experienced criminal, for example, is more likely than a
normal person to recognize the potentially disserving effect of certain sorts of
statements.396 Similarly, a sophisticated declarant, unlike the average person,
might better recognize that certain sorts of statements probably are not
disserving.397
Second, the relevance of a witness' evaluation of a statement's significance
complicates the choice between the three "reasonable man" tests. The person
who heard the declarant speak, for example, might report the statement
because he thought it either would implicate the declarant or would assist the
defendant. 98 In another setting, the Government might think that it was
constitutionally obliged to disclose such a statement to the defendant.399 On
realize the seriousness of his statement, and because of this realization, a court should find his statement
trustworthy. Id. If a court, like Morgan, wanted to avoid the problem posed above, it also could combine
the "litigation significance" approach to penal interest with the objective "reasonable man" test.
396. For example, only an experienced defendant might understand the disserving effects of a statement
in a jurisdiction that has a "presumption of possession from the opportunity to control" doctrine. If the
police, for example, found narcotics under the front seat of an automobile and the unsophisticated
defendant stated, "I was in the front seat and [my codefendant] was in the back seat," he probably would
not understand the criminal implications of his statement. Cf. County Court v. Allen, 442 U.S. 140, 163
(1979) (upholding state statute providing that presence of firearm in vehicle presumptive evidence of illegal
possession by all persons in vehicle).
397. Privileged statements provide the best examples. A declarant, for example, might know of the
spousal immunity or husband-wife communication privileges or of other privileges, such as the reporter's
shield for confidential sources, that are not recognized in all jurisdictions. Nonetheless, courts have been
quick to find privileged statements not against interest. In United States v. Hoyos, 573 F.2d 1111 (9th Cir.
1978), for example, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that a declarant's
statement to his spouse was not against interest. Id. at 1115. Even though the declarant probably was
unaware of the spousal immunity privilege, the statement "could have been suppressed at a subsequent
criminal prosecution under a claim of the confidential marital communications privilege." Id. Even if the
spouse cannot testify against the declarant, a privileged communication may expose the declarant to
prosecution. If the spouse reports the statement to the defense, as the wife did in Hoyos, for example, the
defense may search for other evidence to implicate the declarant.
In contrast, if the listener tells the declarant the communication is privileged, the declarant probably
will not anticipate that the statement might be used against him. Nonetheless, in this setting the declarant
may speak more freely and honestly. Cf. United States v. Trejo-Zambrano, 582 F.2d 460, 464 (9th Cir.)
(affidavit privileged; affiant assumed it could not be used against him), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1005 (1978).
398. Cf. United States v. Atkins, 558 F.2d 133, 135 (3d Cir. 1977) (after overhearing declarant admit to
having killed bank guard during robbery, witness reported statement to family of deceased, which then
accompanied witness when he reported statement to police), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1071 (1978). The
proponent under other circumstances might argue that if a witness who recognized the penal interest effect
of the statement had communicated that understanding to the declarant and if the declarant did not then
retract or qualify the statement, he arguably acknowledged that he understood the significance of his
statement.
399. Evaluating whether the statement was against interest in terms of the prosecutor's constitutional
duty to disclose it, however, probably is too narrow an interpretation of the "reasonable man" test. Under
this interpretation, the prosecutor might take the improperly narrow position that only confessions that
substitute the declarant for the defendant create a reasonable doubt and trigger the constitutional duty to
disclose. See United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 112 (1976) (using word "exculpate," which implies issue
of guilt or innocence, to describe subject of reasonable doubt; test for disclosure is whether admitted
evidence creates reasonable doubt that it did not otherwise exist). On the other hand, prosecutors might
object that their willingness to provide information to the defense should not be the test because they often
disclose evidence when they believe disclosure is not constitutionally advised. Cf. id. at 108 (suggesting that
because disclosure standard inevitably imprecise, "prudent prosecutor will resolve doubtful questions"
about importance of evidence "in favor of disclosure"). For a further discussion of Agurs, see note 373
supra. See also note 383 supra (discussing Brady).
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the other hand, the Government might argue that a statement is not against
the declarant's interest because it would never prosecute the declarant, no
matter what he had said. The Government may make this claim when the
declarant is a valuable informant, if he is serving a long prison term on a
different charge, if he is too difficult to arrest, or if his statement is privileged.
If third persons make these sorts of assessments, would the "reasonable man"
similarly understand the effect of the declarant's statement?
The Advisory Committee did not discuss either complicating factor or
select one of the three approaches as the proper way to interpret the
"reasonable man" test. The third approach-investigating the declarant's
actual belief-is more consistent than the other two approaches with the
Committee's relaxation of the "against-interest" test and its desire to admit
more penal interest statements than had common law courts.4° The Advisory
Committee apparently chose the "reasonable man" test over a purely
subjective test because it thought that the declarant's unavailability to testify
at trial almost always would foreclose judicial determination of his state of
mind at the time he made the statement. Rules 509(1) and 63(10) adopted the
"reasonable man" approach for the same pragmatic reason.4 1 In light of this
analysis, rule 804(b)(3) does not forbid a court from investigating the
declarant's subjective understanding of his statement. Thus, a court should
consider what the declarant thought when evidence of his understanding
exists. A court, however, should not require a proponent to prove the
declarant's subjective understanding if no evidence of it exists or if the
evidence is inconclusive.
The Advisory and Standing Committees' unfortunate failure to explain the
relevance of either the declarant's subjective understanding or his sophistica-
tion has resulted in several questionable judicial decisions,402 including United
400. However, the language of the rule, apparently directing the court to place itself in the declarant's
position but then to ask what a "reasonable man" would have thought, suggests that the second approach is
the correct one. But the error of the second approach is suggested by comparison with the Model Penal
Code's provocation test for assessing the blame of a murderer. See MODEL PENAL CODE: PROPOSED
OFFIIciAL DitFr § 210.3 (1962) ("(1) Criminal homocide constitutes manslaughter when: . . . (b) a
homocide which would otherwise be murder is committed under the influence of extreme mental or
emotional disturbance for which there is reasonable explanation or excuse. The reasonableness of such
explanation or excuse shall be determined from the viewpoint of a person in the actor's situation under the
circumstances as he believes them to be"). The purpose of the two tests is different. The Model Penal
Code's test is designed to distinguish one type of murderer from another; the "reasonable man" would not
always kill in the circumstances which prompted the murderer to kill. In contrast, the Advisory Committee
did not intend rule 804(b)(3)'s "reasonable man" test to perform the same type of sorting function. It
apparently chose the "reasonable man" test to excuse the defendant from proving what the declarant
thought if no evidence of the declarant's understanding existed. The second approach improperly permits a
skeptical court to dismiss evidence of the declarant's understanding as unreasonable.
401. The comment to rule 509 provides: "To avoid the difficulty which would be caused by an inquiry
into the declarant's actual state of mind, the rule prescribes the test of the belief of the reasonable man in
the position of the declarant." MODEL CODE OF EVIDENCE rule 509, Comment c (1942). Similarly, a
commentator to rule 63(10) notes: "If the subjective motive of the declarant at the time of making the
statement must be determined, the familiar reasonable man test is the best way to determine it. Seldom, if
ever, will evidence of the actual state of mind of the declarant be available." Hetland, supra note 301, at
332. See also KAN. CIV. PRO. CODE ANN. § 60-40j, Author's Comments (Vernon 1965) ("reasonable man"
test "practicable approach" to problem).
402. Ignoring what the declarant thought and asking instead what the "reasonable man" would have
thought occasionally might help the defendant. In United States v. Bagley, 537 F.2d 162 (5th Cir. 1976),
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States v. Satterfield4°3 and United States v. Brandenfels. o4 In Satterfield the
declarant, Merriweather, refused to repeat his exoneration of his codefendant,
Satterfield, probably because of his previously expressed fear that he would
thereby jeopardize his appeal.4°5 In affirming the trial court's exclusion of
Merriweather's statements, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit noted the difficulty in determining whether a "reasonable man"
would expect that his appeal would succeed and that the statement might
therefore harm him.40 6 In the court's view, no "reasonable layperson would
have been confident of the success of the appeal" in this case because of the
"inevitable uncertainty" of any appeal and because Merriweather had not
alleged "blatant" error in his appellate brief.4o7 The court thought Mer-
riweather's expressed fear of jeopardizing his appeal was irrelevant because
rule 804(b)(3) requires a court to analyze what a "reasonable man" in
Merriweather's position would have thought and not what Merriweather
himself thought.408 The court of appeals' analysis is doubly wrong. The
average person would have expected, as Merriweather did, that exonerating a
codefendant might jeopardize his appeal. Only a sophisticated declarant
would recognize that an appellate court will not consider extra-record
information. 4 9 Moreover, Merriweather thought he had spoken against his
penal interest, as demonstrated by his refusal to testify at Satterfield's retrial.
In United States v. Brandenfels,410 a similarly questionable decision by the
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, the Government
charged Brandenfels and Grove with multiple counts of fraud, embezzlement,
and counterfeiting in a complicated business fraud.41' Grove fled to Brazil
after the Government began investigating the crime.412 Before Brandenfels
was indicted, he and his attorney interviewed Grove in Sao Paolo.413 During
cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1075 (1977), for example, the defendant testified that he agreed to deliver for the
declarant a package containing valium to another prison inmate. Id. at 164. In fact, the package contained
heroin. Id. The declarant's cellmate was prepared to testify that the declarant had said that he erroneously
gave the defendant heroin rather than valium. Id. The trial court excluded this statement, intimating that
the declarant would not have expected his cellmate to repeat the statement. Id. at 165. The court of appeals
disagreed, stating that no reasonable person would "falsely admit the commission of a serious crime to his
cellmate, knowing that there was a chance, even if slight, that this admission could be used to convict him."
Id. The court, however, did not recognize that a prison inmate might reasonably assume that no fellow
inmate would risk becoming a "snitch" by reporting such a statement either to the prison authorities or to
the defense. Nonetheless, the court of appeals affirmed the exclusion of the statement because the defense
had not satisfied the rule 804(b)(3) corroboration requirement. Id. at 168.
403. 572 F.2d 687 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 840 (1978).
404. 522 F.2d 1259 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1033 (1975).
405. 572 F.2d at 690. Merriweather refused to testify at Satterfield's trial even though the Government
offered him immunity. Id.
406. Id. at 691.
407. Id. But cf. Witham v. Mabry, 596 F.2d 293, 297-98 (8th Cir. 1979) (rejecting argument that
statement by convicted declarant could never be against penal interest; statement excluded, however,
because defendant failed to establish that declarant was seeking post-conviction relief on ground of factual
innocence when he spoke).
408. 572 F.2d at 691 n.1. Although the court did not explain why, it thought that Merriweather's belief
might be relevant to the question of corroboration. Id.
409. An admission like Merriweather's nonetheless might influence an appellate court, sub silentio, in
considering questions of plain or harmless error.
410. 522 F.2d 1259 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1033 (1975).
411. Id. at 1260.
412. Id. at 1261-62.
413. Id. at 1262.
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this interview, Grove gave a tape-recorded statement exonerating Brandenfels
of misconduct while Grove was president of the company.414 The court
approved the trial court's exclusion of Grove's statement, reasoning that it
was not "in a very real sense self-incriminatory and unquestionably against
interest. '415 The court explained that the statement was not against interest
because either Grove did not expect to be extradited or else he believed the
evidence against him was so overwhelming that his exonerating Brandenfels
could not further jeopardize his position.416
In contrast to the Ninth Circuit, which narrowly interpreted the "reasona-
ble man" test in Satterfield and Brandenfels, the Supreme Court has been
quick to find statements against interest when they are offered by the
Government to justify a search challenged on fourth amendment grounds.417
In United States v. Matlock418 the issue was whether Mrs. Graff had authority
414. Id. at 1263 n.20. During this taped conversation, Grove said:
None of those people that are currently being interrogated by various federal agencies were in
any way involved in any of those questionable transactions and I refer specifically to Martin
Brandenfels... [who] was a mortgage loan customer .... As far as any of these people having
any knowledge about how money was originated, who, in some cases the lenders were.... the
only person that has knowledge of those facts is me ....
Id. at 1263 n.10. Although the court of appeals thought this statement was "only marginally" and
"indirectly" against Grove's interest, the statement surely implicated Grove and would have been
admissible if offered against him were he on trial. The Government did not extradite Grove until after
Brandenfels had been convicted. I have been unable to determine whether Grove was tried and, if so,
whether his statement was introduced against him.
415. Id. at 1264. The court also focused on the lack of corroborating circumstances required under rule
804(b)(3) to support an exculpating penal interest statement. Specifically, the court pointed out that
Grove's statement was "less than spontaneous," having been made four to six weeks after Grove fled to
Brazil and spoken directly to one of the men sought to be exculpated. Id. The court also noted the
conspicuous lack of corroboration for Grove's statement and Brandenfels' explanation by a third
coindictee, Gnapp, who had never heard about the "promissory notes, deeds of trust, and mortgages" that
Brandenfels allegedly signed to secure what he claimed to be a loan. Id.
416. Id. The court failed to recognize that if the statement had been admitted and Brandenfels had been
acquitted, the statement might have increased the probability that the Government would have proceeded
against Grove. The court also ignored the possibility that an implicated declarant reasonably would expect
that whatever he said might damage his position, especially if he did not know what evidence the
Government had or could gather against him.
417. The Supreme Court has not been alone in stretching the penal interest analysis to override a fourth
amendment objection. In United States v. Carmichael, 489 F.2d 983 (7th Cir. 1973) (en bane), a panel of
the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit suppressed evidence found by the police at the
time of the defendants' arrest because it thought the complaint supporting issuance of the arrest warrant
was defective. Id. at 985. Reversing, an en bane court held that a second hearsay statement by an
unidentified informant in the complaint was sufficiently against interest to establish his reliability. Id. at
986-87. In that complaint, a federal officer reported that "[t]he confidential informant told your
complainant that he has seen these checks in the possession of one of the defendants and that the defendant
who had possession told him that the checks would be given by Robert E. Carmichael to John Doe and
then to T.W. Allen .... Id. at 984 (footnote omitted). The en bane court inferred that the informant's
statement was reliable because it was against penal interest. Id. at 986. The court, however, did not explain
why the statement was against the informant's penal interest. It may have assumed, without basis in the
record, that the informant was a coconspirator. Cf United States v. Gavic, 520 F.2d 1346, 1350, 1351 n.8
(8th Cir. 1975) (unidentified informant's reliability inferrable from admission to affiant that he had seen
illegal drugs in house that he occupied with defendant; statement against penal interest because "it at least
implicated him in the crime of constructive possession of the contraband"). In fact, the informant might
have instead learned of information about the crime without being criminally involved.
418. 415 U.S. 164 (1974).
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to consent to a warrantless search of a room she claimed to share with the
defendant. 4 9 Because Mrs. Graft and the defendant were illegally living
together under Wisconsin law, the Supreme Court reasoned that her state-
ment was against her penal interest and that she had authority to give
consent. 420 In addition to the questionable logic of inferring authority to
consent from a statement against interest, the Court based its conclusion on
an expansive analysis of what is against interest. The Court did not argue that
Mrs. Graff knew that cohabitation was a crime,421 that the officer informed
her of the possible against-interest effect of her statement, or that the state had
ever prosecuted anyone for cohabitation. Furthermore, the Court failed to
relate the against-interest effect of her statement to the crime about which the
police were questioning her, a nexus that is found in Satterfield, Brandenfels,
and almost every case involving a penal interest statement arising under rule
804(b)(3). 422
In United States v. Harris423 the Supreme Court found that an unidentified
informant's statement, included in an affidavit as support for a search
warrant, was against the informant's penal interest 424 on a showing arguably
less convincing than that in Matlock. According to the affiant in Harris, the
informant admitted both purchasing illegal whiskey from the defendant on
several occasions within a two-year period preceding his tip to a federal agent
and seeing others drink illegal liquor on the defendant's premises.425 The
Court concluded that the informant was reliable because of the penal interest
effect of his statements. 426 In the Court's view, "[c]ommon sense ... would
induce a prudent and disinterested observer to credit these statements. People
do not lightly admit a crime and place critical evidence in the hands of the
police in the form of their own admissions. '427 Although the Court's
419. Id. at 167. The district court found that the searching officers reasonably could have assumed
before the search that facts existed which would render the consent binding on Matlock, the defendant. Id.
Nonetheless, the district court ruled that the Government failed to satisfy a second requirement of showing
Mrs. Graff's actual authority to consent for Matlock because the only proof of her authority was her
inadmissible hearsay statements. Id. at 167-68.
420. Id. at 177.
421. A Wisconsin statute made it illegal to "[o]penly cohabit.., with a person he knows is not his
spouse under circumstances that imply sexual intercourse." Id. at 176 n.13. Mrs. Graff admitted that she
had lived with the defendant in Florida for several months. Id. at 176. The record, however, does not
indicate that cohabitation was a crime in Florida, a fact that might have increased the likelihood that Mrs.
Graff knew her statement might expose her to criminal liability. Florida in fact does have such a statute,
but it apparently outlaws cohabitation only if it is coupled with sexual intercourse. See FLA. STAT. ANN. §
798-02 (West 1976) (prohibiting only lewd and lascivious cohabitating by unmarried couples). The Court
baldly concluded that "[c]ohabitation out of wedlock would not seem to be a relationship that one would
falsely confess." 415 U.S. at 176. That Mrs. Graff invoked the fifth amendment at the motion to suppress
hearing, id. appendix at 22, however, supports the Court's conclusion that her statement was against
interest. Predictably, the Court did not mention this fact in its opinion.
422. For a discussion of two cases in which a court did not find such a nexus, see notes 275 & 291 supra
and accompanying text.
423. 403 U.S. 573 (1971).
424. Id. at 583. Associate counsel for the House Subcommittee mentioned that the Supreme Court's
decisions dealing with the existence of probable cause in search warrants based on statements against the
maker's penal interest confirmed the Supreme Court's willingness to recognize the penal interest exception.
Markup Session, June 5, 1973. He read these decisions as representing "a movement to cut back on the old
Donnelly case." Id.
425. 403 U.S. at 575.
426. Id. at 583.
427. Id. The Court noted: "Admissions of crime, like admissions against proprietary interest, carry
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observation is generally correct, 428 its accuracy was not demonstrated in the
Harris record. The Court implicitly acknowledged this when it said that even
if the informant had been paid for his information or "promised a 'break', '429
these interests "would not eliminate the residual risk and opprobrium of
having admitted criminal conduct. ' 430 The record does not reveal where,
when, or why the informant spoke or whether the informant feared that his
statement would result in prosecution. 431 The record also does not indicate the
informant was aware that he had "confessed" to the crime of either possessing
or purchasing unstamped liquor. The Government's failure to raise the
against-penal interest argument in support of the informant's reliability432 also
underscores the Court's eagerness to find the informant's statement against
penal interest. The Government might have feared that an expansive interpre-
tation of penal interest by the Supreme Court might rebound against the
Government if lower courts then could admit similar statements on such a
weak foundation when offered by defendants. 433
In interpretating rule 804(b)(3) courts should not disregard Matlock and
Harris merely because the Government offered the statements in those cases
to establish probable cause rather than the defendant's guilt or innocence.
First, in both cases the Court suggested the statements would be admissible
under the then-pending version of rule 804(b)(3). 434 Second, the defendant's
practical "burden" of dispelling guilt at trial surely is no greater than the
Government's burden in establishing probable cause in the fourth amendment
their own indicia of credibility-sufficient at least to support a finding of probable cause to search." Id.
428. Had the Ninth Circuit made the same observation in Satterfield and Brandenfels, it would have
reached different results in both cases.
429. 403 U.S. at 583.
430. Id. at 584.
431. In all likelihood the Harris informant thought that he could protect himself only by implicating
the defendant, a danger quite different from that which the Department of Justice thought inheres in
statements made by prison inmates or by the defendant's friends. In the Department of Justice's view, such
parties risk nothing by confessing in an attempt to help the defendant. See Justice's First Letter, supra note
63, at 33 (claiming these situations "fraught with the possibility of contrivance or of unfounded
braggadocio"). Indeed, the affiant in Harris might have fabricated the existence of either the informant or
the conversation. In the fourth amendment area, a defendant might learn less information about the
informant by cross-examinating the affiant during a suppression hearing than the Government might learn
about the unavailable declarant by cross-examining the reporting witness during the defendant's trial. The
Government probably will learn more because at the suppression hearing it can object to defense questions
designed to identify either the informant or the context in which he spoke. Cf PROP. FED. R. EVID. 510,
reprinted in Supreme Court Draft, supra note 1, at 255-56 (detailing when Government must disclose
informant's identity).
432. 403 U.S. at 594 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
433. In Matlock and in Harris, however, the Court acknowledged that Donnelly might prevent the
Government from introducing penal interest statements at the defendant's trial. United States v. Matlock,
415 U.S. 164, 177 (1974); United States v. Harris, 403 U.S. 573, 584 (1971).
434. See United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164, 177 (1974) (statement likely inadmissible at trial under
proposed rule 804(b)(3) of Supreme Court Draft only because declarant probably available to testify);
United States v. Harris, 403 U.S. 573, 584 (1971) (Donnelly's implication that statements against penal
interest without value and per se inadmissible partially rejected in proposed rule 804(b)(3) of Revised
Draft). Although the House had approved the Subcommittee's change to rule 804(b)(3) by the date of the
Matlock decision, the Court's opinion referred to the rule as rule 804(b)(4), 415 U.S. at 177, which was its
number in the Supreme Court Draft. It is thus fair to conclude that the Court referred to the Supreme Court
Draft's version of the rule. In any event, only the corroboration requirement, not the definition of penal
interest, changed from the Supreme Court Draft to the version adopted by Congress. The Matlock Court
did not discuss either corroboration requirement.
THE GEORGETOWN LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 69:851
context. Finally, the Supreme Court's willingness to find a statement against
interest in circumstances that would have troubled the courts of appeals in
Satterfield and Brandenfels is convincingly demonstrated by its decision in
Dutton v. Evans.435
In Dutton the Government charged Evans, Williams, and Truett with
murdering three police officers. 436 At Evans' separate trial the Government
introduced Williams' comment, reportedly made while Williams was in jail
awaiting his own trial, that "[i]f it hadn't been for .. .Alex Evans, we
wouldn't be in this now." 437 In his habeas petition, Evans argued that the
court, by admitting Williams' statement, violated his sixth amendment right
of confrontation.438 Justice Stewart, writing for a plurality of the Court, 439
rejected that argument on two grounds. Not only had Evans had the
opportunity to test the witness' report of Williams' statement, 440 but also
Williams' statement was trustworthy because it was against his penal
interest. 441 Williams' statement, however, is ambiguous: Did he mean that
Evans murdered the victims or, instead, that Evans' earlier conduct, separate
from his involvement in the crime charged, precipitated the prosecution? In
either case, a statement that included a description neither of the crime nor of
Williams' involvement required an imaginative inference to find its disserving
effect. The Court, nonetheless, characterized Williams' statement as against
his penal interest, thereby demonstrating that it interprets the penal interest
and the "reasonable man" tests less restrictively when the Government offers
435. 400 U.S. 74 (1970).
436. Id. at 76.
437. Id. at 77. Shaw, a fellow prisoner, testified that Williams made this comment in response to Shaw's
question, "How did you make out in court?" Id.
438. Id. at 76. The prosecution did not show that Williams was unavailable to testify at trial. Id. at 102
(Marshall, J., with Black, Douglas & Brennan, JJ., dissenting). Defense counsel did not subpoena Williams,
apparently believing that Williams would invoke the fifth amendment. Id. at 102 n.4. If Williams was
available, the statement could not have been admitted under rule 804(b)(3). The Court, however, discussed
the admissibility of Williams' statement in constitutional rather than in evidentiary terms. Id. at 83
(opinion of Court).
439. Chief Justice Burger and Justices White and Blackmun joined Justice Stewart's opinion. Justice
Harlan concurred separately in the result. Justice Marshall, joined by Justices Black, Douglas, and
Brennan, dissented.
440. 400 U.S. at 88. The plurality concluded that the opportunity to cross-examine Shaw, the reporting
witness, satisfied any confrontation clause requirement with respect to Shaw's testimony. Id. This
conclusion confirms the error of excluding a penal interest statement on the ground that the reporting
witness is lying, as the Ninth Circuit essentially did in Satterfield. See notes 237-43 supra and
accompanying text (discussing Satterfield). Both Justice Marshall, 400 U.S. at 103 & n.5 (Marshall, J., with
Black, Douglas & Brennan, JJ., dissenting), and the court of appeals, Dutton v. Evans, 400 F.2d 826, 828
n.4 (5th Cir. 1968), rev'd, 400 U.S. 74 (1970), doubted that Williams had made the statement attributed to
him. The court of appeals described the setting:
[Shaw] testified that Williams was talking to him in a normal voice through a ten-by-ten
plate-glass window in a prison hospital door, while Williams was lying on a bed in the room
and Shaw was standing in the hall. Shaw had stated in the Williams trial that the window was
covered only by wire mesh. The fact that it was covered by a pane of plate glass was brought
out in Evans' trial. Moreover, evidence was submitted but rejected by the trial court which
tended to show that Shaw's testimony may have been compensation for a respite from the dull
routine of prison life.
400 F.2d at 828 n.4. No wonder the court characterized Shaw's account as "somewhat incredible." Id.
441. 400 U.S. at 89.
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the statement than do many courts of appeals when the defendant offers the
statement.
How, then, should a court determine what "a reasonable man in the
[declarant's] position" would have thought? A court should admit the
statement if the declarant said that he thought his statement was against his
interest, even if he was mistaken on an objective assessment. In the absence of
such a statement by the declarant, a court must consider the available
circumstantial evidence of the declarant's state of mind. Thus, the court must
evaluate the facts stated, the declarant's sophistication, the information
available to him concerning his criminal exposure, his relationship to the
defendant,442 and the context in which he made the statement.
If the declarant's statement approaches a confession or if it is recorded,
443
sworn to,44 or written in the presence of others or in response to a request,445
the declarant should recognize the gravity of his actions and the likelihood
that his statement will be reported to the police or to the defense. Similarly,
when the declarant speaks to a police officer,446 to defense counsel or the
defendant, 447 or to a friend or a relative of the defendant, 448 he should be
442. Understandably, a court might suspect that a defendant's friends or relatives might claim
responsibility when the defendant faces a harsher punishment (a multiple-offender sentence, for example)
than they would face (probation or an opportunity for diversion, for example). Cf. Vaughn v. United States,
367 A.2d 1291, 1293 (D.C. 1977) (even though defendant's girlfriend testified against advice of counsel that
she placed foil packets in defendant's sock without his knowledge and she informed police to obtain
revenge, defendant aware drugs in his possession).
443. See Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 287, 299-302 (1973) (declarant gave signed, sworn
confession to defense counsel; statement admissible). But cf. United States v. Brandenfels, 522 F.2d 1259,
1263-64 (9th Cir.) (declarant made statement on tape to defense attorney and defendant, who flew to Brazil
to interview declarant; statement inadmissible), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1033 (1975).
444. See Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 297 (1973) (to extent declarant's sworn confession
tended to incriminate him, it tended to exculpate defendant). But see United States v. Metz, 608 F.2d 147,
157 (5th Cir. 1979) (sworn statement given to defense counsel excluded; corroboration test of rule not met
when statement made in nonadversarial setting), cert. denied, 101 S. Ct. 80 (1980).
Far-sighted defense counsel might seek permission to depose a declarant whom counsel fears may later
become unavailable through flight or assertion of the fifth amendment privilege. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 15
(in "exceptional circumstances" court may order deposition upon motion and notice to parties). Deposing
a declarant serves two purposes. First, the formality of the proceeding increases the likelihood the
declarant understands what he risks by speaking. Second, rule 804(a)(5) of the Federal Rules of Evidence
provides that the proponent of a statement of an absent declarant establishes the declarant's "unavailabili-
ty" by attempting to obtain his "attendance or testimony.., by process or other reasonable means." FED.
R. EVID. 804(a)(5). If the defendant's fifth amendment protection does not forgive his failure to obtain the
declarant's "testimony," defense counsel should try to depose a declarant who is willing to speak.
445. See Thomas v. State, 186 Md. 446, 452, 47 A.2d 43, 46 (1946) (written confession by declarant
admissible); State v. Abrams, 72 N.J. 342, 345, 370 A.2d 852, 854 (1977) (Conford, J., concurring and
dissenting) (statement in writing should be given some weight). But see United States v. Oropeza, 564 F.2d
316, 325 (9th Cir. 1977) (even though declarant wrote statement while in jail cell, statement excluded), cert.
denied, 434 U.S. 1080 (1978).
446. The Department of Justice has conceded that a court may admit a confession given to a police
officer before the defendant's arrest. See Justice's First Letter, supra note 62, at 34.
447. Cf. United States v. Benveniste, 564 F.2d 335, 341 (9th Cir. 1977) (statement made to private
investigator should have been admitted). But cf United States v. Metz, 608 F.2d 147, 157 (5th Cir. 1979)
(sworn statement to defense counsel excluded), cert. denied, 101 S. Ct. 80 (1980); United States v. Oropeza,
564 F.2d 316, 325 (9th Cir. 1977) (statement written by declarant while in jail cell excluded), cert. denied.,
434 U.S. 1080 (1978); United States v. Brandenfels, 522 F.2d 1259, 1263 (9th Cir.) (statement made to
defense counsel and defendant excluded), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1033 (1975).
448. Cf United States v. Goodlow, 500 F.2d 954, 958 (8th Cir. 1974) (trial court should not necessarily
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cognizant of his statement's possibly disserving effect.4 9 A declarant shouldbe wary of speaking to a police officer who is interested in solving the crime or
to defense counsel and the defendant's friends or relatives, all of whom areinterested in finding any information that might help the defendant, especially
when that person searches out the declarant to obtain his statement. In either
case, the declarant should recognize that the listener wants to learn what the
declarant knows of the incident.450
In contrast, when the declarant speaks either to a friend or relative451 or to
someone unassociated with the Government or the defendant,452 he has less
reason to fear that his statement will be reported. 453 Although he may doubt
that his statement will be reported, the declarant nonetheless might recognizethe potentially disserving effect of the statement.454 Moreover, because hefeels secure in speaking to such a person, he might be more likely to speak
exclude statement when witnesses who would testify to statement included defendant, defendant's wife,
and defendant's close friend). But cf. United States v. Hughes, 529 F.2d 838, 841 (5th Cir. 1976) (statement
made to defendant's brother excluded).
449. The declarant should be especially cognizant of the possibly disserving effect of his statement if
someone warns him about the possible significance of his statement.
450. An exception might be a crime, like statutory rape, to which the defense of "consent" does not
apply. Because this defense is one that the normal person might expect a court will apply, an unwilling
declarant might not realize that he has committed a crime. The House Subcommittee discussed only thispenal interest question. See note 317 supra (one Subcommittee member worried that prosecutor easily
might obtain admission about sexual contact from declarant unaware that admission would satisfy one
element of statutory rape crime).
451. This example has divided the courts. Compare United States v. Hoyos, 573 F.2d 1111, 1115 (9thCir. 1978) (because statement to close friend, declarant had no reason to fear friend would report it; friend
reported statement only after declarant's death) and Sussex Peerage, 8 Eng. Rep. 1034, 1044 (1844)(because statement made to son, declarant had little reason to fear son would repeat it) with Green v.Georgia, 442 U.S. 95, 97 (1979) (per curiam) (even though statement to friends, trial court should have
admitted it) and Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 300-02 (1973) (even though statement to friends,
trial court should have admitted it). See also MODEL CODE OF EVIDENCE rule 509, Comment c (1942)(that statement made to acquaintance irrelevant); Cleary Memorandum, supra note 112, at 7-8 (declarant's
statement to acquaintance admitting guilt and implicating defendant is less likely to be against interest
when made in custody than when declarant has nothing to gain by exonerating defendant).
452. Examples include an informant, a bartender, an eavesdropper, or a cellmate. These persons
nonetheless might report the statement. Cf United States v. Atkins, 558 F.2d 133, 135-36 (3rd Cir. 1977)(declarant's statement to X that he killed victim overheard by bystander who reported statement to
victim's family and police; conviction reversed because statement against interest), cert. denied, 434 U.S.
1071 (1978); United States v. Bagley, 537 F.2d 162, 165 (5th Cir. 1976) (reasonable man would not falsely
admit committing serious crime to cellmate if even remote chance that admission would be used against
him), cerL denied, 429 U.S. 1075 (1977).
453. A court might exclude a statement when the declarant has confessed one crime in an attempt to
avoid greater punishment for a separate crime. Compare People v. Moscatello, 114 Ill. App. 2d 16, 32, 34,251 N.E.2d 532, 539, 540 (Ct. App. 1969) (declarant's confession to robbery excluded because he was
motivated to avoid extradition to be tried for murder) with Osborne v. Purdome, 250 S.W.2d 159, 163 (Mo.1952) (declarant's implication of self and defendant admitted against defendant, despite declarant's
statement that he confessed in hope of obtaining leniency because declarant realized he would receive some
sort of punishment). In Moscatello the court hypothesized that the defendant spoke out of self-interest.
People v. Moscatello, 114 Il1. App. 2d 16, 34, 251 N.E.2d 532, 534 (Ct. App. 1969). In Osborne the courtignored the declarant's admission of self-serving interest. Both courts employed a flawed approach. See
Note, Declarations Against Penal Interest, supra note 328, at 169-70 (hypothetical motive to falsify
statement unsubstantiated by evidence not sufficient reason to exclude statement; courts should balance
relative importance of self-serving and disserving interests to determine trustworthiness).
454. Trustworthiness is premised here in a manner consistent with the first interpretation of "against
interest" discussed in this article. See notes 248-57 supra and accompanying text (discussing two historical
approaches for defining "against interest").
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truthfully. The more difficult instance occurs when the declarant might
enhance his self-importance by claiming responsibility for the crime, as when
he speaks in prison or infront of "street" acquaintances or a potential victim.
A similar problem arises when the declarant implicates the defendant while
speaking with a police officer. In this setting, the declarant might have
attempted "to curry favor with the authorities. ' 455 Because juries are more
likely to believe that the defendant has pressured the declarant to speak than
that the Government has done so, 456 courts should interpret the "reasonable
man" test more rigorously when the Government offers such a statement.
The setting in which the declarant speaks also is important. When speaking
in court,457 in defense counsel's office,45 8 or at a police station, the declarant
should recognize the potentially disserving effect of his statement. In these
situations, the declarant should be on notice that because a crime has been
committed, an investigation is underway, and another person has been
accused or is suspected, his statement may be disserving.
Even if a statement is privileged, a reasonable person might still think it is
against his penal interest. Of course, when the declarant believes that the
listener cannot repeat the statement or when the listener tells the declarant
that he will not repeat it,459 the "reasonable man" test is not met. In other
settings, however, such as when the privilege is one not commonly recognized
or when the declarant fears that the listener might report the conversation-a
report that might trigger a police investigation of the declarant notwithstand-
ing the listener's inability to testify against the declarant-the privileged
nature of the communication should not bar its admission.
Irrespective of the conditions under which the declarant made a statement,
rule 804(b)(3) suggests that he (or the "reasonable man") must recognize at
455. Advisory Committee Note to Supreme Court Draft, supra note 1, at 328; see United States v. Love,
592 F.2d 1022, 1025 (8th Cir. 1979) (declarant's statement accusing defendant of transporting her across
state lines to commit act of prostitution excluded because of probability that statement made in attempt to
gain leniency); United States v. Gonzalez, 559 F.2d 1271, 1273 (5th Cir. 1977) (declarant's grand jury
testimony excluded because, once immunized, declarant could have been prosecuted only if he failed to
implicate defendant).
456. See Rothstein, supra note 183, at 154 n.151 (jury more sophisticated about possibilities of private
coercion to obtain exculpatory statements than about analogous Governmental pressures to obtain
inculpating statements). Because the Government need not corroborate the declarant's inculpating
statement as a condition of admissibility, a court should exclude the statement if the declarant could
protect himself only by implicating the defendant.
One court excluded a defense-offered statement when the declarant said that he exonerated the
defendant solely to avoid physical harm. United States v. Miller, 277 F. Supp. 200,209-10 (D. Conn. 1967);
accord, G. LILLY, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE LAW OF EVIDENCE 265 (1978) (arguing that rule 403
authorizes judge to exclude such statements). A court should not exclude the statement on this ground,
however, as long as the defendant satisfies the corroboration requirement and the Government had the
opportunity to inform the jury of the reliability problem. See notes 704-07 infra and accompanying text
(advance notification provides Government opportunity to challenge credibility of declarant).
457. Cf. United States v. Thomas, 571 F.2d 285, 288-90 (5th Cir. 1978) (during preliminary hearing
codefendant made statement implicating himself and exonerating defendant; exclusion of statement
reversible error).
458. Cf. Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 287 (1973) (statement made in defense counsel's office
admitted without objection).
459. Cf. Regina v. O'Brien, 76 D.L.R.3d 513, 519-21 (1977) (10 months after counsel's client
convicted, declarant confessed to counsel on understanding that statement would not be used against him
that he, not defendant, committed crime; statement properly excluded as not against interest). See generally
Ziff, supra note 256, at 168-71 (discussing O'Brien).
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the moment he spoke that his statement was against his penal interest. Thelanguage of the rule is ambiguous, providing that a statement is againstinterest if "at the time of its making" it "so far tended to subject" the
declarant to criminal liability that a reasonable person would not have spoken
unless he thought he was telling the truth. Standing alone, the language "at
the time of its making" suggests that, although the statement must be againstinterest when spoken, the declarant might recognize its disserving aspect at
some later point. However, the last clause of the rule's first sentence"a
reasonable man in [the declarant's] position would not have made the
statement unless he believed it to be true"-appears to modify the language
"at the time of its making" and to exclude a statement that the declarant
recognizes as against his interest only later. Although the Advisory andStanding Committees did not discuss this issue, this interpretation is consist-
ent with their desire to distinguish statements against penal interest from
party admissions.
Arguably, this interpretation is too restrictive. Can we not infer that the
statement was trustworthy if the declarant repeats his statement on a later
occasion; if he acknowledges later that he recognized the disserving effect of
what he said; or if he invokes the fifth amendment to defense questions abouthis statements, his culpability, or his knowledge of the defendant's culpabili-
ty? Although it did not explain why, the Department of Justice feared that
repetition of the statement would justify its admission.460 Yet repetition does
not necessarily establish reliability: The declarant may never recognize the
significance of his statement.46' An inference of reliability does arise, however,
when the declarant explicitly admits complicity, repeats facts rather than
opinions, repeats precisely his earlier statement,462 threatens or implores the
reporting witness not to reveal his earlier statement,463 demands immunity in
testifying about his statement before a grand jury,464 or claims his earlier
statement was true.465
Nonetheless, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit inUnited States v. Satterfield466 refused to consider the declarant's later
statements about what he understood to have been the effect of his earlier
statement because the court thought that the proper inquiry is what a
460. Justice's Third Letter, supra note 130, at 48.
461. The declarant might recognize when he speaks again, however, that his second statement is against
his penal interest. This recognition would justify admitting the second statement, but not necessarily thefirst one. The defendant, of course, would want to introduce both statements so that each would reinforce
the other. The first statement should not be excluded as cumulative.
462. Cf. Chambers v, Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 300 (1973) (repetition provides partial assurance of
statement's reliability). But cf. State v. Larsen, 91 Idaho 42, 48, 49, 415 P.2d 685, 691, 692 (1966) (although
declarant repeated how and where he committed crime charged against defendant, several confessions
excluded because not corroborated).
463. Cf Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 292 (1973) (declarant urged witness not to "mess him
up" by reporting confession).
464. Cf. United States v. Kelley, 480 F. Supp. 901, 903 (E.D. Mo. 1979) (by implication) (unreasonable
to conclude declarant recognized disserving nature of his statement, implicating himself and defendant, in
part because he did not seek immunity before grand jury).
465. Cf. United States v. Carlson, 547 F.2d 1346, 1354 (8th Cir. 1976) (declarant's grand jury testimony
implicating defendant admitted when declarant said he testified truthfully during earlier grand jury
testimony), cer. denied, 431 U.S. 914 (1977).
466. 572 F.2d 687 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 840 (1978).
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"reasonable man," not the actual declarant, would have thought.467 The
Satterfield approach represents an overly literal interpretation of the rule's
language. This approach also illustrates the error of asking only what the
"reasonable man" would have thought. The rule's direction to consider the
"reasonable man" assumes that the court has no evidence to infer what the
declarant understood to be the effect of his statement. As indicated in the
preceding section, the better approach evaluates the trustworthiness of
whatever the declarant says he understood.
468
Similarly, a declarant's assertion of his privilege against self-incrimination
also should justify admitting his statement.469 Of course, such an assertion
does not necessarily establish that the declarant understood the disserving
nature of his statement when he spoke. He may have recognized the effect of
his statement only upon later reflection or when alerted by the judge, the
prosecutor, or his attorney. Although the privilege blocks the court from
determining precisely what the declarant thought, the judge might be able to
infer what the declarant understood to be the effect of his statement by
questioning the declarant closely to ascertain his reason for asserting the
privilege. By invoking the privilege, however, the declarant acknowledges
that he believes that his earlier statement was in some sense against his
interest. Arguably, that acknowledgement confirms the reliability of his
statement and perhaps supports an inference that he understood the penal
interest effect of his statement when he spoke.470 Moreover, a court should
admit the statement regardless of the restrictions of rule 804(b)(3) when the
declarant fails to testify because either the court or the prosecutor warned him
about the potentially disserving effect of testifying about his earlier state-
467. Id. at 691 n.l ("test under Rule 804(b)(3) involves the perception of a reasonable person in
[declarant's] position, not of [declarant] himself').
468. A declarant's later explanation of what he understood to be the effect of an earlier statement is
hearsay. Under rule 104(a), however, the court may consider any nonprivileged information, including
hearsay, in determining whether to admit the earlier statement. Also, if the declarant recognizes his earlier
statement was then against his penal interest, his present state of mind is admissible, see FED. R. EVID.
803(3) (state of mind hearsay exception), if relevant to determining his understanding when he made the
offered statement.
469. The declarant can invoke the privilege in response to incriminating questions. See People v.
Chapman, 50 Cal. App. 3d 872, 877, 123 Cal. Rptr. 862, 865 (Ct. App. 1975) (declarant, who allegedly
inculpated self and exculpated defendant, permitted to invoke fifth amendment).
470. Compare United States v. Benveniste, 564 F.2d 335, 341 (9th Cir. 1977) (although witness' out of
court statement standing alone not against penal interest, witness' assertion of privilege at trial "lends
strong support to conclusion that her testimony would tend to subject her to criminal liability") with Ryan
v. State, 95 Wis.2d 83, 95 n.4, 289 N.W.2d 349, 354 n.4 (1980) (witness' assertion of privilege cannot be
used to bootstrap statement into evidence without further corroboration) and People v. Traylor, 23 Cal.
App. 3d 323, 330-31, 100 Cal. Rptr. 116, 120 (Ct. App. 1972) (witness' assertion of privilege does not mean
that he realized that earlier statement to defense counsel against penal interest). Cf. United States v.
Matlock, 415 U.S. 164 (1974) (app. at 22) (co-occupant's assertion of privilege might provide basis to infer
that she spoke against penal interest). When a witness' reasons for asserting the privilege are unknown, a
court has no basis for inferring guilt. The witness, for example, might be uncertain why the interrogator has
asked a question. See E. GRISWOLD, THE FIFrH AMENDMENT TODAY 15-16 (1955) (arguing that
witnesses interrogated by congressional investigative committee might invoke fifth amendment privilege to
shield conduct that might be link in chain of proof of criminal charge against them). This concern,
however, does not exist when defense counsel questions the declarant during the defendant's trial because
the declarant knows that his statement, his complicity, and the defendant's involvement are at issue. Thus,
Benveniste seems to be correct.
THE GEORGETOWN LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 69:851
ment471 or because the prosecutor refused to immunize the declarant, therebyforcing him to assert the privilege.472
C. CORROBORATION
The Advisory and Standing Committees, which initially refused to include
a corroboration requirement when the Department of Justice demanded one,
added a "simple corroboration" test to the Revised Definitive and SupremeCourt Drafts to appease Senator McClellan. During the hearings before theHouse Subcommittee, Judge Friendly and the Subcommittee members misun-derstood the Advisory and Standing Committees' reason for adding thesimple corroboration" test. The Subcommittee mistakenly473 thought thatthe test was too vague, and they feared that the defendant could satisfy it bytestifying to his own innocence,474 a way originally adopted by the AdvisoryCommittee but later rejected by the Standing Committee.This development of the rule's corroboration requirement differs signifi-
cantly from Judge Weinstein's version. By tracing the evolution of that
requirement in a neutral way, Judge Weinstein finds room to advance a
revisionist interpretation of the burden that the rule imposes on the defend-
ant. According to Judge Weinstein, the Standing Committee added the
"simple corroboration" test to the Supreme Court Draft at the "suggestion" ofSenator McClellan 475 and then Congress merely "elaborated upon" the test.476He rejects interpreting the rule's test in terms of the Government's burden to
corroborate the defendant's confession,77 an analogy that the Department of
471. See State v. Jamison, 64 N.J. 363, 376-78, 316 A.2d 439,446-47 (1974) (trial court should not haveappointed counsel for declarant who was prepared to exonerate defendant before speaking to counselbecause such act encouraged declarant to invoke fifth amendment privilege).472. See note 7 supra and accompanying text (discussing effect of Governmental grants of immunity onfact-finding process). For a discussion of the constitutional dimension of this issue, see note 835 infra.473. Professor Moore made the same mistake. See 11 MOORE, supra note 16, 804.06(3)[2], at ViII-281 ("In recognition of the supposed untrustworthiness of third-party confessions offered to exculpate an
accused, the Supreme Court's version required that such a statment be corroborated."). Althoughimpossible to trace with certainty, the demand for a corroboration requirement probably stemmed from a
misinterpretation of Justice Holnes' dissent in Donnelly and of early decisions that admitted penal interest
statements. Because of the force of the Sussex Peerage and Donnelly, those courts that were willing to admita particular statement usually detailed the circumstantial evidence that justified deviation from the
common law's refusal to recognize the penal interest exception, as in Hines v. Commonwealth, 136 Va.728, 735-43, 117 S.E. 843, 844-49 (1923). This judicial attempt to avoid an unfair result in a particular case,
without rejecting precedent by recognizing a general penal interest exception, was probably misinterpretedto require corroboration in every instance, even after the courts and the legislatures became more willing toadmit penal interest statements. See Note, Declarations Against Penal Interest, supra note 328, at 173 n. 134(recent decisions have developed corroboration requirement by drawing upon arguments of early caseswithout recognizing that courts in some decisions relied upon corroboration primarily as additionalindicium of trustworthiness to justify departing from precedent).474. Although the Subcommittee advanced this reason in its report, see note 153 supra, it neverdiscussed this particular issue during its markup sessions. Instead, the Subcommittee feared that mostdeclarants were either friends or relatives of the defendant or prison inmates and thus were nottrustworthy. Markup Session, June 5, 1973; Markup Session, June 12, 1973.
475. 4 WEINSTEIN, supra note 16, 804(b)(3)[03], at 804-103.476. Id. Professor Moore, in contrast, correctly states that "Congress expanded upon the [corrobora-tion] requirement by adding stronger language .... 11 MOORE, supra note 9, 804.06(3)[2], at VIII-281.Nonetheless, he fails to explain what the "stronger language" means other than that the standard for
corroboration "must not be too high." Id. at VIII-283.
477. 4 WEINSTEIN, supra note 16, 804(b)(3)[03], at 804-104.
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Justice and Senator McClellan first proposed, the Advisory Committee
initially rejected, and the Standing Committee ultimately advanced. Instead,
Judge Weinstein restates the requirement of the rule to read: "The court
should only ask for sufficient corroboration to 'clearly' permit a reasonable
man to believe that the statement might have been made in good faith and
that it could be true."478 In paraphrasing the rule, he implies that the rule
demands less proof than would the confession analogy. 479 Because Judge
Weinstein was a member of the Advisory Committee, his decision to ignore
congressional concern and reassert the original position of the Advisory
Committee is perhaps understandable. Nonetheless, his historical explanation
of the rule's corroboration requirement and his interpretation of what that
requirement demands are plainly wrong.
480
In rejecting Judge Weinstein's interpretation, one has not explained how a
court should interpret the rule's corroboration requirement. Throughout the
development of the requirement, the Advisory and Standing Committees
made little effort to explain what was to be corroborated and by what
quantum of evidence. In its Note to the Supreme Court Draft, for example,
the Standing Committee said only that the "simple corroboration" test
"should be construed in such a manner as to effectuate its purpose of
circumventing fabrication. ' 481 The vagueness of this explanation confirms
both the Standing Committee's reluctance to add the requirement and its
apparent hope that the requirement would be meaningless.
482
478. Id.
479. Judge Weinstein, for example, rejects the relevancy of Opper v. United States, 348 U.S. 84 (1954),
in which the Supreme Court, id. at 90-92, explained the corroboration burden in introducing a defendant's
statement. 4 WEINSTEIN, supra note 16, 804(b)(3)[03], at 804-104 n.11. The Standing Committee,
nonetheless, cited Opper to explain the "simple corroboration" test. See Committee Response, supra note
139, at 59. For a discussion of Opper, see notes 497-501 infra and accompanying text.
Wigmore also rejected the need for corroboration, never mentioning the word in his discussion of the
penal interest exception. He characterized the analogous demand for corroboration of an accomplice's
statement as a condition of admissibility as "mere useless chaff," 7 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2059, at 440
(Chadbourn rev. ed. 1978), a comment that Weinstein quotes for support. 4 WEINSTEIN, supra note 16, 1
804(b)(3)[03], at 804-104. Wigmore only referred to independent evidence when he noted the need for it
in determining whether the statement was truly against interest. 5 WIGMORE, supra note 4, § 1468, at 346.
480. Judge Weinstein concludes that "[i]n effect, the test of Rule 403 is applicable." 4 WEINSTEIN,
supra note 16, % 804(b)(3)[03], at 804-105. Rule 403 authorizes the exclusion of relevant evidence whose
"probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or
misleading the jury .... "FED. R. EVID. 403. Using rule 403 as a guide would result in shifting the burden
from the defendant in establishing the trustworthiness of the statement to the Government in establishing
its untrustworthiness. Although this is the better judicial approach to rule 804(b)(3), Congress clearly did
not intend that result. See Lowery v. Maryland, 401 F. Supp. 604, 607 (D. Md. 1975) (Judge Weinstein's
position incorrectly interprets congressional intent), affd without opinion, 532 F.2d 750 (4th Cir.), cert.
denied, 429 U.S. 919 (1977). The Subcommittee never discussed the relationship between rules 804(b)(3)
and 403 during its markup sessions. The rule's corroboration requirement, in fact, probably requires the
reverse of rule 403: The defendant must establish, at the very least, that the probative value of the statement
substantially outweighs the dangers listed in rule 403.
Judge Weinstein provides two examples to explain how a rule 403 test would work. If the proof were
"undisputed" that the declarant "could not have been at the scene of the crime because he was in prison,"
the court should exclude his statement. 4 WEINSTEIN, supra note 16, 804(b)(3) [03], at 804-104-05. In
contrast, "if there is evidence that he was near the scene and had some motive or background connecting
him with the crime," the court should admit his statement. Id. at 804-105.
481. Standing Committee Note to Supreme Court Draft, supra note 1, at 327.
482. Several possible reasons might underlie the vagueness of this explanation. First, neither the
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During the Subcommittee's hearings, the Standing Committee, in response
to the Department of Justice's objection to Chief Justice Burger that the
"simple corroboration" test was unworkably vague, analogized the test to theGovernment's burden in convicting a defendant by means of his or an
accomplice's statement. Earlier the Advisory Committee had rejected theDepartment of Justice's analogy to convicting a person through his own
statement. Prior to this time, however, no one had offered the analogy of
convicting a defendant through his accomplice's statement. Because nointernal memoranda exist that explain the Standing Committee's reason for
offering both analogies, one cannot ascertain whether the Committee nolonger agreed with the Advisory Committee's earlier rejection of the confes-
sion analogy, whether it was trying once again to mollify its critics, or
whether it was trying cleverly to silence its critics by adopting theirinterpretative analogy. The second or third explanation appears to make more
sense because neither analogy would have been easy to apply and because
each might provide different answers to the several questions discussed below.During these hearings, the House Subcommittee never discussed how courts
should interpret its version of the corroboration requirement, except in-directly by concluding that the trial court in Donnelly should have admitted
the declarant's statement.
What, then, does the rule's corroboration requirement demand? The only
certain conclusion is that the defendant cannot satisfy that requirement by
testifying that he is innocent. Beyond that, interpretation is difficult. The
"clearly indicate" language is not used elsewhere in the Federal Rules ofEvidence.483 Congress implicitly rejected the confusing analogies offered by
the Standing Committee as interpretative guides when Congress increased thedefendant's corroboration burden. Moreover, the Subcommittee's position onDonnelly appears to be inconsistent with its intent to increase the defendant's
Advisory Committee nor the Standing Committee thought the "simple corroboration" requirement was
necessary. Thus, they added it out of fear rather than conviction. Second, Senator McClellan opposed theAdvisory Committee's only attempt to describe what it thought "simple corroboration" should require-
the defendant's testimonial denial of guilt. Senator McClellan, however, would have accepted the
nonspecific explanation quoted in the text as long as the Committee added the corroboration requirement.Third, because Senator McClellan objected to the Advisory Committee's attempt to explain "simple
corroboration" at the September 22, 1971 meeting and the Standing Committee voted to add the "simple
corroboration" requirement on September 30, 1971, the Standing Committee had no time to develop an
alternate way of explaining "simple corroboration" and did not discuss any alternatives during its meeting.Finally, Professor Cleary consciously chose to leave the "simple corroboration" test as vague as possible.As he said, "what constitutes corroboration is left open." Standing Committee Meeting, Sept. 30, 1971.Other evidence, however, suggests that the Standing Committee intended the "simple corroboration" test
to impose a high burden. See notes 486-90 infra and accompanying text (Standing Committee probablyintended to analogize "simple corroboration" burden to Government's corpus delicti burden).
483. The Advisory Committee, however, did use the word "clearly" once in a separate context. In theRevised Draft, the Advisory Committee indicated that specific instances of conduct could be used under
rule 608(b) to question a witness' character for truthfulness "if clearly probative of truthfulness ...."Revised Draft, supra note 1, at 389. That test replaced the requirement of the Preliminary Draft that specificinstances could be used "if relevant to truthfulness .... Preliminary Draft , supra note 1, at 293. In theSupreme Court Draft, however, the Advisory and Standing Committees deleted "clearly," simplyindicating that specific instances could be used "if probative of truthfulness .... Supreme Court Draft,
supra note 1, at 267. Neither Committee explained why "clearly" was added to the Revised Draft or deletedfrom the Supreme Court Draft. No evidence exists to infer that the House Subcommittee was aware of theAdvisory Committee's use of the word in the Revised Draft and that the Subcommittee therefore thought
that the penal interest exception warranted such a test.
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burden. Donnelly would provide an opponent of the penal interest exception
with perhaps the best example of a case in which the trial court should not
have admitted the statement. In Donnelly not only was there no evidence to
check the veracity of the witness who would have testified about the
declarant's purported statement, but also the evidence linking the declarant to
the crime was of questionable value.484 Because of this confusion and
uncertainty, we must examine the meaning of each attempt to explain the
corroboration test.485
1. The Confession and Coconspirator Analogies
What Must Be Corroborated? In applying the Standing Committee's
confession and coconspirator analogies, a court must determine what the
defendant must corroborate. Is it the truth of what the declarant said or the
personal trustworthiness of the declarant that permits a court to infer the
truth of his statement? Neither alternative defines the Government's burden
in corroborating the defendant's or the coconspirator's statement. To in-
troduce a coconspirator's statement under rule 801(d)(2)(E), the Government
must establish the existence of a conspiracy and the defendant's participation
in it.486 To convict a defendant based in part on his admission or confession,
the Government must introduce other evidence to establish both the volun-
tariness of his statement (if he moves to suppress) and the corpus delicti of the
crime.487 Most courts apply the corroboration requirement to the corpus
delicti doctrine.488 The defendant's fifth amendment protection against co-
erced confessions, entitlement to a Miranda warning, and sixth amendment
484. For a discussion of Donnelly, see notes 549-67 infra and accompanying text.
485. The historical roots of rule 804(b)(3)'s corroboration requirement may be the demand for more
than two witnesses in a treason charge or for evidence corroborating an accomplice's testimony. See 7
WIGMORE, supra note 4, §§ 2036 & 2056. Wigmore's justification for the two-witness rule in treason
cases---"the relative proportion, in experience, of... the likelihood of false accusations, as compared with
the harm of a guilty person's escape," id. § 2037-is similar to the apparent concern of the House
Subcommittee with respect to defense-offered penal interest statements. Wigmore thought that "there will
be [an] ample array of witnesses to prove [the defendant's] acts" if he did commit treason. Id. § 2037.
Similarly, the House Subcommittee may have believed that evidence corroborating the declarant's self-
implication would exist if he told the truth. In the absence of such evidence, the Subcommittee may have
thought the declarant was lying or the defendant had fabricated his existence.
Wigmore's explanation of the corroboration rule for accomplice testimony is also instructive. He argues
that at early common law the "rule" was not a rule but an admonition to the judge to caution the jury about
the credibility of the accomplice's testimony. Id. § 2056. When American courts later rejected judicial
comment on the evidence as a way of assisting the jury, they converted the cautionary instruction into a
corroboration requirement. Id. Although no evidence suggests that the Advisory and Standing Committees
or the House Subcommittee were aware of these historical analogues, this history indicates that one better
way of treating defense-offered penal interest statements is to admit the statement freely and to encourage
the judge to comment about the credibility and relevancy of the declarant's purported statement. See note
704 infra and accompanying text (court should be more willing to admit hearsay if judge can identify
credibility and weight issues for jury).
486. FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(2)(E). Two other requirements of that rule-that the coconspirator spoke
during and in furtherance of the conspiracy-are inapplicable to rule 804(b)(3). Supreme Court Draft,
supra note 1, at 293.
487. See MCCORMICK, supra note 4, at 346 (confession requires corroboration tending both to establish
reliability of confession and to prove commission of crime); Developments in the Law-Confessions, 79
HARV. L. REV. 935, 1072 (1966) (same) [hereinafter Developments in Confessions].
488. MCCORMICK, supra note 4, § 158, at 347; Developments in Confessions, supra note 487, at 1072.
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right to counsel might provide sufficient safeguards against the introduction
of unreliable confessions to relieve the Government of the burden of proving
that the defendant's statement was reliable as a further admissibility
condition.489 Thus, the Standing Committtee probably intended to analogize
the "simple corroboration" test to the Government's corpus delicti burden.490
That analogy, however, does not work well. At a minimum, the corpus
delicti doctrine obliges the Government to establish a particular injury.491
Most courts also require the Government to show that a criminal agent
caused the injury.492 A very few courts demand that the Government
introduce evidence that the defendant committed the crime.493 The purpose of
the first two showings is to prevent the conviction of a defendant for a
nonexistent crime.494 The purpose behind the third approach is to prevent the
conviction of an innocent defendant who, to protect another or to commit
legal suicide, has chosen to confess to a crime he did not commit.495 The first
two approaches are inapplicable to defense-offered statements. Through its
proof against the defendant, the Government will establish the commission of
a crime. If the Government fails to do that, the admissibility of the declarant's
statement will never become an issue because the court must grant the
defendant's motion for judgment of acquittal at the close of the Government's
case-in-chief.
To have any meaning, the "simple corroboration" test should require some
form of corroboration of the declarant's statement. By imposing a burden on
the defendant that the Government does not shoulder in introducing either
the defendant's or the coconspirator's statement, was the Standing Committee
demanding corroboration of the truth of what the declarant said, of the
trustworthiness of the declarant, or of both?496 Although the Standing
489. In State v. Edwards, 49 Ohio St. 2d 31, 358 N.E.2d 1051 (1976), the Ohio Supreme Court
indicated that because of "the revolution in criminal law of the 1960's and the vast number of procedural
safeguards protecting the due-process rights of criminal defendants, the corpus delicti rule is supported by
few practical or social-policy considerations. This court sees little reason to apply the rule with a dogmatic
vengeance." Id. at 35-36, 358 N.E.2d at 1056. The United States Supreme Court, however, earlier had held
that the doctrine was important because the defendant may be "unable to establish the involuntary nature
of his statements" and because even a voluntary statement might be unreliable. Smith v. United States, 348
U.S. 147, 153 (1954).
490. Although the Standing Committee's citation to Opper v. United States, 348 U.S. 84, 92-94 (1954),
in which the Supreme Court discussed the meaning of the Government's corpus delicti burden, id. at 92-94,
suggests the Committee's intent, the Committee's simultaneous citation to Dean Wigmore, who mentioned
both aspects of the Government's burden, renders this conclusion less than certain. See Committee
Response, supra note 139, at 59 (citing 7 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2071 (3d ed. 1940)).
491. See F. INBAU, J. THOMPSON & A. MOENSSENS, CRIMINAL LAW 465-66 (1979 ed.) (some courts
require only proof of particular loss or injury involved) [hereinafter INBAU]; Note, The Corpus Delicti-
Confession Problem, 43 J. CRIM. L.C. & P.S. 214 & n.4 (1952) (one view of what constitutes corpus delicti
requires only proof of particular loss or injury) [hereinafter Note, Corpus Delicti].
492. INBAU, supra note 491, at 466; Note, Corpus Delicti, supra note 491, at 214 & n.5.
493. INBAU, supra note 491, at 466; Note, Corpus Delicti, supra note 491, at 214 & n.6.
494. See Note, Corpus Delicti, supra note 491, at 214 & n.2 (citing cases in which defendants convicted
of nonexistent crimes).
495. Id. at 215; see Developments in Confessions, supra note 487, at 1073 & n.9 (policy view of
confession as strong evidence changed as result of unjust capital convictions based on false confessions).
496. A separate analogy might help explain this issue. Consider the nature of the corroborating
information necessary to credit an unidentified informant's information a court should demand before
issuing a search warrant. In Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108 (1964), the Supreme Court divided the inquiry
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Committee did not explicitly answer this question, its citation of Opper v.
United States,497 provides an apparent answer.4 98 In Opper the Government
convicted the defendant for paying a federal employee to recommend that the
Government accept goods furnished by the defendant. 499 The defendant's
statement to the FBI included certain admissions crucial to the Government's
case. In holding that the Government had to satisfy the corpus delicti
doctrine,500 the Supreme Court interpreted that doctrine in a novel way. It
concluded that the Government need not adduce evidence of corpus delicti
independent of the defendant's statement as long as it introduced "substantial
independent evidence which would tend to establish the trustworthiness of
the statement."501 By "trustworthiness of the statement," the Court must
have intended that the Government establish the truth of the statement rather
than the trustworthiness of the declarant.
In Opper, however, the Court did not say whether the Government must
establish the trustworthiness of the statement even when it can establish
injury and criminal agency (the usual corpus delicti burden) apart from the
statement. In Smith v. United States,502 decided the same term as Opper, the
Court settled that question. In Smith the Government convicted the defend-
ant for income tax evasion. 503 Although the defendant made a statement to
federal investigators asserting his net worth, the Government's information
indicated a higher figure.504 The Court held that the Government could meet
its corpus delicti burden in two ways: Either, as in Opper, by introducing
evidence that substantiated the truth of the defendant's admissions or by
introducing evidence independent from the defendant's statement that estab-
in two, asking first whether the affidavit included sufficient information to permit the magistrate to
conclude that the items sought were where they were reported to be, and second, whether the affidavit
included sufficient information either to justify the affiant's belief that the informant's information was
credible or to demonstrate that the informant was reliable. Id. at 114. The first test appears to demand
proof that the informant had first-hand information. Thus, it is similar to rule 804(b)(3)'s requirement that
the declarant have personal knowledge. What the second test demands, however, is not as clear. Although
in Aguilar the Court apparently expected the Government to establish either the reliability of either the
informant's information or the informant himself, at least one court has demanded proof of both. See
United States v. Hyde, 574 F.2d 856, 862 (5th Cir. 1978) (application for wiretap order must meet both
prongs of Aguilar test). Moreover, using this analogy to explain the "simple corroboration" analogies is
difficult because the Supreme Court may have rejected the divided Aguilar inquiry, asking instead only
whether a substantial basis exists for believing the tip. See United States v. Harris, 403 U.S. 573, 579-80
(1971) (plurality opinion) (although affidavit contained no assertion that informant truthful, when ample
factual basis for believing informant coupled with affiant's own knowledge of respondent's background,
sufficient basis existed for magistrate to issue warrant). Harris would appear to permit issuance of a
warrant if either the informant or his information were considered reliable. If this analogy were applied to
the "simple corroboration" test, the defendant could corroborate in the alternative.
497. 348 U.S. 84 (1954).
498. See Committee Response, supra note 139, at 59 (Committee cited Opper as example of when court
might consider corroboration requirement's purpose of preventing fabricatidn effectuated). Although
Senator McClellan identified the case as Smith v. United States, 348 U.S. 147 (1954), a second
corroboration decision, he meant to cite Opper to illustrate the corroboration he thought necessary to admit
a penal interest statement. See note 96 supra (discussing McClellan's confusion of Smith and Opper and
corroboration standards of each).
499. 348 U.S. at 85-86.
500. Id. at 89-90.
501. Id. at 93.
502. 348 U.S. 147 (1954).
503. Id. at 149.
504. Id. at 149-50.
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lished the crime.505 In Smith the Court excused the Government from theburden of proving the trustworthiness of the defendant's admission. By citingOpper, not Smith, the Standing Committee must have intended that a court
require the defendant to establish the truth of the declarant's statement by
evidence independent of the statement. Under Smith, if the Governmentintroduced evidence in its case against the defendant that a crime had been
committed, the Government would excuse the defendant from proving the
truth of the declarant's statement. The Standing Committee, by relying onOpper, created a difference between the Government's burden in introducing
the defendant's statement and the defendant's burden in introducing the
declarant's statement.
Proving the truth of a declarant's statement is not always difficult. At least
when the declarant's statement operates to substitute the declarant for thedefendant in a one-person crime, the defendant could establish the truth ofthe declarant's admission or confession by proving that the declarant had a
motive or an opportunity to commit the crime. However, when the declar-
ant's statement exonerates the defendant in a two-person crime ("My
accomplice was X rather than the defendant") or is a naked opinion ("Thedefendant is not guilty"), what must the defendant corroborate? In the first
example, proof that the declarant participated appears irrelevant to the truth
of the second clause, unless the court infers the truth of the exonerating
statement from evidence supporting the declarant's self-incrimination.506 Or,
must the defendant also establish the truth of the second clause? Could thedefendant do this by pointing to some defect in the Government's evidence
against him?507 Or, must he introduce evidence to establish his innocence?Requiring the defendant to testify creates a conflict between his evidentiaryburden and his fifth amendment protection.5 08 Moreover, requiring thedefendant to prove that the Government failed to prove him guilty as a
condition of admitting the statement resurrects the conceptual dilemma
courts faced before enactment of the Federal Rules of Evidence with respect
to the introduction of a coconspirator's statement.509 Of what relevance, then,
505. Id. at 158. The Court held that the Government could corroborate the truth of the declarant's
statement, rather than injury and criminal agency, because a net worth tax prosecution does not have a
tangible injury. Id. at 154, 156.
506. Cf. 7 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2059, at 424 (Chadbourn rev. ed. 1978) (when court credits
declarant's self-condemnation, it should credit his implication of defendant). The same argument would
apply to penal interest statements: If we do not fear that the accomplice will vindictively damn thedefendant as he damns himself, we should not fear that the declarant will damn himself to save the
defendant.
507. Only two cases have examined the strength of the Government's evidence in deciding whether to
admit a penal interest statement. See United States v. Thomas, 571 F.2d 285, 290 (5th Cir. 1978)(Government's case did not cast doubt on trustworthiness of statement); United States v. Benveniste, 564F.2d 335, 341 (9th Cir. 1977) (Government's actions in investigation provided corroboration for
statements; reversible error to exlude statement). But cf. United States v. Metz, 608 F.2d 147, 157 (5th Cir.1979) (although Government's evidence provided some corroboration for statement, it did not meet
requirements of rule 804(b)(3)), cert. denied, 101 S. Ct. 80 (1980).
508. This does not necessarily follow, however, provided that the defendant can testify at a rule 104(a)hearing out of the presence of thejury and provided that the Government may not use his testimony from
that hearing except to impeach his testimony at trial.
509. See Carbo v. United States, 314 F.2d 718, 736 (9th Cir. 1963) (if, before relying on statement juryhad to be satisfied that declarant and accused were engaged in conspiracy charged, declaration would serve
merely to confirm what jury already decided; therefore, court rather than jury must decide admissibility of
coconspirator's statement).
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is the declarant's statement? These interpretational problems pose difficult
issues for a court. One way to eliminate these problems is for a court to
assume that the Advisory and Standing Committees intended to limit
admissibility only to those statements that substituted the declarant for the
defendant in a one-person crime.
Proving the personal trustworthiness of the declarant is much more
difficult than proving the trustworthiness of his statement. If neither the
defendant nor the witness who reported the statement knew the identity of the
declarant, the defendant's effort would fail.5 10 If the declarant had a criminal
record or if he was a friend or relative of the defendant, his trustworthiness
obviously would be suspect. Moreover, the defendant probably could not
show that the declarant gave credible information on other occasions, a
method by which the Government can establish the credibility of an
informant whose information provides the justification to search under the
fourth amendment. 511 The court, however, might infer the declarant's
trustworthiness if the defendant and the declarant did not know each other
and thus no collusive relationship existed between them.
What is the Defendant's Burden of Proof. The second issue in interpret-
ing the "simple corroboration" test in terms of the Standing Committee's two
analogies is determining the quantum of proof that the defendant must
introduce. This second issue presents even more difficult interpretational
problems than does the first issue. For example, no one explained the
relationship between the "simple corroboration" requirement and the rule
104(a) burden carried by the proponent of any other type of evidence whose
admissibility depends on satisfaction of certain foundation conditions. More-
over, neither analogy provides much help because the Government's burdens
in corroborating a defendant's and coconspirator's statements are not only
undefined but appear to require different amounts of supporting evidence.
Rule 104(a) directs the judge to decide whether to admit any evidence
whose introduction depends upon the satisfaction of conditions like the penal
interest and "simple corroboration" tests.512 The lack of cross-reference
between the "simple corroboration" test with the test of rule 104(a) is perhaps
understandable because rule 104(a) does not explain the burden the propo-
nent bears in establishing any admissibility foundation. Nonetheless, the
court should apply a preponderance of evidence standard under rule
104(a).513
510. Cf. Steadman v. United States, 358 A.2d 329, 331-32 (D.C. 1976) (three witnesses prepared to
testify to having heard unknown declarant admit to killing victim near crime scene; statements excluded).
511. For a discussion of recent decisions applying the two-prong test for establishing the credibility of
an informant, see Project, Tenth Annual Review of Criminal Procedure: United States Supreme Court and
Courts of Appeals 1979-1980, 69 GEO. L.J. 211, 222-25 (1980).
512. See FED. R. EVID. 104(a) (court shall determine preliminary questions with respect to admissibili-
ty of evidence).
513. See D. LOUISELL & C. MUELLER, FEDERAL EVIDENCE § 35, at 264-65 (1977) (preponderance of
evidence standard should govern because not unduly difficult for claimant who usually has access to
information necessary to sustain burden). But cf. Saltzburg, Standards of Proof and Preliminary Questions
of Fact, 27 STAN. L. REV. 271, 301-02 (1974) (standard no higher than "reasonable possibility" should be
imposed on defendant). In Lego v. Twomey, 404 U.S. 477 (1972), the Supreme Court held that the
Government need satisfy only a preponderance standard to overcome the criminal defendant's objection
954 THE GEORGETOWN LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 69:851
Although interpreting the "simple corroboration" test to impose a prepon-
derance standard is inconsistent with the Standing Committee's citation toOpper, it may be consistent with its coconspirator analogy. In Opper theSupreme Court required the Government to prove the reliability of thedefendant's statement by "substantial independent evidence," a burden that itleft undefined. 514 In Smith, however, the Court indirectly set a ceiling on thatburden when it said the Government need not corroborate the defendant's
statement beyond a reasonable doubt or by a preponderance of the evi-dence.515 As in Opper, the Court failed to define "substantial" specifically.5 16
In an earlier case, however, the Court defined substantial as "more than a
mere scintilla. It means such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might
accept as adequate to support a conclusion." 517 Apart from the SupremeCourt's inconclusive attempts to explain the "substantial evidence" test, other
that he confessed involuntarily. Id. at 487. One could argue that, regardless of the Government's proofburden, the defendant's burden should be lower than a preponderance of evidence. See Saltzburg, supra, at302 n.10 (although preponderance test should be imposed on Government when it attempts to introducepenal interest statement, defendant should meet only "reasonable possibility" test). If, to warrant acquittal,
the defendant must "prove" only that a reasonable doubt exists or, conversely, must "disprove" only that
the Government has failed to meet its "beyond a reasonable doubt" burden, a court should allow thedefendant to introduce evidence to establish either variation as long as he satisfied an equally low test of
reliability. Lego suggests, however, that this argument will not prevail. If the defendant is protected
sufficiently by the "beyond a reasonable doubt" standard so that the Government need satisfy only a lower
evidentiary admissibility standard, it might follow that that guilt standard is also sufficiently protective to
oblige the defendant to satisfy the "preponderance of evidence" standard. Regardless of which way oneinterprets Lego, the corroboration requirement of the penal interest exception clearly imposes on thedefendant a burden higher than that of a "preponderance of the evidence."514. 348 U.S. 84,93 (1954). In the Court's only attempt to define "substantial independent evidence," it
said: "It is sufficient if the corroboration supports the essential facts admitted sufficiently to justify a juryinference of their truth." Id. In his statement to the FBI, Opper admitted that Hollifield, a Government
employee, flew from Dayton to Chicago at Opper's telephone request and that Opper then paid him $1,000,Id. at 88. The Government introduced evidence of a telephone call from Opper to Hollifield, of Opper's
withdrawal of $1,000 from his bank account, and of Hollifield's flight to Chicago, all within several days of
the point when Opper admitted he had paid Hollifield. Id. at 87-88.515. 348 U.S. 147, 156 (1954). In contrast to Opper, Smith involved a more elaborate attempt by theGovernment to establish that the defendant either had a net worth no higher than that attributed to him by
the Government at the start of the taxable period, or, alternatively, had earned more taxable income thanhe reported in his tax returns. Id. at 149. As to the former, the Government introduced evidence of thedefendant's tax returns for the preceding eight years, the defendant's jobs and salaries for the precedingfour years, his payment schedule in purchasing an inexpensive house, and his wife's failure to earn
significant income during the time period. Id. at 157, 158. As to the latter, the Government introduced
evidence that the defendant and his wife had opened nine new bank accounts (they had fourteen accountsin twelve banks) and that they had opened brokerage accounts, purchased property, and made other
substantial expenditures. Id. at 158-59.516. The "substantial evidence" test is well-traveled and malleable. The Supreme Court has used it indeciding the constitutionality of issuing a search warrant based on an unidentified informant's tip, UnitedStates v. Harris, 403 U.S. 573, 580-88 (1971), and the constitutionality of a presumption that favors theGovernment. United States v. Leary, 395 U.S. 6, 36 (1969). In each instance, however, the test resembles apreponderance burden. See Harris, 403 U.S. at 580-81 (must be substantial basis for crediting hearsay asground for search warrant); Leary, 395 U.S. at 36 (must be substantial assurance that presumed fact morelikely than not to flow from proven fact). In contrast, the test has been characterized as "one of the morelenient." Sessions & Hall, The Coconspirator's Statement: Evaluating Preliminary Questions of AdmissibilityUnder Rule 801(d)(2)(E), 11 ST. MARY's L.J. 83, 104 (1979). Perhaps more appropriately, the test is
considered one that "lack[s] [a] true historical definition or application." Marcus, Co-Conspirator
Declarations: The Federal Rules of Evidence and Other Recent Developments, From a Criminal Law
Perspective, 7 AM. J. CRIM. L. 287, 301 (1979).
517. Consolidated Edison Co. v. NLRB, 305 U.S. 197, 229 (1938).
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courts have defined the Government's corpus delicti burden in various
ways, 518 from "not beyond a reasonable doubt" to "clear and convincing"
evidence and from "a prima facie showing" to "some evidence" or to "a light
showing." 519 Compounding the problem of selecting among these variations is
the position of a few courts that the quantum of proof demanded may vary
with the circumstances of the case.520 Given these variations, the federal
courts might well have interpreted the "simple corroboration" test in diverse,
if not arbitrary, ways. 521
Although the Government's burden for satisfying the foundational tests of
the coconspirator doctrine is more certain now, it was not well established
when the Standing Committee offered the analogy in 1973. The Supreme
Court has used in dictum the same "substantial evidence" standard it used in
Opper and Smith.522 Before enactment of the Federal Rules of Evidence, lower
courts used the "slight evidence" or "substantial prima facie proof" stan-
dards.523 Since enactment of the Federal Rules of Evidence, federal courts
have not felt bound by the Supreme Court's dictum because most have
interpreted the coconspirator doctrine, rule 801(d)(2)(E), as requiring a court
to determine admissibility under rule 104(a).524 As a result, several courts of
appeals have applied a "preponderance of evidence" standard,
525 while
commentators have argued for the higher standards of "clear and convinc-
518. If the Standing Committee intended its confession analogy to impose on the defendant the same
burden that the Government must meet in proving the voluntariness of the defendant's confession and not
proving the corpus delicti of the crime, the defendant would have to corroborate by a preponderance of the
evidence. See Lego v. Twomey, 404 U.S. 477, 486-87 (1972) (Government need only satisfy preponderance
of evidence burden to overcome criminal defendant's objection that confession given involuntarily).
519. Developments in Confessions, supra note 487, at 1076 & nn. 34, 35; Note, Corpus Delicti, supra note
491, at 215 & nn.9-11, 13-16.
520. Note, Corpus Delecti, supra note 491, at 215 & n.9.
521. See Opper v. United States, 348 U.S. 84, 93 (1954) ("Each case has its own facts admitted and its
own corroborative evidence, which leads to patent individualization of the opinions"); MCCORMICK, supra
note 4, § 158, at 349 (as a practical matter, corroboration requirement seems in many cases to serve for
what is really appellate court judgment that total proof of insufficient probative value); Developments in
Confessions, supra note 487, at 1076 ("There are almost as many verbal formulas as there are courts for the
amount of evidence required, and the formulas expressed often bear little relationship to what the courts
actually require in practice") (footnotes omitted). One court of appeals candidly admitted that the corpus
delicti doctrine is used covertly to reverse an otherwise irreversible conviction for insufficient evidence.
Manning v. United States, 215 F.2d 945, 946 (10th Cir. 1954). In contrast to courts using the corpus delecti
doctrine to protect a defendant whose confession is offered by the Government, courts also might have
used the doctrine to justify excluding penal interest statements offered by the defendant, given their
skepticism about such statements.
522. See United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 701 n.14 (1974) (as preliminary matter substantial
independent evidence of conspiracy necessary to take question to jury; whether standard satisfied question
of admissibility for trial judge).
523. Sessions & Hall, supra note 516, at 90 & n.53, 107 & n.161.
524. See generally Marcus, supra note 516, at 300; Sessions & Hall, supra note 516, at 104-11.
525. See, e.g., United States v. Santiago, 582 F.2d 1128, 1134 (7th Cir. 1978) (hearsay admissible if
more likely than not that declarant and defendant were members of conspiracy when hearsay statement
made and that hearsay statement made in furtherance of conspiracy); United States v. Enright, 579 F.2d
980, 986 (6th Cir. 1978) (same); United States v. Petrozziello, 548 F.2d 20, 23 (Ist Cir. 1977) (same). The
federal courts have had to breathe meaning into rule 801(d)(2)(E) because it does not answer the burden of
proof question. See House Subcommittee Hearings, supra note 15, at 249 (testimony of Judge Henry J.
Friendly) (complaining that rule 801(d)(2)(E) "says nothing that would help anybody at all").
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ing" evidence; 26 "clear, unequivocal, and convincing" evidence;527 or proof
"beyond a reasonable doubt.' 528
The Standing Committee may not have intended courts to interpret the
simple corroboration" test in the way courts have construed the coconspira-
tor doctrine.5 29 If this were the Committee's intent, two points follow.Interpreting the "simple corroboration" test in terms of the preponderance of
evidence burden would have imposed on the defendant a foundation require-
ment higher than even that demanded by Senator McClellan and theDepartment of Justice, both of whom argued for the corpus delicti burden as
an analogy.5 30 Furthermore, the defendant would have had to corroborate thedeclarant's statement to a degree higher than that required of the Govern-
ment in introducing the defendant's confession.53' Put another way, the
526. See United States v. Fatico, 458 F. Supp. 388, 405 (E.D.N.Y. 1978) ("Quantified, the probabilities
might be in the order of above 70% under a clear and convincing evidence burden"); Sessions & Hall, supra
note 516, at 105-06 (same).
527. See Sessions & Hall, supra note 516, at 106 (quantifying clear, unequivocal, and convincing test at
above 80% certainty). For slightly different quantifications, see Underwood, The Thumb on the Scales of
Justice: Burdens of Persuasion in Criminal Cases, 86 YALE L.J. 1299, 1311 (1977).
528. See 4 WEINSTEIN, supra note 16, 104[05], at 104-42-43 (noting, however, that no federal court
has accepted his position). Judge Weinstein's remarkable suggestion, irrespective of its propriety when
applied to coconspirator statements, overlooks the Standing Committee's reliance on the coconspirator
analogy to explain the "simple corroboration" test. This oversight is especially apparent in light of JudgeWeinstein's argument that the corroboration requirement of rule 804(b)(3) should be no higher than that of
rule 403. See note 480 supra (discussing Judge Weinstein's advocacy of test of rule 403 as proper standard
of corroboration under rule 804(b)(3)).
529. Interpreting the Standing Committee's intent is impossible. On the one hand, several clues suggest
that a party would not have to produce much evidence to satisfy the "simple corroboration" test. First,
neither the Standing Committee nor the Advisory Committee believed that the requirement was necessary.
Second, to explain the coconspirator analogy, the Standing Committee referred to Wigmore, who
caustically dismissed court opinions on the sufficiency of evidence needed to corroborate a coconspirator's
statement as "mere useless chafr'; the Committee did not cite rule 801(d)(2)(E). 7 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE §2059, at 440 (Chadboum rev. ed. 1978). Committee Response, supra note 139, at 59. Third, although the
Committees assigned the corroboration inquiry to the judge under rule 104(a), see notes 625-31 infra and
accompanying text, they never explained what the standard of proof would be under rule 104(a). If theyintended courts to apply the prerules standards applicable to each type of evidence, see S. SALTZ3URO &K. REDDEN, FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE MANUAL 39 (2d ed. 1977) ("One can only surmise that thedraftsmen ... intended to leave existing law as it is"), one might expect that they would have relied on the
"substantial evidence" or prima facie evidence tests of Opper and the coconspirator cases decided before the
enactment of the Federal Rules of Evidence.
On the other hand, the Advisory Committee explained in its Note to rule 104(b) that a court should
admit conditionally relevant evidence when "the foundation evidence is sufficient to support a finding offulfillment of the condition." Advisory Committee Note to Supreme Court Draft, supra, note 1, at 198.
That explanation paraphrases the prima facie evidence standard. Because the Advisory Committee
probably intended the standard under rule 104(a) to be higher than under rule 104(b) (because of the
supposed dangers of evidence that requires the judge alone to evaluate whether it satisfies the evidentiary
standards) and because the Advisory and Standing Committees surely should have anticipated that federal
courts would interpret rules 104(a) and 801(d)(2)(E) to impose a higher burden than prima facie evidence,
we can infer that the Committees intended that "simple corroboration" also should require a greater
amount of corroborating evidence.
530. The Department of Justice, however, implicitly demanded that a higher burden be placed on thedefendant: "Only if the requirement of corroboration were interpreted to require a showing at least as
strong as the showing which is now required as a prerequisite to the admission of a confession when
introduced for the purpose of conviction, would trustworthiness be guaranteed to an acceptable degree."
Justice's Third Letter, supra note 130, at 48 (emphasis added).
531. The confession-coconspirator analogies also would have imposed a higher burden on the defendant
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defendant would have had to satisfy a higher proof burden than he must meet
in convincing the factfinder that the Government has failed to prove him
guilty. Of course, these points assume that the Standing Committee intended,
or at least anticipated, that the coconspirator doctrine would involve no less
than the preponderance of evidence test. In any event, if a court interprets the
corpus delicti doctrine in terms of the Opper and Smith "substantial evidence"
burden, the two analogies as judicially interpreted demand different amounts
of corroborating evidence.
The confession and coconspirator analogies do not work well as explana-
tions of the "simple corroboration" test for yet another reason: The defendant
might then be able to admit the statement provisionally, subject to a motion to
strike, if he failed to corroborate it.532 The corpus delicti doctrine is part of the
Government's burden of proof; it is not a condition to the admissibility of the
defendant's statement.533 Thus, it does not structure the Government's
presentation of its case. Instead, the Government suffers a judgment of
acquittal if it fails to establish the corpus delicti. Although the Government
also did not need to corroborate the coconspirator's statement as a condition
of admissibility at the time when the Standing Committee offered its
analogies, the doctrine did apply to the admissibility of such a statement
rather than to the Government's burden of proof.534 Courts permitted the
Government to introduce the statement provisionally, subject to either a
motion to strike or the grant of a mistrial if the Government failed to
corroborate the statement. 535
If the "simple corroboration" test functioned in the same way, the
defendant might have been able to introduce the declarant's statement,
subject to its exclusion if he failed to corroborate. Such a result not only
would have been inconsistent with the Advisory and Standing Committees'
than either the Government or the defendant must meet in all but two instances under the Federal Rules of
Evidence. See FED. R. EvID. 412(c)(3) (to introduce victim's prior sexual conduct in rape case, defendant
must establish that probative value outweighs prejudicial effect); Advisory Committee Note to Supreme
Court Draft, supra note 1, at 221 (in deciding whether to admit evidence of "other crimes, wrongs, or acts"
under rule 404(b), court must determine whether danger of undue prejudice outweighs probative value of
evidence in view of availability of other means of proof and other factors appropriate under rule 403). For
an examination of the constitutionality of rule 412 and similar state shield statutes, see Tanford &
Bocchino, Rape Victim Shield Laws and the Sixth Amendment, 128 U. PA. L. REv. 544 (1980).
532. The coconspirator analogy also would have created difficulty in determining whether a statement
was against penal interest. Most federal courts refuse to consider the alleged coconspirator's statement in
determining whether it has been corroborated. See Sessions & Hall, supra note 516, at 95-97 (majority of
circuits retain traditional rule demanding independent proof of conspiracy). Thus, if a court applied this
aspect of the coconspirator doctrine to penal interest statements, it should not consider the statement itself
in deciding whether it was against interest. This would mean rejecting the Wigmore-Morgan-rule 509(1)
approach of focusing on the facts stated rather than the litigation significance of the statement. The
Advisory and Standing Committees almost certainly did not intend this result.
533. See United States v. Bukowski, 435 F.2d 1094, 1105-06 n.7 (7th Cir.) (rule's nature, rationale, and
history suggest that requirement tests sufficiency of Government's proof and is not merely evidentiary rule
governing competence of confession or admission), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 911 (1970). The Advisory
Committee initially rejected the corpus delicti analogy because it recognized the conceptual problem.
534. See Marcus, supra note 516, at 302 (before advent of rule 801(d)(2)(E) broad discretion of trial
judge to deal with order of proof in coconspirator declaration situation rarely challenged). After enactment
of rule 801(d)(2)(E) some courts of appeals permit the provisional introduction of the statement even
though other courts of appeals now require satisfaction of that rule as a condition of informing the jury of
the coconspirator's statement. Id. at 302-07; Sessions & Hall, supra note 516, at 97-103.
535. Marcus, supra note 516, at 302; Sessions & Hall, supra note 516, at 88, 92.
1981]
THE GEORGETOWN LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 69:851
transfer from the jury to the judge of the corroboration determination 36 but
also would have been unfair to the Government 37 for two reasons. A judicial
instruction to ignore the declarant's statement upon the defendant's failure to
corroborate would have had no better success than similar curative instruc-
tions in other contexts. Moreover, although courts sometimes admit a
coconspirator's statements provisionally, the defendant is protected from
abuse by the sanction of a mistrial. The Government probably lacks similarprotection; in fact, were a mistrial granted, the defendant might enjoy doublejeopardy protection. 538
2. The Rule's Corroboration Requirement
Dissatisfied with the "simple corroboration" requirement added by theStanding Committee, the House Subcommittee rewrote the final sentence of
the rule to read: "A statement tending to expose the declarant to criminalliability and offered to exculpate the accused is not admissible unless
corroborating circumstances clearly indicate the trustworthiness of the
statement. ' 539 It is difficult to know why the Subcommittee decided to
strengthen the corroboration requirement.5 40 Having criticized the Standing
Committtee's corroboration test as vague, the Subcommittee failed to clarify
536. See notes 625-31 infra (between Preliminary Draft and Supreme Court Draft role of deciding
trustworthiness of declarant's statement shifted from jury to judge).
537. Although simply striking the coconspirator's statement and warning the jury not to consider it
may be equally unfair to the defendant, it does not follow that a court should provide the defendant with
the same potential for influencing the jury under rule 804(b)(3) that the Government sometimes receives
under rule 801(d)(2)(E).
538. A final reason why the corpus delicti analogy does not work well is that its purpose is different
from that of rule 804(b)(3). The purpose of the corpus delicti doctrine is to protect the defendant against his
misjudgment or frailty in confessing to a nonexistent crime or to a crime he did not commit and to further
the policy that the Government should investigate the crime rather than concentrate on obtaining
confessions from suspects. Developments in Confessions, supra note 487, at 1073. Neither reason applies,
however, when the defendant offers the declarant's statement. Rather, the reverse is true: To protect the
defendant from erroneous conviction, a court should permit him to introduce any relevant evidence.
539. FED. R. EVID. 804(b)(3).
540. The Subcommittee's markup sessions and the full Committee's report confirm that the Subcom-
mittee intended to impose a higher requirement than the simple corroboration test. The Subcommittee
believed that penal interest statements are "more suspect and so should have their admissibility
conditioned upon some further provision insuring trustworthiness. The proposal in the Court Rule to add a
requirement of simple corroboration was... deemed ineffective to accomplish this purpose ...... House
JUDICIARY REPORT, supra note 10, at 16, [1974] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS at 7089. The
Subcommittee, however, may have objected to the "simple corroboration" requirement as being too vague
rather than as setting too low a burden. This interpretation is justified somewhat by the tenor of the
Subcommittee's discussion of the corroboration requirement during the June 5, 1973 markup session and is
more consistent with its willingness to admit the declarant's statements in Donnelly, in which only
circumstantial evidence supported the defendant's culpability. Although the rule's corroboration require-
ment could be understood in terms of the coconspirator and corpus delicti analogies, the House Judiciary's
explanation of the rule's test, which the Subcommittee wrote, appears to impose a higher burden than the
Standing Committee's analogies.
Professor Graham savaged the Subcommittee's work. See Supplement to Subcommittee Hearings, supra
note 10, at 205-06 (reprinting letter from Professor Kenneth W. Graham, Jr., to Representative William L.
Hungate (July 16, 1973)) (episode created bitterness among scholars hopeful that legislative process would
produce reform; law reviews will soon publish "I told-you-so" articles extolling virtues of rulemaking by
experts, not politicians). Nonetheless, the Advisory and Standing Committees must share responsibility for
leaving the penal interest exception as ambiguous and as unfair as it is to the defendant.
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its requirement, despite an entreaty from the Department of Justice to do
so.541 Furthermore, during its markup sessions, the Subcommittee did not
discuss either the analogies offered by the Standing Committee or the
relationship of its test to the burdens imposed by rules 104(a) or 403. More
importantly, the Subcommittee never explained what it meant by the phrase
"clearly indicate." That language, proposed by the Subcommittee's staff
without consulting with the Advisory or Standing Committees, 542 is not used
elsewhere in the rules or in the law of evidence. As a result, the Subcommit-
tee's derivation of the language remains a mystery.5 43
Understandably, federal courts have struggled with the test, rephrasing it
as demanding "circumstances solidly indicating trustworthiness," that go
beyond "minimal corroboration,"'544 but not as imposing a "standard so strict
as to be utterly unrealistic. ' 545 Because those restatements set the boundaries
of the test so far apart, they too are unhelpful. Perhaps the "clear and
convincing evidence" test is the most sensible restatement of "clearly
indicate." Federal courts have used the "clear and convincing" standard to
describe the Government's burden in introducing evidence of "other crimes,
wrongs, or acts" under rule 404(b).546 Courts also frequently use that
standard with evidence that might present a particular danger of deception.
547
Moreover, that standard is the next ratchet up from the "preponderance of
evidence" standard that Congress might have imposed on a defendant if
Congress had used the coconspirator doctrine to define the House Subcom-
mittee's "simple corroboration" test.54 8
541. After the Subcommittee published its print on June 28, 1973, the Department of Justice urged it to
explain the corroboration requirement. See Ruckelshaus Letter, supra note 177, at 352. The Department of
Justice noted that
[i]t is not clear exactly what corroborating circumstances are required under this provision [of
rule 804(b)(3)]. In light of the Supreme Court's recent decision in Chambers v. Mississippi...
that such inculpatory hearsay statements must be admitted if there exists 'considerable
assurance of their reliability,' we recommend a Subcommittee note to indicate that the
subsection is to be applied in conformity with the Chambers decision.
Id.
542. The Standing and Advisory Committees, however, must share responsibility because in their only
public comment to the Subcommittee's corroboration test, they objected only to the word "clearly," an
objection they did not explain. See Committee's Response to Subcommittee Print, supra note 175, at 298
(urging deletion of word "clearly").
543. In the absence of a congressional explanation, courts may examine related doctrines to provide a
"general guide" to define a word. See Leary v. United States, 395 U.S. 6, 46 n.93 (1969) (to define word
"knowing" in criminal statute, Court examined definition of "knowledge" in Model Penal Code).
544. United States v. Barrett, 539 F.2d 244, 253 (1st Cir. 1976); see United States v. Hoyos, 573 F.2d
1111, 1115 (9th Cir. 1978) (quoting Barrett). See also United States v. Satterfield, 572 F.2d 687, 693 (9th
Cir.) ("corroborating circumstances must do more than tend to indicate the trustworthiness of the
statement; they must clearly indicate it") (emphasis in original), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 840 (1978).
545. United States v. Barrett, 539 F.2d 244, 253 (1st Cir. 1976).
546. E.g., United States v. Cobb, 588 F.2d 607, 612 (8th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 947 (1979);
United States v. Trevino, 565 F.2d 1317, 1319 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 971 (1978); United States v.
Maestas, 554 F.2d 834, 837 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 972 (1977); See also Sessions & Hall, supra
note 517, at 105 & n.151 (citing cases and discussing application of burden to rule 801(d)(2)(E)).
547. See MCCORMICK, supra note 4, § 340, at 798. Professor McCormick's paraphrase of the "clear and
convincing" burden as highly probative, id., captures the Subcommittee's intent. The Subcommittee
viewed penal interest statements offered by the defendant as presenting a particular danger of deception.
548. Numerically, the "clear and convincing evidence" standard demands approximately 70%
probability. Sessions & Hall, supra note 516, at 105-06.
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Because the Subcommittee believed that the trial court should have
admitted the declarant's statement in Donnelly v. United States,549 thisinterstitial interpretation of "clearly indicate" may not capture the Subcom-
mittee's intent, even if it makes sense logically.550 We can approach Donnelly
either by focusing on its facts as described by the Court's opinion and as
reviewed by the Subcommittee's associate counsel or by focusing on the facts
as set forth in the record and appellate briefs.
In Donnelly the Government charged Donnelly with killing an Indian
named Chickasaw.551 Donnelly called William Norris to testify that another
Indian named Joe Dick, who was dead at the time of the trial, had admitted
killing Chickasaw. 52 Refusing to recognize a penal interest exception, theSupreme Court affirmed the trial court's exclusion of Norris' testimony. 553
The Subcommittee's associate counsel reviewed Donnelly during the June 5
and 12, 1973 markup sessions. He told the Subcommittee that only one
549. See HOUSE JUDICIARY REPORT, supra note 10, at 16, [1974] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS at
7090 (result in Donnelly, in which circumstances "plainly indicated reliability," would be changed by rule
804(b)(3)).
550. The Senate Judiciary Committee's reinsertion of the "catch-all" provisions of rules 803(24) and
804(b)(5) further supports converting the "clearly corroborated" language into a "clear and convincing
evidence" test. The House had deleted the broad "catch-all" provisions of the Supreme Court Draft(authorizing the admission of any "statement not specifically covered by any of the foregoing exceptions
but having comparable circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness," Supreme Court Draft, supra note 1,
at 303, "as injecting too much uncertainty into the law of evidence." Subcommittee Note to June 28, 1973
Subcommittee Print, reprinted in Supplement to Subcommittee Hearings, supra note 15, at 174. The Senate
Judiciary Committee, however, agreed with the Advisory Committee that some provision for admitting
hearsay not covered by a specific exception was important both to permit the development of the hearsay
rules and to achieve justice in particular cases. The Senate Judiciary Committee demanded more than did
the Advisory Committee before a court could admit hearsay under the reinstated "catch-all" provisions.
Although its key demand, that the offered hearsay have "circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness"
"equivalent" to the other hearsay exceptions, SENATE JUDICIARY REPORT, supra note 10, at 19, [1974]
U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWs at 7066, did not indicate the test a court should apply, the Senate Judiciary
Committee indicated that the "residual hearsay exceptions will be used very rarely, and only in exceptional
circumstances." Id. Professor Paul Rothstein, the originator of the Senate's language, however, suggested
that a court should admit "catch-all" hearsay only if it found by clear and convincing evidence that
introduction of the hearsay was both necessary and as trustworthy as hearsay satisfying a specific
exception. Senate Judiciary Hearings, supra note 118, at 272 (testimony of Professor Paul Rothstein)(before admitting "catch-all" hearsay, court must determine that hearsay necessary and comparably
trustworthy). Although the Senate Judiciary Committee did not specifically endorse Professor Rothstein's
test, it probably thought that such a test was appropriate. Thus, converting the "clearly corroborated"
language of the penal interest exception into the "clear and convincing evidence" test seems appropriate,
even if the House Subcommittee had not received advice like that of Professor Rothstein's when it drafted
its higher corroboration requirement.
Furthermore, "words [in statutes] acquire scope and function from the history of the events which they
summarize." Phelps Dodge Corp. v. NLRB, 313 U.S. 177, 186 (1941). The congressional concern for crime
that prompted Congress to enact the 1968 Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act, 18 U.S.C. §§
2510-2520 (1976), probably affected Congress when it reviewed the Supreme Court Draft. Senator
McClellan's intervention certainly makes sense in light of this congressional concern about crime. See
McClellan Letter, supra note 82, at 33,642 (proposed Federal Rules of Evidence must not radically alter
present law and debilitate already-weak criminal justice system). To the extent the House Subcommittee
thought it was liberalizing federal common law practice by recognizing penal interest statements, it may
have balked at defining that exception as generously to the defendant as had the Preliminary and Revised
Drafts.
551. 228 U.S. 243, 252 (1913).
552. Id. at 272.
553. Id. at 277.
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person committed the crime and that the declarant, Joe Dick, had the
opportunity to kill Chickasaw.5 54 In his view, no connection existed between
Dick and Donnelly to suggest that Dick had fraudulently exculpated
Donnelly.555 Associate counsel agreed with Justice Holmes who argued in
dissent that the trial court should have admitted Dick's confession "on the
supposition that it should be proved that the confession really was made, and
that there was no ground for connecting Donnelly with Dick.
556
To fully grasp this remarkable case, one must review the record and the
appellate briefs. James Masten, a neighbor of Joe Dick and Chickasaw, found
Chickasaw's body lying on the bank of the Klamath River in Northern
California between 7:00 A.M. and 8:00 A.M. on October 1, 1901 or 1902.557
Although no one witnessed the murder, the Government assumed that
Chickasaw had been murdered because Masten did not find a gun near
Chickasaw's body.5 58 The Government theorized that Donnelly killed
554. Markup Session, June 5, 1973; Markup Session, June 12, 1973.
555. Markup Session, June 5, 1973; Markup Session, June 12, 1973.
556. 228 U.S. 243, 277 (1913) (Holmes, J., with Lurton & Hughes, JJ., dissenting).
557. Brief of Plaintiff in Error on Appeal to United States Supreme Court at 3, United States v.
Donnelly, 228 U.S. 243 (1913) [hereinafter Plaintiffs Brief]. No one recalled whether Chickasaw died in
1901 or 1902. The principal issue on appeal was whether the Government had jurisdiction to try Donnelly,
which depended upon whether the site of the murder was part of the Klamath Indian tribe's territory and
upon whether Donnelly was an Indian. 228 U.S. at 252.
558. A grand jury indicted Donnelly for Chickasaw's murder in 1909 and a jury convicted him in 1910.
Transcript of Record on Appeal at 2, 9, Donnelly v. United States, 228 U.S. 243 (1913) [hereinafter
Transcript of Record]. The delay between the crime and the indictment may have resulted because the
Indians believed that the killing was a problem for them to settle among themselves. Donnelly's counsel,
for example, represented that he received no help in defending his client because the Indians refused to help
white men and did not want the federal Government to interfere in their affairs. Id. at 54-55 (reprinting
Defense Counsel's Affidavit in Support of Defendant's Motion for New Trial (Feb. 28, 1910)).
At trial, the Government called numerous witnesses, all Indians, whom the defense either impeached or
demonstrated had a bias against the defendant, a white man. See Transcript of Record, supra note 558, at
14-43. Henry Griffin, the principal Government witness, testified that a short but indeterminate time after
he heard a shot, he saw the defendant carrying a gun and running along a cowtrail away from the area in
which Masten found Chickasaw's body. Id. at 14-15 (testimony of Henry Griffin). Later that morning after
Griffin learned of Chickasaw's death, he tracked footprints from the point where Masten found
Chickasaw's body to the cowtrail. Id. at 15. Later that morning during a conversation with Donnelly and
others about the murder, Griffin noticed that Donnelly's shoe had a patch similar to the "patch" he had
observed in the tracks leading from the crime scene. Id. at 17-18. Griffin testified that Donnelly did not
respond when Griffin remarked that Donnelly's shoe was patched. Id. at 18. At trial Donnelly testified that
he had not "patched" his shoes, but had nailed hobnails into them for better traction. Id. at 43 (testimony
of James Donnelly). He did not remember whether he did this before or after the day of the crime. Id.
Prior to the trial, Griffin told only the local storekeeper that he saw Donnelly on the cowtrail the
morning of the murder. Id. at 18 (testimony of Henry Griffin). Griffin, however, had accused Donnelly of
killing Chickasaw during an argument over a cardgame between Donnelly and another person, probably in
1907 or 1908. Id. at 15; id. at 31 (testimony of James Donnelly). Asked on cross-examination why he had
not revealed this information before the trial, Griffm answered that he wanted to avoid any trouble and was
afraid Donnelly "might get after [him]." Id. at 15 (testimony of Henry Griffin). The defense impeached
Griffin through bias. After Griffin testified that he and Donnelly once quarreled, id., Charles Stevens
testified that Griffin told him that George Flounder had offered Griffin twenty dollars to implicate
Donnelly, an offer Griffin declined apparently because that was "not enough" money. Id. at 29 (testimony
of Charles Stevens).
Three other Government witnesses testified that on different occasions, years after the crime, Donnelly
admitted killing Chickasaw. Id. at 19 (testimony of Ira Stevens); id. at 20 (testimony of second witness); id.
at 21 (testimony of third witness). The defense impeached all three witnesses. All three were unfriendly
THE GEORGETOWN LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 69:851
Chickasaw around 7:00 A.M., ran down stream, traversed several miles of
wild terrain in circling back to his home, and then returned around 10:00A.M. or 11:00 A.M. with his wife to the small town near the location at whichMasten found Chickasaw's body. 559 The Government offered no motive, and,
apart from one witness' testimony, no evidence that Donnelly had a gun. 560
Claiming to have been at home on the morning of the murder, Donnelly
denied killing Chickasaw.56t
Donnelly made an offer of proof that William Norris would testify that JoeDick confessed at some earlier, unstated date to having killed Chickasaw.5 62
Evidence of questionable persuasiveness connected Dick to the crime. 63 No
evidence, however, indicated that Dick owned a gun or had a motive forkilling Chickasaw, and no witness saw Dick at his house, his acorn camp, or
the murder scene either before or after the murder.564
toward Donnelly and Donnelly had beaten up two of them in fights apparently unrelated to the crime. Id.
at 15 (testimony of Henry Griffin); id. at 19 (testimony of Ira Stevens). Furthermore, each witness testified
that Donnelly made his admission during an altercation. Id. at 19 (testimony of Ira Stevens); id. at 20(testimony of second witness); id. at 21 (testimony of third witness).
559. Plaintiffs Brief, supra note 557, at 3-4. Donnelly testified that he lived about one and one-half
miles from the scene of the crime and that, under the Government's theory, after running downstream pastGriffin's home he would have had to scale several imposing ridges while circling back to his home, which
was located upstream from the scene of the crime. Transcript of Record, supra note 558, at 29-34(testimony of James Donnelly). Donnelly further testified that it "would take 4 or 5 hours for an activefellow to go through the woods to Peewan [where he lived] from Henry Griffin's [home]." Id. at 34.560. Donnelly testified that he did not think that he had a gun at the time of the murder. Id. at 33.Apparently no one conducted an autopsy or ballistics test or attempted to cast the footprints found near the
crime scene at the time of the incident.
561. Id. at 30. Donnelly's two alibi witnesses, his wife and her sister, obviously were biased.Furthermore, a Government witness testified that he saw Donnelly's mother- and father-in-law, but notDonnelly or his wife, at home early that morning. Id. at 40 (testimony of John Bigfire).562. Id. at 35 (testimony of William Norris). That offer did not identify whether anyone else waspresent during the conversation; where or when that conversation occurred; under what circumstancesDick spoke; what precisely he said; what, if anything, Norris did when Dick spoke; when or why Norris
reported Dick's statement to the defense; or what relationship existed between Donnelly and Norris and
between Donnelly and Dick.
563. Shleghorn Jim, a defense witness whose brother was married to a relative of Donnelly's wife,
testified that he followed the footprints of a person he thought might have been running from the scene ofthe crime to a point far past Griffin's house. Id. at 27 (testimony of Shleghorn Jim). Jim did not estimatehow far he followed the tracks. His testimony corroborated in part Henry Griffin's testimony because he
noted that "[flrom the track I did not know if the shoes were patched or torn. I think it was a patch or a
tore (sic)." Id. The record does not indicate when or to whom Jim reported his findings.Jim further testified that "a long ways from where [he] first commenced to follow the tracks [he found]
one place where [the person] had been sitting down under the willows [along the river]." Id. at 27. Thedefense claimed Dick died from "consumption." See, e.g., id. at 32 (testimony of James Donnelly); id. at 35(testimony of William Norris); id. at 37 (testimony of Mrs. Catherine Goodwin, Donnelly's sister). Thedefense, however, never established the basis for this allegation. Nonetheless, Donnelly argued thatShleghorn Jim observed Dick's tracks to the spot at which Dick, out of breath, perhaps from running, sat
exhausted. Plaintiff's Brief, supra note 557, at 28.
Donnelly also testified that Dick lived near Chickasaw, several miles from the scene of the crime.Transcript of Record, supra note 558, at 32 (testimony of James Donnelly). Thus, Dick might have known
about Chickasaw's habits.
Furthemore, Dick allegedly had an acorn camp located in the general direction of the tracks ShleghornJim observed. United States v. Donnelly, 228 U.S. 243, 272 (1913). Although Charles Stevens testified thatDick had an acorn camp somewhere northwest of the murder scene, Transcript of Record, supra note 558,
at 28 (testimony of Charles Stevens), one cannot pinpoint the location of this camp with the meager details
provided in the record.
564. Prior to the murder, someone other than either Dick or Donnelly might have made the tracks
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On this record, the Subcommittee's willingness to admit a statement like
Dick's as a valid statement against penal interest is surprising. Donnelly,
perhaps more than any other case, presents troubling questions concerning
the occurrence of the declarant's alleged confession, the reliability of that
confession, and the existence of evidence linking the declarant to the crime.
The facts of Donnelly suggest that a defendant can satisfy the rule's
corroboration requirement merely by showing that he did not collude with
the declarant and by linking the declarant to the crime by scant, inconclusive
circumstantial evidence. The Subcommittee, however, probably intended to
increase, rather than decrease, the defendant's burden if we assume, perhaps
charitably, that the Subcommittee understood what it was doing and how
courts might interpret its corroboration test. Although the Subcommittee
never specifically discussed during the markup sessions what its test would
demand, it did indicate in the Committee Report that the test inadequately
protected against the danger of defendants introducing fabricated state-
ments.565 Furthermore, the Subcommittee did not change its test when the
Advisory and Standing Committees warned that the Subcommittee's cor-
roboration requirement imposed a burden higher than that usually imposed
on defendants.
As a result, we probably cannot make too much of the Subcommittee's
approval of Justice Holmes' dissent in Donnelly. Because the Subcommittee
members did not read either the Donnelly opinion or the record on appeal, we
should limit our interpretation of that case to the skeletal description
provided by the Subcommittee's associate counsel: One person committed the
crime and the declarant confessed, had the opportunity to commit the crime,
and had no reason to help the defendant at his own expense.5
66 But here we
must stop, because associate counsel, who apparently never compared the
record to the opinion for the Subcommittee, failed to discuss both the
persuasiveness and the trustworthiness of the corroborating information
mentioned in the Court's opinion and Justice Holmes' caveat about trust-
worthiness. 567
Shleghorn Jim followed along the river. Shleghorn Jim never described either the type or the size of the
shoe that made these impressions. Furthermore, he never explained why he chose to follow the tracks,
where he first noticed them, why he stopped following them, or when he first reported his findings. A
healthy person might have made these tracks as well as the impression under the willow tree. That person
might have made the impression during a stop not brought on by fatigue. The Court never addressed any of
these possible explanations that would disassociate both Dick and Donnelly from the crime.
565. See HOUSE JUDICIARY REPORT, supra note 10, at 16, [1974] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS at
7089 ("simple corroboration" requirement ineffective because accused's own testimony might suffice, even
though testimony not necessarily reliable).
566. Interestingly, the Government has conceded that the circumstantial evidence linking Dick to the
crime, as set forth in the Donnelly opinion, 228 U. S. at 272, would satisfy rule 804(b)(3). See Government's
Brief on Appeal at 104, United States v. Atkins, 558 F.2d 133 (3d Cir. 1977), cert denied, 434 U.S. 1071
(1978). In its Brief, the Government essentially paraphrased the Donnelly opinion, stating:
[Dick] lived in the vicinity [of the crime]; the tracks found on the sand bar at the scene of the
crime led in the direction of the camp where declarant was stopping at the time, rather than in
the direction of defendant's home; the tracks indicated at one point an impression of a person
sitting down, indicating a stop caused by shortness of breath, which was natural for declarant
who suffered from consumption.
Id.
567. See United States v. Donnelly, 228 U.S. 243, 277 (1913) (Holmes, J., with Lurton & Hughes, JJ.,
1981]
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3. Chambers v. Mississippi as a Guide
Because the House Subcommittee failed to explain its corroboration test in
meaningful terms, 568 several courts have used Chambers v. Mississippi569 as aguide.570 In that case the Government charged Chambers with murderingAaron Liberty, a police officer who had unsuccessfully attempted to arrest
another person in a bar.571 One police officer testified that Chambers shotLiberty.572 The officer further testified that Liberty, after having been shot,
took careful aim, as if to shoot his attacker, and fired his riot gun, hittingChambers in the back of the neck and head.5 73 Other evidence, however,pointed to Gable McDonald as the killer. Several months after the murder,McDonald confessed to a Reverend Stokes that he had killed Liberty, a
confession that he repeated in a sworn statement given to Chambers'
attorneys two days later. As a result, the police arrested McDonald. The localjustice of the peace discharged McDonald at a preliminary hearing, whenMcDonald testified that he had an alibi and had confessed to Stokes and toChambers' attorneys in order to share in a lawsuit Chambers would bring
against the Government for false arrest.574
At trial Chambers called McDonald as a witness and succeeded inintroducing McDonald's sworn confession during direct examination. WhenMcDonald repudiated his confession during cross-examination, Chambers
sought to examine McDonald as an adverse witness.5 75 The trial court refused
to allow the cross-examination under Mississippi's voucher rule, which denies
a party the right to impeach his own witness.5 76 Chambers also sought tointroduce the testimony of three of McDonald's friends to whom McDonaldhad confessed. The first witness testified that while he was driving McDonaldhome hours after the shooting, McDonald stated that he had shot Liberty.577
The court excluded as hearsay this testimony, which the witness gave in thepresence of the jury.578 The two other witnesses testified out of the presence of
dissenting) (Court should have admitted Dick's confession only if confession actually made and no
evidence of collusion linked Donnelly and Dick).
568. See Lowery v. Maryland, 401 F. Supp. 604, 607 (D. Md. 1975) ("except to indicate that simple
corroboration is not enough, no clues are given as to what constitutes corroborating circumstances"), affd
without opinion, 532 F.2d 750 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 919 (1976).
569. 410 U.S. 284 (1973).
570. See eg., United States v. Guillette, 547 F.2d 743, 754-55 (2d Cir. 1976) (relying on Chambers'
reasoning to assess trustworthiness of third-party confession), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 839 (1977); UnitedStates v. Pena, 527 F.2d 1356, 1362 (5th Cir.) (same), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1033 (1975); United States v.Brandenfels, 522 F.2d 1259, 1264 (9th Cir.) (distinguishing facts from those in Chambers), cert. denied, 423
U.S. 1033 (1975); Lowery v. Maryland, 401 F. Supp. 604, 608 (D. Md. 1975) (citing Chambers forproposition that spontaneity of confession is indicium of reliability), aff d without opinion, 532 F.2d 750(4th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 919 (1976).
571. Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 285-87 (1973).
572. Id. at 286.
573. Id.
574. Id. at 287-88.
575. Id. at 293.
576. Id. Unfortunately, the court never explained why, given its position on the voucher rule, itpermitted Chambers to introduce McDonald's confession during McDonald's direct examination.
577. Id.
578. Id. The court also excluded the witness' statement that McDonald admitted disposing of the
murder weapon and that he accompanied McDonald when McDonald purchased a new gun three weeks
later. Id.
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the jury that McDonald also had admitted the shooting to each of them
individually. The court excluded as hearsay the testimony of these two
witnesses as well. 579
The Supreme Court reversed for two reasons. First, the trial court's
application of the voucher rule on the specific facts impermissibly interfered
with Chambers' right to defend himself580 Second, McDonald's several
confessions were sufficiently reliable to warrant their admission on due
process grounds when Mississippi did not have a hearsay exception for penal
interest statements.581 With respect to the second basis for reversal, the Court
believed that the confessions offered as impeachment were reliable for several
reasons. McDonald had confessed "spontaneously to .. .close acquaint-
ance[s] shortly after the murder had occurred. ' 582 Moreover, other evidence
corroborated McDonald's own sworn statement, including the testimony of
an eyewitness to the shooting, the testimony of a witness who saw McDonald
with a gun after the shooting, and the proof of McDonald's ownership of a
.22-calibre revolver, the type of gun used to kill Liberty.5 83 Additionally, each
confession was "in a very real sense self-incriminating and unquestionably
against interest. ' 584 Finally, McDonald was available at trial either to
repudiate the excluded confessions or to explain why he had made them. 585
The corroborating circumstances in Chambers surely satisfy a "clear and
convincing" evidence standard, if our rephrasing of the corroboration
requirement of rule 804(b)(3) in that way is correct.5 86 Chambers, however,
has limitations as a guide. First, the relationship between Chambers and the
rule's corroboration requirement is uncertain. The Court characterized the
corroborating evidence as "well within the basic rationale of the exception for
declarations against interest." 587 When the Court announced Chambers, the
Supreme Court Draft version of rule 804(b)(3) with its "simple corroboration"
test was pending before Congress. The House Subcommittee increased the
rule's corroboration test after the Supreme Court's decision in Chambers
without explaining the relationship between the two.58 8 Thus, one could
conclude that the corroborating evidence in Chambers was no longer "well
within the basic rationale" but instead dropped to the least amount of
579. Id. at 292-93.
580. Id. at 298.
581. Id. at 300.
582. Id.
583. Id.
584. Id. at 300-01. McDonald also had urged one of his friends not to report the confession. This
suggests that McDonald was aware that disclosure would lead to criminal prosecution. Id. at 301.
585. Id. at 301.
586. The Supreme Court's assertion that McDonald's confessions "bore persuasive assurances of
trustworthiness... ," id. at 302, may be another way of expressing the "clear and convincing evidence"
standard.
587. Id.
588. During the House Subcommittee markup session, associate counsel mentioned Chambers but
argued that it did not require a court to introduce every penal interest statement. Markup Session, June 12,
1973. Neither he nor the Subcommittee members discussed Chambers further, even though the
Department of Justice requested that the Subcommittee clarify the relationship between Chambers and the
corroboration requirement of rule 804(b)(3). See Ruckelshaus Letter, supra note 177, at 352 (in light of
Chambers, not clear what corroborating circumstances required by rule 804(b)(3); Subcommittee should
indicate rule to be applied in conformity with Chambers).
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corroborating evidence necessary to satisfy rule 804(b)(3). If this conclusion is
correct, the rule's corroboration test is constitutionally suspect.
Second, by using Chambers as a guide, several courts have wrongly
demanded that the corroborating evidence match the facts in Chambers. 89
Although the Supreme Court intended that lower courts interpret its decision
narrowly, it did so because it was reversing on constitutional rather than on
evidentiary grounds.590 Furthermore, by demanding that the corroborating
evidence approximate that in Chambers, a court not only might adopt the
Court's questionable analysis of hearsay exceptions, but also might misread
the Chambers record.591 By focusing on the specific facts of Chambers, a court
may too easily err by requiring equivalent corroborating circumstances. The
Supreme Court in Chambers neither weighed the factors it mentioned nor
indicated whether any lesser amount of corroborating information would
have required the trial court to admit a penal interest statement on constitu-
tional grounds.
Third, the Court's stress on McDonald's availability to testify limits
Chambers as a guide. The Government had cross-examined McDonald and
589. See, e.g., United States v. Pena, 527 F.2d 1356, 1361 (5th Cir.) (witness' statement inadmissible
because statement not confession and witness not present in court), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 949 (1976);
Lowery v. Maryland, 401 F. Supp. 604, 608 (D. Md. 1975) (witness' sworn statement inadmissible when
made three and one-half years after crime because insufficiently spontaneous), aff'd without opinion, 532
F.2d 750 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 919 (1976); Ryan v. State, 95 Wis. 2d 83, 96-97, 289 N.W.2d 349,
355 (1980) (confession inadmissible because declarants' statements made months after crime, declarants
not close friends of defendant, no significant corroborating evidence, and declarants' statements not
sufficiently against penal interest).
590. See 410 U.S. at 303 ("[W]e hold quite simply that under the facts and circumstances of this case
the rulings of the trial court deprived Chambers of a fair trial").
591. For example, at least two courts have excluded a statement in part because the declarant had not
spoken to close friends, as McDonald had on three occasions. See United States v. Guillette, 547 F.2d 743,
754 (2d Cir. 1976) (declarant confided in police informant after meeting him for first time over cocktails),
cert. denied, 434 U.S. 839 (1977); Ryan v. State, 95 Wis. 2d 83, 97, 289 N.W.2d 349, 355 (1980) (declarants
first met defendant in prison after crime). McDonald, however, also confessed to Reverend Stokes and to
Chambers' defense counsel. Certainly, McDonald had no reason to confide in Chambers' defense counsel,
whom he should have expected would use his confession against him.
Courts also have excluded statements when the declarant spoke months after the crime rather than soon
after the crime, as McDonald allegedly did. See United States v. Guillette, 547 F.2d 743, 754 (2d Cir. 1976)
(statement made four months after crime), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 839 (1977); United States v. Pena, 527
F.2d 1356, 1362 (5th Cir.) (even though statement made to trusted friend, made months after transaction in
question), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 949 (1976); Lowery v. Maryland, 401 F. Supp. 604, 608 (D. Md. 1975)
(confession made three and one-halfyears after crime), affd without opinion, 532 F.2d 750 (4th Cir.), cert.
denied, 429 U.S. 919 (1976). In Donnelly, however, the declarant spoke years after the crime, if at all. In
Chambers as well, McDonald spoke to Reverend Stokes and to Chambers' defense counsel months after the
murder. Furthermore, the spontaneity of McDonald's statements to his three friends is questionable. None
probably would have been admissible under the "excited utterance" exception of rule 803(2) because when
McDonald spoke he was not "under the stress of excitement caused by the event or condition." FED. R.
EVID. 803(2). McDonald may have admitted his culpability during a normal conversation, perhaps even in
a boastful manner. The Supreme Court in Chambers probably referred to spontaneity as part of its search
for other hearsay exceptions that McDonald's statement came close to satisfying because neither
Mississippi nor the federal courts had adopted a penal interest exception. To demand spontaneity is
ridiculous when the declarant has carefully drafted an affidavit detailing his complicity in a crime, a
process that would impress upon him the significance of his remarks.
One court has excluded a statement because no independent evidence placed the declarant at the crime
scene as in Chambers. Ryan v. State, 95 Wis. 2d 83, 97, 289 N.W.2d 349, 355 (1980). The court's decision,
however, clashes with the Subcommittees's desire to admit a statement like Dick's in Donnelly, in which
only scant, inconclusive, circumstantial evidence tied Dick to the murder.
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could have recalled him to contest the testimony of his three friends. Under
rule 804(b)(3), however, the declarant must be unavailable. Thus, when the
declarant is necessarily unavailable, courts might interpret the rule to require
even more corroboration than existed in Chambers. 92
Finally, courts might use Chambers to interpret the penal interest test too
narrowly. McDonald's confessions substituted him for Chambers in a one-
person crime. The Court considered this important because it supported
Chambers' claim that he was factually innocent.593 Yet, as we have seen, the
Advisory Committee probably did not intend to restrict admissibility to
statements that constituted confessions or that substituted the declarant for
the defendant as the sole culprit.594
4. Judicial Interpretation of Corroboration
Illustrating the differences between cases litigated in the absence of a
corroboration requirement, under the "simple corroboration" requirement,
or in conformance with the House Subcommittee's corroboration require-
ment is difficult. Although each case is tied to its facts, three cases suggest
certain differences. 595
In People v. Edwards596 the Michigan Supreme Court suggested the
approach a court might employ had Congress not enacted a corroboration
test. In Edwards the defendant offered to find a prostitute for Stevens and
Napora. When Stevens and Napora did not agree on a price with King, the
prostitute Edwards had introduced to them, Edwards allegedly shot Stevens
while attempting to rob Stevens and Napora. Edwards admitted to the police
that he had a gun, but claimed that he fired it accidently during a fight with
Stevens.5 97 At trial, Edwards recanted his admissions, claiming that he
thought he could avoid a murder charge by speaking as he had.598 Edwards
then accused Blake of killing Stevens. Edwards testified that he purchased a
.22-calibre pistol (the same calibre gun as the murder weapon) from Blake
hours after the murder.599 Edwards called as a witness Longuemire, a person
with whom Edwards discussed Stevens' murder while Edwards was awaiting
trial. 600 At some point Longuemire allegedly spoke with Blake, who, accord-
ing to Longuemire, confessed to having murdered Stevens. Longuemire,
592. Cf. United States v. Guillette, 547 F.2d 743, 754 (2d Cir. 1976) (declarant's unavailability
important factor in Chambers analysis), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 839 (1977).
593. See Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 287 (1973) (Chambers "has asserted his innocence
throughout").
594. One court, however, apparently has read Chambers as requiring the statement to be a confession.
See United States v. Brandenfels, 522 F.2d 1259, 1263 (9th Cir.) (refusing to admit declarant's exoneration
of defendant's complicity as only "marginally" against declarant's interest), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1033
(1975).
595. Because the Standing Committee offered the corpus delicti and coconspirator analogies shortly
before the House Subcommittee approved a higher corroboration requirement, none of the courts in the
three cases that will be discussed in the text probably understood that each was supposed to interpret the
"simple corroboration" test in terms of those two analogies.
596. 396 Mich. 551, 242 N.W.2d 739 (1976).
597. Id. at 554 n.4, 242 N.W.2d at 740 n.4.
598. Id.
599. Id. at 554, 242 N.W.2d at 740.
600. Id. at 555 & n.8, 242 N.W.2d at 748 & n.8.
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however, never reported Blake's confession to the police and only reported it
to Edwards after Blake's death. 601
Although the trial court excluded Blake's confession because Michigan did
not recognize a penal interest exception at that time, a divided Michigan
Supreme Court reversed. 602 In reversing, the majority did not condition
admissibility on corroboration. Nonetheless, the majority believed that
Blake's statement had been corroborated through King's trial testimony that
she saw Blake at the scene of the murder with a gun.603 At trial, King
explained that she lied to the police not only because Blake threatened to kill
her if she spoke the truth but also because he paid her to remain silent. 604 The
trustworthiness of Blake's confession hardly met the present corroboration
requirement of rule 804(b)(3).605 Nonetheless, a jury surely could have fairly
evaluated the credibility issue had the trial court given the jury that
opportunity.606
United States v. Goodlow607 might illustrate the "simple corroboration"
test. In Goodlow a witness observed two men break the seals on three
interstate trailer trucks and then described the men, their car, and its license
plate number to the police. The next day, the police arrested Goodlow,
Bogan, and Glass in a car, owned by Bogan's sister, that matched the
eyewitness' description. Because the eyewitness identified only Goodlow and
Glass, the police released Bogan.608 At trial, Goodlow challenged the
eyewitness' identification of him, claiming that Bogan committed the crimes
with Glass. To support his claim of misidentification, Goodlow unsuccesfully
tried to admit several statements by Bogan that he was "good for the crime"
and that Goodlow was "not good for it."609 Bogan, who disappeared before
the trial, allegedly made these statements to Goodlow, Goodlow's wife, and a
personal friend of Goodlow shortly after the witness identified Goodlow and
Glass. 610
In a split decision, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth
Circuit reversed, recognizing, as the trial court had not, a hearsay exception
for statements against penal interest. 61' By the date of the decision, the House
of Representatives had passed the version of rule 804(b)(3) ultimately
601. Id. at 570, 242 N.W.2d at 748 (Coleman, J., with Fitzgerald, J., dissenting).
602. Id. at 566, 242 N.W.2d at 746 (opinion of court). Two judges dissented, arguing that Blake's
statement "was not of trustworthy calibre and therefore was properly excluded." Id. at 568, 242 N.W.2d at
747 (Coleman, J., with Fitzgerald, J., dissenting).
603. Id. at 567, 242 N.W.2d at 746 (opinion of court). King, however, earlier had told the police that
she saw Edwards shoot the victim. She also selected Edwards' photograph in identifying the alleged
.murderer. Id. at 568-69, 242 N.W.2d at 747 (Coleman, J., with Fitzgerald, J., dissenting). At trial, King
said she chose Edwards' photograph because the police badgered her into picking it. Id. at 569, 242
N.W.2d at 747.
604. Id. at 554-55 n.6, 242 N.W.2d at 740 n.6 (opinion of court).
605. This point is underscored by Michigan's subsequent adoption of a penal interest exception that
tracks the language of rule 804(b)(3). MICH. CT. R. ANN. MRE 804(b)(3) (West 1979).
606. As the Michigan Supreme Court recognized, "the circumstances surrounding the making of a
third-party statement, whether 'assuring reliability,' 'indicating trustworthiness,' or 'rendering totally
incredible,' go to the weight to be given testimony, not its admissibility." People v. Edwards, 396 Mich.
551, 565, 242 N.W.2d 739, 745 (1976).
607. 500 F.2d 954 (8th Cir. 1974).
608. Id. at 955.
609. Id. at 956.
610. Id.
611. Id at 958.
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enacted. The court of appeals, however, did not apply the higher corrobora-
tion test adopted by the House. Instead, it asked whether there were
"corroborative circumstances giving an aura of trustworthiness to the
statements. ' 612 That question probably represents the court of appeals'
attempt to interpret the "simple corroboration" test.613 Based on three facts,
the court found such an "aura of trustworthiness." First, the car involved in
the crime belonged to Bogan's sister.614 Second, a police officer testified that
Bogan was a "known interstate carrier thief. ' 615 Finally, several inconsisten-
cies in the eyewitness' description of the defendant made it "at least plausible"
that Bogan, not Goodlow, was the thief.616 Because the Government never
retried Goodlow, 617 we cannot determine whether a second trial court would
have thought that the factors considered corroborative by the court of appeals
satisfied the higher corroboration requirement of the rule as enacted. 618
In State v. Higginbotham619 the Minnesota Supreme Court applied the
higher corroboration requirement of the rule as enacted to exclude a
declarant's statement on facts that probably would have convinced the court
of appeals in Goodlow to admit the statement. 620 Charged with murder,
612. Id. at 958 (footnote omitted).
613. This attempt also resembles the prima facie proof test of rule 104(b) more than the preponderance
of evidence test of the coconspirator exception of rule 801(d)(2)(E). Whatever the proper analogy for the
majority's test, however, it clearly was not the corroboration requirement enacted by Congress as the
dissent claimed. See id. at 959 (Ross, J., dissenting). Judge Ross criticized the majority because he thought
the evidence relied upon by the majority was insufficiently trustworthy to satisfy the rule's corroboration
test. Id. Because Judge Ross also distrusted the witness who reported Bogan's statement, he thought that
the rule's corroboration test had not been met. Id. The Advisory Committee, however, had rejected the
reporting witness' credibility as a ground for excluding a declarant's statement. Thus, Judge Ross was
wrong on both counts.
614. Id. at 958 (opinion of court).
615. Id.
616. Id. The majority did not identify those discrepencies.
617. After his conviction was reversed, Goodlow jumped bail. Once he surrendered, the Government
did not retry him because he had spent over a year injail pending the decision on appeal. Conversation with
defense counsel (May 16, 1979).
618. On the record, the court of appeals could have decided that any error in excluding the statement
was harmless. Goodlow's offer of proof did not indicate where Bogan was at the time of the crime.
Goodlow's arrest in the escape car the day after the crime suggests that he might have had access to the car
the day before. The court did not report the "discrepancies" in the eyewitnesss' identifications, which may
have consisted of only a faulty description of Goodlow rather than a description that fit Bogan's
appearance.
619. 298 Minn. 1, 212 N.W.2d 881 (1973). In Higginbothama, the first Minnesota case to recognize the
penal interest exception, the state supreme court used the House Subcommittee's version of rule 804(b)(3)
as a guide. Id. at 4, 212 N.W.2d at 883.
620. Id. at 4-5, 212 N.W.2d at 883; accord, United States v. Metz, 608 F.2d 147, 157 (5th Cir. 1979)
(applying higher corroboration requirement of rule 804(b)(3)), cert. denied, 101 S. Ct. 80 (1980). Metz was
convicted of conspiring, with Bland and others, to distribute cocaine. 608 F.2d at 149. Bland, who had
pleaded guilty, invoked the fifth amendment when called by Metz as a witness. Id. at 156. Metz then
unsuccessfully sought to introduce Bland's statement that he did not know Metz and had not seen him
during the course of the conspiracy. Id. at 157. Metz tried to corroborate Bland's statement in three ways:
Bland had repeatedly reaffirmed the statement (the number of times and the circumstances of the
repetition are not identified), an alibi witness of Metz's had placed him away from the house where several
of the coconspirators had gone on the day of the drug exchange, and the only government agent who had
testified that Metz had been at the house had earlier said that he had not seen Metz there. Metz's
corroborating evidence thus related to his factual innocence, and to the truth of Bland's self-incrimination
(the repetition of his statements) and of Bland's exculpation of Metz (the alibi witness and the change in
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Higginbotham claimed at trial that his friend, O'Neal, killed the victim. 621
Five days after the murder, O'Neal voluntarily appeared at a police station,
waived his Miranda rights, and admitted in a signed confession that he killed
the victim. He then collapsed, saying that he had been on LSD all day.622 The
Minnesota Supreme Court affirmed the exclusion of O'Neal's confession,
accepting the trial court's characterization of it as a "fraud on the public. ' 623
The Government had charged O'Neal with murder following his confession,
but O'Neal invoked the fifth amendment when Higginbotham called O'Neal
as a witness. Moreover, when O'Neal spoke to the police soon after the
murder, he was wearing a vest identified as having been worn by the
murderer. Nonetheless, the Minnesota Supreme Court was not convinced
that O'Neal's confession had been sufficiently corroborated. 624
The difference between Edwards and Higginbotham is striking. The
Edwards court was willing to permit the jury to assess the credit and weight of
the declarant's purported confession despite the possibility that the reporting
witness had fabricated it. The Higginbotham court, in contrast, was unwilling
to permit the jury to evaluate the statement, despite the absence of any
convincing evidence explaining why the declarant might have lied in implicat-
ing himself. The corroboration requirement biased the Higginbotham court
against admitting the statement.
The three cases also suggest that a court might interpret the corroboration
requirement in light of the Government's evidence. If, as in Edwards, the
Government's evidence is weak or, as in Goodlow, the statement undercuts
the reliability of the Government's eyewitness, the court might be more
willing to admit the statement. In contrast, if, as in Higginbotham, the
statement simply provides an alternative explanation for the crime, the court
might exclude the statement. The Higginbotham court used the corroboration
requirement as a substitute for a harmless error analysis. But such an
interpretation of the requirement, especially if used by the trial court ex ante,
is unfair to the defendant. Admissibility should not turn on the strength of the
Government's evidence. The defendant should be permitted to introduce a
statement which would force the jury to choose between two explanations of
the crime, even when the defendant's explanation is implausible.
position of the government agent). This evidence, thought the district court, did not satisfy the
corroboration requirement of rule 804(b)(3), a ruling that the court of appeals thought was not "clear
error." Id.
621. Id. at 3, 212 N.W.2d at 882.
622. Id.
623. 298 Minn. at 3, 212 N.W.2d at 883. Although neither the trial court nor the supreme court
explained the nature of the "fraud," the supreme court did note that "O'Neal, who lived with defendant's
family and was often referred to as defendant's brother, [had] fabricated a false confession out of a desire to
free his close friend." Id. at 5, 212 N.W.2d at 883. Those courts may have thought that Higginbotham and
O'Neal colluded to have O'Neal confess and then invoke the fifth amendment so that his confession would
be admitted to free Higginbotham. That possibility seems unlikely, however, because O'Neal still could
have been tried for the murder once Higginbotham was acquitted.
624. Id. at 5-6, 212 N.W.2d at 882. The court also refused to reverse because it credited the eyewitness'
identification of Higginbotham as the murderer. Id. at 6, 212 N.W.2d at 883. Although this ground would
have justified the conclusion that excluding Bushey's confession was harmless error, the court thought that
excluding his statement was not error.
When the Government's case depends upon eyewitness identification, one would think that a court
should admit any third party statement because eyewitness testimony is notoriously unreliable. See
generally Note, Did Your Eyes Deceive You? Expert Psychological Testimony on the Unreliability ofEyewitness Identification, 29 STAN. L. REV. 969 (1977) [hereinafter Note, Expert Psychological Testimony].
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D. THE MECHANICS OF RULE 804(B)(3)
Five mechanical questions arise when the defendant offers a penal interest
statement. First, should the judge or the jury decide if the statement satisfies
the "against interest" tests of the rule's first sentence and the corroboration
test of the rule's second sentence? Second, may the judge consider the
trustworthiness of the reporting witness in deciding whether to admit the
statement? Third, what is the defendant's burden of proof under the separate
tests of the rule's first and second sentences? Fourth, what evidence may the
judge consider in deciding whether to admit the statement? Finally, what
evidence may the jury consider in deciding how to evaluate the declarant's
statement?
1. The Roles of the Judge and the Jury
The Advisory Committee believed that courts should decide under rule
104(a) whether a statement was against the declarant's penal interest. 625
Nonetheless, the roles of the judge and the jury in assessing the trustworthi-
ness of the declarant's purported statement changed during the legislative
process. The Preliminary and Revised Drafts of the rule provided that the jury
would decide the trustworthiness issue. The Note to the rule in those drafts
explained that "questions of possible fabrication are better trusted to the
competence of juries than made the subject of attempted treatment by
rule. ' 626 The addition of the "simple corroboration" test in the Supreme Court
Draft, however, transferred the jury's role to the judge. In that draft's Note to
the rule, the Standing Committee deleted the sentence that assigned the
trustworthiness question to the jury. In its place, the Committee wrote that
"when the statement is offered by the accused by way of exculpation, the
resulting situation is not adapted to control by rulings as to the weight of the
evidence, and hence the provision is cast in terms of a requirement prelimi-
nary to admissibility. Cf. Rule 406(a)." 627 Thus, the court also must find that,
as a second admissibility condition, the defendant has corroborated the
statement. That determination presents a mixed question of law and fact, with
the judge assessing both the credibility of the declarant and the credibility and
the probativity of his statement.628
625. Advisory Committee Note to Supreme Court Draft, supra note 1, at 197. The Committee noted
that "[o]ften... rulings on evidence call for an evaluation in terms of a legally set standard. Thus, when a
hearsay statement is offered as a declaration against interest, a decision must be made whether it possesses
the required against-interest characteristics. These decisions, too, are made by the judge." Id.; accord,
United States v. Bagley, 537 F.2d 162, 165-66 (5th Cir. 1976) (whether hearsay statement against interest
question of law), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1075 (1977).
626. Advisory Committee Note to Revised Draft, supra note 1, at 444; Advisory Committee Note to
Preliminary Draft, supra note 1, at 386.
627. Advisory Committee Note to Supreme Court Draft, supra note 1, at 327. The Standing Committee
mentioned rule 406(a) to contrast the treatment of habit evidence with that of defense-offered penal interest
statements. Under rule 406, the proponent need not corroborate habit or routine practices as a condition of
admissibility because corroboration "relates to the sufficiency of the evidence rather than [to] admissibili-
ty." Advisory Committee Note to Supreme Court Draft, supra note 1, at 224-25.
628. The trial judge should make findings of fact. If he has not done so, however, the appellate court
may stretch to find some reason to justify excluding the statement. See United States v. Bagley, 537 F.2d
162, 166 (5th Cir. 1976) (trial court could have found declarant's statement unreliable because proof
insufficient that declarant made statement), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1975 (1977).
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This shift in the role of the judge and the jury warrants several comments.
First, the shift is consistent with an inference that the Standing Committee,
through its confession and coconspirator analogies, intended to define
"simple corroboration" in terms of the preponderance of evidence standard.
Second, conditioning admissibility upon a judicial determination of trust-
worthiness makes the penal interest exception unique among the so-called
"class" exceptions to the hearsay rule.629 Third, the three reasons usually
advanced to explain why the judge must determine the admissibility of certain
sorts of evidence do not justify transferring the jury's normal role to thejudge.630 Finally, this transfer creates a difference between the Government's
629. See note 670 infra (describing difference beteen rule 804(b)(3) and other exceptions to hearsay
rule). With every other exception, the jury assesses the credit and the weight of the hearsay and of the
witness who reports it. If the judge refuses to admit a statement, however, the jury cannot assess the credit
and the weight of the statement or the witness who reports it. Rule 63(4)(c) of the Uniform Rules of
Evidence gave such a power to the judge, an authorization one commentator considered "atypical" and
"extraordinary." Chadbourn, Bentham and the Hearsay Rule-A Benthamic View of Rule 63(4)(c) of the
Uniform Rules of Evidence, 75 HARV. L. Rav. 932, 947 (1962). California also gives this power to thejudge. See People v. Chapman, 50 Cal. App. 3d 872, 879, 123 Cal. Rptr. 862, 866 (Cal. App. 1975)
(California evidence code requires judge to make preliminary determination whether hearsay declaration
admissible).
Only three other "class" exceptions, those for business and for public records and for the absence of
.information, specifically authorize the judge to exclude evidence for lack of trustworthiness. See FED. R.
EVID. 803(6) (admissible unless source of information or circumstances of preparation indicate lack of
trustworthiness); FED. R. EVID. 803(7) (same); FED. R. EVID. 803(8) (same). The court will consider the
trustworthiness of such evidence, however, only when the opponent presents evidence challenging the
credibility of the record. Yet under rule 804(b)(3) the defendant must prove the trustworthiness of his
evidence as a threshold matter, even in the absence of the Government asserting that the statement was
fabricated. Thus, in drafting rule 804(b)(3), the Standing Committee gave greater protection to the
Government than a jury instruction would have provided, as Senator McClellan requested.
Rule 804(b)(3) arguably demands even greater corroboration than do rules 803(24) and 804(b)(5), the
"catch-all" hearsay exceptions. Because they condition admissibility on a showing of trustworthiness
equivalent to other hearsay exceptions, they will admit much evidence unless rule 804(b)(3)'s high
corroboration test sets the standard for trustworthiness.
630. When the evidence presents highly technical evidentiary questions, presents information that ajury might be unable to evaluate fairly, or presents issues that implicate a privilege, commentators long
have argued that judges, not juries, should resolve the preliminary question of fact. Saltzburg, supra note
513, at 271 n.2. Neither the Advisory and Standing Committees nor the Congress advanced any of these
three reasons to justify a trial court deciding the trustworthiness of a declarant. During its September 30,
1971 meeting, the Standing Committee approved without discussion Professor Cleary's suggestion to alter
the roles of the judge and jury following the September 22, 1971 meeting between Senator McClellan and
representatives of the Advisory and Standing Committees. Although the Advisory Committee had not
directed Professor Cleary to make this change as part of its revision of the penal interest exception during
its September 5, 1971 meeting and Senator McClellan had not spoken of it as part of his objection to the
exception, Professor Cleary probably thought that the change was necessary so that courts would
understand that the trial judge should decide the corroboraton issue.
Of the three, only the second rationale is relevant to rule 804(b)(3). Although some courts argue that
penal interest statements are inherently unreliable, see United States v. Atkins, 558 F.2d 133, 136 (3d Cir.
1977) (reversing trial court that excluded declarant's statement after remarking, "This is bizarre ... oh, this
is ridiculous"), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1071 (1978); United States v. Guillette, 547 F.2d 743, 754 (2d Cir.
1976) ("inherent danger that third party confessions tending to exculpate a defendant are the result of
fabrication"), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 839 (1977), this concern is not persuasive. The defense undoubtedly
will search for and adduce any evidence that shows the defendant's innocence. When the search proves
fruitless, see Steadman v. United States, 358 A.2d 329, 331-32 (D.C. 1976) (defense unable to show
defendant innocent and declarant involved because proffered witness statements untrustworthy), however,
the jury surely will question the evidentiary significance of the statement. Moreover, the prosecution
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and the defendant's ability to introduce evidence, a distinction that raises
constitutional problems. 631
2. The Trustworthiness of the Witness
The courts of appeals have divided over whether the judge may assess the
credibility of the witness as well as the credibility of the declarant. 632 In
United States v. Satterfield633 the United States Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit cautiously refused to answer the question, but leaned toward
permitting the inquiry because it thought that it detected congressional
authorization to assess the witness' credibility. Because the rule refers to the
trustworthiness of the statement rather than solely to that of the declarant,
the court thought that the rule was written broadly enough to justify
examining the witness' credibility. 634 Moreover, the court believed that the
Advisory Committee may have indirectly approved of such an inquiry when it
mentioned in its Note that courts at common law excluded penal interest
adequately can challenge the worth and the reliablity of the declarant's statement by cross-examining the
reporting witness, investigating the declarant, or delivering a scorching summation deriding both the
declarant and the reporting witness. By taking such actions, the prosecutor provides the jury with
information for assessing the credibility of the declarant's statement. Thus, the jury probably will not
overvalue hearsay evidence that one might consider unreliable.
631. The rule's corroboration requirement burdens the defendant but not the Government. In fact, the
Government need not establish the credibility of other sorts of questionable evidence, such as a defendant's
confession, a coconspirator's implication of the defendant, or an eyewitness' identification, as a condition of
admissibility. Additionally, the power of the judge to rule on trustworthiness also prevents the defendant
from benefiting from the jury's refusal to follow the trial court's instruction to ignore a statement that is
excluded after provisionally being admitted. Unlike the defendant, the Government may have this benefit
because several courts of appeals permit the Government to introduce a coconspirator's statement subject
to a motion to strike. See, eg., United States v. James, 590 F.2d 575, 582-83 (5th Cir.) (en bane)
(Government may introduce coconspirator's statement subject to later motion either to strike or to declare
mistrial), cert. denied, 442 U.S. 917 (1979); United States v. Macklin, 573 F.2d 1046, 1049 n.3 (8th Cir.)
(Government may introduce coconspirator's statement on condition that it later show sufficient
independent evidence of conspiracy), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 852 (1978); United States v. Stanchich, 550
F.2d 1294, 1297-98 (2d Cir. 1977) (judge may permit admission of coconspirator's statement subject to
proof of coconspirator's participation in conspiracy; if proof insufficient judge must instruct jury to
disregard, or if necessary, grant defendant's motion for mistrial). See generally Marcus, supra note 516, at
302-03. Thus, the rule's corroboration requirement burdens the defendant in a way that the Government is
not constrained. For a discussion of the constitutional issues raised by this distinction, see notes 708-59
infra and accompanying text.
At least one court has refused to impose a corroboration requirement as a condition of admitting penal
interest statements because to do so would create too great a disparity between the Government's and the
defendant's respective burdens. See People v. Edwards, 396 Mich. 551, 566, 242 N.W.2d 739, 746 (1976)
(double standard, which assumes defendant more likely to use perjured testimony, unacceptable). For a
discussion of Edwards, see notes 596-606 supra and accompanying text. No state, however, that has
enacted a code of evidence patterned after the Federal Rules of Evidence has omitted a corroboration
requirement. E.g., ME. R. Or. MRE 804(b)(3) (West 1980) (test same as Federal Rule 804(b)(3) but adds
Bruton sentence); MICH. Cr. R ANN. MRE 804(b)(3) (West 1979) (test identical to Federal Rule
804(b)(3)); N. Max. R. EVID. 804(b)(4) (Michie 1978) (same). None of these three states published
legislative history to explain why it chose the version of the penal interest test it enacted, a failure common
to the states.
632. Compare United States v. Bagley, 537 F.2d 162, 167 (5th Cir. 1976) (trustworthiness of witness
relevant), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1075 (1977) with United States v. Atkins, 558 F.2d 133, 135 (3d Cir. 1977)
(trustworthiness of witness irrelevant), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1071 (1978).
633. 572 F.2d 687 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 840 (1978).
634. Id. at 692.
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statements because of possible fabrication "either of the fact of the making of
the confession or in its contents. ' 635 Neither source, however, supports the
court's interpretation. Although it failed to say so in its Note to the rule, the
Advisory Committee specifically refused to demand proof of a witness'
credibility as a condition of admissibility.636 Furthermore, the Advisory
Committee mentioned the common law courts' fear about fabrication only to
reject it.637
Apart from congressional intent, two important reasons suggest why a
court should not evaluate the witness' credibility. Although courts exclude
hearsay because the Government cannot cross-examine the declarant, the
Government can cross-examine the witness who reports the declarant's
statement. As a result, the jury can evaluate the witness' demeanor and
credibility. Furthermore, a constitutional problem under the compulsory
process and due process clauses is implicated when the judge believes that the
defense has not established the witness' credibility and therefore bars the jury
from hearing the witness. 638
3. The Defendant's Burden of Proof
A defendant who offers a statement that is against the declarant's penal
interest must satisfy the "against interest" and corroboration admissibility
conditions. 639 Although rule 104(a) does not define the proponent's burden in
satisfying an admissibility condition, courts usually consider the burden to be
one of evidentiary preponderance. 640 Therefore, the judge must employ a
more-likely-than-not standard when assessing whether the defense-offered
statement is against the penal interest of the declarant. If the model of the
corroboration requirement presented in this article is correct, however, thejudge must employ the more demanding standard of clear and convincing
evidence in assessing trustworthiness. Thus, the judge must use two standards
of proof. In this respect, the penal interest exception for defense-offered
statements also is unique among the hearsay exceptions.
4. The Evidence the Judge May Consider
The judge must determine whether the defendant has satisfied his founda-
tion burdens. In making this assessment, may he consider otherwise inad-
635. Id. (quoting Advisory Committee Note to Supreme Court Draft, supra note 1, at 327).
636. See note 230 supra and accompanying text. The House Subcommittee did not consider this
question during its markup sessions.
637. See Advisory Committee Note to Supreme Court Draft, supra note I, at 327 (common law
limitation excluded because exposure to criminal law liability satisfies against-interest requirement;
common law position indefensible in logic).
638. In Satterfield the court of appeals acknowledged this problem but chose not to face it by approving
the trial judge's exclusion of the declarant's statement. 572 F.2d at 692. The trial judge had found that the
defense had not sufficiently corroborated the declarant's credibility. Id. The Supreme Court has also held
that cross-examination of the reporting witness satisfies the confrontation clause as to whether the
declarant spoke as reported. See Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74, 88 (1970) (plurality opinion); note 440 supra
(discussing Dutton).
639. Since we explored this issue above, we need only recognize here that the corroboration test is
anomalous. See notes 486-567 supra and accompanying text.
640. Saltzburg, supra note 513, at 271 n.2.
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missible information? This problem may arise in several different ways. For
example, the defendant may call a witness who reports that the "street"
knows that the declarant committed the crime. Similarly, the defendant may
call a police officer who reports that an informant, whom the officer will not
or cannot identify, told the officer that the declarant had or the defendant had
not committed the crime.641 Also, the defendant may call a police officer who,
based on personal knowledge or in response to a hypothetical question, would
testify that the crime was committed in a way that resembles the work of the
declarant. 642 The first two examples involve otherwise inadmissible hearsay.
The officer's opinion in the third example is arguably inadmissible either
because he is not an expert witness 643 or because the evidence of the "other
crime" he thinks the declarant committed does not satisfy rule 404(b)'s test."
Nevertheless, the court should consider these three types of evidence because,
apart from privileged communication, 645 rules of evidence do not bind a court
in deciding a question of admissibility under rule 104(a).
May the court consider the testimony of the defendant? The House
Subcommittee strengthened the "simple corroboration" test in part because it
feared that "the accused's own testimony might suffice" to satisfy that test,
even though this testimony would "not necessarily increas[e] the reliability of
the hearsay statement." 646 The Subcommittee's fear, however, does not justify
ignoring the defendant's testimony in all instances. The Subcommittee feared
that by denying his guilt the defendant could satisfy the "simple corrobora-
tion" test.6 47 A court should consider any information the defendant can
provide that implicates the declarant. If the defendant can establish the
641. But cf. United States v. Sedgwick, 345 A.2d 465, 473-74 (D.C. 1975) (no error when Government
failed to disclose statement by unidentified person to police officer that declarant had admitted committing
crime charged against defendant because declarant's statement would not have been admissible at trial).
642. See United States v. Goodlow, 500 F.2d 954, 958 (8th Cir. 1974) (trustworthiness of declarant's
statement established, in part, by police officer's testimony that declarant was "a known interstate carrier
thief"); cf. United States v. Harris, 403 U.S. 573, 583 (1971) (defendant's reputation may be considered in
evaluating sufficiency of search warrant affidavit).
643. See FED. R. EVID. 702 (witness qualified as expert may testify or give opinion about matters on
which he is expert).
644. See FED. R. EVID. 404(b) (evidence of other crime inadmissible to prove character of person to
show he acted in conformity with those crimes).
645. Determining whether the statement is privileged is a difficult threshold quesion. In United States
v. Hoyos, 573 F.2d 1111 (9th Cir. 1978), the declarant admitted to his wife that he, not the defendant, was
guilty. Id. at 1113, 1115. The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the trial
court's exclusion of the statement, indicating, inter alia, that under the husband-wife privilege the trial
court would not have admitted the statement were the declarant on trial. Id. at 1115. The court of appeals
did not explain its reasoning. If it thought that the litigation significance of the statement, were the
declarant on trial, determined admissibility of the statement at the defendant's trial, it reasoned
erroneously. If it thought that the statement was not against interest because the declarant thought his
comment was protected by the husband-wife privilege, however, it would have been on firmer ground.'
Even this second interpretation, which the court of appeals did not advance, is probably an incorrect
assessment of against interest. If the declarant's wife reported his statement to the police, an investigation
of his involvement might have followed, thus providing an against-interest effect of his statement even if his
wife could not have testified against him.
646. HousE JUDICIARY REPORT, supra note 10, at 16, [1974] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS at 7089.
The House Subcommittee apparently did not discuss this point during its markup sessions.
647. Id. The Advisory Committee originally thought that the defendant's testimonial denial would be
the only way that he could satisfy the "simple corroboration" test, a view that the Standing Committee
later rejected. See notes 142-44 supra and accompanying text (describing Standing Committee's decision).
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trustworthiness of the declarant or the truth of his statement or can shift guilt
to him, surely the court should not ignore the defendant's testimony.
If the court considers the defendant's testimony, may the Government
introduce the defendant's testimony in its case-in-chief if he implicates
himself in some way during the rule 104(a) hearing?648 Neither rule 804(b)(3)
nor rule 104(d) provides an answer. The Revised Draft answered this question
by limiting the Government's use of the defendant's testimony for "im-
peachment if clearly contradictory of testimony given by him at the trial." 649
When Senator McClellan objected to this limitation, 650 the Standing Commit-
tee responded by deleting any reference in rule 104 to the Government's
ability to use the defendant's testimony.651 Nonetheless, to be consistent with
other decisions,6 52 a court should allow the Government only to use the
defendant's rule 104(a) testimony either to impeach him should he testify at
trial or to charge him separately with perjury.
5. The Evidence from the Rule 104(a) Hearing
If the court concludes that the defendant has satisfied the rule's corrobora-
tion test on the basis of inadmissible evidence, should it permit the defendant
to introduce that evidence in order to convince the jury to credit thedeclarant's statement? Suppose, for example, the defendant offers a police
report that includes an unavailable witness' description of the culprit that
matches the declarant's physical appearance better than it does the defend-
ant's. Problems also arise if the defendant offers evidence of the declarant's
commission of other crimes, similar to the crime charged against the
defendant, but the evidence does not satisfy the "clear and convincing"
standard imposed under rule 404(b). Moreover, the defendant might offer the
opinion of a police officer that the declarant is a "known thief" or an addict
who steals to support his habit. One might argue that the jury should hear
these sorts of evidence because the judge already has applied a test under rule
804(b)(3) in determining the statement's trustworthiness, a test that is higher
than the one the jury would apply in finding reasonable doubt. 653 Without this
648. The judge may conduct the rule 104(a) inquiry out of the jury's hearing, see FED. R. EVID. 104(C)(inquiry out ofjury's hearing when interests ofjustice so require), and probably should conduct the inquiry
out of the jury's presence. See United States v. Sarmiento-Perez, 633 F.2d 1092, 1101 n.5 (5th Cir. 1980)
(pretrial or non-jury hearing preferred).
649. Revised Draft, supra note 1, at 325.
650. See McClellan Letter, supra note 82, at 33,642. Senator McClellan objected that rule 104(d)
"appears to be an unwarranted extension of Simmons v. United States, 390 U.S. 377 (1968) and a
narrowing of Walder v. United States, 347 U.S. 62 (1954)." Id. Senator McClellan probably correctly
believed that the Revised Draft's version of rule 104(d) extended Simmons and Walder. The Advisory
Committee, however, disagreed with his interpretation. See Advisory Committee Note to Revised Draft,
supra note 1, at 328 (Simmons and Walder reflected in rule 104(d)).
651. As enacted, rule 104(d) reads: "The accused does not, by testifying upon a preliminary matter,
subject himself to cross-examination as to other issues in the case." FED. R. EVID. 104(d).
652. See Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222, 225-26 (1971) (Government may use statement taken in
violation of Miranda only to impeach); Simmons v. United States, 390 U.S. 377, 394 (1968) (Government
may not use suppression hearing testimony against defendant at trial).
653. A court also should permit the defendant to introduce these sorts of otherwise inadmissible
evidence if it allows the jury to ask whether the declarant's statement is actually against penal interest. Thejury must answer this question to decide if the statement is conditionally relevant under rule 104(b). Before
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otherwise inadmissible evidence, the jury might distrust the declarant's
credibility or fail to understand the relevance of the declarant's statement
even though the judge already had decided the credibility of the statement as
a matter of law.
Apart from constitutional considerations, 654 the Federal Rules of Evidence
provide little room for the court to allow the jury to hear this sort of evidence.
Rule 102 states that the "rules shall be construed to secure fairness in
administration... and promotion of growth and .development of the law of
evidence to the end that the truth may be ascertained and proceedings justly
determined. ' 655 That directive, however, might not be broad enough to permit
a court to ignore the more specific command of a different rule.656 Rule
404(a), for example, bars introduction of a "person's character," in contrast
to a party's character, except when, as in rule 404(b), a party offers evidence
for other purposes, such as proof of "motive, intent, preparation, plan,
knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident. ' 657 Each of these
purposes might be relevant when the evidence is a penal interest statement.
The federal courts interstitially have imposed the clear and convincing
evidence standard when the Government has offered such evidence against
the defendant because such evidence is potentially very prejudicial.658 Because
the introduction of evidence that the declarant committed other crimes would
the evidence reaches the jury, however, the judge must have answered that question affirmatively as a
threshold admissibility condition under rule 104(a). Advisory Committee Note to Supreme Court Draft,
supra note 1, at 197. The relevance of such a statement also is conditioned upon the declarant's having
spoken against his penal interest. Because rule 104(b) requires that this condition exist, the rule may
authorize the jury to ask the very question that rule 104(a) ordered the judge to answer as a threshold
admissibility condition. If the jury can ask that question, the court arguably should provide the jury with
the same otherwise inadmissible evidence that the court considered in reaching its rule 104(a) determina-
tion.
The legislative history does not explain the relationship of rules 104(a) and (b). The Preliminary Draft of
rule 104(b) ordered the court to instruct the jury concerning its role in assessing conditionally relevant
evidence; the judge was to instruct the jury to disregard the evidence unless the jury found that the
condition was satisfied. Preliminary Draft, supra note 1, at 186-87. The Advisory Committee, however,
deleted that order without explanation from subsequent drafts. Nonetheless, the judge still might instruct
the jury that, in assessing the persuasiveness of the penal interest statement, it may consider the
circumstances in which the declarant allegedly made the statement. Thus, the judge indirectly might
inform the jury that it may ignore the statement either if it distrusts the declarant or the reporting witness
or if it is unsure of the import of the statement.
654. For a discussion of the defendant's emerging right to present evidence under either the compulsory
process or the due process clauses, see notes 771-839 infra and accompanying text.
655. FED. R. EVID. 102.
656. Albert Jenner, the chairman of the Advisory Committee, however, suggested that courts should
interpret rule 102 expansively. In referring to rule 102, he said:
The whole premise on which these rules were drafted was that the law of evidence should
grow and develop under these rules as a format. The history of the rulemaking process under
the enabling act has been that the Advisory Committee will, with the input of the bar,... of
the courts . . . . [and] of the Congress, revise the . . . rules ....
House Subcommittee Hearings, supra note 15, at 525-26 (testimony of Albert E. Jenner, Jr.). See also Senate
Judiciary Hearings, supra note 118, at 212 (testimony of Albert E. Jenner, Jr.) (policy of rule 102 makes it
"greatest of all of the rules submitted by the Court"); Moore & Bendix, Congress, Evidence and
Rulemaking, 84 YALE L.J. 9, 12-13 (1974) (rule 102's directive to interpret rules to "promot[e]... growth
and [the] development of the law of evidence" provides the "necessary lubricant of growth").
657. FED. R. EVID. 404(b).
658. See generally Advisory Committee Note to Supreme Court Draft, supra note 1, at 219-21.
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aid, rather than prejudice, the defendant, a court might apply a lower
standard of proof in deciding whether the declarant committed the other
crimes and whether they were relevant to the charge against the defendant.
V. THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF RULE 804(b)(3)
Surprisingly, neither Congress nor the Advisory and Standing Committees
discussed the constitutionality of rule 804(b)(3)'s penal interest exception. 659
No federal court has decided whether the rule is constitutional.660
Before considering the constitutionality of the penal interest exception, two
preliminary observations are in order. First, neither the Supreme Court's
review of the Federal Rules of Evidence nor Congress' approval of the rules
forecloses a constitutional attack on rule 804(b)(3) or any of the other rules.661
659. Both Committees were quite aware of the confrontation clause problem in introducing hearsay
evidence against the defendant. See Advisory Committee Note to Supreme Court Draft, supra note 1, at
291-92 (discussing evolution of confrontation clause challenges to hearsay evidence). Thus, their failure to
recognize the compulsory process problem of restrictions like the "simple corroboration" test on the
defendant's ability to introduce evidence is inexplicable. Similarly, the House Subcommittee apparently
failed to consider the constitutionality of its higher corroboration requirement, despite requests to clarify
the relationship between that requirement and Chambers. The Subeommitee may have discussed the
constitutional question during its October 2, 1973 session; the tape recording of that session omits the
discussion of defense-offered penal interest statements. If the Subcommittee did discuss the issue, however,
its decision not to delete the corroboration requirement is irrelevant for constitutional purposes. Although
Congress may increase the protection beyond what is constitutionally mandated, it may not decrease that
protection. See Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641, 648-51 & n.10 (1966) (literacy requirement need not
be adjudged violative of equal protection to be prohibited; yet Congress may not dilute equal protection
guarantee). Second, Congress apparently did not discuss the constitutional problem of imposing the
corroboration requirement only on the defendant, although it was informed of the disparity. See Letter
from Melvin B. Lewis to Representative William L. Hungate (July 18, 1973), reprinted in SUPPLEMENT TO
SUBCOMMITrEE HEARINGS, supra note 10, at 210-11.
660. Although two federal courts of appeals have suggested in dictum that the rule "is no more
restrictive than the Constitution permits, and may in some situations be more inclusive," United States v.
Satterfield, 572 F.2d 687, 692 (9th Cir.) (quoting Barrett), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 840 (1978); United States
v. Barrett, 539 F.2d 244, 253 (1st Cir. 1976), neither court explained when the rule might admit a statement
whose admission was not constitutionally required.
661. HOUSE SUBCOMMITTEE HEARINGS, supra note 15, at 16-17 (testimony of Judge Albert B. Maris)("rulemaking by the Court could not . . . function" unless Court retained authority to review
constitutionality of any rule it transmitted to Congress); see Mississippi Publishing Co. v. Murphee, 326
U.S. 438, 444 (1946) (Supreme Court promulgation of Federal Rules of Civil Procedure does not precludejudicial review of validity); 11 MOORE, supra note 4, 501[3], at 5031 & n.21 (same).
Although a defendant ordinarily lacks standing to challenge the facial constitutionality of a statute
whose application to him is not unconstitutional, courts have made exceptions. See, e.g., County Court v.
Allen, 442 U.S. 140, 159-60 (1979) (dictum) (court may examine facial constitutionality of mandatory
presumptions); Wardius v. Oregon, 412 U.S. 470, 476-77 (1973) (state notice-of-alibi rule with no provision
for reciprocal discovery unconstitutional on its face even though state court might have inferred reciprocity
had defendant given notice); Leary v. United States, 395 U.S. 6, 37 (1969) (presumption of knowledge of
illegal drug importation inferred from possession; irrelevant whether Congress might have made possession
itself illegal); United States v. King, 552 F.2d 833, 840 (9th Cir. 1976) (statute providing for depositions of
Government witnesses not facially unconstitutional), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 966 (1977). See generally
Clinton, The Right to Present a Defense: An Emergent Constitutional Guarantee in Criminal Trials, 9 IND.
L. REV. 711, 807-08 (1976) (facial attack on evidentiary exclusionary rule rare because issue of exclusion
depends on importance of evidence in particular case). In any event, a defendant could challenge a
restrictive interpretation of the various tests of rule 804(b)(3)'s first sentence or of the corroboration
requirement as applied in his case.
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In United States v. Matlock,662 Chambers v. Mississippi,663 and United States v.
Harris664 the Supreme Court did not implicitly approve rule 804(b)(3) as
enacted because that rule differs from the version of the rule pending at the
time of each of these decisions. 665 Thus, constitutional review of the penal
interest exception appears justified, particularly because Congress changed
the Supreme Court Draft of the rule by increasing the corroboration
requirement. 666
Second, the separation of powers doctrine limits the extent to which courts
may ignore clear congressional intent in order to limit a constitutional attack
on a statute. 667 At least one commentator has argued that Congress' decision
about the trustworthiness of certain types of evidence-like statements
against penal interest-supersedes a different evaluation by the Supreme
Court.668 If a court nonetheless refuses to follow Congress' guidance in
applying the penal interest exception, it may consider whether the exception
is unconstitutional on its face or in its application.
In assessing the constitutionality of the penal interest exception, a court
must ascertain Congress' intent. Unfortunately, as demonstrated throughout
this article, Congress never clearly defined the exception. Because the
meaning of the corroboration requirement, the penal interest standard, and
662. 415 U.S. 164 (1974).
663. 410 U.S. 284 (1973).
664. 403 U.S. 573 (1971).
665. In Chambers the Supreme Court specifically referred to the Supreme Court Draft. 415 U.S. at 177.
In Matlock, 410 U.S. at 299 n.18, and Harris, 403 U.S. at 584, the Court referred only to the proposed
rules.
666. Congress' change should eliminate any hesitancy or embarrassment the Court might have in
overturning a rule it had approved under the current rulemaking procedures. See Amendments to Rules of
Civil Procedure, 374 U.S. at 869-70 (statement of Black and Douglas, J.J.) (amendments to FED. R. Civ.
P.); Weinstein, Reform of Federal Court Rulemaking Procedures, 76 COLUM. L. REv. 905, 935 (1976).
667. See Martin, Inherent Judicial Power: Flexibility Congress Did not Write into the Federal Rules of
Evidence, 57 TEX. L. REv. 167, 193-95 (1979) (legislative rules enumerating public policy prevail over
contrary judicial rules); Joiner & Miller, Rules of Practice and Procedure: A Study of Judicial Rule Making,
55 MICH. L. REv. 623, 629 (1955) (court may promulgate rules unless rules conflict with legislative or
constitutional policy).
668. See Martin, supra note 667, at 196 (federal courts must apply higher corroboration test of rule
804(b)(3) because it has "substantive effect" of making conviction more likely in some cases). Repeatedly
told that the Congress had the authority to change the Supreme Court Draft, the House Subcommittee may
have been more willing to change a rule, like the penal interest exception, that it thought involved
substantive rather than procedural decisions. Cf. House Subcommittee Hearings, supra note 15, at 494
(testimony of Stuart H. Johnson, Jr.) ("simple corroboration" requirement a substantive change).
Congressional supremacy rests on the assumption that it gathered sufficient information to make an
informed assessment about the probative value of penal interest statements different from that of the Court
and its Committees. Cf. Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641, 653 (1966) (courts should not review
congressional resolution of competing factors concerning literacy requirement if basis exists for prohibi-
tion). See also House Subcommittee Hearings, supra note 15, at 224 (testimony of John J. Cleary) ("The
function of Congress before it passes legislation is to gather information."). Because Congress failed to
develop that record, see notes 670-707 infra and accompanying text, federal courts arguably are not bound
to enforce congressional intent. Nonetheless, because federal courts are divided over the proper
interpretation of rule 804(b)(3), allowing the courts to ignore the rule's restrictions will lead to ad hoc,
inconsistent results until the Supreme Court announces an evidentiary or constitutional test. In any event,
in passing upon the constitutionality of a statute, the federal courts may search for information if Congress
failed to develop an adequate record. See Leary v. United States, 395 U.S. 6, 38 (1969) (court may
supplement legislative record to sustain constitutionality of presumption). Moreover, the courts may
reconsider the facts upon which Congress relied if those facts no longer are applicable. Id. at 38 n.68.
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the "reasonable man" test are unclear, we must develop our own model of the
rule to capture Congress' intent. For the remainder of this discussion, assume
that a penal interest statement offered by the defendant is admissible only if it
exculpates the defendant by substituting someone else in a one-person crime
and it is corroborated by clear and convincing evidence. 669 Furthermore,
assume that the Government may introduce without corroboration a state-
ment implicating the defendant.
As formulated, the rule is constitutionally suspect in four respects. First,Congress relied on several unwarranted assumptions to justify the high
corroboration burden imposed on the defendant. Second, the rule improperly
discriminates between the defendant and the Government because the
defendant alone must satisfy the corroboration requirement. Third, if thedefendant does not satisfy the corroboration requirement, the rule foreclosesjury assessment of the declarant's credibility. Finally, the rule clashes with the
defendant's fifth and sixth amendment rights to introduce evidence.
A. CONGRESS FAILED TO JUSTIFY THE CORROBORATION REQUIREMENT
The corroboration requirement, unique among hearsay exceptions, 670 is
disproportionate to the possibility that the declarant will fabricate a statement
669. Although this model makes a constitutional attack on the rule easier than would a less restrictive
model, the legislative history contains sufficient support to justify these assumptions. Although the model
compels consideration of the constitutional issues, such an examination appropriately determines the
constitutional limitations of a restrictive hearsay exception. Moreover, models less restrictive than that
proposed in the text are also constitutionally suspect. But cf Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353
U.S. 448, 477 (1957) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) (Supreme Court should interpret statutes narrowly to
find statutes constitutional).
670. The penal interest exception as applied to defense evidence operates differently from every other
hearsay exception. The New York City Bar Association stated in a letter to the Subcommittee:
The hearsay exceptions are permitted because the law makes a rough determination that
certain statements are sufficiently probative to justify being admitted, but their weight is at all
times for the trier of facts. To condition admissibility [under the penal interest exception]
upon a showing of corroborating circumstances indicating trustworthiness is in effect to
decide what weight the declaration against interest should have as a concomitant to admitting
it.
Letter from Alvin K. Hellerstein to Representative William L. Hungate (Aug. 2, 1973) (forwarding
comments of the Committee on Federal Courts, The Association of the Bar of the City of New York),
reprinted in SUPPLEMENT TO SuBcoMMiTT HEARINGS, supra note 10, at 309.
Thus, the rules generally do not authorize the judge to exclude other forms of hearsay if he believes them
to be untrustworthy. Rule 403, for example, enables the judge to exclude statements whose potential
prejudice or confusion outweighs its probative value. LILLY, supra note 456, § 78, at 265 (1978); 4
WEINSTEIN, supra note 16, 804(b)(3)[01] at 804-92. But cf. House Subcommittee Hearings, supra note
15, at 252 (testimony of Judge Henry J. Friendly) (judge's authorization to exclude statements under rule
403 not clear). Nonetheless, 403 does not specifically mention trustworthiness as a ground to exclude
evidence. Moreover, those few rules like rule 804(b)(3) that advance trustworthiness as a ground for
exclusion highlight the uniqueness of the penal interest exception. Rules 803(6)-(8) permit the judge to
exclude certain records as untrustworthy. This authorization originated in Palmer v. Hoffman, 318 U.S.
109 (1943), in which the Supreme Court upheld exclusion of an accident report preljared for litigation. Id.
at 111. The Advisory Committee Note suggests that because the report was not prepared in the regular
course of business, the report's accuracy was questionable. Advisory Committee Note to Supreme Court
Draft, supra note 1, at 309-10. According to rules 803(6)-(8), however, the opponent carries the initial
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to aid the defendant. To restrict the admissibility of evidence, 671 Congress
must justify its decision.672 Congress, however, did not and could not have
justified the corroboration requirement. Moreover, the corroboration require-
ment is overinclusive and therefore violates the due process clause of the fifth
amendment and the compulsory process clause of the sixth amendment.
Congress made several unwarranted assumptions in drafting the penal
interest exception. First, the House Subcommittee misinterpreted the purpose
of the "simple corroboration" test. The House Subcommittee wrongly
assumed that the Advisory and Standing Committees added that requirement
to the Supreme Court Draft out of a fear that defendants too easily could
introduce untrustworthy evidence. In fact, the Advisory and Standing
Committees simply succumbed to the pressure exerted by Senator McClellan.
burden of indicating the record lacks trustworthiness. In contrast, rule 804(b)(3) requires the defendant-
the proponent-to establish trustworthiness by a standard higher than that usually imposed under rule
104(a).
Similarly, hearsay offered under rule 803(24) and 804(b)(5), the "catch-all" provisions, may be admitted
more easily than under rule 804(b)(3). A court may admit hearsay under those rules if, inter alia,
,.circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness" "equivalent" to other hearsay exceptions exist. Although
Congress did not indicate which hearsay exceptions should be the guide for "catch-all" hearsay, the Senate
Report suggests a narrow interpretation. To convince the House of Representatives of the wisdom of
"catch-all" provisions, the Senate Judiciary Committee argued that "there are certain exceptional
circumstances where evidence which is found... to have guarantees of trustworthiness equivalent to or
exceeding the guarantees reflected by the presently listed exceptions, and to have a high degree of
probativeness and necessity could properly be admissible." SENATE JUDICIARY REPORT, supra note 10, at
19, [1974] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws at 7065 (citing Dallas County v. Commercial Union Assoc. Co.,
286 F.2d 388 (5th Cir. 1961), one of the few pre-rules cases where federal courts admitted hearsay that
satisfied no recognized exception). Despite Congress' narrow interpretation of rules 803(24) and 804(b)(5),
federal courts have admitted many hearsay statements under the two rules. See, eg., United States v.
White, 611 F.2d 531, 538 (5th Cir. 1980) (claim form executed by payee of check who died prior to trial
admissible under rule 803(24) due to circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness); United States v. West,
574 F.2d 1131, 1135, 1137-38 (4th Cir. 1978) (grand jury witness' testimony admissible over confrontation
clause objection because essential and trustworthy under rule 804(b)(5)); United States v. Lyon, 567 F.2d
777, 784 (8th Cir. 1977) (FBI agent's transcribed interview of defendant's landlady admissible under Rule
804(b)(5) because accuracy guaranteed by detailed testimony of transcribing technique). See generally
Note, The Residual Exceptions to the Hearsay Rule in the Federal Rules of Evidence: A Critical
Examination, 31 RUTGERS L. REV. 687 (1978). Because a declarant's statement inevitably will be vital to
the defense, courts also should apply the corroboration requirement liberally. Cf. United States v.
Iaconetti, 540 F.2d 574, 578 (2d Cir. 1976) (requiring lesser demonstration of trustworthiness as
importance of hearsay to proponent increases). No court has admitted hearsay, inadmissible under rule
804(b)(3), under the "catch-all" provisions. Cf. Lowery v. Maryland, 401 F. Supp. 604, 608 (D. Md. 1975)
(admissibility of penal interest statements offered by defendant governed by rule 804(b)(3); therefore rule
804(b)(5) inapplicable), aff d. without opinion, 532 F.2d 750 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 919 (1976).
671. See Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 302 (1973) ("the accused ...must comply with
established rules of procedure and evidence designed to assure both fairness and reliability in the
ascertainment of guilt and innocence."). Commentators agreed that Congress could amend any rule in the
Supreme Court Draft, as long as Congress enacted its own draft of all the rules. House Subcommittee
Hearings, supra note 15, at 24 (testimony of Judge Albert BJ. Maris); id. at 148, 151 (testimony of Justice
Arthur J. Goldberg).
672. See note 668 supra and accompanying text (deference to congressional decisions assumes informed
assessment and basis for choice). See also Jaffe, supra note 248, at 308-64 (criticizing rule 804(b)(2), "dying
declarations" hearsay exception, as lacking empirical justification); Letter from Professor Kenneth W.
Graham, Jr., to Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure (July 28, 1971), reprinted in House
Subcommittee Hearings, supra note 15, at 196-97 (psychotherapist privilege lacks factual basis). Congress,
however, expanded the defendant's ability to introduce evidence through the penal interest exception
because federal courts had not recognized that exception. The common law undoubtedly contributed to
Congress' niggardly version of the exception.
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Second, the House Subcommitee feared that the defendant could satisfy the
"simple corroboration" test by testifying that he was innocent.673 Although
the Advisory Committee originally took this position, the Standing Commit-
tee rejected it, stating that the defendant's testimony alone was insufficient. 674
In agreeing with the Advisory Committee, the House Subcommittee in-
creased the corroboration requirement based on a groundless concern. Third,
the House Subcommittee erred in assuming that friends, relatives, or fellow
inmates provide most defense-offered penal interest statements and that such
declarants inevitably are untrustworthy. 675 Finally, the House Subcommittee
failed to justify its greater distrust of penal interest statements as compared to
statements against pecuniary or proprietary interest or other forms of
673. The Subcommittee expressed this fear as its sole concern over the "simple corroboration" test.
HousE REPORT, supra note 10, at 16, [1974] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS at 7089-90. Rather than
increase the requirements of the rule, the Subcommittee simply should have provided that a defendant
could not satisfy the "simple corroboration" test by denying his guilt.
674. The Standing Committee acted in response to Senator McClellan's objection raised at his
September 22, 1971 meeting with members of the Advisory and Standing Committees.
675. Although Judge Friendly and associate counsel offered no support for the argument, the
Department of Justice offered two cases to support its theory that friends, relatives, and fellow prison
inmates were most likely to be declarants. See Justice's First Letter, supra note 63, at 33 (citing United
States v. Dovico, 380 F.2d 325 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 944 (1967), and Scolari v. United States, 406
F.2d 563 (9th Cir.) (per curiam), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 981 (1969)). In Dovico the Government separately
convicted the declarant and the defendant for selling cocaine. 380 F.2d at 326. While in prison, the
declarant allegedly admitted to a fellow inmate that he sold the cocaine. The evidence at trial indicated that
the declarant retrieved a brown sack from a garbage container in which the defendant had placed a brown
sack. Id. A witness revealed the delarant's statement shortly after the declarant's death, thereby providing
grounds for a new trial. Id. At the second trial, however, the judge excluded the statement as
untrustworthy and found the defendant guilty. Id. The court of appeals affirmed, acknowledging that
although it perhaps should recognize the penal interest exception, it found no error because the declarant
had not exposed himself to the possibility of other punishment with his admission. Id. at 327. In Scolarl the
Government charged the defendant with smuggling amphetamines. 406 F.2d at 563. He sought to
introduce a statement by a passenger in his car that she put the drugs in one of the car's tires. Id. at 563.
Following Donnelly v. United States, 228 U.S. 243 (1913), the court excluded the statement, leaving for "a
more propitious occasion the question as to how old, or how badly reasoned" Supreme Court precedent
must be before a court should abandon it. Id. at 564. In both Dovieo and Scolari the court's interpretation of
the exception appears consistent with the common law. Nonetheless, both courts should have admitted the
statement because such confessions, if true, are crucial to the defendant. By admitting the statements, the
courts could have allowed the factfinder to assess the credibility of each statement.
A few other cases, however, do add support to the Subcommittee's assumption. See Witham v. Mabry,
596 F.2d 293, 295-97 (8th Cir. 1979) (cousin's confession to crime inadmissible because not shown to be
against penal interest); United States v. Satterfield, 572 F.2d 687, 693 (9th Cir.) (codefendant's statement
that defendant not involved inadmissible because good reason to believe codefendant lied), cert. denied, 439
U.S. 840 (1978); Lowery v. Maryland, 401 F. Supp. 604, 607-08 (D. Md. 1975) (fellow inmate's affidavit
admitting he lied at defendant's trial inadmissible because uncorroborated and not necessarily reliable),
aff d without opinion, 532 F.2d 750 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 919 (1976); People v. Chapman, 50
Cal. App. 3d 872, 880-81, 123 Cal. Rptr. 862, 867-68 (Ct. App. 1975) (admission byjailed codefendant that
he fired fatal shot inadmissible because it did not exculpate defendant; codefendant's statement that
defendant attempted to stop fight also inadmissible because it was not against codefendant's penal interest);
Brown v. State, 99 Miss. 719, 726, 55 So. 961, 961 (1911) (confession of defendant's brother to crime
charged inadmissible because confession "mere hearsay"); Ryan v. State, 95 Wis. 2d 83, 85-89, 289 N.W.2d
349, 355 (1980) (fellow inmate's confession inadmissible because not shown to be against penal interest,
made to strangers, and too vague to provide probable cause to arrest).
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hearsay. 676 Beginning with the Sussex Peerage,677 courts have considered
penal interest statements less reliable than other types of against-interest
statements or other forms of hearsay. 678 They feared that recognizing the
penal interest exception might tempt defendants either to claim falsely that a
third party had confessed or to induce a third party to give a false
confession. 679 The Subcommittee wrongly assumed that the Advisory and
Standing Committees shared this common law belief, a belief that assumes the
defendant's guilt.6 80
These four errors suggest that the corroboration requirement is arbitrary
and overbroad. As Washington v. Texas681 illustrates, legislatures may not
establish "arbitrary rules that prevent whole categories of defense witnesses
676. This distrust may be justified in some instances. See, eg., United States v. Hughes, 529 F.2d 838,
839 (5th Cir. 1976) (uncorroborated testimony of defendant's brother regarding third party admission of
guilt excluded as untrustworthy); United States v. Dovico, 380 F.2d 325, 326 (2d Cir.) (witness' statement
that codefendant confessed to sole responsibility for crime after codefendant's death inadmissible because
witness subject to no further punishment), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 944 (1967); United States v. Miller, 277 F.
Supp. 200, 206 (D. Conn. 1967) (new trial based on declarant's two written confessions denied because
declarant repudiated confessions and substantial evidence that confessions originally made under duress);
Steadman v. United States, 358 A.2d 329, 331 (D.C. 1976) (testimony that unknown person or persons
confessed to murder excluded as unreliable); People v. Edwards, 396 Mich. 551, 568, 242 N.W.2d 739, 747
(1976) (Coleman, J., with Fitzgerald, J., dissenting) (court should have excluded statement by fellow
inmate offered after discussion of crime with defendant because statement not of "trustworthy calibre"). In
Hughes, Dovieo, Steadman, and Edwards the witness' credibility, not the declarant's credibility, was in
dispute. The Government usually should be able to develop that issue on cross-examination. Indeed, the
Advisory Committee rejected the issue as a cause for concern. Reporter's Comments to Revised Draft,
supra note 54, at 114d.
The remarkable example advanced by the Government in Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284 (1973),
to justify its argument that the penal interest exception should not be constitutionally recognized, does not
justify lower courts suspecting the trustworthiness of all penal interest statements. The Government argued
that in a typical case the defendant (D) and the declarant (T) would collaborate so that T, after confessing
to the witness (W), would disappear. Id. at 301 n.21. D then would be acquitted on the testimony ofW. IfT
were later apprehended and charged, T would call D as a witness who would admit that he had committed
the crime. Once D had been acquitted, he could not be retried because retrying him would be
unconstitutional on double jeopardy grounds. Id.
677. 8 Eng. Rep. 1039 (1844).
678. 5 WIGMORE, supra note 4, § 1476, at 349-58.
679. See Brennan v. State, 151 Md. 265, 271, 134 A. 148, 150 (1926) (many persons accused of crime
likely to yield to temptation and introduce perjured testimony of third party). The historical justification
for any corroboration requirement probably is misguided. Common law courts probably pointed out the
reasons why the declarant's statement appeared to be reliable to justify deviating from the strong judicial
disapproval of the exception expressed in influential cases like the Sussex Peerage and Donnelly. Later,
those justifications for departing from precedent were interpreted as requiring corroboration as an
independent test for admission. Note, Declarations Against Penal Interest, supra note 328, at 173 n.134.
680. Professor Lewis noted:
The spectre of a criminal defendant arranging for a contrived confession by an accomplice
gifted with an unassailable alibi in order to create a reasonable doubt of his own guilt, is just
that: a spectre. I know of no case where any such thing has happened; but there are many
recorded instances of inculpatory third-party confessions induced by promises and lenity, on
the premise that the person accused within the confession is a more direct prosecutive target
than is the confessor. The rule, as proposed, is an extremely unfortunate one, and works a
fundamental revision of the relationship between the citizen and his Government.
Letter from Professor Melvin B. Lewis to Representative William L. Hungate (July 18, 1973), reprinted in
SUPPLEMENT TO SUBCOMMITTEE HEARINGS, supra note 10, at 211.
681. 388 U.S. 14 (1967).
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from testifying on the basis of a priori categories that presume them unworthy
of belief. ' 682 In Washington the Supreme Court held unconstitutional twoTexas statutes prohibiting coparticipants in a crime from testifying for each
other while permitting each to testify for the Government against the other.683
Because the statutes failed to "rationally [set] apart a group of persons who
are particularly likely to commit perjury," 684 they arbitrarily infringed upon
the defendant's sixth amendment right to compulsory process.685 Although
these statutes operated somewhat differently from rule 804(b)(3),686 Washing-
ton requires that a legislature justify its evidentiary exclusionary rules. 687
The analysis used in testing the constitutionality of a presumption that
excuses the Government from adducing evidence reinforces the Washington
requirement that legislatures justify limitations on the defendant's ability to
introduce evidence. 688 If the presumption is permissive, allowing but not
682. Id. at 22.
683. Id. at 23. The defendant, Washington, and several companions searched for the new boyfriend of
his former girlfriend. Another individual, Fuller, joined the group with his shotgun. Washington claimed
that Fuller shot the new boyfriend. Id. at 15. In defense, Washington insisted that Fuller was drunk, that he
unsuccessfully implored Fuller to give him the shotgun, and that he fled immediately before Fuller shot the
boyfriend. At trial Washington sought to call Fuller as a witness. Fuller had previously been convicted of
the murder and would have confirmed Washington's version of the facts. The two Texas statutes, however,
precluded Washington from examining Fuller. Id. at 16-17.
684. Id. at 22. According to the Supreme Court, the rule's exceptions demonstrated its absurdity. An
accomplice could testify for the Government against his coparticipant. Moreover, the ban no longer
applied to an accused accomplice once he was acquitted, at which time he would be completely free to
incriminate himself without fear of punishment. Id.
685. Id. at 22-23.
686. Although rule 804(b)(3) sometimes precludes the defendant from introducing a penal interest
statement, the Texas statutes always precluded a defendant from calling a coparticipant as a witness.
Furthermore, in Washington the Government could have cross-examined Fuller. Such cross-examination is
impossible when a court admits the statement of an unavailable declarant. While these differences suggest
that Congress might have justified the rule's corroboration test more easily than Texas could have justified
its statutes, Congress failed to do so.
687. Convinced by Senator McClellan that not every declarant would implicate the defendant to help
himself, the Standing Committee changed its position to permit the Government to introduce such a
statement. See notes 198-99 supra and accompanying text (discussing change in position). Neither the
Standing Committee nor the House Subcommittee, however, made the sort of empirical inquiry that the
Washington Court expected when they decided not to impose the corroboration requirement on the
Government. Cf Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 295-98 (1972) ("voucher" rule prohibiting
defendant from impeaching own witness irrational and destructive of truth-gathering process).
688. The constitutional analysis of rule 804(b)(3)'s corroboration requirement is distinguishable from
an analysis of the defendant's burden of proving, or of adducing evidence to prove, an affirmative defense.
A substantive criminal statute may constitutionally impose on the defendant the burden of persuasion with
respect to an affirmative defense or a factor mitigating the degree of criminality. See Patterson v. New
York, 432 U.S. 197, 205-09 (1977) (burdening defendant with proving affirmative defense of extreme
emotional disturbance constitutional). The Patterson doctrine, superficially analogous to the "two-trial"
model of rule 804(b)(3), see notes 714-15 infra and accompanying text, is inapposite for several reasons.
First, penal interest statements almost always relate to the identity of the culprit rather than to an
affirmative defense. Thus, they concern an element of the crime that the Government must prove. No
statute, however, may constitutionally impose an affirmative burden of production or persuasion on the
defendant with respect to an element of the crime itself. Sandstrom v. Montana, 442 U.S. 510, 524 (1979);
Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684, 703-04 (1975). Second, the affirmative defense doctrine concerns the
burden of production or persuasion, rather than the admissibility of evidence. In contrast, rule 804(b)(3)
acts as a bar to the introduction of evidence. Third, the defendant is burdened with proving certain
affirmative defenses because he has greater access to the evidence relevant to those defenses. With respect
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requiring the jury to infer the presumed fact once the basic fact has been
proven, the party challenging it must demonstrate its invalidity as applied to
his case.689 In contrast, a mandatory presumption, one requiring the defend-
ant to rebut or disprove the presumed fact once the Government proves the
basic fact, is constitutional only if facially so, rather than as applied in the
specific case. 690 The basic fact proved must support the inference beyond a
reasonable doubt.691 Congress must demonstrate the relationship by empirical
evidence. 692
This presumption analysis can justifiably be applied to rule 804(b)(3)
because the rule operates like a mandatory presumption: The court admits a
statement only if the defendant satisfies the corroboration requirement. 693
Thus, to withstand judicial scrutiny, the rule must be constitutional on its
face. The House Subcommittee believed that statements against penal interest
offered by the defendant were untrustworthy because it assumed that
declarants usually were friends, relatives, or fellow inmates of the defendant.
Congress, however, did not develop an empirical record to justify either the
"basic fact," the nature of the declarants, or the "presumed fact," the
untrustworthiness of statements by these sorts of declarants. Had Congress
demonstrated that such declarants generally were untrustworthy, it might
have legitimately imposed the corroboration requirement in cases involving
these declarants.694 Because Congress failed to develop such a record, the
corroboration requirement is unconstitutional on its face. 695
to rule 804(b)(3), the defendant will have the statement itself and yet may know no more about the
declarant than the Government. Finally, the nature of the defendant's burden in proving an affirmative
defense remains unsettled. May a statute impose a standard of "beyond reasonable doubt," of "clear and
convincing" evidence, or only of "a preponderance" of the evidence? If the latter standard applies, the
burden of proof would be lower than the evidentiary burden imposed on the defendant by rule 804(b)(3)'s
corroboration requirement (as modeled) when he attempts to introduce evidence relevant to an affirmative
defense.
689. County Court v. Allen, 442 U.S. 140, 157 (1979).
690. Id. at 157-60 (dictum).
691. Id. at 167. The Supreme Court applied the "more likely than not" test to a permissive
presumption. Id. at 166-67.
692. The Supreme Court has reviewed not only the legislative history but also other relevant sources in
evaluating that relationship. See Turner v. United States, 396 U.S. 398, 408-18 (1970) (presumption of
illegal importation knowledge from heroin possession valid due to surveys, reports, and common sense
indicating that awareness).
693. Cf. Jaffe, supra note 248, at 227 (challenging constitutionality of rule 804(b)(2)'s dying declaration
exception in same way).
694. Congress would have had to refine the requirement with regard to inmates. Although a court
justifiably should be concerned about an inmate's exoneration of the defendant long after the Government
convicted the defendant, a court should put more stock in an inmate's confession to a crime committed
while he and the defendant were serving time together.
695. Similarly, Congress' failure to justify its fear that most penal interest statements are untrustworthy
regardless of the declarant's status also suggests constitutional defects. The presumption cases eliminate the
argument that constitutional review of rule 804(b)(3) is precluded by the congressional ability to condition
the admission of evidence. See Tot v. United States, 319 U.S. 463, 472 (1943) (illegal possession of firearm
may not be presumed from possession despite Congress' ability to outlaw possession). Furthermore,
Congress' failure to justify the corroboration requirement is suspect because courts are eliminating the
requirement in other circumstances presenting the danger of witness fabrication or error. See Arnold v.
United States, 358 A.2d 335, 343-45 (D.C. 1976) (en bane) (corroboration of rape victim's testimony serves
no legitimate purpose); People v. Edwards, 396 Mich. 551, 566 n.43, 242 N.W.2d 739, 746 n.43 (1976)
(because no corroboration required of undercover agents and informers who are "professional dissem-
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Washington v. Texas also provides a procedural due process attack on the
rule's corroboration requirement. The Texas statutes implicitly presumed that
"the right to present witnesses was subordinate to the court's interest in
preventing perjury, and that erroneous decisions were best avoided by
preventing the jury from hearing any testimony that might be perjured, even
if it were the only testimony available on a crucial issue. ' 696 Those premises
also underlie Congress' decision to increase the corroboration requirement.
The Washington Court suggested that less drastic measures could have
protected the accuracy of the factfinding process. Texas, for example, simply
could have trusted the jury to assess the "credit and weight" of the
coparticipant's testimony.697
The Advisory Committee in the Preliminary and the Revised Drafts would
have permitted the jury to assess the credibility of both the declarant and the
witness who reported the declarent's statement.698 The assumption in those
drafts was that the jury properly could evaluate the reliability of the
statement. Furthermore, as long as the court found that the statement
satisfied the penal interest test of the rule's first sentence, it did not need to
exclude the statement to prevent jury error. The Standing Committee
withdrew that role from the jury because it wanted to placate Senator
McClellan and not because it disagreed with the Advisory Committee's belief
that the jury could assess credibility and weight accurately. Congress' failure
to justify this shift in the roles of judge and jury renders it constitutionally
suspect in light of Washington.699
blers," no corroboration required of penal interest statement offered to exculpate defendant); Note, Expert
Psychological Testimony, supra note 624, at 1001-02 (no jurisdiction adopted corroboration requirement for
eyewitness identification); cf. FED. R. EvID. 406 (eliminating corroboration of habit evidence).
696. 388 U.S. 14, 21 (1967) (footnotes omitted).
697. Id. at 22 (quoting Rosen v. United States, 245 U.S. 467,471 (1918)). Professor Westen reaches the
same conclusion, but he too recognizes that the Supreme Court did not specifically use an "alternative-
means" analysis. Westen, The Compulsory Process Clause, 73 MIcH. L. REv. 73, 115 n.20 (1974)
[hereinafter, Westen, Compulsory Process]. Professor Westen has argued that other decisions by the Court
also illustrate that a legislature must adopt the least drastic approach when limiting the defendant's ability
to introduce evidence. See Westen, Order of Proof: An Accused's Right to Control the Timing and Sequence
of Evidence in His Defense, 66 CALIF. L. REV. 935, 968-69 (1978) (state's interest in preventing pejury
should be promoted by jury evaluations of credibility rather than by exclusion) [hereinafter Westen, Order
of Proo]. See also Clinton, supra note 661, at 800 (when Governmental interest advanced, court must
consider whether evidentiary objectives justifying infringement of defendant's constitutional rights
attainable with less drastic means).
698. See Advisory Committee Note to Revised Draft, supra note 1, at 444 ("Questions of possible
fabrication are better trusted to the competence of juries than made the subject of attempted treatment by
rule."); Advisory Committee Note to Preliminary Draft, supra note 1, at 386 (same).
699. Professor Cleary recognized this problem:
The amendment [of the House Subcommittee increasing the corroboration requirement]
seems to inject the judge unduly into the area reserved to juries. The same may be said with
respect to establishing the standard of proof as "clearly" a burden beyond that ordinarily
attending the admissibility of evidence by any party and particularly going beyond burdens
that have been thought properly to be imposed upon defendant in criminal cases.
Reporter's Comments to Subcommittee Print, supra note 176, at 38. Unfortunately, the Advisory and
Standing Committees did not inform the House Subcommittee of Professor Cleary's concern. Congress
never responded to a similar criticism of the "simple corroboration" test made during the hearings. See
House Subcommittee Hearings, supra note 15, at 239 (statement of John J. Cleary, Executive Director,
Federal Defenders of San Diego, Inc.) (lack of corroboration applicable to weight, not admissibility).
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The possibility that the declarant's unavailability might reduce the jury's
ability to assess his credibility does not justify imposing the corroboration
requirement as a condition of admissibility.7°° If less drastic methods exist to
inform the jury of the credibility issue, procedural due process requires that a
court use them. In a related context, the Supreme Court has noted that a
hearsay declarant's failure to testify raises the issue of his credibility for the
jury.701
Congress could have made changes in the rule that would have limited the
possibility for a due process attack on the rule. Congress, for example, could
have imposed the rule's corroboration burden only when the declarant was a
friend, relative, or a fellow prison inmate.702 Congress even might have
excluded any statement made after the defendant had been convicted.
703
Congress could have ordered every trial court to warn the jury of the
700. The facts in United States v. Satterfield, 572 F.2d 687 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 840 (1978),
illustrate why the corroboration test should be a matter of weight rather than of admissibility. In affirming
the exclusion of declarant Merriweather's exculpation of Satterfield, the court of appeals listed three facts
that corroborated and four facts that undercut the reliability of the statement. Reliability was corroborated
because Merriweather allegedly made the statement during an argument with Satterfield, suggesting
spontaneity; Merriweather worried that his statement would jeopardize his appeal; and the alleged ill will
between Merriweather and Satterfield reduced the likelihood that Merriweather would falsely exculpate
Satterfield. Id. at 693. Reliability was undercut, however, by the low likelihood that Merriweather would
prevail on appeal; the substantial period of time between the robberies and Merriweather's statements; the
possibility that Merriweather concocted his statement; and the identification of Satterfield as the robber by
eight eyewitnesses. Id. Because any jury could have understood and evaluated these competing considera-
tions, the court of appeals should not have excluded the statement.
701. See Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74, 88 (1970) (plurality opinion) ("[declarant's] statement contained
no express assertion about past fact, and consequently it carried on its face a warning to the jury against
giving the statement undue weight"); id. at 91 (Blackmun, J., with Burger, C.J., concurring) ("I am at a
loss to understand how any normal jury . . . could be led to believe, let alone be influenced by, this
astonishing account by [the witness of what the declarant had said]"); id. at 99 (Harlan, J., concurring in
the result) ("The jury, with the guidance of defense counsel, should be alert to the obvious dangers of
crediting such testimony [of the witness about the declarant's implication of the defendant]"). Also,
nonassertive conduct is treated as nonhearsay under rule 801(a)(2) in part because the jury is able to detect
its ambiguous quality, thus foreclosing jury over-valuation. See generally R. LEMPERT & S. SALTZBURG, A
MODERN APPROACH TO EVIDENCE 350-51 (1977).
702. Although Professor Cleary thought it was impossible to distinguish between types of declarants or
statements in the rule, Memorandum No. 19, supra note 52, at 291, the Advisory Committee's instructions
on using the "simple corroboration" test would have given courts discretion to demand more corroboration
if the declarant were a friend, relative, or a fellow prison inmate. See Advisory Committee's Note to
Supreme Court Draft, supra note 1, at 327 (test should be construed to effectuate purpose of circumventing
fabrication).
703. See United States v. Mackin, 561 F.2d 958, 962-63 (D.C. Cir.) (declarant's insufficiently
corroborated recantation of trial testimony inadmissible to convict defendant), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 959
(1977); Commonwealth v. Hackett, 225 Pa. Super. Ct. 22, 29-30, 307 A.2d 334, 338 (1973) (limiting
admissibility of penal interest statements to those made before or during trial). But see Commonwealth v.
Nash, 457 Pa. Super. Ct. 296, 305 n.4, 324 A.2d 344, 348, 348 n.4 (1974) (Roberts, J., concurring)
(criticizing Hackett restriction). Such a restriction is constitutionally questionable because a declarant
might honestly exonerate a defendant convicted of a crime committed by the declarant. Moreover, the
defendant's heavy burden to overturn his conviction provides an alternative form of protection. To justify a
trial judge's grant of such a motion, the newly-discovered evidence must "probably produce an acquittal
upon retrial." United States v. Mackin, 561 F.2d 958, 961 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 959 (1977).
The motion based on the defendant's claim to have "newly discovered" the exculpatory statement also
must be made within two years of final judgment. FED. R. CRIM. P. 33. The defendant, however, might
have no remedy if his only claim is that he was erroneously convicted in an otherwise error-free trial. Cf
Moore v. Illinois, 408 U.S. 786, 795-96 (1972) (absent constitutional obligation for Government to disclose
evidence, irrelevant that evidence was probative of innocence).
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credibility problem 70 4 or could have permitted courts to comment on the
credibility of the particular statement.705 Congress might have required the
defense to notify the Government whenever the defendant intended to offer a
penal interest statement. 706 By notifying the Government of the identity of
704. Courts should be more willing to admit hearsay evidence if the trial judge can identify the
credibility and weight issues for the jury. In the Preliminary Draft the Advisory Committee had ordered
the judge to explain to the jury how it should evaluate conditionally relevant evidence. Preliminary Draft,
supra note 1, at 14-15 ("If under all the evidence upon the issues the jury might reasonably find that the
fulfillment of the condition is not established, the judge shall instruct the jury to consider the issue and to
disregard the evidence unless they find the condition was fulfilled"). One way for the judge to inform thejury of the credibility problem is to add this command deleted from later drafts. Another way is for thejudge to comment on the evidence. Although Congress refused to enact Proposed Federal Rule of Evidence
105, Supreme Court Draft, supra note 1, at 199 (summing up and comment by the judge), neither the House
of Representatives nor the Senate thereby intended to forbid federal courts from continuing the federal
common law practice of commenting on the weight of the evidence. See JUNE 28, 1973 PRINT, supra note
10, at 151 (refusal to adopt rule 105 does not affect existing common law); SENATE JUDICIARY
COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 10, at 24 (same). Senator McClellan offered this suggestion:
[W]here the declarant himself had been involved in the past in criminal offenses, [the judge
should instruct the jury that] his statement should be received and credited only with the
utmost care because of the special danger of perjury and the virtually universal experience of
the untrustworthiness of such declarations.
McClellan Letter, supra note 82, at 33,648. Senator McClellan did not explain why the instruction was
appropriate only when the declarant had been "involved in the past in criminal offenses," the restriction's
meaning, or the basis of "virtually universal experience." The suggestion in the text goes further, with the
court instructing the jury whenever the defendant offered a purported statement against interest, or at least
whenever the declarant was a friend, relative, or a fellow inmate.
In other contexts, the Supreme Court has held that an instruction adequately protects the defendant
from untrustworthy evidence offered by the Government. See, e.g., Parker v. Randolph, 442 U.S. 62, 73-74
(1979) (plurality opinion) (instruction that codefendant's confession be considered only against source
avoids confrontation clause violation); Manson v. Braithwaite, 432 U.S. 98, 116 (1977) (juries intelligently
measure weight of identification evidence despite untrustworthy aspects); Opper v. United States, 348 U.S.
84, 95 (1954) (severance not required despite admission of codefendant's incriminating statements). The
Court has approved cautionary instructions concerning an accomplice's testimony against the defendant.
See Cool v. United States, 409 U.S. 100, 103-04 (1972) (per curiam) (discussion of use of accomplice's
testimony). Conversely, an instruction cautioning the jury to view defense evidence skeptically could be
constitutional. Cf id. (jury instruction to credit defense witness, an alleged accomplice, unconstitutional
only if testimony true beyond reasonable doubt).
705. See PROP. FED. R. EVID. 105, Supreme Court Draft, supra note 1, at 199 (summing up and
comment by judge on weight of evidence and credibility of witnesses). Although Congress refused to enact
this rule because the matter was considered procedural rather than evidentiary, the Senate correctly
understood that it reflected federal common law practice. SENATE JUDICIARY REPORT, supra note 10, at
24.
706. This suggestion parallels the notification requirements of rules 803(24) and 804(b)(5), which
condition admission of a statement on the proponent's notification to the opponent of "his intention to
offer the statement and the particulars of it, including the name and address of the declarant." FED. R.
EVID. 803(24); FED. R. EVID. 804(b)(5). Such notification probably does not infringe upon the defendant's
fifth amendment right. See United States v. Nobles, 422 U.S. 225, 233-34 (1975) (production of defense
investigator's notes presents no fifth amendment violation); Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78, 82-86 (1970)(notice-of-alibi statute does not violate fifth and fourteenth amendments); cf. FED. R. CRIM. P. 12.1 (notice
of alibi); id. 12.2 (notice of insanity defense); id. 16(b) (defense obligation to permit Government inspection
of documents, tangible objects, reports of examinations, and tests when defense has sought similar items
from Government); id. 26.2 (production of statement by any witness other than the defendant). The
defense would almost certainly accept a disclosure requirement in exchange for eliminating or reducing the
corroboration requirement. Moreover, compared to Professor Westen's suggestion, see Westen, Order of
Proof, supra note 697, at 978 (state might require defendant to disclose substance of his trial testimony
before trial or out of presence of jury), this suggestion is less radical and thus probably more feasible,
1981] RULE 804(b)(3)
both the declarant and the witness, the content of the statement, the way in
which the defense obtained the statement, and the relationship between the
declarant and the defendant, the defendant would provide the Government
with an adequate opportunity to challenge the credibility of both the
declarant and the reporting witness.
707
B. THE RULE DISCRIMINATES BETWEEN THE GOVERNMENT
AND THE DEFENDANT.
Washington v. Texas7 8 suggests an equal protection challenge to rule
804(b)(3). 709 Under the Texas statutes at issue, the state could call a
coparticipant to testify against the defendant, but the defendant could call
only an acquitted coparticipant as a witness.710 In his concurring opinion,
Justice Harlan wrote: "Texas has put forward no justification for this type of
discrimination between the prosecution and the defense in the ability to call
the same person as a witness, and I can think of none."
'71
'
707. If the defendant refused to disclose or if, upon disclosure, the Government could not challenge the
credit and weight of the declarant's statement, the court might exclude the statement under rule 403. See
note 670 supra (discussing whether judge may invoke rule 403 to exclude otherwise admissible hearsay). In
People v. Chapman, 50 Cal. App. 3d 872, 123 Cal. Rptr. 862 (Ct. App. 1975), for example, the defendant
and the declarant were identified as having fought with and killed the victim. The defendant admitted his
presence but claimed that he had tried to break up the fight. While the defendant and the declarant were in
jail, the declarant reportedly twice admitted that he shot the victim and once said that the defendant tried
to intervene. A relative of the defendant's was prepared to testify that, before the two were arrested, the
declarant admitted sole responsibility. A third person who also was present, however, denied this last
confession. Furthermore, the Government claimed that the declarant admitted responsibility because he
would be sentenced as a juvenile and would therefore not be treated harshly and that the defendant asked
the declarant to testify falsely under threat of bodily harm. Id. at 875-79, 123 Cal. Rptr. at 864-66. The trial
court refused to admit any of this evidence on the ground that the declarant's statements were
untrustworthy, a decision affirmed on appeal for two reasons. The trial court not only had authority to
assess credibility as a condition to admission but also could exclude the evidence as prejudicial, misleading,
or confusing, Id. at 879-82, 123 Cal. Rptr. at 866-67. Chapman was wrongly decided because the
Government adequately contested the hearsay and the jury could have assessed the credit and weight of the
statements.
When a declarant invokes the privilege against self-incrimination, the Government may grant
immunity. An immunized witness might still refuse to testify, but the Government could ask the witness
leading questions that would challenge his credibility before the jury. By analogy to Dutton v. Evans, 400
U.S. 74 (1970), in which the Supreme Court overrode the defendant's confrontation clause objection in part
because the defendant could have subpoenaed the declarant to testify, id. at 88 n.19, a trial court should not
impose the corroboration requirement if the Government refuses to immunize the declarant. If the
Government does immunize the declarant, it could still prosecute him with any evidence, including his
hearsay statement, it gathered apart from his testimony.
708. 388 U.S. 14 (1967). The Supreme Court, however, did not mention equal protection.
709. Cf. Green v. Georgia, 442 U.S. 95, 97 (1979) (per curiam) (due process violation to exclude from
jury's consideration coparticipant's penal interest statement when state had introduced same statement in
separate trial against another coparticipant); Cool v. United States, 409 U.S. 100, 100 (1972) (per curiam)
(conviction reversed for error in two jury instructions, one to convict if it believed uncorroborated
accomplice's testimony, the other to acquit if it believed accomplice's exculpation of defendant beyond
reasonable doubt); United States v. Benveniste, 564 F.2d 335, 339 (9th Cir. 1977) (court reversed
conviction for exclusion of penal interest statement under rule 804(b)(3) while noting trial court's exclusion
of exculpatory statements and inclusion of inculpatory statements).
710. Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14, 16 n.4, 22-23 (1967).
711. Id. at 24 (Harlan, J., concurring). Nonetheless, Justice Harlan concurred on due process grounds.
Id. at 25.
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Rule 804(b)(3) creates a difference between the Government's ability andthe defendant's right to introduce a penal interest statement by imposing a
corroboration requirement solely on the defendant. 7 2 The rule may create a
second difference because it allows the Government to introduce a related
statement against the defendant but allows the defendant to introduce only athird-party statement that substitutes the declarant for the defendant in a one-
person crime.713
Two examples illustrate these differences. In a one-person crime, theGovernment prosecutes the defendant and the defendant "prosecutes" thedeclarant.714 The Government may introduce an admission or confession bythe defendant without corroboration. 715 The defendant, however, may notintroduce the declarant's statement without satisfying the rule's corrobora-tion requirement. When the Government prosecutes the defendant in a three-person crime, it may introduce the second coconspirator's statement implicat-ing the defendant without corroborating its reliability under either rule804(b)(3) or rule 801(d)(2)(E).716 The defense, on the other hand, may notintroduce the third coconspirator's statement exonerating the defendant
without meeting the rule's corroboration requirement. Moreover, if the word
"exculpate" in the second sentence of rule 804(b)(3) limits admissibility ofthird-party statements offered by the defense to those that substitute thedeclarant for the defendant, the defendant may not introduce the third
coconspirator's statement, even if he can corroborate it. The third coconspira-tor's exculpation of the defendant, however, is related to his self-implicationin the same way as the second coconspirator's implication of the defendant is
related to his self-implication.
Congress gave no reason for imposing the corroboration requirement solely
on the defendant.717 The likely way in which the jury might err in evaluatingpenal interest statements suggests that the corroboration requirement shouldbe imposed upon the Government rather than upon the defendant. Admittinghearsay poses the risk that the jury will overvalue the reliability of the
712. Judge Weinstein characterizes this question of the admissibility of statements implicating thedefendant as "[p]articularly troublesome," 4 WEINSrEIN, supra note 16, % 804(b)(3)[03] at 804-109, but
"solves" it by erroneously concluding that Congress meant to exclude all such statements. Id. at 804-I 10,He interprets Congress' deletion of the "Bruton sentence," which the House Subcommittee had reinserted,
and Congress' approval of the second sentence (as modified by the House Subcommittee) to mean thatCongress intended to preclude the introduction of any statements offered by the Government'whichimplicate the defendant. Id. This interpretation is erroneous. See notes 188-215 supra and accompanying
text (discussing deletion of Bruton sentence).
713. Whether this difference exists depends upon an interpretation of the word "exculpate" in the rule'ssecond sentence. See notes 372-84 supra and accompanying text (discussing interpretation of "exculpate");
cf. Walden v. State, 284 So. 2d 440, 441 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1973) (statement excluded in part because itdid not substitute declarant for defendant).
714. In this example, the defendant's action resembles the impleader doctrine in civil litigation under
which a civil defendant sues a third party whom he claims is "liable to him for all or part of the plaintiff's
claim against him." FED. R. Civ. P. 14(a).
715. See notes 529-35 supra and accompanying text (discussing Government's corpus delicti burden).716. Rule 801(d)(2)(E), however, imposes the separate admissibility requirement that the declarant
spoke "in furtherance of the conspiracy." FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(2)(E). This separate requirement will
usually justify excluding the coconspirator's post-arrest implication of the defendant under this rule.717. Moreover, the Advisory and Standing Committees did not explain why they imposed the "simple
corroboration" requirement only on the defendant. No evidence exists to suggest that the Committeesdistinguished between the Government and defendant to placate Senator McClellan. See note 199 supra
and accompanying text (Committees' reason for adding corroboration).
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statement.718 The jury, however, might undervalue the reliability of a
statement offered by the defendant to exonerate himself, assuming that the
jury might infer the defendant's guilt simply because he has been charged.
Furthermore, the jury might undervalue the statement because the Govern-
ment has decided to continue the prosecution. 719 The jury might assume that
the Government would have dismissed the charge against the defendant if the
declarant's statement was reliable. Additionally, the jury might undervalue
the declarant's statement if the reporting witness called by the defendant
appears to be biased (a friend or a relative of the defendant) or of questionable
status (one who obtained the statement while in jail).
In contrast, the jury might overvalue the reliability of the declarant's
implication of the defendant because it will have greater difficulty in
recognizing pressure by the Government than by the defendant on a
declarant.720 The status of the police officer, the usual witness who reports the
declarant's implication of the defendant, also might enhance the reliability of
the statement. The declarant, however, might lie in implicating the defendant
to shift suspicion from himself to obtain a favor from the Government, or to
avenge a grudge against the defendant. The House Subcommittee, the
Advisory Committee, and the Standing Committee recognized that the
declarant might falsely implicate the defendant.721 This statement is equally
subject to fabrication as a statement from a prison inmate or a friend or
relative of the defendant. Yet the Subcommittee failed to impose the
corroboration requirement when the Government offered that sort of state-
ment. In this instance, the rule's corroboration requirement is as underinclu-
sive as it is overinclusive in not singling out friends, relatives, or fellow prison
inmates as the only declarants whose statements must be corroborated by the
defendant. 722
The Subcommittee's failure to impose the corroboration requirement on
the Government apparently resulted from its misinterpretation of the defend-
ant's confrontation clause protection rather than from a belief that the
declarant would not speak against his penal interest in implicating the
defendant. During the June 12, 1973 markup session, for example, Represen-
718. Assuming that the jury trusts the Government's evidence more than the defendant's, this danger
exists when the Government offers a statement implicating the defendant.
719. This assumes that the jury does not realize that the defendant is currently under no obligation to
disclose an exculpatory statement to the Government.
720. See Rothstein, supra note 183, at 154 n.151 (jury's sensitivity to private coercion greater than
realization of Governmental pressures).
721. Markup Session, June 12, 1973; see Advisory Committee Note to Revised Draft, supra note 1, at
444 (statements of codefendants traditionally regarded with suspicion because of readily supposed
advantages of implicating another); Cleary Memorandum, supra note 112, at 7 ("[Professor Blakey] is
certainly correct that the ["Bruton sentence"] too broadly assumes that every declaration implicating
another is made to curry favor with the authorities and hence not against interest.").
722. In practice, one way to resolve this underinclusivity is to inspect the declarant's motivation closely
to determine whether the statement is actually against penal interest. Compare United States v. Love, 592
F.2d 1022, 1025 (8th Cir. 1979) (prostitute's statement to police implicating defendant not against interest)
with United States v. White, 553 F.2d 310, 313 (2d Cir.) (prostitute's statement to police implicating
defendant admissible because against interest), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 972 (1977). No matter how difficult
this inspection will be, a holding that no implication of the defendant by an arrested declarant is against the
latter's penal interest clashes with congressional intent. But see United States v. Sarmiento-Perez, 633 F.2d
1092, 1102-03 (5th Cir. 1980) (third-party custodial confessions implicating defendant are inherently
untrustworthy and not admissible under rule 804(b)(3)).
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tative Holtzman asked why the corroboration requirement should not beimposed on the Government.23 In response, associate counsel argued such a
requirement was superfluous because Bruton created a confrontation clausebar to all Government-offered penal interest statements by an unavailable
declarant. 724
Neither Bruton nor several of the Supreme Court's later efforts to explainthe confrontation clause provide the defendant with this protection. 725Associate counsel and the Subcommittee apparently assumed that the Court
admitted the codefendant's implication of Bruton as substantive evidence.The Court, however, admitted the codefendant's statement only against the
codefendant in Bruton.726 The Court explicitly reserved consideration of the
confrontation clause problem that exists when a hearsay statement satisfies an
exception and is therefore substantively admitted against the defendant. 727 If a
statement satisfies the confrontation clause whenever it satisfies a hearsay
exception, the House Subcommittee created an equal protection problem in
not imposing the corroboration requirement on the Government.728
723. Markup Session, June 12, 1973.
724. Id. In the Subcommittee's June 28, 1973 print the reinserted "Bruton sentence" reads: "Astatement or confession offered against the accused in a criminal case, made by a codefendant or otherperson implicating both himself and the accused, is not admissible." JUNE 28, 1973 COMMITTEE PRINT,
supra note 10, at 175. The Subcommittee may have initially believed that a declarant's implication of thedefendant was inadmissible under any hearsay exception on constitutional grounds. The Advisory andStanding Committees suggested changing the final clause of the June 28 version from "is not inadmissible"to "is not within this exception." Committees' Response to Subcommittee Print, supra note 175, at 298.The Subcommittee adopted the suggestion, and its October 10, 1973 print included the change of language.OCTOBER 10, 1973 PRINT, supra note 10, at 388. This change would permit the Government to introducethe declarant's implication through some other hearsay exception or through the coconspirator doctrine of
rule 801(d)(2)(E). The Subcommittee thus apparently narrowed its constitutional concern to rule
804(b)(3).
725. See Parker v. Randolph, 422 U.S. 62, 74-75 (1979) (jury instruction not to consider codefendant's
confession implicating defendant but not admitted against the defendant satisfies Bruton concerns whendefendant's own confession introduced); Schneble v. Florida, 405 U.S. 427, 432 (1972) (defendant's
confession permits conclusion that introduction of codefendant's statement harmless error); Nelson v.O'Neil, 402 U.S. 622, 629-30 (1971) (no Bruton violation if codefendant denies making statement at trialand statement implicating defendant not admitted against defendant); Harrington v. California, 395 U.S.250, 254-55 (1969) (defendant's confession permits conclusion that introduction of codefendant's statement
harmless error).
726. Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123, 125 n.2 (1968).
727. The Supreme Court noted:
We emphasize that the hearsay statement inculpating petitioner was clearly inadmissible
against him under traditional rules of evidence .... There is not before us, therefore, any
recognized exception to the hearsay rule insofar as petitioner is concerned and we intimate no
view whatever that such exceptions necessarily raise questions under the Confrontation
Clause.
Id. at 128 n.3. Instead, the Court was concerned with the effectiveness ofajudicial instruction to ignore the
codefendant's statement in determining the defendant's guilt. Id. at 137. Because the Court thought that nojury would follow such an instruction, it feared that the jury would misuse the nontestifying codefendant's
statement as substantive evidence against the defendant, denying the defendant his right to confront his
accusor. Id.
728. The House Subcommittee perhaps understandably misinterpretated Bruton because it was misledby the Supreme Court's emphasis on the confrontation clause rather than the procedural due process
clause. See generally Haddad, Post-Bruton Developments: A Reconsideration of the Confrontation Ration-
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Since Bruton, the Supreme Court has attempted to explain the role of the
confrontation clause when a hearsay statement is admitted against the
defendant. In its first relevant attempt, Dutton v. Evans, 729 the Government
introduced the declarant's hearsay statement against the defendant under
Georgia's hearsay exception for coconspirator's statements.730 The statement,
however, did not automatically satisfy the confrontation clause. In a plurality
opinion, the Court apparently established two tests to determine whether a
hearsay statement satisfies the confrontation clause: The statement must
satisfy a hearsay exception 731 and it must be reliable.
732
Justice Stewart's plurality opinion left several points unclear. First, is a
showing of reliability a separate test? If the statement satisfies a widely-
accepted hearsay exception, why is an independent demonstration of its
reliability necessary? Hearsay exceptions generally assume the reliability of a
qualifying statement. Second, what kind and what quantum of evidence
satisfies the "indicia of reliability" test? The supporting evidence in Dutton
was equivocal. Was the Court satisfied because the defendant could have
subpoenaed the declarant to testify,733 because the declarant's statement was
not "crucial" to the Government or "devastating" to the defense,734 or
because the "trier of fact [had] a satisfactory basis for evaluating the truth of
the prior statement"?735 If the declarant was unavailable (as he must be under
rule 804(b)(3)) or if the statement played a more important role in the
Government's proof, would the Court expect a more convincing demonstra-
tion of reliability? If either is true, how should lower courts interpret Justice
Stewart's conclusion that the declarant's statement was reliable? If Georgia
had a penal interest exception like rule 804(b)(3), would satisfaction of such a
penal interest exception simultaneously satisfy the confrontation clause? If
this is the meaning of Dutton, it follows that the confrontation clause offers no
protection when the Government introduces an uncorroborated penal interest
ale, and A Proposal forA Due Process Evaluation of Limiting Instructions, 18 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1 (1980)
(Bruton protection better understood in due process rather than confrontation clause terms). In Nelson v.
O'Neil, 402 U.S. 622 (1971), Justice Brennan argued that the majority in O'Neil overvalued the
effectiveness of a jury instruction to ignore the codefendant's implication of the defendant, admitted only
against the codefendant, in holding that the confrontation clause was not violated when the codefendant
testified. Id. at 633-34 (Brennan, J., with Douglas & Marshall, JJ., dissenting).
729. 400 U.S. 74 (1970). The Court decided California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149 (1970), several months
before Dutton. Although hearsay wis admitted against the defendant in Green, the defendant was able to
cross-examine the declarant both at the preliminary examination and at trial. 399 U.S. at 151-52. In Dutton
the declarant did not testify at any point, although apparently either party could have subpoenaed him. 400
U.S. at 88 n.19. Because rule 804(b)(3) conditions admissibility of the declarant's statement on his
unavailability, the rule establishes a factual setting more analogous to Dutton.
730. 400 U.S. at 83 & n.15.
731. Id. at 82-83. The Supreme Court held that Georgia's expansive coconspirator exception,
permitting the Government to introduce a coconspirator's statement made during the concealment phase
of the crime, did not violate the confrontation clause. Id. at 83. The Court noted that federal court
decisions excluding statements made during the concealment stage of a conspiracy were based on an
evidentiary rule promulgated pursuant to the Court's supervisory power and did not establish a
constitutional limit on the exception. Id. at 82.
732. Justice Stewart found that the statement bore "indicia of reliability" because the statement was
spontaneous and against the declarant's penal interest. Id. at 89.
733. Id. at 88 n.19.
734. Id. at 87.
735. Id. at 89 (quoting California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 161 (1970)). See also Mancusi v. Stubbs, 408
U.S. 204, 213 (1972) (quoting Dutton and Green).
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statement under rule 804(b)(3). Thus, the confrontation clause would not
provide the sort of protection that the House Subcommitte anticipated.
The Court's most recent confrontation clause decision, Ohio v. Roberts, 736
clarifies some of the ambiguity in Dutton but introduces other interpretive
problems. The Court confirmed that the confrontation clause demands a
demonstration of the reliability of a hearsay statement. 737 In evaluating
whether the statement bore "indicia of reliability," the Court indicated that
the "[r]eliability [of the hearsay statement] can be inferred without more in a
case where the evidence falls within a firmly rooted hearsay exception." 738 If
the statement falls outside these exceptions, "the evidence must be excluded,
at least absent a showing of particularized guarantees of trustworthiness." 739
The Court's dictum can be read in different ways. The Court correctly
stated that the dying declaration exception is "firmly rooted" in history. 40
The Court's approval of the dying declaration exception suggests that any
hearsay exception, widely accepted by many jurisdictions, satisfies the
confrontation clause's test of reliability. 741 The constitutionality of a hearsay
exception, however, should be tested by the likelihood of the statement's
reliability rather than the longevity of the exception's acceptance. The Court's
reference to the business record and the prior cross-examined testimony
exceptions, which are thought to cover evidence more reliable than dying
declarations, suggests that the confrontation clause may require an analysis of
the premises of the particular exception and that the dying declaration
exception enjoys special treatment solely because of its age.
Neither of these interpretations of the Court's dictum is compelling.
Although the business records exception also is well established, its premises
remain controversial.74 2 In Roberts the Court did not explain the meaning of
736. 100 S. Ct. 2531 (1980). In Roberts the defendant, convicted of forging a check and with possession
of stolen credit cards, defended on the ground that the victim's daughter gave him permission to use the
checkbook and credit cards. Id. at 2535. To establish this defense, counsel called the daughter as a witness
at the preliminary examination. Id. She denied that she had given the defendant such permission. Id. When
the defendant testifed at his trial that the daughter gave him permission, the prosecutor introduced the
daughter's preliminary examination testimony in rebuttal. Id. The daughter did not testify at trial. Id.
737. Id. at 2539. The Court held that, as a threshold test, the declarant must be unavailable and the
Government must make a good faith effort to produce him at trial. Id. at 2538-39, 2543. The Court noted,
however, that unavailability need not be demonstrated if the utility of trial confrontation is minimal. Id. at
2538 n.7 (citing Dutton).
738. Id. at 2539. The Court's examples of "firmly rooted" exceptions were those for dying declarations,
cross-examined prior testimony, and business records. Id. & n.8.
739. Id. at 2539 (footnote omitted).
740. See Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S. 237, 243 (1895) ("from time immemorial [dying
declarations] have been treated as competent testimony"). The dying declaration exception might have
been the only exception recognized at the time the confrontation clause was ratified. See F. HELLER, THE
SIxTH AMENDMENT 105 & n.65 (1951) (dying declaration only exception recognized at common law at
time of constitutional convention); cf H. ROTrsCHAEFER, HANDBOOK OF AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL
LAW 796 (1939) (citing Kirby v. United States, 174 U.S. 47, 61 (1899), which stated that dying declaration
exception well established at time of constitutional convention).
741. This possibility rests upon the belief that the dying declaration exception admits what is perhaps
the most unreliable type of hearsay. See House Subcommittee Hearings, supra note 10, at 217 (statement of
a Committee of New York Trial Lawyers on the Proposed Federal Rules of Evidence) (arguing that onlyjustification for exception is necessity because in homicide cases declarant obviously unavailable to testify
against defendant).
742. In Roberts the Supreme Court quoted a student comment that included the business records
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"firmly rooted," for it again declined to comment on the constitutionality of
all hearsay exceptions. 743 Furthermore, the Court accepted prior cross-
examination as a substitute for judicial inquiry into the reliability of the
hearsay. 744 Yet the Court did not explain how a court determines whether a
particular exception (other than those for dying declarations and business
records) that involves no cross-examination is "firmly rooted" or how it
decides that challenged hearsay is reliable in a particular case.
The penal interest exception could be "fir-mly rooted" because many
jurisdictions accept it, commentators have argued that penal interest state-
ments are reliable, and the Supreme Court has recognized the exception.
745 If
the Government need only demonstrate that the exception is "firmly rooted,"
the corroboration requirement of rule 804(b)(3) is unconstitutional because it
imposes a higher burden on the defendant. If a court does not consider the
exception "firmly rooted," it also might examine the exception on a case-by-
case basis not only because the exception is included in rule 804 rather than in
rule 803,746 but also because common law courts historically have been
skeptical of penal interest statements. 747 If this test of "particularized
guarantees of trustworthiness" is interpreted generously for the Government,
the constitutional problem remains. If a court, for example, focuses on the
trustworthiness of the declarant's self-implication rather than on the evidence
that links the defendant to the crime, the Government's confrontation clause
burden might be lower than the defendant's corroboration burden under rule
804(b)(3). Moreover, because rule 804(b)(3) does not impose the corrobora-
exception "among the safest of the hearsay exceptions." Ohio v. Roberts, 100 S. Ct. 2531, 2539 n.8 (1980)
(quoting Comment, Hearsay, the Confrontation Guarantee and Related Problems, 30 LA. L. REv. 651, 668
(1970)). Congress, however, was troubled by the Supreme Court's version of the business record exception
(rule 803(6)) and therefore narrowed it by adding requirements. See Comments by the Standing and
Advisory Committees to H.R. 5463, reprinted in Senate Judiciary Hearings, supra note 118, at 67 (detailing
history of change to rule). Ironically, the comment cited by the Court in Roberts also concluded that
business records generally should be inadmissible in criminal cases. Comment, Hearsay, the Confrontation
Guarantee and Related Problems, 30 LA. L. REv. 651, 668 (1970).
743. See 100 S. Ct. at 2538 (no attempt to "map out theory of the Confrontation Clause that would
determine the validity of all... hearsay 'exceptions"') (quoting California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 162
(1970)). The Court's case-by-case interpretation of the confrontation clause is similar to a due process
analysis with a preference for in-court confrontation. See Graham, The Right of Confrontation and the
Hearsay Rule: Sir Walter Raleigh Loses Another One, 8 CRIM. L. BULL. 99, 133 (1972) (right to confront
accuser important symbol of fairness).
744. See 100 S. Ct. at 2541-42 (defense counsel's questioning of daughter at preliminary hearing
partook of cross-examination as matter of form).
745. See, e.g., United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164, 174 (1974) (declarant's statement admitting
extramarital cohabitation admissible at suppression hearing because against penal interest); United States
v. Harris, 403 U.S. 573, 583 (1971) (Burger, C.J., with Black, Blackmun & White, JJ., concurring)
(informant's tip credible to establish probable cause for search warrant because against penal interest);
Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74, 89 (1970) (plurality opinion) (that coconspirator's statement against penal
interest one indicia of reliability).
746. The exception was included in rule 804 because against interest statements were thought to be less
reliable than those in 803. Following Chambers, however, at least one commentator wondered whether rule
804(b)(3) should be transferred to rule 803, which does not require that the declarant be unavailable. Letter
from Gilbert G. Ackroyd to Representative William L. Hungate (July 18, 1973), reprinted in SUPPLEMENT
TO SUBcOMMITEE HEARINGS, supra note 10, at 207 (Chambers might require transfer of against interest
exception to rule 803). See also note 52 supra (Advisory Committee rejected transfer of exception to rule
803).
747. See notes 25-42 supra and accompanying text (discussing common law courts' treatment of penal
interest statements).
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tion requirement on the Government, courts might require less supporting
evidence from the Government to satisfy the Roberts test than rule 804(b)(3)
demands of the defendant.
The Court's decision in Roberts does not explain whether the confrontation
clause provides the same protection as the corroboration requirement. If the
same protection is not provided, an equal protection imbalance exists. To
avoid this constitutional problem, courts could impose the corroboration
requirement on the Government when it seeks to introduce a declarant's
statement 748 and could permit the defendant to introduce a related statement
when the crime was committed by more than one person. Such a judicialinterpretation of the rule749 probably is justified because the Advisory andStanding Committees overlooked the corroboration imbalance50 and the
748. Although not attempting to correct an equal protection imbalance, the United States Court of
Appeals for the Fifth Circuit imposed a corroboration requirement on the Government in United States v.Alvarez, 584 F.2d 694 (5th Cir. 1978). Lopez, an alleged coconspirator of the defendant Alvarez, soldheroin to an undercover agent. Lopez later testified that a then-dead third coconspirator told him thatAlvarez supplied the heroin. Id. at 695. The court of appeals first concluded that the Government'sindependent evidence of a conspiracy was insufficient to justify admission of the hearsay evidence under
rule 801(d)(2)(E). Id. at 699. The court then concluded that the Government had to corroborate the
coconspirator's statement in order to introduce it as a penal interest statement under rule 804(b)(3), Id. at701. The court reasoned that to rule otherwise would circumvent rule 801(d)(2)(E)'s additional
requirements Id. See also United States v. Oliver, 626 F.2d 254, 261 (2d Cir. 1980) (without discussion
court assumes rule imposes corroboration requirement on Government); NEW YORK PROPOSED CODE OF
EVIDENCE, rule 804(b)(3) ("A statement tending to expose the declarant to criminal liability and offered in
a criminal proceeding is not admissible unless other evidence corroborates the trustworthiness of the
statement").
In contrast to Alvarez, the Fifth Circuit in United States v. Sarmiento-Perez, 633 F.2d 1092 (5th Cir.1980), distinguished between the Government's and the defendant's burden, imposing on the Government
a higher burden of showing that the declarant had spoken against his penal interest in implicating thedefendant than the defendant faced in proving that the declarant had spoken against penal interest in
exculpating the defendant. Id. at 1098, 1100. The court thought that the "tend to subject" language of rule804(b)(3)'s first sentence set the penal interest burden only for the defendant. Id. at 1096. Although
claiming that this distinction was not constitutionally required, the court thought that it was justified by
confrontation clause principles. Id. at 1099. Moreover, the court went radically further by saying that adeclarant in custody could never speak against his penal interest by implicating the defendant. Id. at 1102-
03. The court's dual conclusions clash with the Advisory and Standing Committees' position, and probably
with Congress' as well. The decision is justified, if at all, only as a constitutional decision. However, becauseRoberts orders an analysis of the reliability of any hearsay not encompassed within a "firmly rooted"
exception, Roberts may implicitly reject any sort of automatic exclusion of hearsay.
749. Alternatively, a court could protect the defendant by applying rule 403's balancing test ofprejudice against probativity to an uncorroborated statement that implicates the defendant. The court,however, would face three problems. First, rule 403 might not authorize exclusion of evidence that satisfies
a hearsay exception. See note 670 supra (discussing whether rule 403 authorizes exclusion). Although the
court could exclude evidence on evidentiary rather than constitutional grounds, rule 403 might beinapplicable because the Supreme Court has held that the confrontation clause is satisfied when a hearsay
statement falls within a hearsay exception. See Ohio v. Roberts, 100 S. Ct. 2531, 2539 (1980) (reliability
inferred when evidence satisfies firmly rooted hearsay exception). Second, rule 403 might not permit
exclusion of hearsay for unreliability because the rule does not use that term. However, the rule'sprovisions for "unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury" arguably include
unreliable evidence. Finally, assuming rule 403 authorizes exclusion, the defendant must prove that thedanger of unfair prejudice substantially outweighs the probative value of the evidence. This burden wouldbe difficult to meet if the hearsay statement was an important part of the Government's evidence.
Moreover, the Government is not similarly burdened when the defendant offers the statement.
750. See note 200 supra and accompanying text (Standing Committee did not notice disparity whenfailing to impose corroboration requirement on defendant); Comment, Inculpatory Statements, supra note199, at 1216 & n.155 (logical expansion of corroboration requirement to inculpatory statements simply
overlooked by Advisory Committee).
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House Subcommittee, incorrectly interpreting Bruton, did not impose the
corroboration requirement on the Government.
751
By imposing the corroboration requirement on the Government, however,
a court will not eliminate the equal protection imbalance between the
Government's ability to introduce an unavailable declarant's statement
implicating the defendant and the defendant's ability to introduce an
exculpatory statement. The Government still can resort to the coconspirator
rule.752 A trial court may admit a coconspirator's statement if the Govern-
ment separately establishes753 that a conspiracy existed and that the defendant
was a member of it.754 The majority of federal courts satisfy these require-
ments by interpreting rule 104(a) to impose a preponderance of evidence test
on the Government under the coconspirator rule.755 This test imposes a lower
burden of proof on the Government than the corroboration requirement
would impose on the defendant. 756 Moreover, the coconspirator rule does not
require the Government to establish the reliability of the statement. If the
coconspirator rule is "firmly rooted," 757 the confrontation clause provides no
751. The Subcommittee's refusal to eliminate the imbalance should not bar interstitial interpretation.
Cf. Letter from Melvin B. Lewis to Representative William L. Hungate (July 18, 1973), reprinted in
SUPPLEMENT TO SUBcOMMITTEE HEARINGS, supra note 10, at 210-11 (rule should be changed because
implications of corroboration imbalance disturbing); Recommendations of the District of Columbia Bar
Study Commitee on the Federal Rules of Evidence (July 31, 1973), reprinted in SUPPLEMENT TO
SUBCOMMITTEE HEARINGS, supra note 10, at 291 (three of 15 committee members recommended
imposing corroboration requirement on inculpatory statements).
752. FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(2)(E). By resorting to rule 801(d)(2)(E), the Government could circumvent
the problem of whether the coconspirator's implication of the defendant is against his penal interest. See
Davenport, The Confrontation Clause and the Co-Conspirator Exception in Criminal Prosecutions: A
Functional Analysis, 85 HARV. L. REv. 1378, 1396 (1972) (coconspirator's purported penal interest
statement implicating defendant should be excluded under both hearsay exceptions).
753. See Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60, 74 (1942) (declaration of conspirator against absent
alleged coconspirator inadmissable unless coconspirator connected with conspiracy). At least two courts of
appeals, however, now permit consideration of the statement in determining whether rule 801(d)(2)(E) has
been satisfied. These courts interpret rule 104(a), which permits consideration of otherwise inadmissible
information in deciding questions of admissibility, to authorize examination of the statement. See United
States v. Enright, 579 F.2d 980, 985 n.4 (6th Cir. 1978) (arguably, court may consider statement to
determine admissibility under rule 104(a)); United States v. Martorano, 557 F.2d 1, 12 (1st Cir. 1977) (new
rules permit consideration of statement when it simply corroborates significant independent evidence), cert.
denied, 435 U.S. 922 (1978).
754. FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(2)(E). Because of these conditions, the coconspirator rule might not always
apply when a coconspirator's statement is inadmissible under rule 804(b)(3). A declarant's statement to a
police officer that implicates the defendant, for example, is unlikely to satisfy either requirement of rule
801(d)(2)(E).
755. See Comment, Reconstructing the Independent Evidence Requirement of the Coconspirator
Hearsay Exception, 127 U. PA. L. REV. 1439, 1450-52 & nn.80-96 (1979) (citing and discussing cases)
[hereinafter Comment, Independent Evidence Requirement].
756. Rule 801(d)(2)(E)'s requirement that the statement be made "in furtherance of the conspiracy,"
however, does provide separate protection for the defendant. This protection disappears if a state adopts
rule 804(b)(3) but not the "in furtherance of' requirement of rule 801(d)(2)(E). Cf. Dutton v. Evans, 400
U.S. 74, 78 (1970) (plurality opinion) (although coconspirator's statement could not have been admitted
under federal rules, Georgia rules permitted because no "in furtherance of" requirement). A court could
also give the defendant additional protection by instructing the jury to ignore this statement if the jury
determined that the alleged coconspirator's statement did not further the conspiracy or that the defendant
was not a party to it. Authorities disagree whether this instruction should be given. Compare United States
v. Herrara, 407 F. Supp. 766, 772 (N.D. Ill. 1975) (under rule 104(a) jury should not reconsider questions
of admissibility decided by court) with MCCORMICK, supra note 4, § 53 at 124 n.97 (jury could be
instructed to disregard evidence).
757. See Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74, 87 (1970) (plurality opinion) (exception well-established under
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separate protection for the defendant. The Government could circumvent ajudicial imposition of the corroboration requirement by applying the cocon-
spirator rule with its lower burden of proof.758 Interstitial judicial interpreta-
tion of rule 804(b)(3) then would not eliminate the equal protection im-
balance.7 59
C. THE RULE STRIPS THE JURY OF ITS CUSTOMARY FACTFINDING ROLE
Although the jury usually evaluates the credit and weight of the evidence,
the corroboration requirement transfers this customary function to thejudge.760 The requirement makes the issue of trustworthiness a threshold
question of admissibility rather than a jury question of relevance conditioned
on fact. The Advisory Committee originally assigned the question of trust-
worthiness to the jury in the Preliminary and Revised Drafts. 61 With the
addition of the "simple corroboration" requirement in the Revised Definitive
and Supreme Court Drafts, the Standing Committee shifted this responsibility
to the judge.7 62
state statutory law). Although the Supreme Court has not determined the constitutionality of rule
801(d)(2)(E), the rule is probably constitutional. See Comment, Independent Evidence Requirement, supra
note 755, at 1447-48 (courts continue to rely upon validity of preponderance of evidence test under rule801(d)(2)(E)); cf. United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 701 n.14 (1974) (describing evidentiary
requirements for admitting coconspirator's statement less restrictively than federal courts of appeals have
interpreted requirements of rule 801(d)(2)(E)).
758. The Government also might use rule 804(b)(5), the "catch-all" hearsay exception, to introduce an
unavailable declarant's statement that implicates the defendant. The United States Court of Appeals for the
Eighth Circuit, for example, has held that rule 804(b)(5) permits the admission at trial of grand jury
testimony that implicated the defendants. United States v. Carlson, 547 F.2d 1346, 1355 (8th Cir. 1976),
cert. denied, 431 U.S. 914 (1977). The coconspirator exception did not apply because the witness had not
testified at the grand jury "in furtherance of the conspiracy." Id. See also United States v. Payne, 492 F.2d
449, 452 (4th Cir.) (in prerules decision, witness' written, unsigned statement to Government agent that
implicated himself and brothers admitted when witness could not remember incident or making the
statement), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 876 (1974); United States v. Thevis, 84 F.R.D. 57, 73 (N.D. Ga. 1979)(statements by declarant implicating defendant in several crimes admissible under rule 804(b)(5)).
759. The appellate treatment of an error in admitting a coconspirator's statement or in excluding a
defense-offered declarant's statement also creates a disparity between the Government and the defendant.
When the trial court errs in either instance, that error might be treated as harmless on appeal. Cf. Parker v.
Randolph, 442 U.S. 62, 71 n.5 (1979) (citing cases holding introduction of coconspirator's statement
harmless error). Compare United States v. Sarmiento-Perez, 633 F.2d 1092, 1104 (5th Cir. 1980)(erroneous introduction of coconspirator's penal interest statement not harmless error) with State v. Wahle,
298 N.W.2d 795, 798 (S.D. 1980) (assuming that admission of wife's statement implicating defendant was
error, error was harmless). Thus, the error in admitting a coconspirator's inculpatory statement or in
excluding a declarant's exculpatory statement might not warrant reversal even if the error prejudices thedefendant. Furthermore, the jury might be affected by a coconspirator's statement, admitted subject to a
motion to strike, even if later instructed to ignore it. This consideration explains why one court has held
that the trial court should decide whether to admit the coconspirator's statement pretrial or out of thejury's presence, United States v. James, 590 F.2d 575, 579-80 (5th Cir. 1979) (en banc), and has suggested
that the trial court decide whether to admit a coconspirator's statement under rule 804(b)(3) in the same
way. United States v. Sarmiento-Perez, 633 F.2d 1092, 1101 n.5 (5th Cir. 1980). In contrast, jury error
never benefits the defendant because the court is unlikely to admit the declarant's statement subject to a
later motion to strike if the defendant fails to satisfy the corroboration requirement.
760. This criticism particularly applies to a judicial evaluation of the credibility of the witness as a
condition of admissibility. See notes 237-43 supra, and accompanying text (discussing United States v.
Bagley, 537 F.2d 162 (5th Cir. 1976)).
761. See text accompanying note 626 supra (according to Advisory Committee notes to Preliminary
Draft and Revised Draft, questions of possible fabrication better trusted to competence of jury),
762. See text accompanying note 627 supra (Standing Committee transferred trustworthiness question
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Neither the Standing Committee at its September 30, 1971 meeting nor the
House Subcommittee during its markup sessions discussed this important
transfer. The transfer is justified only by assuming that the jury could not
understand a judicial instruction that explained the meaning of the "simple
corroboration" requirement or that the jury would nonetheless consider the
statement even if they properly understood an instruction and decided that
the statement was not sufficiently corroborated.
The first explanation is subject to the same criticism as the corroboration
requirement: The shift was based upon a nonprincipled compromise, not a
substantive evaluation of the trustworthiness of defense-offered statements.
The jury explanations also are suspect because in our system of justice we
assume that a jury can evaluate the credit and weight of the evidence and will
follow a judicial instruction.763
Several state courts have refused to impose a corroboration requirement on
the defendant, concluding that this requirement was relevant only to the
probativity of the statement and not to its admissibility.764 In United States v.
Satterfield765 the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
similarly expressed concern that an admissibility determination by the judge
under rule 104(a) about the credibility of the witness might interfere with the
jury's customary responsibility. 766
In Cool v. United States767 the Supreme Court rejected a trial court's
instruction to the jury to disregard the defense-offered exculpatory testimony
of an accomplice unless the jury believed the testimony was true beyond a
reasonable doubt. 768 The Court held that the instruction violated the defend-
ant's sixth amendment right to present evidence. 769 In one sense, the Cool
instruction is less obstructive than the corroboration requirement because the
corroboration requirement's burden of proof, although high, is lower than
proof "beyond a reasonable doubt." The corroboration requirement is more
from jury to judge). The Standing Committee did not explain what was meant by the following passage
from its explanatory note: "When the statement is offered by the accused by way of exculpation, the
resulting situation is not adapted to control by rulings as to the weight of the evidence, and hence the
provision is cast in terms of a requirement preliminary to admissibility." Supreme Court Draft, supra note
1, at 327. Neither the Standing Committee nor Professor Cleary explained why this change was necessary,
nor what was meant by the statement that "the resulting situation is not adapted to control by rulings as to
the weight of the evidence .... Unfortunately, Congress never discussed this shift in the roles of the judge
and the jury.
763. If the jury is thought able to follow a judicial instruction to ignore the defendant's impeaching
convictions on the issue of guilt, see Spencer v. Texas, 385 U.S. 554, 560-61 (1967) (in determining guilt and
sentence jury informed of defendant's prior conviction for murder), it is surely able to follow an instruction
to inspect closely the defense-offered penal interest statement. See also note 704 supra.
764. See, eg., People v. Edwards, 396 Mich. 551, 565, 242 N.W.2d 739, 745 (1976) (circumstances
surrounding third-party statements relevant to weight given testimony not admissibility); Commonwealth
v. Nash, 457 Pa. 296, 308, 324 A.2d 344, 350 (1974) (Roberts, 3., concurring) (circumstances ensuring
reliability relevant to weight of evidence not admissibility); Newberry v. Commonwealth, 191 Va. 445, 462,
61 S.E.2d 318, 326 (1950) (jury should decide credibility and weight of hearsay evidence).
765. 572 F.2d 687 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 840 (1978).
766. Id. at 691-92. After examining the legislative history of rule 804(b)(3), however, the court
suggested, without deciding, that judges may exclude an exculpatory statement if corroborating circum-
stances do not clearly indicate the trustworthiness of the witness. Id. at 692. The Ninth Circuit decision,
however, was probably incorrect. See notes 632-38 supra and accompanying text (Satterfield incorrectly
permitted judge to assess witness credibility).
767. 409 U.S. 100 (1972) (per curiam).
768. Id. at 104.
769. Id.
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obstructive, however, because the jury will not even consider the trustworthi-
ness of the statement if the court decides not to admit the statement.Thus, the corroboration requirement in rule 804(b)(3) is constitutionally
suspect because it strips the jury of its customary role of evaluating the credit
and the weight of the evidence. 770 Nonetheless, the constitutional focus
arguably should be on the corroboration requirement itself rather than on thejudge-jury division because the judge makes a similar admissibility determina-
tion in other hearsay exceptions.771
D. THE RULE CONFLICTS WITH THE DEFENDANT'S RIGHT
TO PRESENT EVIDENCE
The Supreme Court, which has seldom considered the defendant's con-
stitutional right to introduce evidence under the compulsory process clause of
the sixth amendment,772 has never explained the relationship of this right to
the defendant's right to exclude evidence under the confrontation clause of
the sixth amendment. 773 This section of the article, which will discuss this
relationship, first assumes that the rights are directly related because thedefendant may introduce any evidence that he could not prevent theGovernment from introducing. The section then will focus on the importance
of introducing penal interest statements for the defense and will assume that
the rights are inversely related because, under certain circumstances, thedefendant may introduce evidence regardless of the Government's ability to
do so.
Whether or not a penal interest statement satisfies either reliability
requirement of Roberts, 774 our model of the corroboration requirement of rule804(b)(3) arguably imposes a higher burden on the defendant than Robertsimposes on the Government. An analysis of Dutton v. Evans775 demonstrates
770. An analogous issue is the judge-jury division when a factual issue determines both the admissibility
of evidence and the jury's decision on the merits. See State v. Lee, 127 La. 1077, 1080-81, 54 So. 356, 357(1911) ("Mack Lee" murdered the victim; the defendant, identified as Mack Lee, called Mack Lee's wife to
testify that he was not Mack Lee; her testimony excluded when Government asserted spousal immunityprivilege). In this setting the court, by deciding the admissibility question, may preclude the proponent
from introducing his only available evidence on the ultimate issue. As a result, the court arguably should
adopt the rule 104(b) approach, admitting the evidence if a reasonable juror could conclude that the
evidence was relevant and instructing the jury to ignore it otherwise. See generally R. LEMPERT & S.SALTZBURG, supra note 701 at 1138-39. Similarly, the court could admit a defense-offered penal interest
statement upon a finding, under rule 104(b), that a reasonable juror could find that the declarant's
statement was reliable.
771. The judge assesses trustworthiness as an issue of admissibility under hearsay exceptions 803(6),
803(7), and 803(8) for certain types of records. The applicable standards, however, in these exceptions are
lower and the opponent has the burden of providing evidence of untrustworthiness. See also Note, The
Theoretical Foundation of the Hearsay Rules, 93 HARV. L. RE. 1786, 1804-07 (1980) (discussing
inconsistency of hearsay rules with traditional role of jury).
772. Cf Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14, 18 (1967) (sixth amendment compulsory process right
applicable to states). See also Green v. Georgia, 442 U.S. 95, 97 (1979) (per curiam) (denial of due process
to exclude reliable hearsay testimony at punishment proceeding); Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284,
302 (1973) (denial of due process to exclude reliable hearsay testimony at trial).
773. See generally Clinton, supra note 661; Westen, Future of Confrontation, supra note 311, at 1185;Westen, Confrontation and Compulsory Process: A Unified Theory of Evidence for Criminal Cases, 91
HARV. L. REV. 567 (1978) [hereinafter Westen, Confrontation and Compulsory Process]; Westen,Compulsory Process II, 74 MICH. L. REV. 191 (1975); Westen, Compulsory Process, supra note 587, at 71.774. See notes 742-43 supra and accompanying text (discussing possible interpretations of Roberts).
775. 400 U.S. 74 (1970) (plurality opinion).
m
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that the Government bears a lower burden in satisfying the confrontation
clause than the defendant bears in satisfying the corroboration requirement.
In Dutton the Supreme Court inferred that the declarant had not falsely
implicated the defendant because the declarant's statement, made in response
to a witness' question, was spontaneous and against the declarant's penal
interest.776 The declarant's statement, however, would not have satisfied the
"excited utterance" hearsay exception of rule 803(2).777 Moreover, the
declarant's statement, which was extremely ambiguous, 778 required the Court
to draw a questionable penal interest inference because the statement did not
directly implicate either the defendant or the declarant.779 Additionally, even
if the witness did not fabricate the statement,780 he might not have understood
what the declarant said.781 Thus, the objections to the version of rule 804(b)(3)
in the Preliminary and Revised Drafts, which contained no corroboration
requirement, apply to the declarant's statement in Dutton: It was ambiguous,
it was not obviously against the declarant's penal interest, it did not substitute
the declarant for another person, and it might not have been reported
honestly or accurately.
The Court's analysis in Dutton of the "indicia of reliability" test apparently
suggests that the confrontation clause does not impose on the Government as
high a proof burden as the corroboration requirement of rule 804(b)(3)
imposes on the defendant. In his plurality opinion, however, Justice Stewart
described the declarant's statement as neither "crucial" to the Government
nor "devastating" to the defense.782 Thus, the Court might demand additional
evidence of reliability if the hearsay statement played a more important role in
the Government's case.783 Nonetheless, that additional evidence might not
776. Id. at 89.
777. The declarant's statement in Dutton was not spontaneous because it was made long after the
commission of the crime. Furthermore, the statement would not have been admissible under rule 803(1) as
a present sense impression or under rule 803(3) as an existing mental condition.
778. 400 U.S. at 104 (Marshall, J., dissenting); see notes 440-41 supra and accompanying text
(declarant's statement subject to different interpretations).
779. The declarant apparently ran no penal interest risk in speaking: He had already been convicted and
the Court did not suggest that his statement jeopardized any appeal he might have been pursuing.
The Court also claimed that the declarant's conviction corroborated the reliability of his statement. 400
U.S. at 88. This argument is doubly flawed. It begs the question whether the verdict was accurate; it is
irrelevant to the issue whether the Dutton jury had sufficient information to evaluate the reliability of the
declarant's statement because the jury did not learn of his conviction.
Because the Government probably could have introduced the declarant's statement against him at his
own trial as a personal admission, the Court's analysis all but equates the party admission and penal
interest doctrines.
780. Id. at 103 & n.5 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (doubtful that declarant made statement attributed to
him).
781. For the setting in which the witness reportedly heard the statement, see note 440 supra (quoting
court of appeals' description).
782. 400 U.S. at 87.
783. In Roberts the Court implied that the "crucial-devastating" language ofDutton was relevant to the
first confrontation clause test of whether the declarant was unavailable. See Ohio v. Roberts, 100 S. Ct.
2531, 2538 n.7 (1980) (utility of trial confrontation so remote that Dutton did not require prosecution to
produce seemingly available witness). In Roberts the Court did not discuss the corroborating factors in
Dutton. Thus, the Court arguably viewed the introduction of the declarant's statement in Dutton as
harmless error rather than as a violation of the confrontation clause. This interpretation of Dutton is
supportable because Justice Blackmun, the author of the majority opinion in Roberts, concurred in Dutton
on harmless error grounds. Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74, 90 (1970) (Blackmun, J., concurring).
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equal the amount of evidence required to satisfy the corroboration require-
ment.
In both Dutton and California v. Green784 the Court stated that the
confrontation clause was satisfied when "the trier of fact [had] a satisfactory
basis for evaluating the truth of the prior statement. ' 785 If this is a test
separate from the Roberts "indicia of reliability" inquiry786 and if this test is
applied to defense-offered penal interest statements, Dutton suggests that
these statements will not be given undue weight by the jury.78 7 The jury also
should recognize the possible untrustworthiness of any penal interest state-
ment. The statement should be particularly suspect if made or reported by a
friend, relative, or fellow prison inmate of the defendant, or if the defendant
cannot link the declarant to the crime. Moreover, the Government should
have an adequate opportunity to challenge the trustworthiness of the
statement, particularly when the defense must disclose the statement in
advance of trial. In addition, the jury might be skeptical of a statement if it
does not have access to otherwise inadmissible information that the defendant
presented during the admissibility hearing.78 8 This interpretation indicates
that the corroboration requirement's burden of proof is too high as long as the
second part of the Roberts test might be satisfied by asking whether the
factfinder has sufficient information to distrust the hearsay. 789
In Chambers v. Mississippi,790 however, the Court's discussion of the
defendant's due process right to introduce evidence poses a problem with the
initial assumption that the defendant's right to introduce evidence is cotermi-
nous with his right to exclude evidence. The Chambers Court held that the
trial court's exclusion of exculpatory hearsay testimony and the state's
voucher rule, which precluded the defendant from cross-examining the
784. 399 U.S. 149 (1970). In Green the declarant testified at trial but claimed that he did not remember
the incident. Id. at 152. The Court held that the introduction of the declarant's preliminary examination
testimony did not violate the confrontation clause because the defense had cross-examined him at the
hearing. Id. at 153.
785. Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. at 89 (quoting California v. Green, 399 U.S. at 161).
786. In Roberts the Supreme Court did not consider whether the factfinder had an adequate
opportunity to evaluate the truth of the witness' preliminary examination testimony. See Ohio v. Roberts,
100 S. Ct. 2531, 2542-43 (1980) (cross-examination afforded satisfactory basis to evaluate truth of prior
statement). As a result, the Court might not use this version of the confrontation clause analysis in the
future.
787. Any defense-offered penal interest statement will carry a mark of unreliability like that which the
Dutton Court found stamped on the declarant's statement. See 400 U.S. at 88 (declarant's statement not
given undue weight by jury because contained no express assertion about past fact); Westen, Confrontation
and Compulsory Process, supra note 773, at 599 (hearsay evidence has inherent deficiencies).
788. See notes 643-52 supra and accompanying text (discussing evidence judge may consider in rule
104(a) hearing).
789. This interpretation of Roberts indicates that the result in Edwards, see notes 596-606 supra and
accompanying text, was correct and that excluding a statement like that in State v. Smith, 415 A.2d 553
(Me. 1980), was wrong. In Smith the trial court excluded a statement by the defendant's wife that she and
not the defendant had killed the victim. Id. at 558-59. The court of appeals affirmed, holding that the
defendant had failed to corroborate his wife's statement. Id. at 561. The wife was motivated to lie, thought
the court of appeals, for several reasons: the two had been married only after each was arrested, she spoke
only once the defendant had lost his motion to suppress his own confession, she had earlier said that both
had killed the victim, and he might have convinced her to lie in his favor. Id. at 560-61. Although these
factors do suggest that the wife might have lied, the Government could have introduced them to convince
the jury not to credit her exoneration of the defendant.
790. 410 U.S. 284 (1973).
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declarant, violated the defendant's due process rights.791 The Court's opinion
is confusing.792 On the one hand, the Court emphasized the defendant's right
to adduce evidence. 793 On the other hand, the Court observed that the
defendant normally cannot circumvent evidentiary exclusionary rules, 794 that
its decision was based on a close reading of the facts, 795 and that the decision
established no new principles of constitutional law.796 A long list of cor-
roborating factors797 convinced the Court that the declarant's extrajudicial
statements were trustworthy and that the trial court should have admitted
them under the due process clause.798 The Court did not explain whether it
intended that this amount of corroborating evidence was required to invoke
the defendant's due process right. If this amount of evidence is required, the
corroboration requirement of rule 804(b)(3) probably is constitutional on its
face 799 because the corroborating evidence in Chambers would surely satisfy
the clear and convincing evidence burden of the penal interest exception.
A comparison of the Court's language in Chambers and in California v.
Green also suggests that the defendant can exclude more evidence than he can
admit. In Chambers the Court concluded that the "hearsay statements
involved ... were originally made and subsequently offered at trial under
791. Id. at 302. The declarant, McDonald, confessed to the murder that the Government charged
against Chambers. McDonald, however, later repudiated his confession. Id. at 287-88. At trial, Chambers
called McDonald as a witness and had his repudiated confession admitted into evidence. Id. at 291.
Because of a state voucher rule, however, Chambers was unable to cross-examine McDonald or introduce
the testimony of three witnesses to whom McDonald had admitted the crime. Id. at 294.
792. See MCCORMICK, EVIDENCE 84 (Supp. 1978) (Chambers has constitutional issue of uncertain
dimension). The interpretive problem partly results from the Court's blending of the defendant's
compulsory process clause and confrontation clause arguments into one "fair trial" decision. See Westen,
Compulsory Process, supra note 697, at 152-53 (Chambers blended two constitutional arguments into single
"fair trial" decision). Professor Westen, who briefed and argued the case before the Supreme Court,
suggests that the Court decided Chambers on due process rather than on compulsory process grounds
because of a procedural quirk: The defendant made only a due process argument in the state appellate
proceedings. See Westen, Confrontation and Compulsory Process, supra note 773, at 607 n.108 (Court
assumed only question concerned due process).
793. See 410 U.S. 284, 302 (1973) (few rights more fundamental than right to present witnesses in own
defense).
794. The Court stated that "we need not decide in this case whether, under other circumstances, [the
rationale of excluding a penal interest statement because of fear of fabrication] might serve some valid state
purpose by excluding untrustworthy testimony." Id. at 300. The Court also stated that "the accused...
must comply with established rules of procedure and evidence designed to assure both fairness and
reliability in the ascertainment of guilt and innocence." Id. at 302. At least two courts subsequently have
used this dictum to justify excluding penal interest statements. See Lee v. State, 338 So. 2d 399, 402 (Miss.
1976) (Chambers suggests that less trustworthy statements might be excluded); Commonwealth v. Nash,
457 Pa. 296, 302, 324 A.2d 344, 346 (1974) (Chambers did not intend that every penal interest statement be
admitted).
795. See 410 U.S. at 303 ("[W]e hold quite simply that under the facts and circumstances of this case
the rulings of the trial court deprived Chambers of a fair trial.").
796. Id. at 302.
797. The Court noted a number of corroborating factors: Each of McDonald's confessions was made
spontaneously to a close acquaintance shortly after the murder, an eyewitness saw McDonald shoot the
victim, McDonald was seen with a gun immediately after the shooting, and evidence indicated that
McDonald owned a gun of the same type as used to kill the victim. Id. at 300-01.
798. Id. at 302.
799. The corroborating facts in a particular case, however, should not be required to match precisely
those in Chambers. See notes 589-91 supra and accompanying text (several courts have wrongly concluded
that corroborating evidence should match precisely Chambers evidence).
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circumstances that provided considerable assurance of their reliability." 80  In
Green the Court admitted the Government-offered statement because it had
been "given under circumstances that [made] it reasonably reliable . "...'9801
The "considerable assurance" standard arguably imposed a higher burden on
the defendant than the "reasonably reliable" standard imposed on the
Government. Although the Chambers Court could have been describing the
force of the facts rather than the contours of the due process right to
introduce evidence, the Court might think the defendant's rights should differ
because of the effect of admitting or excluding evidence on a jurisdiction's
choice of hearsay exceptions.
The Government usually attempts to fit its hearsay evidence within an
existing hearsay exception. 802 Were the Court to hold such an exception
unconstitutional, it would reject the determination of reliability in the state's
evidentiary rules.803 Such a ruling might impede the development of addi-
tional exceptions to the hearsay rule.804 In contrast to the Government, a
defendant resorts to the constitutional right to introduce evidence only when
the jurisdiction has no relevant hearsay exception. Were the Court to hold
that the defendant may introduce such evidence, the Court would reject thejurisdiction's determination of what constitutes unreliable hearsay. To avoid
interference in state rulemaking, the Court in Chambers might have intended
to require more corroborating evidence from the defendant than from the
Government.
Nonetheless, in Chambers the Court arguably overwrote the decision
because it hesitated to deny the right of Mississippi and other jurisdictions not
800. 410 U.S. at 300.
801. 399 U.S. at 167 n.16.
802. Cf., eg., Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74, 87-88 (1970) (coparticipant's statement admitted under
Georgia hearsay exception; no violation of confrontation clause); California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 152-53
(1970) (preliminary examination testimony admitted under California Evidence Code; no violation of
confrontation clause); Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123, 125-26 (1968) (Government apparently
conceded that codefendant's statement, admitted at joint trial, was admissible only against codefendant).
But cf United States v. Rogers, 549 F.2d 490, 499 n. 1 (8th Cir. 1976) (Government unsuccessfully argued
that statement could satisfy confrontation clause without satisfying hearsay exception), cert. denied, 431
U.S. 918 (1977). The "catch-all" hearsay exceptions permit the Government to introduce hearsay that does
not satisfy a traditional exception. See FED. R. EVID. 803(24) (permitting admission of hearsay statements
not covered by exceptions listed); FED. R. EvID. 804(b)(5) (same). If the Government offers hearsay
through one of these exceptions, the court should analyze trustworthiness in light of the confrontation
clause test in Roberts.
803. The Supreme Court assured states that its decision in Chambers was not a constitutional intrusion
into state evidentiary rules. See 410 U.S. at 302-03 ("Nor does our holding signal any diminution in the
respect traditionally accorded to the States in the establishment and implementation of their own criminal
trial rules and procedures").
804. This consideration convinced Justice Harlan to alter his interpretation of the confrontation clause.
In California v. Green he argued that the confrontation clause required the Government to produce any
available witness whose declarations it seeks to use. 399 U.S. at 174 (Harlan, J., concurring). In Dutton he
argued that the confrontation clause only gave the defendant the right to cross-examine any witness against
him. 400 U.S. at 95 (Harlan, J., concurring). Justice Harlan altered his interpretation because his Green
position "would significantly curtail development of the law of evidence" and would unnecessarily require
the production of declarants in certain instances, such as the business records exception. Id. at 95-96. His
Green position was inconsistent with the Advisory Committee's original intent to broaden the circum-
stances when hearsay should be admissible. See Preliminary Draft, supra note 1, at 345 ("A statement is not
excluded by the hearsay rule if its nature and the special circumstances under which it was made offer
assurances of accuracy not likely to be enhanced by calling the declarant as a witness, even though he is
available").
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to recognize the penal interest exception. 805 The Court's opinion also suggests
that the Court would find a due process violation with less corroborating
evidence. The Court noted that the penal interest exception had not been
universally accepted because many jurisdictions wanted to avoid fabricated
admissions of guilt.8 06 In Chambers, however, the declarant apparently did
not implicate himself to help the defendant.807 Because the declarant's
statements were therefore "well within the basic rationale of the exception for
declarations against penal interest, 808 the Court might find a due process
violation with less convincing evidence. The Court also implied that the
declarant's statements would have been admissible under the Supreme Court
Draft version of rule 804(b)(3), 809 which included the lower "simple cor-
roboration" test. Thus, the Court eventually might conclude that the burden
of proof in rule 804(b)(3) is too high.810
Because the Supreme Court has never explained the contours of the
defendant's compulsory process right to introduce evidence, whether the
defendant could introduce more evidence under the compulsory process
clause than under the Court's interpretation of the due process clause in
Chambers remains unclear. Although the Court in Chambers riveted its
decision to the facts of the case,811 the opinion contains language broad
805. See Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 299 (1973) (penal interest exception not accepted by
most states).
806. Id.
807. See id. at 288 (Liberty claimed that he confessed only because he hoped to share in lawsuit with
Chambers for false arrest).
808. Id. at 302.
809. See id. at 299 & n.18 (exclusion of statements against penal interest not required under new rules).
In citing rule 804, the Court did not explain the contours of the "penal interest" and "simple
corroboration" tests. The Court also misinterpreted the rule, which conditions admissibility on the
unavailability of the declarant. Thus, the decision in Chambers suggests that the unavailability requirement
cannot preclude the introduction of certain types of defense-offered penal interest statements. Following
this decision one commentator questioned whether Congress should transfer the penal interest exception to
rule 803, which does not require the declarant's unavailability. Letter from Gilbert G. Ackroyd to
Representative William L. Hungate (July 18, 1973), reprinted in SUPPLEMENT TO SUBCOMMITTEE
HEARINGS, supra note 10, at 207.
810. The Supreme Court's decision in Green v. Georgia, 442 U.S. 95 (1979) (per curiam), suggests that
the Court might eventually support the position that a restrictive interpretation of the penal interest
exception is unconstitutional. In Green the defendant and his accomplice were tried separately and
convicted of murder. At his sentencing trial the defendant was not permitted to introduce an exculpatory
hearsay statement made by his accomplice because Georgia did not have a penal interest exception. Id. at
95-96. The Supreme Court held that the exclusion of the accomplice's hearsay statement, "[i]n these unique
circumstances," was a violation of due process. Id. at 97. By "unique circumstances," the Court apparently
was referring to the nature of the punishment and the use of the accomplice's statement in his own trial.
The Court, however, did not inspect this statement as carefully as the Court did in Chambers in evaluating
the declarant's confessions. In Green the Court concluded that the accomplice's statement was reliable
because it was made spontaneously to a close friend and because other evidence corroborated its truth. Id.
at 97. The Court's finding of sponaneity, however, has less evidentiary justification than similar findings in
Chambers and Dutton because the record did not indicate the circumstances surrounding the statement in
Green. See Green v. State, 242 Ga. 261, 264-65, 249 S.E.2d 1, 5 (1978) (failing to describe circumstances),
rev'd, 442 U.S. 95 (1979). Additionally, the Court failed to review the record carefully to determine
whether the accomplice's statement was trustworthy. The Court simply stated that "there was no reason to
believe that [the accomplice] had any ulterior motive" in exculpating the defendant. 442 U.S. at 97. Thus,
Green suggests that a defendant need only corroborate the truth of the declarant's self-condemnation and
show that no collusive relationship exists. A more restrictive interpretation of rule 804(b)(3) might be
unconstitutional.
811. 410 U.S. at 303.
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enough to conclude that rule 804(b)(3) unconstitutionally restricts the
defendant's due process right to introduce evidence.812
The Court in Chambers characterized the excluded evidence as "critical"
to the defense.813 But because the trial court permitted the defendant to
introduce one of the declarant's confessions, 814 he was not totally prevented
from shifting responsibility to the declarant. In contrast, a defendant who is
unable to satisfy the corroboration requirement of rule 804(b)(3) usually will
be unable to substitute the declarant for himself or to separate himself from
the criminal activity of the declarant. Thus, the corroboration requirement or
a restrictive interpretation of the word "exculpate" significantly weakens the
defendant's defense more than did the exclusion of the evidence in Chambers.
The declarant's statement is usually the cornerstone of the defense815 and is
often the only evidence the defendant can offer except for his testimonial
denial of guilt.8l6 Because the declarant's statement is "critical,"817 the defense
is not simply "far less persuasive"818 without the statement. A trial court
should permit the defendant to introduce the penal interest statement under
the compulsory process clause. In this sense, the defendant's compulsory
process right is inversely related to his confrontation clause protection.8l 9
812. See id. at 302 ("Few rights are more fundamental than that of an accused to present witnesses in
his own defense"). A due process approach balances the defendant's interest in admitting hearsay against
the legislature's interest in excluding unreliable evidence. See Tanford & Bocchino, supra note 531, at 560
(court balances state interests with defendant's rights).
A court would find further support for the conclusion that rule 804(b)(3) is unconstitutional if it
followed the Warren Court's practice of interpreting a specific amendment, such as the right to compulsory
process, as providing more protection for the defendant than due process considerations. See Nowak,
Foreword-Due Process Methodology in the Postincorporation World, 70 J. CRIM. L.C. & P.S. 397, 401
(1979) (Warren Court focused on Bill of Rights rather than due process considerations); Tanford &
Bocchino, supra note 531, at 563 (Court must decide if violation of specific right under strict standard of
review). Under this approach the Government must establish a compelling interest in order to exclude the
defense-offered penal interest statement. See, e.g., Clinton, supra note 661, at 798 (Government must show
compelling interest since right to defend fundamental); Tanford & Bocchino, supra note 531, at 563
(defendant's rights only limited when state demonstrates compelling interest); Westen, Confrontation and
Compulsory Process, supra note 773, at 580-81 (defendant's right to cross-examine only overcome for
compelling reasons). Professor Westen also has argued that the defendant is entitled to a "presumption in
favor of admitting evidence, trusting the jury to evaluate evidence for its appropriate weight and credibility,
except regarding the most tendentious and inherently dubious evidence." Westen, Future of Confrontation,
supra note 311, at 1200.
813. 410 U.S. at 302. The defendant's defense "was far less persuasive than it might have been had...
the other confessions been admitted." Id. at 294.
814. Id. at 291.
815. My conclusion is based on conversations with defense attorneys throughout the preparation of this
article. Excluding a penal interest statement often leads to the exclusion of other evidence that supports the
defendant's defense. In Commonwealth v. Hackett, 225 Pa. Super. Ct. 22, 307 A.2d 334 (1973), for
example, the trial court convicted the defendant for possession of heroin and operating a car under the
influence of a narcotic drug. The defendant alleged that he was involuntarily drugged and unsuccessfully
attempted to introduce the exculpatory statements of the person who allegedly drugged him. In excluding
the statement, the trial court also refused to admit defense evidence that narcotics users usually have needle
marks on their bodies. The defendant had no such marks. Id. at 23-24, 307 A.2d at 335.
816. The defendant might also fear testifying if he can be impeached by prior convictions.
817. See Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. at 302 ("[C]onstitutional rights directly affecting the
ascertainment of guilt are implicated"). See also Mattox v. United States, 146 U.S. 140, 152 (1892)
(admission by defense of dying victim's exonerating statement justified on ground of necessity).
818. Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. at 294.
819. See Clinton, supra note 661, at 808-09 ("Ihe admission of hearsay evidence with no extrinsic
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Whether a restrictive interpretation of the penal interest exception syste-
matically distorts the factfinding process is impossible to determine. The
decision of the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit in United
States v. Thomas,8 20 is apparently the only federal example of a retrial
following a reversal of a conviction for erroneous exclusion of a defense-
offered penal interest statement. In other cases, the Government has not
reprosecuted the declarant. 821 Thus, these decisions do not indicate how a jury
might have assessed the significance of the declarant's excluded statement.
The Thomas decision, however, illustrates the importance of admitting the
declarant's statement.8 22
In Thomas the Government jointly charged the defendant and codefendant
for a bank robbery. 23 The defendant's version)of the robbery significantly
differed from the codefendant's.8 24 At the preliminary hearing, all of the
attorneys and the magistrate heard the codefendant say, "[T]hey ought to let
[the defendant] go, he didn't have anything to do with it.''825 Nonetheless, the
trial court did not permit the defendant to introduce the statement at trial.
8 26
The Fifth Circuit reversed, holding that the trial court should have admitted
the statement because it was a statement against penal interest 27 and it had
indicia of reliability might be constitutionally compelled if the evidence is of criticial importance to the
accused." (footnote omitted)). Dutton should not be interpreted to impose a higher reliability burden on the
defendant if the declarant's penal interest statement is central to the defendant's defense because the
Government has no confrontation clause protection.
820. 571 F.2d 285 (5th Cir. 1978).
821. In Chambers, for example, the state refused to charge the declarant or to retry the defendant. The
state, however, did not dismiss the charge against the defendant. Conversation with Professor Westen
(May 7, 1979). In United States v. Benveniste, 564 F.2d 335 (9th Cir. 1977), the Government dismissed the
charge after the defendant's conviction was reversed. Conversation with defense counsel (May 16, 1979). In
United States v. Atkins, 558 F.2d 133 (3d Cir. 1977), the Government did not reprosecute the defendant
when he was resentenced to a long prison term on other counts to which the excluded penal interest
statement was not relevant. Conversation with defense counsel (May 7, 1979). In United States v.
Goodlow, 500 F.2d 954 (8th Cir. 1974), the Government did not recharge the defendant because he was
incarcerated for a year while his successful appeal was pending. Conversation with defense counsel (May
16, 1979).
822. Admittedly, one example provides frail support for the conclusion that a high corroboration
burden or a restrictive interpretation of "penal interest" is invariably unfair to the defendant. Cf. Jackson v.
Denno, 378 U.S. 368, 402-03 (1964) (Black, J., dissenting and concurring) (theoretical suggestions by
commentators cannot completely replace empirical data from actual litigation). Moreover, in Thomas the
defense counsel, informed of the strengths and weaknesses of the evidence at the first trial, could have
presented a better defense at the retrial.
823. 571 F.2d at 287.
824. Id. at 287-88. The defendant retestified that he unknowingly participated in the robbery. Id.
825. Id. at 288.
826. Id. The trial court was concerned that by admitting the statement, it would have to grant a mistrial
for the codefendant, a concern rejected by the court of appeals. Id. Paradoxically, the trial court thought
that the Government, but not the defendant, could introduce the statement against the codefendant at a
separate trial. Id. The codefendant would have had no hearsay objection to the statement because it was not
offered for the truth of the matter stated but instead would have been offered to show his state of mind. Id.
at 289-90.
827. Id. at 288. The Fifth Circuit rejected the Government's argument that rule 804(b)(3) admitted
only "direct confessions of guilt." Id. Instead, the court adopted the party admissions analogy: The trial
court may admit the statement for the defendant if it could have been admitted against the declarant. Id..
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been corroborated.8 28 At the retrial the magistrate reported the exculpatory
statement, and the jury acquitted the defendant.8 29
Although Thomas is the only example of the importance of defense-offered
penal interest statements to accurate factfinding, other evidentiary restric-
tions reinforce the conclusion that both the corroboration requirement and a
narrow interpretation of rule 804(b)(3) unfairly discriminate against the
defendant.8 30 In attempting to shift responsibility to the declarant in a one-
person crime or to exonerate himself in a multiple-person crime, the
defendant must rely on the penal interest exception.8 31 A declarant's assertion
828. Id. at 290. Because the trial court had not decided whether the "corroborating circumstances
clearly indicate the trustworthiness of the statement," id., the Fifth Circuit did not apply the "clearly
erroneous" standard on appeal. Id. The court found that corroboration existed because the Government's
evidence against the defendant was weak, the codefendant had spoken spontaneously at the preliminary
examination, and he had no reason to fabricate. Id. Thomas and United States v. Benveniste, 564 F.2d 335(9th Cir. 1977), are the only decisions that have examined the strength of the Government's case in
evaluating corroboration. Although the strength of the Government's case arguably relates instead to
harmless error, a court nonetheless should consider this factor.
829. Conversation with defense counsel (May 7, 1979). On direct examination, the codefendant
acknowledged that he admitted his own complicity in the robbery in the preliminary hearing but denied
that he exculpated the defendant. Id. Although the reasons for the second jury's acquittal are not known,
the only difference in the evidence presented at both trials was the codefendant's statement.
830. The judicial inconsistency in interpreting the significance of particular corroborating facts
provides another reason why the corroboration requirement is questionable. Courts have divided over the
corroborating significance of a sworn statement by the declarant, see note 444 supra; of a statement written
by the declarant, see note 444 supra; of a statement to defense counsel or the defendant, see note 458 supra;
to a friend or relative of the defendant, see note 448 supra; to someone unconnected to the defense, see note
452 supra; or to someone close to the declarant, see note 451 supra; and of the declarant's repetition of the
statement.See note 462 supra. This division confirms that the rule provides no direction, and that appellate
reconsideration of the exclusion of a defense-offered statement may turn more on the harmlessness of
exclusion than on the rule itself.
831. The defendant probably cannot use other hearsay exceptions to introduce the declarant's
statement. The declarants in Chambers and Dutton, for example, did not speak under circumstances that
would have satisfied rule 803(2)'s "excited utterance" exception. In contrast, the Government probably has
avenues other than rule 804(b)(3) to introduce a declarant's implication of the defendant. If the declarant
recants his earlier implication of the defendant while testifying at trial, the Government could introduce his
hearsay implication that was made before a grand jury or at a preliminary examination. See United States
v. Garner, 574 F.2d 1141, 1145-46 (4th Cir.) (accomplice's grand jury implication of defendant admitted
under rule 804(b)(5) when accomplice denied grand jury testimony at trial), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 936(1978); FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(1)(A) (witness' earlier inconsistent statement made under oath admissible as
substantive evidence if he testifies at trial); cf. FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(2)(E) (coconspirator exception).Furthermore, the defendant probably will be unable to depose the declarant. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 15(a)(limiting right to depose to exceptional circumstances). Even if the defendant receives permission to depose
the declarant, the Government undoubtedly would explain the privilege against self-incrimination to the
declarant.
If penal interest is narrowly interpreted to exclude a declarant's exoneration of the defendant in a multi-person crime, an interesting contrast with the admissibility of nonassertive conduct results. A difficult
question at common law was whether conduct constituted an implied assertion by the actor and was
therefore hearsay. Admitting nonassertive conduct poses a greater danger of misinterpretation than
admitting a verbal assertion. Nonetheless, rule 801(a) treats nonassertive conduct as nonhearsay, because it
is less likely to be insincere. See Advisory Committee Note to Supreme Court Draft, supra note 1, at 293-94.(situations giving rise to nonverbal conduct virtually eliminate questions of insincerity). Thus, the
defendant, for example, might introduce evidence of the departure of migrant workers immediately after a
murder to shift responsibility to them. See note 48 supra (discussing People v. Mendez, 193 Cal. 93, 223 P.65 (1924)). If the departing migrant workers had announced that they committed the crime, this statement
exonerating the defendant would be inadmissible. Moreover, if they had said nothing, the admissibility of
m
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of the privilege against self-incrimination demonstrates the importance of a
generous interpretation of this exception. Prompted by the Government or
the court,832 the declarant might invoke the privilege and prevent the
introduction of the defendant's exculpatory evidence, which can now be
introduced only through rule 804(b)(3). The court, which must interpret the
privilege liberally,8 33 probably will conduct a limited examination of the
declarant.8 34 The defendant cannot require the Government either to grant
the declarant immunity835 or to force the declarant to invoke the privilege
evidence of their departure would present an issue of conditional relevancy under rule 104(b). The
defendant's burden under this rule is less than his burden under rule 804(b)(3).
Another problem concerns the Government's obligation to disclose favorable evidence to the defense. If
the prosecutor, for example, learns of an exculpatory statement by a declarant but is unable to locate the
declarant, is the prosecutor obliged to disclose this information voluntarily? The Supreme Court has stated
that the prosecutor must disclose only "evidence" that is "obviously exculpatory." United States v. Agurs,
427 U.S. 97, 107 (1976); ef Giles v. Maryland, 386 U.S. 66, 74 (1967) (nondisclosed evidence oftwo police
reports justifies remand; court did not decide prosecutor's duty to disclose); Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S.
83, 87 (1963) (prosecutor's suppression of material evidence violates due process). If such evidence is not
disclosed, the defendant's conviction will be reversed "if the omitted evidence creates a reasonable doubt
that did not otherwise exist." United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 112 (1976). Although the declarant's
statement might be "obviously exculpatory," the key word in Agurs is "evidence." The Court has not
explained whether "evidence" means information that is admissible. If the evidence must be admissible, the
prosecutor may believe that he is free to determine whether the statement satisfies rule 804(b)(3). Thus, the
prosecutor may disclose the information only if he thinks that the rule is satisfied. In the above example,
the prosecutor will probably decide that the rule is not satisfied because the necessary corroboration is
absent. Moreover, if the crime was committed by more than one person, the prosecutor might conclude
that the statement simply justified charging the declarant. A prosecutor might risk not disclosing on the
expectation that an appellate court could later find that nondisclosure was harmless error. If the prosecutor
had disclosed the statement, however, the defendant might have been able to find the declarant or to amass
sufficient corroborating evidence to justify introducing the statement.
832. See United States v. Roberts, 503 F.2d 598, 600 (9th Cir. 1974) (after codefendant pleaded guilty
to one count, he invoked fifth amendment when called as witness by defendant because Government did
not dismiss other counts), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1113 (1975); United States v. Johnson, 488 F.2d 1206,
1209 (1st Cir. 1973) (codefendant invoked fifth amendment because he feared conspiracy charge).
833. See Hoffman v. United States, 341 U.S. 479, 486 (1951) (fifth amendment privilege must be
accorded liberal construction). The California Court of Appeals' decision in People v. Johnson, 39 Cal.
App. 3d 749, 114 Cal. Rptr. 545 (Ct. App. 1974), demonstrates the unfairness of interpreting penal interest
restrictively. In Johnson the defendant murdered the victim with a knife. Id. at 752-53, 114 Cal. Rptr. at
547. Invoking his self-incrimination privilege, a witness to the murder refused to testify. Citing a penal
interest exception, the defendant then attempted to introduce a statement by the witness that he gave the
defendant the knife during a struggle with the victim. The trial court excluded this statement as hearsay
evidence. Id. at 760, 114 Cal. Rptr. at 553. Although the court of appeals held that the witness could invoke
the fifth amendment, it agreed that the witness' hearsay statement was not against his penal interest
because "it is indeed difficult to discern that [the witness], a layman, should have realized, or in fact did
realize, that his statement was a distinct threat against his penal interest." Id. at 762, 14 Cal. Rptr. at 554.
Because narrowly interpreting penal interest is unfair, the declarant's assertion of the privilege justifies
concluding that his statement was against interest. See note 470 supra and accompanying text (invocation
of privilege arguably confirms reliability of statement).
834. Although the trial court may make a limited examination of the witness in an in camera hearing,
see FED. R. EVID. 104(a) (preliminary questions concerning existence of privilege determined by court),
the court must respect the privilege "[if the [self-incrimination] danger might exist.., without requiring
the witness to demonstrate that a response would incriminate him .... United States v. Melchor Moreno,
536 F.2d 1042, 1046 (5th Cir. 1976) (emphasis in origuial).
835. See note 7 supra (discussing Government grants of use immunity). This result has been criticized
because the prosecution always could prosecute the declarant based on his out-of-court statement and
other existing evidence. See generally Note, The Sixth Amendment Right to Have Use Immunity Granted to
Defense Witnesses, 91 HARV. L. REV. 1266 (1978) (compulsory process clause should require state to grant
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before the jury.8 36 Furthermore, defense counsel may not call a witness if he
expects the witness to invoke the privilege.8 37 If the witness invokes the
privilege, the defendant cannot ask the jury to infer the truth of the question
from the assertion of the privilege. 838 Additionally, the court may consider a
"missing witness" instruction to be inappropriate if the defendant is unable
to produce the declarant because he will invoke the privilege.839 These
immunity to defense witnesses unless state can justify denial). Chambers and Dutton suggest that penal
interest statements should be admitted if the Government refuses to offer immunity. In both decisions, the
Supreme Court noted that the declarant was available for cross-examination by the objecting party.
Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. at 291; Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. at 78. Because the Government
controls whether the otherwise unavailable witness will testify, a court should require the Government to
grant immunity or have its hearsay objection overruled. Professor Westen suggests that the compulsory
process clause requires the Government to either grant immunity or dismiss the prosecution. See Westen,
Confrontation and Compulsory Process, supra note 773, at 581 n.18 (if testimony material, court can force
prosecution to grant immunity or dismiss prosecution); Westen, Compulsory Process, supra note 697, at
166-70 (compulsory process clause requires Government to grant immunity to defense witnesses). The
defendant might tactically prefer to introduce the hearsay statement because it would not be subject to
examination. If the witness, who was granted immunity, denied making the earlier statement or denied its
truth, the defendant then could introduce the statement to impeach the testimony.
836. See, e.g., United States v. Martin, 526 F.2d 485, 487 (10th Cir. 1975) (defendant properly
prevented from calling informant to plead fifth amendment before jury); United States v. Lacouture, 495
F.2d 1237, 1240 (5th Cir.) (defendant properly prevented from calling witness to plead fifth amendment
before jury), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1053 (1974); United States v. Johnson, 488 F.2d 1206, 1211 (1st Cir.
1973) (defendant properly prevented from calling codefendant to plead fifth amendment before jury);
Bowles v. United States, 439 F.2d 536, 542 (D.C. Cir. 1970) (en banc) (witness should not testify for
purpose of exercising privilege before jury). But see id. at 545 n. 11 (Bazelon, C.J., dissenting) (defendant
may have constitutional right to have witness invoke privilege before jury). Convictions may be reversed
when a witness called by the Government has invoked the fifth amendment. Although it did not find
reversible error in Namet v. United States, 373 U.S. 179 (1963), the Supreme Court stated that reversal was
warranted
when the Government makes a conscious and flagrant attempt to build its case out of
inferences arising from use of the testimonial privilege [and when] in the circumstances of a
given case, inferences from a witness' refusal to answer added critical weight to the
prosecution's case in a form not subject to cross-examination ....
Id. at 186-87. Courts, however, have not interpreted Namet as barring the Government from testing
whether the witness will invoke the privilege to each question. See United States v. Mayes, 512 F.2d 637,
650 (6th Cir.) (extensive questioning unfair trial tactic but not reversible error), cert. denied, 422 U.S. 1008
(1975); Cota v. Eyman, 453 F.2d 691, 695 (9th Cir. 1972) (no constitutional error in questioning witness
after he invoked privilege). Moreover, courts have not interpreted Namet to require a hearing before the
witness testifies to determine whether he will invoke the privilege. See People v. Chandler, 17 Cal. App. 3d
798, 804, 95 Cal. Rptr. 146, 149 (Ct. App. 1971) (pretestimonial hearing not required). Finally, courts have
not interpreted Namet to require the Government to notify the court of the witness' intent to invoke the
privilege if the prosecutor does not believe that the witness can properly invoke it. See Rado v. Connecticut,
607 F.2d 572, 581 (2d Cir. 1979) (no misconduct when prosecutor believed witness had no fifth amendment
privilege to invoke).
837. Such conduct would constitute an ethical violation. ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE,
chap. 3, standard 5.7(c), at 3.84 (prosecutor); id. chap. 4, standard 7.6(c), at 4.90 (defense counsel).
838. See Supreme Court Draft, supra note 1, at 260 (PROP. FED. R. EVID. 513; no inference from
invocation of privilege permitted). This restriction probably is justified if the witness' testimony is unknown
and therefore the assertion of the privilege is ambiguous. The restriction, however, is not justified if the
declarant has made an earlier penal interest statement. A second reason for the restriction is that the
witness has not testified to anything and therefore the jury has no evidence before it to consider. Although
conceptually sound, this reason should be rejected because the Government controls immunity.
839. Compare Bowles v. United States, 439 F.2d 536, 542 (D.C. Cir. 1970) (en banc) (although
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possibilities highlight the unfair burden a defendant carries when he attempts
to introduce a declarant's statement under rule 804(b)(3).
E. THE NEED FOR REMEDIAL CONGRESSIONAL ACTION
To eliminate these constitutional problems, Congress should revise rule
804(b)(3). First, it should confirm that the form of a declarant's statement is
irrelevant and that admissions, confessions, and opinions equally are admissi-
ble as long as the statement satisfies rules 401, 602, and 701.840 Second, it
should confirm that the declarant's personal assessment of the significance of
his statement is relevant, even if he makes that assessment long after he
uttered the statement. That confirmation would eliminate the need for the
Government to immunize a declarant who is unavailable because he has
invoked the fifth amendment. Third, Congress should add to rule 804(b)(3)
the disclosure obligation of the "catch all" hearsay rules to require the
defendant to inform the Government of the substance of the statement, the
identity and whereabouts of the declarant (if known) and the reporting
witness, and the circumstances under which the declarant made the statement
and how it was reported to the defense. It could authorize the court to give a
cautionary instruction to alert the jury to the trustworthiness problem.
Finally, Congress should eliminate the corroboration requirement. The penal
interest test already provides a trial court with an adequate test to exclude a
declarant's statement on the ground that the declarant spoke to advance his
self-interest or did not understand the disserving effect of his statement. If
Congress believes that the rule must contain some form of corroboration
requirement, however, it should reframe that requirement to conform to the
corroboration requirement of rules 803(6)-(8). The defendant then would
carry the burden of proving trustworthiness only when the Government raises
a legitimate question about the declarant's credibility. If Congress retains a
corroboration test, it should impose that burden on the Government as well as
on the defendant. With these changes, the defendant will be better able to
convince the jury either of his innocence or of the Government's failure to
prove him guilty. 84'
Admittedly, these changes will not preclude a defendant from introducing
a fabricated statement. Nonetheless, Congress should act to eliminate the
constitutional problems that pervade rule 804(b)(3). On balance, these
changes should lead to more accurate factfmding.
instruction should be given if requested, no error for trial court not to give missing witness instruction
voluntarily) with United States v. Martin, 526 F.2d 485, 486-87 (10th Cir. 1975) (neutralizing instruction
given jury proper when trial court refused to force witness to invoke privilege before jury).
840. Moreover, statements which implicitly challenge the Government's evidence should also be
admitted. In Brinson v. State, 382 So. 2d 322 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1979), for example, an eyewitness
described the robbers as a black man and woman. Id. at 323-24. The defendant, a black woman,
unsuccessfully sought to introduce the confession of a white man who asserted the fifth amendment when
called by her as a witness. Id. at 324. The appellate court reversed, reasoning that the white man's
confession indirectly challenged the accuracy of the eyewitness' description. Id. at 324-25.
841. As the Chief Justice said in a different context, "admissions of guilt by wrongdoers, if not coerced,
are inherently desirable." United States v. Washington, 431 U.S. 181, 187 (1977) (not requiring that grand
jury target who implicated himself be given Miranda warnings).
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VI. CONCLUSION
Born of the common law's fear of fabrication, the penal interest exception
developed during the last century as a child of judicial and legislative
misinterpretation. Rule 804(b)(3), the product of that development, emerged
from a system that is not as well designed to promote well-reasoned
rulemaking as it should be. The evolution of rule 804(b)(3) illustrates several
reasons why the Advisory and Standing Committees should publish more of
their work as a means of improving the rulemaking process. 842
First, more complete disclosure will help the Committees resist improper
and overly influential political pressure. By not publishing the alternative
versions of the rule and the rationale behind those choices, the Committees
forfeited the substantial political weight of the organized bar for resisting the
pressure exerted by the Department of Justice to a lesser extent and Senator
McClellan to a greater extent. Without such help, the Committees lacked the
political clout to fend off the Senator in his attempt to limit the Supreme
Court's rulemaking autonomy.
Second, fuller disclosure will help Congress in its review of the Commit-
tees' proposals. Unaware that the Committees added the "simple corrobora-
tion" requirement to placate Senator McClellan, the House Subcommittee
increased the corroboration requirement because it thought the Committees'
test was too vague and it feared that a defendant could satisfy the test by
testifying to his own innocence.843 Unfortunately, the secrecy that cloaked the
relationship between Senator McClellan and the Advisory and Standing
Committees hid the nonsubstantive rationale underlying the "simple cor-
roboration" test.844
Finally, increased disclosure would force the Committees to undertake a
more thorough review'of relevant source materials. Such a review would have
substantially improved the development of rule 804(b)(3). That development
suffered from a review that proceeded in a factual vacuum with no analysis of
the case law to determine either the typical relationship between the
defendant and the declarant or the types of statements defendants typically
842. The process that led to revisions in rule 804(b)(3) for nonsubstantive, political reasons might be an
isolated incident, not the tip of an iceberg. Although I have not reviewed the unpublicized work of the
Advisory and Standing Committees that lie behind the development of other rules for the Supreme Court,
no colleague who teaches in the fields of evidence, criminal procedure, or civil procedure has provided me
with similar examples. Thus, the development of the Federal Rules of Evidence probably represents an
unprecedented chapter in the rulemaking process, a chapter that developed only because the rules
engendered so much controversy.
843. The Subcommittee also misunderstood the Advisory and Standing Committees position with
respect to the "Bruton sentence."
844. Although Senator McClellan eventually published his letter to the Standing Committee and
explained that he met with the representatives of the Advisory and Standing Committees on September 22,
1971, neither he nor his staff notified the House Subcommittee that he intended to hold the rules hostage
until the Advisory and Standing Committees accepted the changes he had demanded. Unfortunately, the
Advisory and Standing Committees never publicized their reaction to the Senator's excessive demands.
Although that omission was understandable as long as only Senator McClellan was attempting to limit the
Supreme Court's rulemaking autonomy, those Committees should have fought harder to preserve their
earlier versions of the penal interest exception once the House Subcommittee began considering legislation
to increase Congress' oversight of the rulemaking process. Ironically, Congress reduced the Supreme
Court's rulemaking autonomy largely because the Committees worked in secret and failed to explain
publicly the rationale behind the changes they made in the Supreme Court Draft.
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offered and courts usually admitted. Furthermore, except for the Department
of Justice, which expressed its belated concern about the effect of Chambers v.
Mississippi, each group that considered rule 804(b)(3) either was unaware of
or blithely ignored the constitutional implications of each version of the rule.
That omission, as unsettling as it is for scholars, may continue to be more
distressing and discomforting to defendants.
The Judicial Conference should publish or at least make available for
public review the background work of the reporter, the alternative versions of
each rule considered by the Advisory and Standing Committees, the public
comments received throughout the Committees' deliberations, and the rea-
sons the Committees rejected the various alternatives of a rule.845 Publication
has its costs: Disclosure occasionally might prove embarrassing and might
impede a frank discussion among the Committee members. Publication has its
benefits, too: It might strengthen the Committees' ability to resist political
pressure; it should reduce the likelihood that Congress will misinterpret the
Committees' proposals; it will assist courts in applying the rule ultimately
adopted by Congress; and it only can heighten the image of the rulemaking
process as a professional, dispassionate, unpoliticized approach to achieving
needed changes in the law.846 Increased disclosure would have enhanced the
development and the application of rule 804(b)(3) and would have prevented
the procedural and constitutional problems that result from the current
version of the rule.
845. This proposal parallels, but extends beyond, the suggestions of critics of the Judicial Conference's
work in developing the Federal Rules of Evidence. See Lesnick, The Federal Rule-Making Process: A Time
for Re-examination, 61 A.B.A. J. 579, 580 (1975) (Judicial Conference procedures should be more open
and should be published); Supplemental Memorandum of the Washington Council of Lawyers: A Study of
the Decision-Making Process in the Formation of the Proposed Rules of Evidence, reprinted in Senate
Judiciary Hearings, supra note 118, at 313 ("The experience of the Rules of Evidence proves the case for
broad-based participation in the rulemaking process, for open procedures, and for clearly designated
responsibility").
846. Better suited and able than congressional committees, the Advisory and Standing Committees
should remain the primary source for developing needed changes in court-promulgated rules. See generally
Weinstein, Reform of Federal Court Rulemaking Procedures, 76 COLUM. L. REv. 906 (1976).
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